My Lords, I strongly support keeping these clauses in the Bill. I admire the moral courage of Ministers in this Government for putting these clauses in the Bill, despite the well-made arguments against doing so.

My calculation is that, in central London, a rampaging terrorist’s life expectancy is about nine minutes. Not surprisingly, these events are infrequent, because they are not likely to be successful. This is primarily due to the fortitude, courage and training of the armed police officers of the Metropolitan Police.

I have been on duty in an operational military headquarters, in the field, overseas, when we had to deal with life-threatening emergencies. There is nearly always an information fog, and it is exceptionally difficult for commanders to understand what is actually happening on the ground. The same will apply to police control rooms during a terrorist attack. I understand the difficulties; I have been there. Nevertheless, the Metropolitan Police and other forces usually manage to suppress an attack within a few minutes, for which we should all be really grateful. Unfortunately, it is inevitable that, if there are enough such incidents, perceived or real problems will arise. We only need to think of the difficulties that arose with the Bondi Beach tragedy. We must accept that things might not go as desired.

I am not a lawyer, but the Committee will be aware that I have engaged in armed military operations. I knew that I was accountable for my actions, as well as any troops under my command. That was an obvious risk, but one that, as a prudent risk-taker, I was prepared to accept because I was confident that I would be fairly and promptly dealt with if something went wrong. I am not convinced that the same applies to armed police operations. We have already discussed in the last group delays in the disciplinary machinery. Unfortunately, I was late attending, but I agreed with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said—I apologise for not being there at the start.

In questionable police firearms cases, the CPS has the very difficult task of balancing two conflicting factors. On one hand, there is the very low probability of conviction in these cases—perhaps the Minister will tell us how many armed officers on duty have been convicted of such offences. If that were the only consideration, it would be difficult to authorise a prosecution because the prospect of a conviction would be very low. But, on the other hand, we need to secure public confidence that the police and the state are not above the law and that the evidence against a relevant police officer will be tested by a jury in court. If we do not agree these clauses, we run the risk of prudent risk-takers declining to be trained or to keep their firearms ticket.

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, touched on the use of the military instead of the police. The military is not correctly trained to undertake civil policing duties. It can in certain circumstances be used, but the military will apply overwhelming military force to resolve the issue.

This lack of willingness to volunteer for firearms duty could, in turn, result in standards being surreptitiously lowered in order to meet demand for authorised firearms officers, leading to precisely the opposite effect to the one we desire. I am sure the Minister will deny that there is any possibility of standards being surreptitiously lowered, but I assure noble Lords that, in the military—not so much in firearms training but in other areas—we are surreptitiously lowering the standards, so this is a very real risk. The noble Lord, Lord Carter, touched on existing recruiting difficulties.

When, regrettably, an armed police officer has to do his or her duty, we cannot allow the lives of his or her family and friends to be turned upside down by media attention that serves no useful purpose.