Lord Davies of Gower:

Moved by Lord Davies of Gower

20: Clause 2, page 7, line 8, at end insert—“17D Uniform and publication of images in relation to a designated body(1) A person in a public place commits an offence if the person—(a) wears an item of clothing, or(b) wears, carries or displays an article,in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.(2) A person commits an offence if the person publishes an image of—(a) an item of clothing, or(b) any other article,in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.(3) In subsection (2) the reference to an image is a reference to a still or moving image (produced by any means).(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).(5) A constable may seize an item of clothing or any other article if the constable— (a) reasonably suspects that it is evidence in relation to an offence under subsection (1), and(b) is satisfied that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.(6) In connection with exercising the power in subsection (5), a constable may require a person to remove the item of clothing or other article if the person is wearing it.(7) The powers conferred by subsections (5) and (6) may not be exercised so as to seize, or require a person to remove, an item of clothing being worn next to the skin or immediately over a garment being worn as underwear.”Member’s explanatory statementThis Amendment would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public, or publishing an image of, an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body.

My Lords, I have already made it clear that the way the Government have dealt with this Bill is unfortunate, so I will not dwell on that any longer. The amendments in this group reflect the concerns that the Opposition have raised with the Government on a number of occasions. The Government have told us that they cannot accept any of them for myriad reasons. As I hope I will demonstrate to the Committee, every one of the Government’s arguments will fail at the first hint of scrutiny.

Amendment 20 would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body. This would include those who publish an image of such articles. This amendment seeks to correct the strange situation that could arise under this Bill whereby a state entity may be designated, but it would not be an offence to display its insignia or to glorify it online.

I am a little concerned by what is meant by an article of clothing. My noble friend will know that the keffiyeh is widely worn on the streets of London and was much associated, when worn by Yasser Arafat, with the PLO. Is there a risk that the wearing of the keffiyeh would be associated with support for a designated body? If there is, we are in very serious trouble.

I am not well-acquainted with this article of clothing.

It is an Arab headdress.

Should it come before a court, the court would have to decide. Further than that I cannot comment, but I take on board what the noble Lord says.

Getting back to what I was saying, such provisions already exist for proscribed organisations under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act. Where the IRGC is designated under this legislation, its insignia and flags could be displayed openly in public with complete legal impunity. Hordes of its supporters could wave IRGC flags on British streets and intimidate members of the Jewish community, and avoid any legal ramifications. This is an obvious legislative gap that is damaging to public confidence.

At Second Reading, the Minister said that banning uniforms would impact legitimate engagement of the designated state body, which would need to continue, for example, on diplomatic channels. I do not buy that argument. We are not legislating for Iran in this Bill; we are legislating for the United Kingdom. The offences do not apply to non-UK persons outside the United Kingdom. My amendments would not criminalise the display of IRGC insignia in Tehran. They would criminalise such acts only in Britain. I contend that, if, for some reason, an Iranian diplomat came to the country for diplomatic negotiations—although I do not believe that that has happened since 1980—it would be perfectly acceptable to require them not to wear an IRGC uniform or insignia.

If noble Lords are not convinced by my arguments then perhaps the following words will help put forward the case for my Amendment. For the same reason as penalising support,

“it should also be an offence to display in public a flag or other insignia in such a way as to arouse reasonable suspicion that a person is a member or supporter of a” foreign intelligence service subject to a statutory alert and liability threat notice. The argument continues:

“This is by parity with section 13 Terrorism Act 2000 which applies only to public displays.”

These were the words of Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, in his report published last year.

Much of this legislation has been justified by the Government on the grounds that it is rooted in the recommendations made by Jonathan Hall in his independent review. This amendment is a policy recommendation explicitly called for in his review. If the Government believe that his recommendation is grounds for policy justification, why does that not apply to our amendment, or will the Minister say that he believes that Jonathan Hall was wrong to suggest that uniforms should be banned?

This Government have been one categorised and defined by reviews. On countless occasions, across a range of departments, my colleagues and I have been told by the Government that they are waiting for the outcome of a review before taking any decisive action. Well, the review has concluded and Jonathan Hall has been clear, and now the Government have decided that they want to pick and choose which recommendations they would like to take forward. That raises the important question: why bother having the review in the first place?

Amendment 23 would give the police and immigration officers the power to seize the passports of individuals attempting to leave the country to assist a designated body abroad. It would do that by replicating the provisions of Section 1 and Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015. The amendment details at length the powers available to police and immigration officers to seize passports, and would ensure that the same safeguards in the 2015 Act are in place.

I remind noble Lords that this too was a direct recommendation from Jonathan Hall’s report. He said:

“There is a strong case for enabling speedy action to remove a passport from a person who would otherwise leave the jurisdiction, where there is suspicion of involvement in foreign power threat activity”.

At Second Reading, the Minister stated:

“We are going to do it; we are just not going to do it in this Bill, which is a specifically designed piece of legislation to give powers to the Home Secretary. We will have further national security legislation later in his Parliament”.—[Official Report, 23/6/26; col. 614.].

In our discussions with the Government, they once again said that they agreed with Jonathan Hall KC and that they would do this at some point in this Session. When we asked the Government why, if they had accepted the recommendation, they would not implement it in this Bill, we were simply told that the Home Office did not have enough time to draft the amendment. But the Government have had over a year since Jonathan Hall KC’s report to sort out the policy detail. They have had a year to get the drafting right. Let us be under no illusion about how much time it would actually take them to draft this power. They are not starting from scratch. We already have the framework for the power in law in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, as I have already mentioned. Half the job has already been done.

I have tabled my amendment, which the Minister will know is a more comprehensive version of the amendment tabled in the Commons, to show the Government that it can be done. If the Opposition can draft a comprehensive amendment on past procedure in a few days then surely the Government, with their Civil Service, can do the same.

The other criticism the Government have raised is that the amendment retabled in the Commons was too narrow, as they want the power to be extended further than to just those travelling abroad to assist a designated group. To do that, the Government say they need more time to ensure that this legislative gap is properly addressed, but all the while they prevaricate the legislative gap remains in place. If the Government want a wider power of passport seizure, applying to more offences in the National Security Act, they can bring forward a wider power in future legislation. I would be fine with that, but why will they not accept this narrower power for now as a stopgap while they draft the wider power?

Finally, Amendment 21 seeks to emulate the offence of disseminating terrorist publications in the Terrorism Act 2006. I have heard what the Minister has said about the differences between designating state-linked bodies and proscribing terrorist groups. I accept that there is a difference, but this is an issue where the difference in treatment is not borne out by the facts. The bodies we are dealing with in this threats regime are the very bodies engaging in propaganda to further their nefarious ends. The IRGC distributes materials encouraging others to wage war against the West. For example, the IRGC has founded news outlets, including Sepah News, Tasnim News Agency and Fars News Agency among others. The Seraj Cyberspace Organization serves as a central organisation that recruits and mobilises pro-regime users to conduct online operations for the IRGC. This includes social media campaigns, spreading disinformation online, and fomenting divisions among opposition groups through targeted operations. It has developed an expanded initiative to increase the IRGC’s human capacity online—its so-called soft war officers, who have been particularly active since the anti-regime protests in Iran in 2022 and the Hamas terrorist attacks on 7 October.

Other countries are taking action against the propaganda spread by the IRGC. In May, Europol’s internal referral unit launched co-ordinated action to target the IRGC’s online content after the EU designated it a terrorist organisation. It took down a total of 14,200 posts linked to the group. This operation exposed the enormous extent and reach of the IRGC’s online activities. Europol said:

“The content was spread across mainstream social media platforms as well as streaming services … Propaganda was identified in several languages, including Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, English, French, Persian, and Spanish. The material ranged from speeches blending religious martyrdom narratives with highly charged political messaging to AI-generated videos glorifying the IRGC and calls to avenge the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei”.

There we have it—AI-generated videos glorifying the IRGC, calls to violence, blogs, recruitment of online operatives and more. The reach of the IRGC’s propaganda and violent material is vast and it is only growing.

I will not accept that designated bodies are different from terrorist groups when it comes to the dissemination of propaganda material. The Government stated that they believed dissemination would fall under the Section 17A offence of inviting support for a designated body. However, the reality is that many publications may not explicitly invite support for, in the limited sense as applied in Section 17A. They may simply glorify the actions and activities of the designated body. I have already given many examples of the myriad ways in which groups like the IRGC disseminate material. If this is the reality then it is abundantly clear that there is a gaping hole in the Bill.

The corresponding terrorism offence that my Amendment 21 is modelled on is contained in Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006. The offence in new Section 17A of inviting support for a designated body is modelled on the offence in Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000. These two offences were enacted six years apart. It is therefore evident that the Government and Parliament believed in 2005, when the new Terrorism Bill was introduced, that the original Section 12 offence in the 2000 Act was insufficient to deal with the full range of terrorist publications. If they believed otherwise, they would not have sought to create a separate stand-alone offence of dissemination in the 2006 Act. In other words, Parliament has already confirmed its belief that “inviting support for” does not sufficiently cover the wider dissemination of supportive materials. That is clearly evidenced by the arguments from the Government at the time. In 2005 the Minister responsible, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, said that the Government wanted to give law enforcement agencies the tools they needed to tackle a particular mischief: the dissemination of publications in context, which means that they will either encourage terrorism or be of use to terrorists in practical ways. That was a very clear statement.

The then Labour Government recognised that a specific stand-alone offence of dissemination was needed to address the fact that the dissemination of terrorist publications was not covered by the offence of inviting support in the Terrorist Act 2000. I hope the Minister can confirm that this Labour Government will take the same sensible steps that their predecessors took, and I look forward to what he has to say. I beg to move.

My Lords, I have added my name in support of Amendment 20 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. As he has explained, Amendment 20 would create an offence mirroring an existing offence in Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Under that section, it is already an offence for a person to wear an item of clothing in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that that person is a supporter of a proscribed terrorist organisation. So we already have that offence in Section 13 of the Terrorism Act in respect of proscribed terrorism organisations; but, unless Amendment 20 is adopted, there will be no similar offence for someone wearing a uniform or displaying the insignia of a designated body.

I agree with those who have said a number of times that state threats call for a different response in some respects from that which we adopt in respect of terrorist organisations, but I do not see why, in respect of this particular offence, a different approach is needed. With this Bill we are trying to protect our public spaces—our public sphere, really—from the influence of malign foreign state organisations and from their attempts to subvert our democratic values and our liberal principles.

The Bill criminalises supporting a designated body but, as the Minister has explained before, it does so on a basis that is more demanding than for the corresponding offence under the Terrorism Act, so it would be challenging to rely on the offence of “supporting” to target the particular conduct Amendment 20 is aimed at. The “supporting” offence requires a prohibited purpose, which is defined as follows:

“that the person knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know”, that the purpose

“is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”.

Faced with a person wearing the uniform of a designated organisation or carrying the insignia of that organisation in our streets, it would be difficult for the police to apply that test and quickly determine whether the prohibited purpose, which is not a low bar, was satisfied in the specific circumstances. But, if we have an offence such as Amendment 20 would introduce, which mirrors an existing offence under terrorism legislation, that determination could be made more simply and there would be no reason for the police to hesitate.

I hesitate to make comparisons with the 1930s, but I imagine that if we had had this power then, we would have designated the SS and then surely would have expected our police to arrest those wearing SS uniform in public spaces. I do not understand the hesitation the Government have in adopting this amendment, which, as we have heard, has already been recommended by a number of experts. I do not believe that immunity is a good reason. It is already the case that if an Iranian diplomat chooses to wear a Hamas uniform, he cannot be arrested because he enjoys immunity. Even though he would be committing an offence under Section 13 of the Terrorism Act, that diplomat would be able to invoke immunity. If the same person chooses to wear in London an IRGC uniform—if the Government end up designating that organisation—that person would be entitled to immunity. I do not think that immunity is a good reason for not extending this offence to designated organisations. For that reason, I hope that the Government will be able to support the amendment or, at the very least, indicate a willingness to adopt an offence on very similar terms. If the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, is going to divide the Committee on his amendment, he will have my support.

My Lords, I too have added my name in support of Amendment 20 and endorse everything my noble friend Lord Verdirame has just said. I will briefly add, for emphasis, that the Government have promised an equivalent power for state-related organisations and without this, one of the key planks would not have an equivalent power.

Finally, if I understood correctly the concern expressed about the keffiyeh at the beginning of speech of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is that not an article of clothing now commonly associated with a fully proscribed terrorist organisation, Hamas? As has been said, if such legal jeopardy arose, the relevant law does exist—Section 13 of the Terrorism Act. It is not widely used, and the argument would probably be that this headdress was originally about the assertion of Palestinian national identity. It has indeed been co-opted by supporters of Hamas, but it is a separate question which I do not think impinges on whether this amendment ought to be supported.

My Lords, I hesitate to do so, but I disagree with my two noble friends who have just spoken. Some years ago I was in a supermarket in London and found myself standing next to an approximately 17 year-old young man who was wearing a t-shirt with a swastika on it. He was entitled to wear that if he wished, because it is not unlawful to wear a t-shirt with a swastika on it, however much one disapproves. I turned to the young man and, in a moment of complete foolishness, I suppose, said to him, “Excuse me, but do you realise that 6 million people were murdered by the Nazis on the back of that particular insignia?” He turned to me and said, “Sir, I’m most awfully sorry: I never knew that, and I will never wear this again”. I was surprised that I got away with it and lived to tell the tale, as noble Lords will be sure I have on many occasions.

I do not think that in this Bill, we should be criminalising the mere wearing of such insignia as I have described. This is not a counterterrorism Bill; this is a counter-state threats Bill. We had this discussion at Second Reading and, in my view at least, we are not merely replicating what is in other Acts of Parliament. Further, if somebody wears an insignia and there is a public order disturbance or a racially aggravated public order disturbance, there are plenty of other Laws to deal with that activity.

My final reason for objecting to this Amendment is one that perhaps some will think trivial. However, if your Lordships were to look at new Section 17B of the 2023 Act, on page 4 of the Bill, between lines 13 and 21 it contains no fewer than four split infinitives in “to materially assist”, to which I object as a matter of principle. I hope that the Minister might agree that they should read “materially to assist” in order to comply with the English language, something I was taught by my foreigner parents to comply with at all times if possible.

My Lords, we cannot support these amendments. As we have heard several times, this is emergency legislation, introduced at a time when an urgent response is necessary to the activities of some truly malign state actors and their proxies.

There has been a dangerous escalation in recent months and years, not only of the threats of military and quasi-military attacks, but of cyber attacks on our energy and transport infrastructures and on our economy more widely. Then there has been an appalling outbreak of antisemitic attacks in the UK and abroad, and in allied countries such as Australia. Those attacks have also given occasion, we should remember, to anti-Muslim attacks at home and abroad. Our traditions of tolerance and peaceful co-existence have been, and have certainly seemed, constantly under threat.

Against that background, it has been considered that the mechanisms of proscription under existing terrorism legislation have needed supplementing with the provisions of this Bill concerning malign state-sponsored threats. As the Minister has confirmed, and I do not wish to be repetitive of what has been said many times in the debates today, there is to be further government legislation to tackle the growing threat from foreign state entities and their proxies, and to improve this country’s defences against cyber security threats. The Bill is, in that sense, work in progress.

We do not see the need to tack on to the Bill new offences of wearing items of uniform, dissemination of particular types of publication, or further complex new powers for seizure of passports, all in the last stages of a piece of emergency legislation. There may be a case for some version of some of the measures proposed, under some conditions, after careful later consideration.

I echo some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, but there are other points about the difficulties we have had with the Terrorism Act and other legislation. I am not sure that I go as far as he does on split infinitives, although my personal preference echoes his. We should not be introducing legislation at this stage which would raise all the issues that have so troubled us under the Terrorism Act. Now is not the time for these measures and this emergency legislation is not the Bill.

My Lords, I normally bow to the views of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on these matters—I am not entirely sure I understand the point he made about split infinitives—but I am not sure he is right on this occasion; nor was the noble Lord who last spoke. The IRGC, for example, is not simply a military arm of the Iranian state. It also operates through propaganda, symbolism, recruitment and ideological influence. While the Bill addresses the hostile state activity, I do not believe it adequately addresses the ideological dimension.

Noble Lords have spoken about the level of antisemitism, which has been considerably worsened by the number of marches that we have seen display the symbols, flags and uniforms of terrorist organisations. There should be consistency between “designation” and a “proscribed organisation”. Designation should also have practical consequences. It would be very difficult to explain to members of the public why a designated organisation’s flags, insignia and symbols should continue to be displayed in support of that organisation at marches or on the street. Terrorism legislation already recognises the importance of symbols, uniforms and imagery in demonstrating support. This Amendment would close a potential gap in the legislation.

Further, the police should be given some practical powers to act immediately where support of a designated body is being demonstrated. We have already seen so much confusion, but we have been privileged to have the police come and talk to noble Lords. It was pretty obvious, even from things such as “From the river to the sea” and what “jihad” actually means, that we should be giving some practical advice. If the police or the public require a handbook, almost, to explain what “designation” means, then this House has failed. Therefore, the point that my noble friend made is eminently reasonable, and we should pass this amendment.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for giving the Committee the opportunity to debate these amendments, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for articulating the general position that the Government will take. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for the comments that he made, which mirror some of the points I will make in my response.

I completely understand why the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower, Lord Pickles—who has just spoken—Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, wish to pass these amendments. They make a legitimate argument. The Government are clear in their Opposition to all forms of terrorist support, particularly in the current context of antisemitism, and there are key issues that the Government wish to take specific action on. I will say a few words about each of the proposed offences in turn.

As has been said, Amendment 20 is modelled on Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which relates to organisations proscribed for being concerned with terrorism. Section 13 has proved to be operationally useful as a strict liability offence, meaning the prosecution does not have to prove an individual’s intention or state of mind. Terrorist organisations seek to recruit others to further their harmful ideologies, and wearing a terrorist uniform or displaying insignia, a flag or a logo are all acts of strength or dominance, if not terror. Section 13 seeks to deny proscribed organisations that oxygen of publicity.

However—this is where I hope I can offer an explanation to the Committee—as was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, for bodies involved in state threat activity, the situation is different. Foreign intelligence services and their proxies largely operate covertly and discreetly. This means that acts of flag waving and wearing a uniform in allegiance to a designated body are less of a concern. Notwithstanding difficulties that may arise with immunity from prosecution, in the event that a state body is designated, the offence could criminalise, among other things, a visiting military attaché, an embassy worker, or a cultural delegation. This could have profound consequences for diplomatic relations, and, where a designated body is a front company that was previously perceived as legitimate, this strict liability offence might punish those who simply fail to remove that body’s branding. Any need for the offence is especially limited, given that the offence of “supporting a designated body” under new Section 17A is wide enough in scope to capture the same activities. I therefore cannot accept Amendment 20.

I shall comment also on Amendment 21, which relates to a new offence:

“Dissemination of publications relating to a designated body”.

It includes a power for constables to seek the removal of internet-based publications. Again, the amendment replicates Sections 2 and 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006, but for designated entities. These offences cover the sale or other dissemination of books or other publications that encourage people to engage in terrorism or provide information that could be useful to terrorists. The Act, as currently constituted, provides a power for police to require the takedown of such material by internet service providers.

Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 is designed to criminalise the dissemination of terrorist publications. It was introduced recognising the significant harm that can be caused. This offence purposely is not dependent on an organisation having been proscribed, recognising that terrorist publications may include publications which include and encourage the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism more broadly. In contrast, this Bill focuses on the strengthening of our response to organisations involved in foreign power threat activities that pose an acute threat to the UK and its interests. The threat from publications in this context is, I would suggest, not the same.

Offences in the National Security Act were specifically designed to target threats from state-linked activity, and that Act contains a number of offences that do not appear in terrorism legislation, including assisting a foreign intelligence service. In addition, this Bill includes offences under new Section 17A if a person

“invites support for, or expresses an opinion or belief that is supportive of, a designated body, and does so for a prohibited purpose”.

I contend that this offence is wide enough to capture the dissemination of publications where those requirements are met. A replicated offence in this case is not appropriate or required to address the state threats, and, incidentally, it was not recommended by Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, who cautioned against directly copying these offences. He said:

“There is no evidence that penalising general encouragement of state threat activity is needed to avert harm to national security”.

Therefore, I suggest to the noble Lord that this amendment is unnecessary: it is not recommended by Jonathan Hall and the powers should not be included in the Bill.

The final amendment is one we have discussed on several occasions, including today. Amendment 23 seeks to give effect to Jonathan Hall KC’s recommendation that the police be given the power to seize passports. Whereas Jonathan Hall KC recommended that the power should be available on the basis of suspected foreign power threat activity, as currently exists for terrorism-related activity, this amendment is more limited in its application. Noble Lords will be aware that the Bill before us covers a range of issues, but as to the proposal in this amendment, I have already given a commitment on several occasions to deliver all Jonathan Hall KC’s recommendations in the report that inspired this Bill, including the question of passport seizure, which Amendment 23 seeks to examine. However, I have been clear that, in doing so, the Bill should focus narrowly on the new proscription-like power to tackle state threats, and it is not the right vehicle for this proposal.

The noble Lord’s Amendment 23 covers pages 14 to 26 of the amendment paper, the Marshalled List that is in front of us today. It takes 13 pages to give implementation to the policy objective of banning passports. I suggest that the noble Lord will probably ask me, at some point, why I will not accept his amendment. He has tabled 13 pages full of detailed points, which he suggests will meet the objective, but I cannot necessarily say to the Committee that they do meet that objective.

On Amendment 23, I told the noble Lord that we will achieve the objective he described in our own time, with proper legal facility. The noble Lord shakes his head, or perhaps I should say he looks quizzically at me: I think he will agree with that. I assure him that we want to meet the objective he set, but not in this Bill. I cannot be any clearer than that. I recognise that, at 13 pages, such provisions require detailed policy work, done in concert with key operational partners. While noble Lords have sensibly drawn their inspiration from the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, it is an assumption that all those provisions are fit for the purpose of the state threats context. The detailed policy work needs to be completed, and we need to ensure that we have operational guidance for partners, to be ready on commencement of the legislation. I am afraid the noble Lord’s Amendment 23 does not meet that objective.

I assure the noble Lord that we are not on different pages on this. The Bill is a specific Bill for a specific purpose and, while I agree with its general direction of travel, Amendment 23 is not fit for purpose. I therefore ask the noble Lord not press Amendments 20, 21 or 23, for the reasons I have outlined. However, should he choose to do so, I invite my noble friends to vote against them.

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Walney and Lord Verdirame, and my noble friend Lord Pickles, for their support, and I thank the Minister for his response. I listened to what the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Carlile of Berriew, had to say about this. However, I remain unconvinced. The very act of wearing or displaying the insignia of a designated body can intimidate members of our society and damage community cohesion. I do not believe that the Bill, as drafted, offers sufficient safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals and communities who are targeted by foreign state powers.

If an individual wore an IRGC uniform and sat outside a synagogue, any reasonable member of the public would consider this an intimidatory act. However, the threshold for successful prosecution under a Section 17A offence would remain unacceptably high. The individual could argue that the purpose of wearing the uniform was not to express support for the designated body and that it was worn in a satirical context. Even if this extremely subjective intention could be disproved, it would then fall on the prosecution to show that such actions were prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK, which is another subjective and potentially problematic barrier to prosecution.

I suggest that my Amendment fixes this glaring loophole. It shuts down any avenues through which those who seek to terrorise others can evade prosecution. There are simply no justifications for why someone in the UK should be wearing or displaying the insignia of a designated state threat. Therefore, in line with Jonathan Hall’s recommendation, we should make it an offence to do so.

Amendment 23 concerns the seizure of passports of those suspected of supporting designated bodies, and this amendment has been unequivocally supported by Jonathan Hall, and is already a power which the police possess when combating terrorism. Let us be clear about this: it is not a new police power. It was a direct recommendation of a government-sanctioned review, and the Government have said that they will commit to implementing this policy. There is therefore no good reason to oppose this amendment, nor is there a logical or practical one.

Although the Government have pledged to implement this power in a future Bill, there are three concerns that remain which have not been assuaged by the Minister. First, any such future Bill will not receive Royal Assent before the Summer Recess. This means that those who support the IRGC will be protected from these police powers for a considerable length of time. What is the point of rushing to designate a group before Parliament concludes, but not giving the police force the necessary teeth to operate effectively?

Secondly, as I have made clear, the Government have perhaps acted in bad faith on this Bill. We on these Benches simply cannot wait for an unspecified date to enact a policy that can be accepted today. Thirdly, the Minister has acknowledged that his party is currently undergoing vast leadership changes. What is government policy today may not be government policy tomorrow.

I turn now to Amendment 21. As stated previously, this amendment would close yet another legislative gap in this Bill.

There is absolutely no indication from any potential new Prime Minister that any changes to security legislation will be made. The King’s gracious Speech, and this Bill, both stand.

Amendment 21, as stated previously, would close yet another legislative gap in the Bill, a gap that was recognised 20 years ago and subsequently rectified in the Terrorism Act 2006. I remain unconvinced by the Government’s justification for opposing our amendment. If the Government and Parliament recognised 20 years ago that a specific criminal offence of dissemination was required to address a lacuna in the law in relation to terrorism, surely we must recognise today that it is precisely the same lacuna in this Bill.

If my amendments do not form part of the final Act, I fear that the types of propaganda by designated bodies that I mentioned earlier will be allowed to flourish, that the IRGC will be able to parade in its uniforms and with its flags, and that those seeking to travel abroad to assist the IRGC will not be stopped. If any of these things happen, a crucial test of the Bill— namely, its ability to target and disrupt state threats to the United Kingdom—will have failed.

The Government have shown that they are not willing to take the necessary action to strengthen the Bill. If that is the case, I am left with no choice but to test the opinion of the House.

Ayes 150, Noes 216.

Amendment 20 disagreed.

Amendments 21 and 22 not moved.

Clause 2 agreed.

Amendment 23 not moved.

Clauses 3 to 8 agreed.

Schedule agreed.

House resumed.

Bill reported with amendments.