Lord Hogan-Howe:

Moved by Lord Hogan-Howe

422A: After Clause 151, insert the following new Clause—“Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) The Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/2) are amended as follows.(2) After Regulation 13 (timeliness of investigations), insert—“13A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings. (5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.”(3) The Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (S.I.2020/4) are amended as follows.(4) After Regulation 19 (timeliness of investigation), insert—“19A Scrutiny of investigation timeliness(1) A legally qualified person must be appointed to scrutinise any investigations of misconduct or gross misconduct which have not been completed within 12 months.(2) The legally qualified person must determine whether there is good and sufficient reason for the time already taken, and how much time is anticipated to be needed for completion of the investigation.(3) In determining whether there is good and sufficient reason, the legally qualified person may have regard to any relevant matter, and must have particular regard to—(a) whether the investigation has been efficient and effective;(b) whether there has been unnecessary or unreasonable delay, having regard to the complexity and seriousness of the case;(c) the impact upon the officer and others;(d) any anticipated further delay;(e) the public interest and effect on confidence in the police disciplinary system;(f) representations made on behalf of any person entitled to receive a copy of the information provided.(4) If the legally qualified person determines that there is good and sufficient reason to continue the investigation, then the legally qualified person must set a date for the conclusion of all proceedings.(5) Nothing in this provision shall have any effect in relation to any criminal investigation.””Member’s explanatory statementThis Amendment proposes a 12-month limit, unless extraordinary circumstances reviewed by a legally qualified person dictate otherwise, which would encourage forces and external bodies to complete misconduct and gross misconduct processes quicker, allowing officers to resume duties and limiting the negative impact on their health and wellbeing.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, has made a good suggestion with this Amendment. He makes the broad point that the police misconduct process takes far too long, and I agree. To be fair, it is not the only misconduct process that takes a long time, but this one is particularly challenged.

I will particularly mention two things. First, time deadlines would be helpful. There are two ways to approach that. One is that there might be an absolute deadline of 12 months, as the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests, and then some independent, legally qualified person looks at the case. That could work. The alternative is to set some deadlines so that, for example, 90% of cases are resolved in one year, which at least would give the system a kick. At the moment, I am afraid the system is not getting any better—rather, it is getting worse—so either something statutory or some kind of guidelines would be a good idea.

On Tuesday I raised the issue of firearms officers, a group particularly affected by this, and that is what I want to speak to here. I have argued that there should be a higher bar before they are prosecuted for murder, but the Government do not accept that at the moment. They have offered anonymity, and we are to debate that shortly.

Part of the problem, particularly for firearms officers, is the incredible length of time in some cases. There have been two cases over the last 20 years that took 10 years: the case of PC Long, who was prosecuted after a series of legal machinations only to be found not guilty 10 years later, and that of W80, where after a public inquiry—basically an inquest led by a High Court judge because intercept evidence was involved in the case—the High Court judge decided that there was no unlawful killing, the IOPC or its predecessor decided that there should be some gross misconduct, the Metropolitan Police disagreed, the Supreme Court ordered that there would be a misconduct hearing and the legally qualified chair of the independent tribunal said there was no case to answer. After consideration by the Supreme Court, an officer had been under investigation for 10 years. That cannot be right.

Some of the problems are to do with the sequential nature of the decision-making in these cases. Officers are often under jeopardy, first from the IOPC and then from the CPS. Then obviously it could go to court and there may be a finding of not guilty, but then—for firearms officers in cases where someone has died—the case can go back to a coroner’s inquest, which can find an unlawful killing verdict, at which point it goes back through the cycle again. That is one of the reasons why some of these problems are arising.

First, deadlines would be a good idea as either an advisory or a mandatory limit. Secondly, I do not understand why some of the people involved in the decision-making that I have described have to do it sequentially, not in parallel. For example, why can the CPS and the IOPC not decide together whether something is a crime or misconduct?

At the moment, not only are there many links in the chain that sometimes come to contradictory conclusions but, more importantly, it is taking too long. I argue that in all this there are two groups of people who suffer: one is firearms officers, the group whose case I am arguing, but the other is the families waiting to hear what is happening. If people have lost someone, they deserve to hear whether or not this is a crime or misconduct, but at the moment that is not happening.

This amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, is a sensible suggestion and I support it. If the Government do not, perhaps they would like to make some indication of how they intend to improve the misconduct system, particularly as it affects firearms officers in the circumstances I have described.

My Lords, this has been a short debate. I agree with many of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I find it almost extraordinary that misconduct investigations linger on for so long; it really is a disgrace for everybody involved. Police professional standards departments have for too long been seen as something of a Cinderella function within forces, chronically underprioritised, underfunded and understaffed, and now they are buckling under the surge in the volume of complaints. This is combined with a narrowing of the remit of the IOPC, which increasingly takes on only the most serious and high-profile cases, resulting in a growing backlog and indefinite drift.

Amendment 422A confronts this head on. Such independent legal oversight could act as a checkpoint, strengthening individual case oversights and extracting timely lessons from failures. Criminal investigations would stay exempt, protecting the pursuit of serious crime.

There are risks in setting time targets for investigations—there is no question about that—not least the incentive for officers to delay co-operation if the clock is ticking. We have concerns that a rigid cap could risk corner-cutting on complex investigations. At the very least, stronger guidance on the expected length of inquiries is now required, as well as real scrutiny when these expectations are missed.

There also needs to be a much sharper focus on leadership and case management. Complainants should not face long waits, especially knowing time will diminish the strength of their evidence; neither should innocent officers endure years in limbo, with their careers stalled and well-being eroded. Taxpayers should not bear the rising cost of suspensions while losing front-line capacity at the same time.

Amendment 422A would restore some balance by prioritising fairness to officers, closure for victims and credibility for policing. We are happy to support it, and I look forward to the Minister’s reply.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington for tabling his Amendment 422A and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for ably stepping into the breach to allow it to be debated. It is a very important matter and I am glad we have had a chance to debate it.

I am very sympathetic to the amendment’s goals. It aims to set a 12-month time limit for misconduct and gross misconduct investigations within police forces. As others have said, timely legal restitution is the only way that justice is effectively served. That applies both to those in the police who are under investigation and, obviously, to victims who are let down by delays that are needlessly, but often, the result of administrative workload. Applying a strict deadline for remedies, excepted under only extraordinary circumstances, is an easy way by which institutions can be encouraged to proceed with investigations in a timely fashion.

That said, I am a little wary of fully endorsing a blanket time limit on police forces for investigations. Although in some cases, perhaps even most, misconduct investigations can and should be sped up, it would be heedless to assume that all forces are simply being inefficient in the time that investigations take. There is a vast disparity between forces’ capacity to deal with their primary function of investigating crime, let alone with administrative internal matters, such as misconduct matters. Certain forces’ ability to spare the resources to source, for instance, legally qualified adjudicators should not, therefore, be assumed. Officer numbers are down, crime is up, and we should be careful about placing additional requirements on police forces that expedited conduct investigations might entail.

Of course, we support the aim of increasing efficiency and ensuring justice is delivered. I thank my noble friend for his amendment and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

I am grateful to the Committee, and in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for moving the Amendment. To be fair to the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, he stayed here very late—until the end—on the previous day on this. I am sorry that he is not able to be in his place today. He was here to move the amendment when we pulled stumps on Tuesday night at gone 11 pm.

Having said that, the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to introduce a new system of independent legal adjudicators with powers to close down investigations. I think I can agree with the noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, that delays in investigations are in nobody’s interests—of police officers who subsequently are proved innocent, of victims, or of speedy justice for those who have strayed and committed potential offences. Lengthy delays risk impacting the confidence of complainants and the welfare of the police officers involved.

We recognise those impacts, which is why we introduced reforms last year, including a presumption of fast-track hearings for former officers and a broader power for police forces to utilise fast-track hearings. In addition—and I hope this helps the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—we have committed to establish a wider review to address barriers to timeliness in police misconduct cases as part of the police accountability review we are currently undertaking. I agree completely that timeliness must improve, but I argue that this amendment could potentially add bureaucracy, cost and delay to the system, not remove it.

I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, will recall that the responsibilities of independent lawyers in the misconduct system were removed under previous Governments, with senior officers replacing them as chairs of misconduct hearings. Lawyers now sit as independent legal advisers on misconduct panels; reintroducing a decision-making role for them would not only blur the lines of independence but come at greater financial cost to policing, which goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, mentioned.

As a Government, we are committed to ensuring that chief constables have the necessary powers to remove those who have no place in policing, but this amendment could have a significant detrimental effect on public confidence. I will give one example to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. A timeline on an investigation into gross misconduct could mean that an investigation could be terminated not because it has been resolved but because of an arbitrary time limit being reached. The time limit proposed here could mean that significantly complex, difficult cases are terminated without a resolution for the victim or, indeed, for the police officer against whom any allegations are made.

There is a point in the general thrust of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington. There is a problem that needs to be resolved, but I suggest that the Government can resolve it without the legislative proposal before the Committee. I ask the noble Lord, who nobly volunteered to move the amendment, to now nobly volunteer to withdraw it.

It is certainly a first for me.

I thank the Minister for his reply and other people for their comments. I thought I might make only a couple of points in response. I indicated that although the Amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, suggests a mandatory limit, there may be difficulties with that. I wonder whether the Government, might consider three things in their review, which the Minister mentioned. First, they could set an expectation so that, for example, cases should be completed within 12 months unless, for example, the director-general of the IOPC or some arbiter concludes otherwise. Secondly, I raised the sequential nature of the decision-making. That compound effect gives a longer time than I regard as necessary.

I am trying to work out now whether I should let the noble Lord, Lord Bailey, speak—

The noble Lord was not here for the start of the group, so I am afraid that he cannot contribute.

I will conclude. I wonder whether, in the review, the Government could consider this sequential decision-making, which I do not think helps speed. Thirdly, if they are really adventurous they could look at whether police officers should be employees, because then you would get lawyers out of the system—I sit surrounded by them, but they never make it quicker or cheaper. Everyone else who is an employee can go to the employment tribunal, but officers cannot; it is on these grounds that lawyers get involved. I am afraid that is one of the major factors in why this takes so long and is expensive. I have taken my life in my hands, so I will sit down and withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment 422A withdrawn.

Clause 152: Anonymity for authorised firearms officers charged with qualifying offences

Debate on whether Clause 152 should stand part of the Bill.

My Lords, I oppose Clauses 152 to 155 standing part of the Bill. I declare my interests as deputy chairman of the Telegraph Media Group and chairman of the News Media Association. This stand part notice is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who unfortunately cannot be here today as he is on business abroad. I added my name to it along with the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, to whom I am very grateful. Like the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, I am aware that I am surrounded by lawyers wherever I look, but I must admit to not being one of them.

These clauses introduce a statutory presumption of anonymity for firearms officers charged with a qualifying offence involving the discharge of a lethal weapon. Clause 152 creates a presumption that the criminal courts grant anonymity to any firearms officers charged with a “qualifying offence”, unless to do so would be

“contrary to the interests of justice”.

Clause 153 allows the court to preserve or reimpose anonymity after conviction if there is an appeal. Clause 154 defines the reporting direction as barring the publication of any matter that might lead to identification, including name, address, place of work, photographs and video. Clause 155 sets out the kinds of measures that may be required to be taken under an anonymity order, including screening or voice modulation during a court appearance.

Under the clauses, anonymity would apply from the point of charge until conviction and sentence or, where relevant, an appeal is abandoned or dismissed. If an officer is acquitted or charges are dropped, anonymity, including reporting restrictions, can persist indefinitely. Taken together, these measures are a significant attack on open justice, press and media freedom, and the public’s right to receive information, something that should be curtailed in only the most exceptional circumstances. They would undermine the already fragile trust in the police, limit opportunities for public scrutiny of those entrusted with firearms—which is a most serious manifestation of state power—and have a profound chilling impact on public interest reporting.

I will outline the reasons why I believe these clauses are wrong. First, their provision is unnecessary. Judges already have the power to grant anonymity where there is clear evidence of a real and immediate risk to an officer or their family, with proper and proportionate safeguards in place for fairness and review. Under the current law, a defendant applying to the court for anonymity must rightly demonstrate, with clear and cogent evidence, that anonymity is strictly necessary to protect their rights. Such orders are tailored, time-limited and subject to review. They therefore do not interfere with the rights of the media or the expectations of the public, and they strike the right balance between officer safety, which we must obviously be very concerned about, and open justice. That is a workable and trusted balance between safety and open justice. These clauses reverse that position for a special category of alleged offender and are therefore an unprecedented shift in English law.

Secondly, there is no evidence for making such sweeping changes to the law. The Home Office has never provided evidence that police officers as a group are more likely to be subject to harm by being identified as a defendant in a criminal case than any other defendant in a high-profile or controversial case. There is therefore no need to upend the existing law to give firearms officers greater protection from legitimate scrutiny than anyone else. That would create a justifiable perception in the public’s mind that there is one rule for firearms officers and another for everyone else, and they would be right.

Thirdly, these provisions clearly undermine the long-standing principles of open justice that are a fundamental tenet of our legal system and essential to our free society. Justice must not only be done; it must also always be seen to be done by the public, and therefore by the press. Such a sweeping privacy regime, which would apply automatically, regardless of any actual risk posed to an officer, and which gives protection to state agents, would clearly undermine confidence in the system. If anything, there is the clearest possible public interest in serious criminal cases involving police officers being subject to the highest form of rigorous public scrutiny and transparency, not the most lax. Anything that undermines open justice risks increasing the possibility of miscarriages of justice.

Fourthly, one of the most practical advantages of open justice and transparency is the critical role of a robust media in identifying systemic issues and patterns of offending. These clauses would make that impossible. Clause 155, for instance, allows for a wide range of contextual information to be kept from the public, including, vitally, an officer’s workplace. How can the press and the public help identify patterns or bring additional information to light in the absence of such basic information? That would hamper investigations and make public appeals for information far less effective. Indeed, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Mark Rowley has recently supported calls to share more details, not fewer, about suspects with the public earlier, in a bid to stop the spread of misinformation.

Fifthly, and on that very point, these clauses create a heightened risk of jigsaw identification of a suspect, where separate, anonymised details are combined with publicly available information to identify an individual. This is inevitable, particularly in small communities with their own online networks. The danger of false identification, with very serious repercussions for an individual, is all too obvious. That would also produce a chilling effect on legitimate, verified journalism, because editors would inevitably act with extreme caution in reporting, needlessly censoring it to avoid harsh penalties for breaching a court order.

Finally, there are issues about the compatibility of these clauses with the ECHR. Others are far more expert on this than I am, and I will let them deal with it during this debate, but it is clear to me as a lay person that the interference with freedom of expression contained in these clauses is wholly disproportionate given that no pressing social need has been demonstrated.

In summary, no evidence has been provided as the basis for such a sweeping change in the law set out in these clauses, which would produce a two-tier justice system. They would interfere with press and media freedom in a wholly disproportionate way and create a profound chilling effect on public interest reporting. They undermine the principles of open justice that are the bedrock of our judicial system and vital to our open democratic society. They risk further damaging public confidence in the police, already at an all-time low after the appalling murder of Sarah Everard, and in our judicial system. Above all, they are unnecessary because suitable safeguards that balance officer safety with public accountability and scrutiny already exist and have proved themselves workable and effective. For all these reasons, these clauses should not stand part of the Bill. I hope the Minister will indicate that the Government are going to think again.

My Lords, I support the stand part notices tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood. Clauses 152 to 155 should be removed from the Bill in their entirety.

Before I begin, I want to make absolutely clear to the Committee that there is no question of whether authorised firearms officers encounter danger, because of course they do. I pay tribute to them and their families for the risks they assume in the course of their daily lives to protect us all. Nor is this about whether the court should protect individuals where there is a real and immediate risk to life or safety, because that already exists. I spent 15 years in chambers as a libel and media barrister with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, defending freedom of expression with great passion against the imposition of reporting restrictions. It is that defence that I am here to speak about today, because these clauses would see a constitutional cornerstone of our democracy overturned.

Open justice is not a concession to the media; it is about the public. It is about understanding what is going on in our criminal justice system. It protects the very sacred principle in this country of policing by consent, in which we rely on the public’s confidence and belief in transparency. It maintains confidence in the legitimacy of criminal proceedings. When, tragically—let us be realistic, it is what we are talking here—the state, represented by a fire officer, has killed or maimed someone by the use of force, open justice provides accountability to the public, and the public should have that accountability. That is why anonymity has always been exceptional. It is justified only on evidence and where strictly necessary. Even in cases of national security and terrorism, that remains the case.

So, why now? Why these clauses? It is important that we reflect on the context in which they are being brought forward. The case behind the proposal, acknowledged by the Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, is that of Martyn Blake, a police officer who shot and, tragically, killed Chris Kaba during a police stop in Streatham in September 2022. For those who remember the case, after a year-long investigation—I say that in the light of the previous Amendment—the CPS authorised a charge of murder in September 2023. The court had initially granted the officer anonymity.

Following that charging decision, firearms officers laid down their arms. Noble Lords may recall that there were widely reported issues regarding morale in the force, recruitment of firearms officers and ensuring they knew they had the confidence of the Government and the public to do their jobs safely and securely. All those concerns were legitimate, but I ask noble Lords to remember, and the Government to bear in mind—it seems to have been overlooked in the conversations about this—that those firearms officers laid down their arms after the charging decision, not after the anonymity decision had been lifted. That is what happened. Initially, there was a storm about the anonymity—speculation, fear, concern, conspiracy theories and online campaigns. The officer was subjected to endless questions and issues around his and his family’s life. In fact, there has been no evidence that the lifting of the anonymity order caused any further problems for him than the initial lack of transparency, which raised suspicion and led the public to have fears and doubts.

It is that lack of evidence in bringing these clauses forward that causes me the gravest concern. Under the current system, when an anonymity order is made it is done only on evidence and in exceptional circumstances, as we saw in the Blake case. Here, we are trying to reverse that principle. After that case, noble Lords may also recall there was a review of the standards of conduct in firearms charges—the Godwin/Fulford review. Even then, no issues were raised about the anonymity protection for officers. That was drawn by the Home Secretary from some concerns—and they were put no higher than “concerns”—in the evidence given to that inquiry.

These clauses invert some of the most important principles in our justice system. They would give rise to the risk of a declaration of incompatibility by the European Court of Human Rights subject to Section 4 of the Human Rights Act. They proceed not from risk established in the individual case but from the status of a defendant. What a terrible principle to instil and embody in our law. They tell the courts that secrecy should be presumed and that the public should be kept away from the facts because of the role a defendant performs. It is not a modest adjustment that the Government seek; it is a change of principle and an unprecedented shift in English criminal law.

My noble friend Lord Black has already referenced the compromises and the difficulties for investigation of crimes if the press are not able to report freely. I endorse and support all those; I will not repeat them. Presumptions about reporting matter. They signal to the public Parliament’s view of where the balance should lie, and they shape outcomes and public perception for the reasons the noble Lord gave and many others that I am sure noble Lords sitting here are already thinking about.

Once anonymity becomes the default, openness becomes something that must be justified rather than assumed. That runs against European human rights law, our own Human Rights Act and all the cornerstone principles of our democracy. The justification offered—that firearms officers face a heightened risk of reprisal—is not adequate. It might be true in particular cases, but the law already provides for that very argument. Where risk is demonstrated, courts can and do grant anonymity when it has been justified, on evidence, and shown to be strictly necessary. Not once have we been given a reason in any of the debates, public statements and conversations around these clauses why firearms officers should be singled out for a statutory presumption when others who face serious threats do not.

What are we opening the floodgates to: prison officers, soldiers, witnesses in organised crime cases, or private citizens caught up in highly contentious incidents? Why would we not have to provide anonymity to some or all the above? Equality before the law, our rule of law, is not strengthened by creating special rules for one category of defendant, particularly—this is so important—when that defendant is an agent of the state.

There is also the issue of public confidence. When the state takes a life, transparency is essential. We are the United Kingdom; we have led the world in these principles. We are not Iran or some third-world country trying to figure out how to dictate its people. If Parliament were to accept that open justice may be displaced by default, because of operational pressure or institutional anxiety, it would become easier to extend that logic elsewhere. This is how fundamental principles are eroded: incremental exceptions that seem reasonable in isolation. Maybe it is trite for me, as a former practising barrister, to say that hard cases make bad law; in this case, it would seem hard politics does too.

We already have a system that allows courts to protect safety where it is genuinely at risk without abandoning openness, accountability or equality before the law. For all these reasons, I support the stand part notices and submit that these clauses should not stand part of the Bill.

My Lords, I respectfully disagree with the proposition that these clauses should be removed from the Bill. My views will come as no surprise to the 10 noble Lords who were present in the Chamber on Tuesday night at 11.15 pm to debate my Amendment on why police officers who use excessive force on the spur of the moment, in the honest but mistaken belief that their use of force was reasonable, should be sentenced differently. There will be an opportunity to debate that further at on Report.

The underlying principles here as to whether anonymity should be given to police firearms officers in criminal proceedings where they are charged with a qualifying offence are exactly the same. As the House of Lords Judicial Committee said 30 years ago in the case of Lee Clegg, law enforcement officers deserve to be treated differently, since they go on patrol to assist in the maintenance of law and order with no intention of killing or wounding anyone. They face evil people who get out of bed with the full intention of trying to kill them and us. That life and death situation does not normally confront the rest of us. These officers have to make split-second decisions in order to protect us and deserve, at the very least, to be given anonymity if they are charged with a criminal offence, so that they and their families are protected from adverse publicity during those proceedings.

The last thing we want is such brave officers being deterred from volunteering for firearms training when the National Police Chiefs’ Council says that police forces across England and Wales are grappling with a significant shortage of firearms officers, exacerbated by the lack of legal protections afforded to them, particularly regarding criminal and misconduct proceedings.

Clauses 152 to 155 are a welcome recognition by the Government that police firearms officers are in a unique position. As I have said, I would take this further to address how such officers are sentenced, but that must wait for Report. In the meantime, the modest protection of anonymity during criminal proceedings, with an exception built in where anonymity would not be in the interest of justice, is a proportionate measure which is long overdue.

My Lords, I share with the noble Lord, Lord Carter, concern and admiration for our firearms officers and officers generally, who have a very difficult job. I declare an interest having acted for police forces in cases involving the use of firearms. However, I do not share his conclusions about these provisions.

I should also declare an interest as the chairman of the Independent Press Standards Organisation, which regulates the press or those bodies that choose to be regulated by it. I hope that has given me some indication of some of the challenges that journalists face, particularly in reporting court proceedings. Very often, they struggle to cover court cases because of the reduced number of journalists and the general facilities available to newspapers. Were this provision to become law, they would be faced with a presumption that changes the balance and represents, on the face of it, a challenge to our principles of open justice.

Given that there is already a discretion available to the courts on anonymity, I ask the Minister this: what is wrong with the existing law, which provides that there is such a balance to be exercised by the judge? If there is nothing wrong with the law, there is no need to change it. This is a significant change, and the Government must have some very clear thoughts as to why they are making it. What is the situation that now persists which requires a fundamental change in questions of reporting and free speech?

Supposing it is possible to persuade a judge to rebut the presumption which will now exist in these provisions, what would be a good reason for lifting the anonymity which prima facie is going to be imposed by them? It is important, before we make such a significant change in the law, that the rationale is clearly understood.

While not in any way undermining or questioning the importance of protecting officers in appropriate circumstances, I say that the balance is a very subtle one, and that balance should not be disturbed by these provisions. I do not think we even need to consider the European Court of Human Rights’ position. This is an ancient tradition of open justice, and it is one which is, I am afraid to say, threatened by these provisions.

My Lords, I oppose the stand part notices and support the Government in their clauses. I have heard the proposers of the stand part notices make much of what is a relatively weak argument, suggesting that this is a constitutional outrage, when all that is happening is a change in the assumption about anonymity. Anonymity is already available; this is just about who has to prove whether it should be granted. A lot of hyperbole has been used about this. I accept that the media will make this argument; I do not deny that. I agree that the police should be held accountable; that is not the issue. It is about a very small group of people. I will try to address the point about evidence. A point was made about what evidence had been advanced; I will try to address at least two things.

First, of course, this was built on the Chris Kaba case. Frankly, I think the judge made the wrong decision about anonymity. I believe that because Mr Kaba was arrested having been connected to two shootings and linked to an organised crime gang who had access to firearms. Naming the officer put him at risk of attacks by connected people. Bear in mind that, three years later, within three hours a jury found him not guilty. It was never a very strong case, but why did the judge order the anonymity order to be lifted in those circumstances?

As the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, mentioned, the reaction from firearms officers was to do with two things—the charging of the officer in the first place and the compound effect of the lack of anonymity. I do not think that many of them laid their weapons down. There may have been a threat to, as that was an emotional reaction, but it did not happen because they are honourable people who know that, if they walk away, nobody is there to help, so they will keep doing their job on the whole.

It is a very small group of people who might be affected as suspects in these cases. There are only about 5,500 firearms officers in England and Wales. Over the last 20 years, they shot dead on average three people per year and wounded another two. It is a very rare event that police officers in the UK will shoot people. It has been quite hard for me to find details about how often they have been charged with offences, but I estimate it is around five to 10 times over the last 20 years, so it is quite a rare event. Even if this is to be agreed, and the Bill passes in the form that it is, not that many people will be affected by it. I do not think the press’s accountability mechanism will be affected vastly.

These officers all volunteer. They are not paid any more to do what they do. They cannot be ordered to do what they do. We rely on them. About 60 million of us rely on 5,000 of them to do what none of us can do—to go forward with a gun and deal with a situation that none of us want to face. It is in that circumstance that I think they are, if not a unique group, a very unusual group. Even the military cannot do it unless the Government allow them. This is a pretty special group of people, and we need to support them. I argue that there should be more support. I have argued about when we should charge them. However, this was a singular measure the Government offered in response to the Chris Kaba case and many others.

We could have talked about the Anthony Long case I mentioned earlier. It took 10 years and then they found him not guilty. In the W80 case, an officer, having gone through 10 years of inquiry, then had no case to answer before a misconduct process. These are the cases that are lodged in the minds of the officers who have this task to do on our behalf. Imagine that, in the 0.75 of a second in which you have to make a decision, someone is hanging on your shoulder saying, “Well, make sure you do it right, because we’ll come looking for you afterwards”.

Many of these officers never discharge their weapons. I think in 2025 there were 17,000 incidents in which a police firearm was deployed, but I have already mentioned how often they discharge their weapons; it is very few times. They are not a trigger-happy group. They need our support, and this is just one of the mechanisms by which we can do it.

Secondly, an assumption is all that it is. It can be argued out. The evidence for the change is that the Chris Kaba case shows that judges can get it wrong. Perhaps they, like all of us, can make mistakes. More importantly, how do you prove that there is a genuine threat when someone is charged? There is no such thing as perfect intelligence about whether these things will happen. We saw in the second Iraq war that intelligence is a variable feast. It is people analysing information they have to give their best assessment of whether a threat exists. Surely we should give some leeway to the officer in the case. It is not only about them but about their families. Their families go through this for years as well; they live at the same address. Their kids go to the same schools. They are affected by it.

I have met the officer involved in the Chris Kaba case. The experience his family had over the years that he was under inquiry was pretty awful. They had to move out for a while and had to decide whether to permanently move home. We all say, “Well, actually, this is just a point of principle and a legal issue”, but it is not to them; this is their life. I understand why the media make the argument and why it is a legal issue that must be debated properly, but I think this is a minor measure that might give some comfort to a brave group of people whom we rely upon.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Carter, for reminding us of his late-night work the other night, and I look forward to discussing that subject when we come back to it on Report. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, for bringing a practical police view to this very difficult debate. I come at this from a position essentially in favour of these clauses not standing part, for the reasons so far advanced by my noble friends Lady Cash and Lord Black, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks.

This is a difficult question. Unquestionably, it is a difficult question. If it were not, we would not be here. We have, as parliamentarians, as legislators, to work out where the balance should lie between the desire for anonymity for police officers in these circumstances and the desire for openness, open justice and the ability of the public—not just the press but the public as a whole—to see what is being done in their name in the court system.

I hope I shall not go on too long merely repeating what others have already said, but it is worth reminding ourselves that the courts work on the basis of open justice. The public are entitled to watch, to read and to comment about trials, and to know who has been charged and prosecuted and with what result. There are exceptions to protect national security, vulnerable witnesses, victims of sexual offences and children. We have a regime for, first of all, providing for reporting restrictions; secondly, for restricting public access to the courtroom and for holding all or part of some trials in private; and, thirdly, for withholding the name of witnesses—for example, under a witness order under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. But a witness order under that provision is a special measure of the last practical resort, and requires the court to be vigorous in its consideration of the statutory hurdles that have to be overcome and to ensure that the defendant is not irreparably disadvantaged or denied a fair trial. Fourthly, we have within that regime provision for anonymity in investigations—for example, when considering fatal gang crimes involving the use of guns and knives by those aged 11 to 30.

Police officers are human—I underline the word “human”. They are a human example of state power—and I underline the word “state”. We respect and we admire them for their often dangerous and selfless work. We know from our own work here in Parliament how vital police officers are for our own protection. I was not far away from the scene of PC Palmer’s murder in March 2017. He was unarmed and later awarded a posthumous George Medal, but there were armed officers there who had to kill PC Palmer’s murderer. I heard those shots as I walked along the colonnade in New Palace Yard from my office in Portcullis House to take part in a Division in the other place. The noble Lord, Lord Hanson, may well have gone through the same experience. I was grateful then, as I am to this day, to the police men and women on duty that day who ushered me and other Members of the other place to safety, regardless of their own.

But it is, in the final analysis, a matter of judgment on which side of this argument we need to come down—on the side of anonymity or on that of open justice. I bear in mind the need for armed police officers and their families to be protected from reprisals, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, mentioned. I bear in mind the operational need not to discourage volunteers suitably qualified to become armed response officers or armed officers. We have been reminded this morning of the case of Martyn Blake, which created, I think, the genesis of these clauses.

However, I also bear in mind the constitutional and public policy demands. I would not describe this as a constitutional outrage; it is a perfectly rational debate about which side of a difficult line one wishes to land. It is not a constitutional outrage to do one thing or the other. It is just advancing an argument. But I bear in mind the constitutional and public policy demands for open justice, for public trust and for transparency in a justice system that applies to us all without creating different categories of defendant as a question of blanket rule. Blanket rules of the sort envisaged by Clauses 152 to 155 are, I suggest, best avoided where a stronger, focused case-by-case approval approach can be achieved—and it is, in my experience, already achieved under our current system.

In the last few days, we have seen the ICE officer shoot that woman driving her car in Minnesota. Of course I have only seen the news footage, but I suggest that, here, that ICE officer would be prosecuted for murder, subject to any defence he could advance. That case aside, we face the problem of some lawyers and campaigners using every police shooting as the basis of an anti-police pile-on, or for some other political campaign that they happen to support. In short, if we are, as I hope we will be, sceptical about Clauses 152 to 155 standing part of the Bill, we must prevent the appalling hunting parties against the police. Let us then pause and reflect before agreeing to these clauses.

I dare say we will not make a decision today, other than that the issue advanced by my noble friend Lord Black will be withdrawn. But we all have a little time between now and Report—we come here with the best of intentions and good will—to think a little more carefully about the practical solution to this, and whether we need to use the blunderbuss of legislation or whether we can still rely on judicial discretion, vigorously applied and well argued for in each separate case, to see where justice can be found.

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I ask him this? I respect his opinion, for obvious reasons, but one issue he did not address—it was one of my arguments for why these clauses should stand part—is the difficulty of proving the threat at the beginning of an investigation. It is not straightforward. We have to say that someone out there is going to kill this officer or try to attack them—that there is a threat to them in some way. Of course we all make our best attempts to assess whether that is accurate or not. He describes the present system as a blanket arrangement, but actually there is only an assumption, which can be removed, and in the Kaba case was removed. That leaves the officer at risk of that decision being automatic—that is, to be named if they cannot prove otherwise. Why should they bear the risk of being named, when the reverse could allow, first, an assumption they would not be named, and if later that changed, they could be named. What we can never do is name someone, then introduce anonymity—so it is a one-way valve that surely the law might help to respect.

The matter that the noble Lord is bringing up is the very sort of discussion that ought to be had in front of the judge. Presumably, no prosecutor, and no one acting on behalf of a police officer who wished to maintain his anonymity, would advance an argument unless there were some basis for it. If someone went in front of the judge and said, “I’m generally fearful that, just because he’s a police officer who bears arms, he is likely to be the victim of reprisal”, I think they would probably need to do a bit better than that. I suspect nobody would go in front of the judge and make that argument unless they had something better than that.

I suspect that, in the usual run of things, there will be information. It may not be information that the court would wish the world at large to know about. It could be intelligence evidence. It could be other information that both the applicant—the applicant police officer or the applicant prosecutor—and the judge would agree should be kept private. That surely can be done now. We have all sorts of national security cases where evidence is not disclosed to the world at large. All I ask is: let us just think a little bit further. It may well be that, at the end of the day, we shall come to the same conclusion as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and as the Government do in their clauses. But I have yet to be persuaded that we have got to the right answer today.

My Lords, I strongly support keeping these clauses in the Bill. I admire the moral courage of Ministers in this Government for putting these clauses in the Bill, despite the well-made arguments against doing so.

My calculation is that, in central London, a rampaging terrorist’s life expectancy is about nine minutes. Not surprisingly, these events are infrequent, because they are not likely to be successful. This is primarily due to the fortitude, courage and training of the armed police officers of the Metropolitan Police.

I have been on duty in an operational military headquarters, in the field, overseas, when we had to deal with life-threatening emergencies. There is nearly always an information fog, and it is exceptionally difficult for commanders to understand what is actually happening on the ground. The same will apply to police control rooms during a terrorist attack. I understand the difficulties; I have been there. Nevertheless, the Metropolitan Police and other forces usually manage to suppress an attack within a few minutes, for which we should all be really grateful. Unfortunately, it is inevitable that, if there are enough such incidents, perceived or real problems will arise. We only need to think of the difficulties that arose with the Bondi Beach tragedy. We must accept that things might not go as desired.

I am not a lawyer, but the Committee will be aware that I have engaged in armed military operations. I knew that I was accountable for my actions, as well as any troops under my command. That was an obvious risk, but one that, as a prudent risk-taker, I was prepared to accept because I was confident that I would be fairly and promptly dealt with if something went wrong. I am not convinced that the same applies to armed police operations. We have already discussed in the last group delays in the disciplinary machinery. Unfortunately, I was late attending, but I agreed with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said—I apologise for not being there at the start.

In questionable police firearms cases, the CPS has the very difficult task of balancing two conflicting factors. On one hand, there is the very low probability of conviction in these cases—perhaps the Minister will tell us how many armed officers on duty have been convicted of such offences. If that were the only consideration, it would be difficult to authorise a prosecution because the prospect of a conviction would be very low. But, on the other hand, we need to secure public confidence that the police and the state are not above the law and that the evidence against a relevant police officer will be tested by a jury in court. If we do not agree these clauses, we run the risk of prudent risk-takers declining to be trained or to keep their firearms ticket.

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, touched on the use of the military instead of the police. The military is not correctly trained to undertake civil policing duties. It can in certain circumstances be used, but the military will apply overwhelming military force to resolve the issue.

This lack of willingness to volunteer for firearms duty could, in turn, result in standards being surreptitiously lowered in order to meet demand for authorised firearms officers, leading to precisely the opposite effect to the one we desire. I am sure the Minister will deny that there is any possibility of standards being surreptitiously lowered, but I assure noble Lords that, in the military—not so much in firearms training but in other areas—we are surreptitiously lowering the standards, so this is a very real risk. The noble Lord, Lord Carter, touched on existing recruiting difficulties.

When, regrettably, an armed police officer has to do his or her duty, we cannot allow the lives of his or her family and friends to be turned upside down by media attention that serves no useful purpose.

My Lords, this is not a small matter that we are debating. I have listened to both sides of the argument. The argument in favour of these stand part notices was made in detail, initially by the noble Lord, Lord Black, and was then supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Cash. I listened to those submissions, and they strongly reflected my own. I asked myself: is there anything I can usefully add? I do not think there is, but we are dealing with a matter of high principle. The noble Baroness, Lady Cash, reminded us of the statement that hard cases make bad law. What we have heard in Opposition to these stand part notices exemplifies that proposition. We are dealing with a very important matter, and we should not allow a few hard cases to make bad law.

My Lords, I find myself persuaded by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. This is a moment when, as legislators, we have to pause and ask where the balance really lies. For me, this is not an either/or. When legislators try to legislate, they must not pass the burden of coming to terms with difficult conundrums to someone else to resolve. I would be quite unhappy if we were to leave it to the judge to decide. If they go for anonymity, the courts could then be seen by some people as being on the side not of the citizen but of a few. We have to resolve this and come to a common mind on where we think this should be done. It seems to me that we should not burden the courts with coming to a decision. Legislators should make up their minds on what way they want to go.

I am persuaded by the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe. I have always been in favour of open courts, trial by jury and no citizen being above the law. We should all have equality before the law, but that argument can sometimes, unfortunately, ignore circumstances that need to be differentiated—not because you do not want fairness and equality but because, if you blindly go down a particular road, you may cause a greater injustice. That is why I am not in favour of people who are so moralist and who keep to their morals: if you are not careful, you could end up with an injustice.

To those who oppose these clauses and to the Government, who bravely want to put this particular way of doing it in the Bill, I suggest that a further conversation needs to be had. How do we resolve this? Clearly, some of us—and I am one of them—would like to defend police officers who have to decide in a split-second to do something, without a lot of thought. They see a danger and they want to neutralise it—not like in Minnesota, where I do not think there was any danger; I would not want to defend those kinds of actions. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has given us the figures, and actually the statistics are very low. In the unfortunate cases where this has happened, most of our armed police officers are disciplined and well trained. However, in life, you always end up with risks you did not anticipate.

I would want to go the way that the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, argued for—that if somebody took a decision because they saw greater danger and they took somebody out, I can tell you, the media and other people will focus on their family, not on the decision that was taken. We who are legislators cannot ignore the difficulty that that raises for families.

I do not think that volunteers will disappear immediately if these clauses are not part of the Bill. I still think there are people who, for the sake of security and the well-being of society, will continue to volunteer—but you are going to make it more difficult. I plead with all of us in that regard. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has encapsulated my thoughts on this but I am still in a quandary: will I vote for this or for that? I just hope that the mover of this stand part notice will withdraw it, knowing that Report is still to come, so that it is a clear conversation, and then we can all make up our mind where this is going to lie.

My Lords, can I just make an observation that the question is whether we agree these clauses in the Bill or not? If we do not agree the clauses in the Bill, they will fall out of the Bill and then we cannot consider them at a later stage. If we want to consider them at a later stage, we must agree them today.

My Lords, it is with great trepidation that I speak, very briefly. Having heard such powerful legal voices discussing these issues—and I hugely respect the legal expertise that we have in the House—on the basis of what we have heard and how the Government have approached this issue, I am minded to support the Government in the initiatives that they are taking here. I feel that we really ought to support these highly disciplined firearms officers. We are living in the era of lawfare and of the courts being used not to the advantage of those who seek to protect us all.

We are very fortunate in this country, unlike in other countries, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, mentioned, to have a situation where the discharge of police firearms is a very rare eventuality. Those who hold that responsibility are highly trained, highly disciplined and highly motivated individuals. If there is a situation where they end up in a court of law because of the discharge of their firearm in the course of their duty, we should support them until there is a decision of that court. Of course, everything changes at that point. But this is about them being endangered, and having the threat of being endangered. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said about how difficult it is to describe that threat in the beginning—and you cannot go backwards on this. In this very specific and rare eventuality, I believe that we should give those who put their lives in danger to protect us the benefit of the doubt.

My Lords, I may be wrong, but I had never understood that until there was a vote anything in a Bill disappeared. Consequently, unless I am wrong, unless we vote on these three clauses, they will remain until Report. Consequently, I do not entirely understand what the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, was telling us.

To move on, I shall speak extremely briefly—and, I have to say, unlike some noble Lords, I genuinely mean briefly. First, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, has pointed out, this is a profoundly important issue. Secondly, hard cases do not make good law. I am very unhappy at the idea that anyone should automatically be given anonymity in a situation in which they have behaved in a way where there is at least a possibility that they may be guilty of some crime. I would prefer to see the situation as it remains today—but I also listened to, and think that it is a very sensible suggestion from, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that the pause should give us time to discuss further how on earth this should be dealt with.

My Lords, from these Benches we support a carefully framed presumption of anonymity for firearms officers facing criminal charges, but we believe that it should be tightly drawn and subject to clear judicial safeguards.

Giving automatic anonymity to firearms officers who face criminal charges would mark a major and highly sensitive change. It deserves careful and measured consideration and scrutiny to strike the right balance. The public must have confidence that wrongdoing by officers will be dealt with fairly and transparently. But equally—and I think this is very important—officers must feel assured that if they act in good faith and follow their training, the system will protect and not punish them.

We welcome the wider provisions of the Bill to strengthen police accountability, particularly those speeding up investigations by the IOPC, but we understand why firearms officers seek reassurance. These are exceptionally difficult and high-risk roles, where hesitation can have tragic consequences. With fewer than 6,000 operational firearms officers across England and Wales, those concerns cannot be lightly dismissed.

At the same time, we recognise the force of the arguments made by those noble Lords who support the stand part notices proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and accept that a broad, inflexible anonymity system sits uneasily with the principle of open justice. The public have a legitimate right to know when those entrusted with legal powers are alleged to have acted unlawfully. Our preference is for a statutory presumption in favour of anonymity in firearms cases, rebuttable when the court is satisfied that identification is necessary in the interests of justice or public confidence.

We should trust our judges to apply a clear statutory test, protecting officers where necessary, while safeguarding the principles of open justice on which confidence in policing depends. A narrowly tailored presumption, coupled with robust judicial oversight, can provide the reassurance that firearms officers need without creating the perception of a two-tier justice system that treats police officers differently from everyone else. Of course, rebuilding trust in policing must be our shared priority, and ultimately that rests not on secrecy but on transparency, fairness and confidence that accountability will apply equally to all.

Thankfully, fatal police shootings are rare, and it is even rarer still for such cases to reach the courts. In these exceptional, highly charged cases, a carefully limited presumption of anonymity is a reasonable and proportionate step to keep skilled officers in these vital roles, while upholding open justice.

My Lords, as I think we all agree, this is a profoundly important issue, and one in which there is realistically no perfectly right answer. But let us start with the position that it remains one of the greatest triumphs of British policing that to this day we do not routinely have armed police officers. The image envisaged by Sir Robert Peel when he established the Metropolitan Police—that of policing by consent and the avoidance of a militarised police force, when he had the example of what he saw on continental Europe at the time—has endured. I have listened anxiously to the speeches today, which have been thoughtful and balanced. But we start, on this side, in His Majesty’s Opposition, with the view that on balance the approach of Clauses 152 to 155 is the right one. I shall say more about that in a moment.

While the vast Majority of police officers in this country are unarmed, we know that, in order to protect the public, a few thousand brave officers volunteer to put themselves in harm’s way and become authorised firearms officers. The latest figures show that, as of 31 March 2025, there were 6,367 firearms officers in England and Wales. Of those, 5,753 were operationally deployable. That represented a decrease of 108—or 2%—from the previous year. There is a downward trend in the number of armed police officers, which should be a matter of concern to us all. It has to be arrested.

It is not hard to see why fewer and fewer officers are willing to take on this role. The recent prosecution of, and events surrounding, Martyn Blake demonstrate what can go wrong. Throughout, Martyn Blake was public property. He was left in limbo for two years while awaiting an IOPC investigation, a CPS decision and then a murder trial. As we have heard, he was eventually acquitted in October 2024. Despite that acquittal, the IOPC then announced that it was launching a further investigation for gross misconduct. This remains unresolved. Through all of that, he has been publicly known to everyone.

Matt Cane, the general secretary of the Metropolitan Police Federation, has criticised that in the strongest terms—with which we, on this side, broadly agree. The concern and criticisms which he raised have real-world consequences. Police officers feel that their reasonable use of force may be treated disproportionately or unreasonably after the event in a manner which does not recognise the pressures they face when they make split-second decisions.

During the trial of Martyn Blake, dozens of officers handed in their weapons. There was a serious concern that, in the event of a guilty verdict, police forces across the country would be faced with real, severe shortages of armed officers. The publicity given to all that must have been an aggravating factor for Mr Blake. We have to protect these police officers.

We have heard powerful speeches, from the proposer, my noble friend Lord Black, my noble friend Lady Cash and others, not least the noble and learned Lords, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers and Lord Garnier, either in full support of these stand part notices or asking us to look very carefully at them with a view to doing something along those lines.

There are important issues to consider: open justice; whether or not there should be special treatment for police officers; and concerns about unintended consequences. I remind the Committee of the provisions in Clause 152(3), which says that the court must, first,

“cause the following information to be withheld from the public in proceedings before the court, in each case unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”; then come the identification details. The court must also

“give a reporting direction … in respect of D”— the defendant—

“(if one does not already have effect), unless satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”.

This is putting in place a presumption which can be rebutted.

I feel that this is rather broad. In practice, it would be helpful for the courts and for those who have to deal with applications to act on that presumption and to lift that bar, if this was put rather more clearly, with some examples. I do not have any to put before the Committee today, but I came to that view when listening to the debate. I invite the Government to think very carefully about whether something should be done about the terms in the clause. This might go quite a way to addressing the concerns of those who are legitimately concerned about the wrong sort of special treatment being given to police officers, and about open justice more generally.

His Majesty’s Opposition are broadly in favour of these provisions, but I ask the noble Lord: if this becomes law, how is a judge going to change his or her approach to the issue of anonymity from the position that prevailed before this change? How is it going to alter things?

He is going to start—assuming that the judge is a he—from the position that, unless there is an application to the contrary, the bar against publication is in force. I am asking the Government to consider, before we return on Report, whether guidance can be developed and something put into the Bill which addresses the concerns about it being too difficult and imprecise to address in practice. We can listen to and address this on Report. At the moment, we support the provisions in the Bill, but I advance certain—I would not say reservations—anxieties about how this will work in practice and whether, in fact, it would be an absolute bar. Clearly, one hopes that this is not what is intended and that these words are not there just as some sort of fig leaf.

This is not an easy position. We heard some powerful and very persuasive speeches on the other side from the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, calling for support for our officers, and from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who, perhaps, more than any of us, knows what is truly involved for these police officers.

We support the clauses as they are. I remind the Committee that, as we stand here debating the issue of anonymity for firearms officers, outside this building, we are being protected by members of this very special group. In and around this building, they work every day—day in, day out—to keep us safe. We are able to continue with our important work of legislating only because of the safety which armed police officers provide. We owe those who protect us a real degree of protection. On the assumption that they are acting in good faith, they must be spared from the anxiety that if something goes wrong—and it will have gone wrong if they feel they have to shoot—they must not then be left exposed, as Martyn Blake was. We have seen how that went wrong. On this basis, for the time being at least, we support these clauses.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for giving notice of his Opposition that Clauses 152 to 155 stand part of the Bill, and the noble Lord, Lord Black of Brentwood, for introducing the Clause stand part debate and allowing this important and interesting discussion. I acknowledge from the outset that the Government agree these are not easy issues.

Clauses 152 to 155 largely stand or fall together, creating a bespoke system for a very small and discrete category of defendants in criminal trials; namely, authorised firearms officers charged with offences arising from the discharge of their weapon during the course of their official duties.

Notwithstanding the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about lawyers—of which, of course, I am one—made during the course of the debate on the last group, I agree with much of what he has said. The starting point for the Government is that armed police officers perform a unique and high-risk role. They are trained to use lethal force, on behalf of the state, to protect the public, often in fast-moving and dangerous situations. This puts them personally at risk of death or serious injury every day in the course of their duties. They deserve our thanks and admiration for putting themselves in harm’s way to protect the public—and that, a point made by many of your Lordships, includes you and me. Because many of those with whom they engage are involved in serious crime, it exposes them and their families to the risk of retribution. That is the Government’s starting point.

There is another equally important principle in play: we do not have secret trials in this country. The principles of open justice and the ability for the press to report on cases continues to be one of our proudest and most carefully and jealously guarded traditions. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, for whom I have the utmost respect, for putting in impassioned terms the importance of freedom of the press and freedom of speech.

So why then have the Government decided to introduce a presumption of anonymity in trials for authorised firearms officers? This limited presumption is being introduced due to the unique nature of firearms officers’ roles and the risks that arise from them being identified during court proceedings. What marks them out from other categories of defendant is that these are not risks merely to their reputation but to their lives. These are not theoretical risks. Firearms officers who have been charged with an offence can face serious death threats and other forms of intimidation. The threats do not stop with them but extend to their families as well. The real and present nature of this danger cannot be ignored.

I want to give two illustrations of incidents which demonstrate how extreme the consequences can be for those who serve as firearms officers. In one case, a contract for murder was issued against an officer who had acted in the line of duty and who was later found to have acted entirely within the law. In another, a bounty was placed on an officer who, as things turned out, had been lawfully carrying out their responsibilities. The threat is not theoretical; it is a stark reality. The safety of our officers and those they love must not be compromised. Some of these officers may later be found not guilty by a jury, but if they and their families have faced real and credible threats, by then the damage is done.

The time has come for action to be taken. The National Police Chiefs’ Council has said that firearms officers are fearful of the consequences and processes for them if they are involved in a death or serious injury case because of what has happened to colleagues, mostly so because of how it has played out in the media.

The noble Lord, Lord Black, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made the point that the courts already have the power to order reporting restrictions in a case where the court judges that disclosure of a defendant’s identity would give rise to a real and immediate risk to life, and asked why a presumption is necessary. Our answer is this. It must be remembered, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, pointed out, that police officers volunteer for armed roles and they are not compelled to undertake such duties, nor are they paid more to do so. Data from armed policing shows the start of a slow decline in the number of those wishing to serve as armed officers. The armed policing attrition and retention document records that, since 2019, there has been a loss of 583 armed officers. That is an 8.8% reduction. Everyone hearing this should be worried. We rely on these officers to keep us and those we love, as well as our fellow citizens, safe. We, a Labour Government, are persuaded and have decided to act.

We have concluded that we need to strike a balance between the safety and security of our brave firearms officers, who are presumed innocent unless or until convicted by a court of law, and their families and our inviolable principles of open justice and freedom of the press. I venture to suggest that this is what these provisions achieve. The most important things to note are that these. First, once a jury has decided that the defendant is guilty then of course their identity will be made public. Secondly, these provisions establish only a presumption of anonymity during the trial. The judge at any stage has the ability to order that part or all of the defendant’s identifying characteristics should be revealed. It changes only where we start, not necessarily where we end up. Thirdly, the media and others will be informed, as is usual, of cases where there is a reporting restriction in place. Journalists and others will be able to make representations to the judge as to why they say that the identity should be known at an early stage, to help the judge decide where the balance should be struck in any individual case.

I remind your Lordships of the old truism about the difference between what is in the public interest and matters in which the public are interested. It is judges who make decisions of this kind every day and are best placed to do so. I add the reassurance that, where a judge concludes that narrower steps will suffice, the court will order only the minimum necessary. I can say to your Lordships from my own experience, and knowing my former judicial colleagues as I do, that they take the freedom of the press to report trials very seriously indeed. I venture to say that the two distinguished former judges who have spoken in this debate—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—have shown just that.

Open justice remains the starting point. This measure introduces a narrow, rebuttable presumption for a small, clearly defined cohort. Proceedings will remain public, evidence will be tested in open court, and judicial reasons are given. Only the defendant’s details may be withheld, where necessary, until the point of conviction. It expressly allows the court to lift anonymity wherever it would be

“contrary to the interests of justice” for the anonymity to remain.

I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, that this is a difficult issue that needs to be approached with care and that everyone should be moderate in the way they approach it. However, this measure does not compromise transparency or judicial independence. All it does it ensure that officers are not exposed to undue risk before the facts have been tested and decided upon by a court. It is about fairness, safety, and maintaining confidence in policing and justice.

I hope that my explanation of these clauses has gone some way to reassuring your Lordships. It would, as always, be a pleasure to meet the noble Lords, Lord Black and Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, again—I think this is the third time in 48 hours that I have offered to meet him—as well as representatives of the News Media Association, who have written to me at least twice on this important topic. I would be more than happy to discuss all of their concerns. In the meantime, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Black, to withdraw his opposition to the clause standing part.

I thank the Minister very much for her comments and the offer to meet. I suspect she is involved in a large number of meetings at the moment, and we will try not to add too much to the burden.

This has been a very good debate on a difficult subject, but one, as we have heard from a number of people, that is of profound importance. We have to get the balance right, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, and that is what this debate has shown.

I will make three quick points, if I may. First, to underline what we heard a number of times in this debate, of course we all have huge admiration and respect for firearms officers. They are a very brave group of people who do a great deal here to protect us, and we are in their debt. They deserve protection. The points we have tried to make are that they have it at the moment. The difficulty with these clauses is that it is made automatic. That means, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, it is not always going to be easy to rebut.

There is an issue, as far as the media is concerned, that a presumption of anonymity could mean that the media is not put on proper notice and therefore is unable to challenge the presumption, if indeed those media outlets possess the resources to do so. If it is left to potluck that reporters become aware then open justice erodes, because the media has not got a chance to consider whether it should contest the presumption.

Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and others have said that, thankfully, it is a very small number of cases such as this that ever come to court. It is not about that; this is a matter, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, of high principle. In my experience, open justice and press freedom do not perish because of obvious assaults against them but because of apparently innocuous incremental changes such as this and the provision of special cases. The point, as my noble friend Lady Cash said, is that if anonymity becomes the default, openness has to be justified. That is the end of a very slippery slope, which is one of the things the Minister and I can talk about when we meet.

Finally, to echo a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, made, at the end of the day, this is about state power and the exercise of state power. We chip away at the scrutiny of that at our peril. To do so, we should have overwhelming evidence. I appreciate what the Minister said in summing up, but I still do not believe that the case has been made. A number of noble Lords have said that we have time before Report to consider this further. It is a matter of huge importance, so let us take the time before Report to do so. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my Opposition to the Clause.

Clause 152 agreed.

Clauses 153 to 155 agreed.

Amendments 423 and 423A not moved.

Clauses 156 to 164 agreed.

Schedule 19 agreed.

Clause 165 agreed.

Clause 166: Power to give directions to critical police undertakings