My Lords, I oppose Clauses 152 to 155 standing part of the Bill. I declare my interests as deputy chairman of the Telegraph Media Group and chairman of the News Media Association. This stand part notice is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who unfortunately cannot be here today as he is on business abroad. I added my name to it along with the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, to whom I am very grateful. Like the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, I am aware that I am surrounded by lawyers wherever I look, but I must admit to not being one of them.

These clauses introduce a statutory presumption of anonymity for firearms officers charged with a qualifying offence involving the discharge of a lethal weapon. Clause 152 creates a presumption that the criminal courts grant anonymity to any firearms officers charged with a “qualifying offence”, unless to do so would be

“contrary to the interests of justice”.

Clause 153 allows the court to preserve or reimpose anonymity after conviction if there is an appeal. Clause 154 defines the reporting direction as barring the publication of any matter that might lead to identification, including name, address, place of work, photographs and video. Clause 155 sets out the kinds of measures that may be required to be taken under an anonymity order, including screening or voice modulation during a court appearance.

Under the clauses, anonymity would apply from the point of charge until conviction and sentence or, where relevant, an appeal is abandoned or dismissed. If an officer is acquitted or charges are dropped, anonymity, including reporting restrictions, can persist indefinitely. Taken together, these measures are a significant attack on open justice, press and media freedom, and the public’s right to receive information, something that should be curtailed in only the most exceptional circumstances. They would undermine the already fragile trust in the police, limit opportunities for public scrutiny of those entrusted with firearms—which is a most serious manifestation of state power—and have a profound chilling impact on public interest reporting.

I will outline the reasons why I believe these clauses are wrong. First, their provision is unnecessary. Judges already have the power to grant anonymity where there is clear evidence of a real and immediate risk to an officer or their family, with proper and proportionate safeguards in place for fairness and review. Under the current law, a defendant applying to the court for anonymity must rightly demonstrate, with clear and cogent evidence, that anonymity is strictly necessary to protect their rights. Such orders are tailored, time-limited and subject to review. They therefore do not interfere with the rights of the media or the expectations of the public, and they strike the right balance between officer safety, which we must obviously be very concerned about, and open justice. That is a workable and trusted balance between safety and open justice. These clauses reverse that position for a special category of alleged offender and are therefore an unprecedented shift in English law.

Secondly, there is no evidence for making such sweeping changes to the law. The Home Office has never provided evidence that police officers as a group are more likely to be subject to harm by being identified as a defendant in a criminal case than any other defendant in a high-profile or controversial case. There is therefore no need to upend the existing law to give firearms officers greater protection from legitimate scrutiny than anyone else. That would create a justifiable perception in the public’s mind that there is one rule for firearms officers and another for everyone else, and they would be right.

Thirdly, these provisions clearly undermine the long-standing principles of open justice that are a fundamental tenet of our legal system and essential to our free society. Justice must not only be done; it must also always be seen to be done by the public, and therefore by the press. Such a sweeping privacy regime, which would apply automatically, regardless of any actual risk posed to an officer, and which gives protection to state agents, would clearly undermine confidence in the system. If anything, there is the clearest possible public interest in serious criminal cases involving police officers being subject to the highest form of rigorous public scrutiny and transparency, not the most lax. Anything that undermines open justice risks increasing the possibility of miscarriages of justice.

Fourthly, one of the most practical advantages of open justice and transparency is the critical role of a robust media in identifying systemic issues and patterns of offending. These clauses would make that impossible. Clause 155, for instance, allows for a wide range of contextual information to be kept from the public, including, vitally, an officer’s workplace. How can the press and the public help identify patterns or bring additional information to light in the absence of such basic information? That would hamper investigations and make public appeals for information far less effective. Indeed, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Mark Rowley has recently supported calls to share more details, not fewer, about suspects with the public earlier, in a bid to stop the spread of misinformation.

Fifthly, and on that very point, these clauses create a heightened risk of jigsaw identification of a suspect, where separate, anonymised details are combined with publicly available information to identify an individual. This is inevitable, particularly in small communities with their own online networks. The danger of false identification, with very serious repercussions for an individual, is all too obvious. That would also produce a chilling effect on legitimate, verified journalism, because editors would inevitably act with extreme caution in reporting, needlessly censoring it to avoid harsh penalties for breaching a court order.

Finally, there are issues about the compatibility of these clauses with the ECHR. Others are far more expert on this than I am, and I will let them deal with it during this debate, but it is clear to me as a lay person that the interference with freedom of expression contained in these clauses is wholly disproportionate given that no pressing social need has been demonstrated.

In summary, no evidence has been provided as the basis for such a sweeping change in the law set out in these clauses, which would produce a two-tier justice system. They would interfere with press and media freedom in a wholly disproportionate way and create a profound chilling effect on public interest reporting. They undermine the principles of open justice that are the bedrock of our judicial system and vital to our open democratic society. They risk further damaging public confidence in the police, already at an all-time low after the appalling murder of Sarah Everard, and in our judicial system. Above all, they are unnecessary because suitable safeguards that balance officer safety with public accountability and scrutiny already exist and have proved themselves workable and effective. For all these reasons, these clauses should not stand part of the Bill. I hope the Minister will indicate that the Government are going to think again.