Lord Blencathra:

Moved by Lord Blencathra

39B: Clause 1, page 1, line 14, at end insert—“(1A) A person is only eligible for assistance under this Act if their wish to end their life is principally attributable to the symptoms, suffering or prognosis of the terminal illness.”Member’s explanatory statementThis Amendment seeks to narrow eligibility for assistance to illness-related motives.

My Lords, I will speak relatively briefly to the amendments in this group. I degrouped them for a technical reason. They are quite narrowly drawn. I know there is a group coming up, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, that is wider ranging and more important than mine. If any noble Lord wishes to speak on the principle of these amendments, they might be better off waiting for the noble Baroness’s group.

The purpose of my Amendment 39B is to ensure that a person who wishes to die is driven by their illness, not by poverty, loneliness, lack of care or other remedial pressures. This would restore the link between the justification for the Bill and its operation. The political case for assisted dying has always been framed around unbearable physical suffering caused by terminal illness, yet the Bill contains no requirement that the person’s motivation must arise from that illness. Without this amendment, the Bill becomes a general choice in adversity scheme, where any reason—financial distress, lack of care, fear of being a burden—can drive the decision.

The noble and learned Lord has now explicitly said:

“I am strongly against saying poor people should not have that choice”.—[Official Report, 16/1/26; col. 2020.]

That is an admission that the Bill permits assisted death for reasons of poverty. My amendment would correct that. It would ensure that the motivation must be principally attributable to the illness itself, not to the state’s failure to provide care, housing or support. This is not about denying autonomy; it is about ensuring that autonomy is real. A decision driven by poverty or abandonment is not a free choice. The amendment would ensure that the Bill remains what the public believe it to be: a response to suffering caused by terminal illness, not a response to social failure.

My Amendment 39C would draw a clear line: financial distress, lack of housing or lack of social support cannot be the primary motivations for an assisted death. Without this safeguard, the Bill risks becoming a mechanism by which poor and unsupported people are offered death instead of help. The Bill is presented to the public as a response to the unbearable physical suffering caused by terminal illness, yet it contains no requirement that the person’s motivation must arise from that illness. Without these amendments, the Bill permits assisted death for a whole host of reasons that Parliament never intended, such as loneliness, poverty, lack of housing, lack of care or feeling like a burden on the state or your dependants.

The noble and learned Lord has now accepted that these motivations are valid choices. That is a dramatic shift from his own 2012 commission, which said that motivations were never legitimate and that safeguards must prevent them. Peers are entitled to ask what has changed other than the political need to keep the Bill workable. International evidence shows that non-medical motivations dominate assisted dying requests. Pain is not the primary driver. We hear that being a burden is a driver, as is the loss of autonomy. Parliament must decide whether it is comfortable legislating for that.

Finally, these amendments ensure that asking “why” has consequences. If the answer is poverty, loneliness or lack of care, the response should be support, not a lethal prescription. These amendments restore coherence, safeguard autonomy and prevent the Bill from becoming a general choice in adversity scheme. I beg to move.

In the interests of being brief, rather than repeating everything that my noble friend said, I look forward to the answers from the sponsor of the Bill and from the Minister.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for tabling these amendments. I note his wish to keep this brief so that we can move on to a later group to discuss the issues that he raises in greater breadth.

Amendment 39C seeks to exclude anyone whose primary motivations for the request for an assisted death are financial concerns, lack of housing or lack of social support. This would require someone to establish the motivations of a person requesting an assisted death. It is not clear who would make this assessment or how they would make it. It is also unclear how a number of the phrases in the amendment are meant to be interpreted and assessed, including “financial concerns”, “lack of housing” or “lack of social support”, because these terms are not defined. The amendment also conflicts with later provisions of the Bill setting out how eligibility is assessed in more detail, which would cause confusion. If passed, considerable further policy and drafting work would need to be done to clarify the intent.

In the spirit of brevity, I make no comment on the other amendment in this group. However, as noble Lords will be aware, the amendment has not had technical drafting support from officials.

My Lords, I am grateful for how this has been dealt with. We have discussed this a lot, at Second Reading and in Committee. I have made clear that, while suffering may very often be the cause of somebody wanting an assisted death, it is not the trigger for it as a legal requirement. Why people want to end their life in the context of a terminal illness is for them to decide. The effect of these amendments is that a person is entitled to an assisted death only if the reasons for them wanting the assisted death are the symptoms, suffering or prognosis of the terminal illness. I am not in favour of inquiring as to precisely what is the cause. Severe misery may well be the cause in the context of a terminal illness. In my view, this provision would unduly limit the entitlement to an assisted death, so I am against these amendments because they go right against the principle of the Bill.

My Lords, I think that the noble and learned Lord is utterly wrong in his last pronouncement. Misery should not be a reason for an assisted death. The misery might be able to be removed. At Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Moylan stated that many people do not actually want to die; they want the things that are causing the feeling to be removed. They want better housing, they want better relationships with their family, they wish their love life was better or they want out of total misery. The noble and learned Lord is utterly wrong in seeming to extend the reason for dying beyond the severity of the terminal illness.

We will probably discuss this better and in more detail in the next group of amendments, so I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment 39B withdrawn.

Amendments 39C to 43 not moved.