Amendment 1

Sentencing Bill - Report – in the House of Lords at 3:40 pm on 6 January 2026.

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Lord Keen of Elie:

Moved by Lord Keen of Elie

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 14, after “months” insert “before any credit is given for a guilty plea”Member’s explanatory statementThis Amendment would mean that the presumption for a suspended sentence would apply to sentences before credit is given for a guilty plea.

Photo of Lord Keen of Elie Lord Keen of Elie Shadow Minister (Justice), Shadow Advocate-General for Scotland

My Lords, my Amendments 1 and 27 concern the interaction between the presumption of suspended sentences in Clause 1 and the application of credit for a guilty plea at the first opportunity.

In Committee, I raised what I consider to be a straightforward but important point of drafting and of principle: whether the presumption for a suspended sentence is intended to apply to the sentence before or after credit is given for a guilty plea. The purpose of that Amendment was to probe how widely the Government intend this presumption to operate. The Minister’s response in Committee confirmed that the presumption would apply after guilty plea credit had been awarded. That confirmation is important, as it means that the presumption of suspended sentences is not confined to offences attracting sentences of up to 12 months, as has been repeatedly suggested, but in practice extends to offences carrying a sentence of up to 18 months, which is of course beyond the sentencing provisions of the magistrates’ court and takes us into to the realm of what is generally regarded as serious crime.

The Minister opposed this amendment on the basis that it would create inconsistency. He argued that the presumption would not apply where an early guilty plea reduced a sentence to 12 months or less but could still apply where other forms of mitigation achieved the same effect. That objection, I say respectfully, misunderstands both the purpose and the effect of this amendment. The distinction between credit for a guilty plea and other forms of mitigation is deliberate and long established. Credit for a guilty plea is not mitigation in the ordinary sense. It is a structured formulaic reduction applied for a specific policy purpose: to encourage early admissions of guilt and spare victims the ordeal of trial. Indeed, Parliament and the Sentencing Council have always treated it separately.

This amendment seeks to ensure that the starting point for the court, whether an offence ordinarily attracts custody or suspension, is determined by the seriousness of the offence and not by a subsequent procedural discount. Without this amendment, Clause 1 operates in a way that the Government have never openly acknowledged. An offender facing a sentence of up to 18 months’ imprisonment can, by entering an early guilty plea, reduce that sentence by one-third and thereby bring himself within the automatic presumption of suspension. That is not a marginal effect but a substantial expansion of the scope of Clause 1. That is what I described in Committee as opening Pandora’s box.

Once the presumption is allowed to apply after a guilty plea credit, it ceases to be confined to genuinely low-level offending. Offences such as robbery, serious assault or the possession of knives—offences that Parliament and the public would reasonably expect to attract immediate custody—are surreptitiously drawn into the presumption, even though they can carry sentences of 15 months or more. If that is the Government’s intention, it should be stated plainly, but if, as Ministers have repeatedly suggested, the presumption is aimed only at genuinely short sentences of up to 12 months, this amendment is necessary to give effect to that stated policy.

We also heard a wider concern in Committee that I think was left unacknowledged: by allowing guilty plea credit to determine eligibility for suspension, the Bill risks creating perverse incentives. Offenders may come to believe that pleading guilty is not merely a matter of sentence reduction but a route to avoiding custody altogether, and that risks undermining public confidence in the justice system.

This amendment does not undermine the policy of encouraging guilty pleas, nor does it widen the scope of custody. It is a technical clarification designed to ensure that Clause 1 operates as the Government have publicly described it and not in a far broader and unintended manner. If the Minister cannot give us these assurances, I will seek to divide the House.

Photo of Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Liberal Democrat Lords Spokesperson (Justice) 3:45, 6 January 2026

My Lords, if nobody is going to speak before me on this Amendment, I shall do so, but only very briefly. I hear everything that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has said, but it is my view and my suggestion that that misunderstands the nature of the discount that is given for a guilty plea. A discount for a guilty plea may not have originally been formalised, but it has always been treated, and should be treated, as mitigation of itself, properly so called, because it recognises guilt, and by recognising guilt, the defendant goes some way to establishing reform. It is the starting point for reform. It also, as the noble and learned Lord has recognised, avoids the trauma of a trial for victims and is a further indication of remorse. So I fully understand why a guilty plea, while it may be that without a guilty plea a sentence would have exceeded 12 months, should attract exactly the same discount as in the case of not guilty pleas.

Photo of Lord Timpson Lord Timpson The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice

I start by setting out my appreciation for the support that the Government have received for Clause 1. Throughout the Bill’s passage, noble Lords have highlighted evidence showing that those given a community order or a suspended sentence reoffend less than similar offenders given a short prison sentence. We are following the evidence to reduce crime, creating fewer victims and safer communities, and we are following the lead of the previous Conservative Government, who originally introduced this measure during the last Parliament without the Amendment we are debating today. I am a great believer in working across the political spectrum to get the best policies that reduce reoffending. I have dedicated myself to solving this problem and creating a sustainable justice system. I strongly believe that the clause as drafted, without any further amendments, is the best policy, and I must repeat that we are not abolishing short sentences.

I can assure noble Lords that I have considered the issue of early guilty pleas, raised by Amendments 1 and 27, with great care. I have met the noble and learned Lord to discuss his concerns and I value the attention given to this issue, but it has long been the practice of the courts to give a reduction in sentence where a defendant pleads guilty. This avoids the need for a trial, enables cases to be dealt with quickly and shortens the gap between charge and sentence. The Government do not wish to disincentivise early guilty pleas, in part because of the urgent need to reduce the backlog in cases coming to court. Early guilty pleas can save victims and witnesses from concern about having to give evidence, which is particularly important in traumatic cases. These amendments risk reducing the incentive to plead guilty, potentially causing further avoidable trauma for victims, and they would create a clear and significant anomaly in sentencing.

For reasons of simplicity and coherence, it is the final sentence length given by the judge that must be relevant for the purposes of the presumption. Under these amendments, the presumption would not apply where an early guilty plea had brought the sentence down to 12 months or less, yet it could still apply where any other mitigation, such as age or being a primary carer, had the same effect. The inconsistency is stark. Two offenders receiving the same final sentence could be treated entirely differently, based solely on the type of mitigation applied. This is neither coherent nor fair.

Finally, the Sunset clause proposed in Amendment 103 would introduce unnecessary instability. It would undermine public confidence and complicate operational planning for courts, prisons, probation services and local authorities. The last thing we need at the moment is instability in the justice system.

I am a firm believer in dealing with problems head-on and solving them for the long term. We inherited difficult decisions that needed to be made, but someone had to make them, because we simply cannot run out of cells. We are building 14,000 new ones, but that takes time. I came into this job to rebuild our criminal justice system to lead to fewer victims, not more. Clause 1 is a crucial means of achieving that, and undermining it through further exclusions is not the right way forward. There will be a long Shadow over those who vote for amendments to put even more pressure on the prison system.

I hope that I have explained why the Government’s position is the right one and I hope for cross-party support for a truly cross-party policy. After all, this was originally a Conservative measure, reintroduced in this Bill by Labour and supported by the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Green Party in Committee in the Commons. I therefore kindly urge noble Lords not to support these amendments.

Photo of Lord Keen of Elie Lord Keen of Elie Shadow Minister (Justice), Shadow Advocate-General for Scotland

I am obliged to the Minister for his observations. However, I have a number of points.

First, the apparent use of statistics comparing repeat offending by those who suffer a suspended sentence with those who are given a prison sentence is, potentially, very misleading. In general, repeat offenders will receive a sentence of imprisonment, whereas single offenders will often receive a suspended sentence. It is those who are inclined towards the repetition of criminal conduct who are imprisoned, and therefore the comparison made with these statistics is, potentially, highly misleading.

Secondly, I do not accept the reference to any other mitigation. The procedural mitigation—procedural discount, in reality—granted in respect of a guilty plea is not comparable. It was not in the past considered comparable with the other aspects of mitigation mentioned by the noble Lord.

The Government have repeatedly described this policy as targeting only genuinely short sentences. Sentences of more than 12 months are not genuinely short sentences; they are sentences that can be imposed only by the Crown Court. They are regarded as sentences applicable to serious criminal conduct; that is not the purpose of Clause 1 in its present form. The Government wrote in their own manifesto that the sentences criminals receive

“often do not make sense either to victims or the wider public”.

Allowing serious offenders to evade custody will do little to rebuild public confidence in the justice system. If the Government truly intend to suspend sentences of up to 18 months as a matter of policy, they should have plainly said so. If they do not, they should accept this Amendment. In these circumstances, with some regret, I beg to test the opinion of the House.

Ayes 182, Noes 209.

Division number 1 Sentencing Bill - Report — Amendment 1

Aye: 180 Members of the House of Lords

No: 206 Members of the House of Lords

Aye: A-Z by last name

Tellers

No: A-Z by last name

Tellers

Amendment 1 disagreed.

Amendments 2 to 24 not moved.

Amendment

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amendment

As a bill passes through Parliament, MPs and peers may suggest amendments - or changes - which they believe will improve the quality of the legislation.

Many hundreds of amendments are proposed by members to major bills as they pass through committee stage, report stage and third reading in both Houses of Parliament.

In the end only a handful of amendments will be incorporated into any bill.

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