To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the extent to which British military equipment contains components made in China or is reliant on rare earth minerals from China.

My Lords, the Government and the Ministry of Defence welcome foreign trade where it allows us to provide our Armed Forces with the equipment they require, but the Government will not compromise our national security or our stringent legal and regulatory requirements or conflict with the objectives of our defence industrial strategy. The Government are working at pace to diversify the UK critical mineral supply chain and reduce reliance on any single source.

My Lords, the chilling reality is that we are living in an age of cyber and data espionage and sabotage, whether from the use of CIMs, cellular IoT modules in everyday domestic components or wilfully directed malign activity by agencies hostile to western values and the UK. Can the Minister confirm to this House in more detail what protective measures the MoD is urgently deploying in respect of our defence supply chain to avoid our defence capability being unacceptably compromised?

The Government introduced a new critical minerals strategy—which is part of what the noble Baroness is asking about—that set an ambition for 2035 to reduce our reliance, and we are engaging with our partners on this. We also signed an MoU on critical minerals in Washington DC. She asked me specifically about the approach of the MoD. The MoD is working hard to think about ways of stockpiling critical components and critical minerals for the UK defence sector and to improve recycling and the circular economy. I want to stress the recognition of the point that the noble Baroness makes and the need for a much wider approach, as identified in the strategic defence review and the national security strategy. We do not in any way underestimate the persistent challenges in this space, and we will do all in our power to use the powers we have to deal with them.

My Lords, a typical high-end, Chinese-made electric and semi-autonomous vehicle will have up to a dozen cameras, radars and laser sensors collecting images of everything around it. Cyber security is at best opaque, and a Norwegian researcher recently reported that 90% of the data that was collected by his car was sent back to China. What is the Government’s view on visitors with Chinese cars coming to MoD sites? You would not allow someone from the People’s Liberation Army to stand there with a video camera, and you would not allow a drone to fly over your site. But how do you monitor, police, and manage foreign Chinese cars coming on and off MoD facilities?

The first thing I should say is that we focus on all vehicles coming to MoD sites, not just Chinese vehicles. All modern electric vehicles have surveillance components which we should be careful about, so I want to be completely clear with the noble Lord and the House that that is our approach. With regard to the question he asked, however, we are aware that individual defence organisations may have stricter requirements relating to electric vehicles on some sites, but, obviously, we do not provide specific details for security reasons, as I am sure the noble Lord will understand. We have made a lot of progress since the previous Administration instructed all government departments to cease deployment of surveillance equipment. My Right Honourable Friend the National Security Minister made it clear in November 2025 that all sensitive government sites originally identified with such equipment—that is CCTV equipment manufactured in China—have now finished their replacement work.

My Lords, the Minister will be aware that China has systematically and strategically got a grip and a monopoly on the refining of critical minerals. The effect of that has been demonstrated only this week, where China has cut off Japan from critical minerals over a political issue. First, what help are we and our allies giving to Japan in this important crisis? Secondly, what are we going to be doing in the future in order to secure our own supply chain to make sure we do not suffer from this dependence on China?

My noble friend raises a very important point, which is the basis of a very live and active discussion within government at the moment. I have already mentioned the launch of the critical mineral strategy. I want also to draw attention to the urgency and the energy with which this problem is being addressed. The UK and the US signed an MoU on critical minerals in Washington DC on 4 February, only three weeks ago, and this will help secure supply in the mining and processing of critical minerals. I also want to address my noble friend’s question about our work with partners and allies. Our long-standing and trusted relationships with our partners and allies around the world, including Japan, are one of our strongest—both hard-power and soft-power—assets. We are engaging very actively with Australia, including early discussions on collaboration on its critical mineral strategic reserve project. We are also working, as I think my noble friend would expect, with NATO, Five Eyes, AUKUS, Canada and France.

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It is the turn of the Cross Benches.

My Lords, the fact that 85% of all drone components worldwide come from China illustrates the urgent need for a more resilient supply chain. The development of such a supply chain depends on the placing of orders in the appropriate industries to build up their capacity. In the UK’s case, the placing of such orders seems to depend on the defence investment plan. When are we going to see this elusive document?

I think my noble friend Lord Coaker has run out of ways to say, “It’ll be along soon”, so perhaps I should just say, “It’ll be along soon”. On the wider question that the noble and gallant Lord raises, it is absolutely true that these components are central, not just to defence industries, as he knows, but to the whole economy—to phones, laptops and all sorts of things. That is why the Government are putting such effort and such energy into a more resilient and sustainable supply chain. I can say, even in advance of the defence investment plan, that we have committed to public investment in the national critical mineral strategy. We are not just relying on the markets and private investment.

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It is the turn of the Conservative Benches. If they can make their minds up, someone can ask a question.

My Lords, under the Washington declaration of 2023, we were promised by the then American Administration that all electric vehicles, military and civil, exported from this country, provided that they contained critical minerals or rare earths mined either in America or here, would be subject to the same subsidy as American vehicles were to be given anyway, under the American Government plans. What happened to that deal? Is it still outstanding?

I do not know the specific answer to that, but I will be very happy to come back to the noble Lord. I would stress that we are working very closely with the Americans on this whole question of critical minerals. The noble Lord often asks about the Commonwealth. I should say that we are working closely with our Commonwealth partners on resolving these issues and having a common approach.

My Lords, surely the best way to protect the defence supply chain is to have a short supply chain. Does the Minister agree that the best way to do that is to support out indigenous industries here in the United Kingdom—right across the United Kingdom—particularly to use the expertise that is on display? I am thinking of the Cyber Security Centre in Belfast, for example.

I entirely agree with the noble Baroness on that point. As she knows from previous answers that I have given from this Dispatch Box, the defence industry in the UK generally, and in Northern Ireland specifically, is enjoying a great renaissance; that has a great deal to do with government investment. That is something to which we are committed, and we are already seeing the benefits.

My Lords, it is my great privilege to serve in the Armed Forces Parliamentary Scheme, as do many other noble Lords. I was recently provided with a uniform for a trip to the Falkland Islands. I was somewhat surprised to see that that uniform was made in China. Is it beyond our allies in NATO to be able to manufacture our own uniforms?

My Lords, I dare say it is not. Procurement of clothing is one of the many things that we are working on. On the wider question of procurement from China, we do not at all underestimate the challenge of that, and we will continue to work on it.