Lord Meston:

Moved by Lord Meston

272: Clause 72, page 90, line 20, leave out “, they are given reason to suspect” and insert “and Wales, they know or suspect, or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting,”Member’s explanatory statementThe purpose of this Amendment is to align the wording with that of the equivalent duty to report money laundering as stated in section 330(2) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and to extend the scope of the duty to cover Wales in addition to England.

My noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson cannot be here and has asked me to speak to her amendments in this group, 12 in number, to which I had already added my name in support. I pay tribute to her dedicated campaigning on what we will now debate. All her amendments concern and seek to reinforce the Government’s decision to legislate for mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse in a wide range of contexts.

My noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson’s amendments are based on her earlier Private Member’s Bill and echo amendments by her to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill, which was debated in June. I recall that in that debate the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, referred to a need for a clear and comprehensive system of mandatory reporting. Following the work of IICSA, which highlighted the widespread and endemic nature of child sexual abuse, the Government’s decision to put forward the duty set out in Chapter 2 is welcome and should be supported—but I would say, only as far as it goes.

The main point of difference is that whereas the Bill does not expressly provide for sanctions for non-compliance with the duty, many of us wish the duty to be underpinned by criminal sanctions, as IICSA recommended. Quite simply, a lesser sanction such as a possible referral to a professional regulator or to the Disclosure and Barring Service is not enough to enforce the new and important duty. We will get to this shortly with Amendment 280.

Before we move on, I would like to say that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, was quite correct to emphasise the wide range of situations in which abuse can occur. It is not just child grooming gangs, well-known celebrity abuse cases or cases involving institutions such as churches or schools; the reality is that the Majority of child sexual abuse occurs in domestic and family situations. It is therefore welcome that this Bill will potentially cover such a wide range of scenarios.

As someone who spent much of his working life dealing with child abuse cases, I suggest that these basic points should inform the debate on this part of the Bill and the amendments to it. First, safeguarding children should be seen as the responsibility of everyone. I quote my noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson:

“A well-designed mandatory reporting law is a key component of an effective safeguarding system”.—[Official Report, 17/1/25; col. 1382.]

I would add that a positive duty to report, with sanctions, is the only certain way of ensuring that steps will be promptly taken to investigate and prevent abuse when it is revealed or suspected.

Secondly, and fundamentally, doing nothing when suspicions of abuse are aroused should not be seen as an option. A failure to report is a culpable failure to protect, and it is a failure to prevent harm to the child concerned and to other children at risk. Thirdly, a child who has the courage to disclose abuse needs to be reassured that his or her anxieties will be quickly and properly dealt with. Fourthly, a strong mandatory law will convey to potential perpetrators that abuse will not be tolerated. Finally, difficult cases concerning historic sexual abuse, whether one likes that term or not, arise in all jurisdictional areas. These require courts to deal with alleged abuse that may have been undetected and/or unreported for many years. A later group of amendments will consider these. In the context of this group, I suggest that a duty to report suspicions of abuse as soon as possible should reduce the number of such historic cases, with all their evidential and emotional complexities.

I turn to the individual amendments. Amendment 272 aims to align the wording of the Bill with that of the equivalent duty to report money laundering in Section 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and to extend the duty to cover Wales as well as England. The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, makes the point that for the past 23 years the country has protected money in ways in which it has not yet protected children. I have compared other formulations of positive duties elsewhere—for example, in the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Female Genital Mutilation Act—and submit that what the amendment here proposes is clearer and more incisive than the wording in the Bill.

Amendment 274 would ensure that any report goes to the local authority that has the duty to protect the child, investigating the child’s circumstances and putting in place therapeutic treatment as well as protective measures. The local authority already has a duty to work with the police and to pass reports on to them if there is evidence of an offence. Amendment 275 is consequential.

Amendment 276 would ensure that a report is made in cases of suspected offences occurring outside England and Wales. Amendment 277 seeks to align the duty with existing statutory guidance, which expects a report to be made as soon as practicable. If there is a risk to the life or safety of a relevant child, the guidance expects the report to be expedited rather than delayed in order to enable fast consideration of necessary Intervention.

Amendment 278 would remove the scope for people not to report when they believe that someone else will do so. Experience shows—certainly this is my own experience—that that is just one of the many ways in which people with knowledge or suspicion of abuse will convince themselves that it is all right to do nothing, and to hope that the problem will go away.

Amendment 279 is intended to make it clear that the management and proprietors of a setting have the duty to report suspected abuse—for example, when suspicions are reported to management by other staff. It should not be a prerequisite to have had any direct contact with the child, nor should it be an excuse that they did not have any direct contact with the child. It is not the responsibility or function of management to consider the merits of the complaint; they have a straightforward responsibility to report concerns.

Amendment 280 would make failure to report a criminal offence, and this is perhaps the central amendment as far as we are concerned. The IICSA report made a balanced and carefully considered recommendation that it should be, providing for defences as indicated in the amendment. I suggest that criminalising a failure to report is justified in helping to reduce a significant risk of substantial harm to children. Paragraph 116 of the IICSA report states:

“Where an individual to whom mandatory reporting Laws apply has witnessed or received a disclosure of child sexual abuse, it should be a criminal offence to fail to report that to the relevant local authority or police force. Such a failure would amount to a deliberate decision not to pass on information about child sexual abuse to those authorities empowered to protect children from harm and to prevent future abuse by investigating and prosecuting it when it occurs. For those who work with children or are in a position of trust to fail to facilitate that is inexcusable, and the sanction for such an omission should be commensurate”.

Amendment 281 seeks to define “operators of a setting” in cases of private and corporate ownership, and Amendment 284 would clarify and describe the wide range of settings in which relevant activities covered by Clause 72 might occur. These are not exclusive lists, and I hope the Committee will recognise the wide extent of the activities that need to be covered. For example, the amendment refers outside mainstream religious organisations, to

“other organisations holding non-religious worldviews”.

That echoes cases I have dealt with involving sects and cults that are closed and secretive, and insist on loyalty.

Amendment 286 would remove the “best interests” defence in Clause 79 if the person has delayed reporting suspected sexual abuse. Finally, Amendment 288 would create an offence

“of causing detriment to a person fulfilling the duty to report”.

This is to prevent retaliation against those who report. I well remember a case in which a newly qualified teacher properly reported what a young girl had told her about what had been done to her and her siblings in the family home. She then had to face the vindictive and furious response of those children’s stepfather. That is what this amendment is geared to prevent.

I hope I will be excused for having spoken at some length, but I hope I have also done some justice to the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson.

Before we move on, I clarify that the lead Amendment in this group, Amendment 271F, was not moved so we have moved on to Amendment 272, which has been proposed as the lead amendment, and the group will continue as normal.

Thank you for that. I was slightly confused, because the first Amendment in the group was not moved.

My Lords, this follows on very well because I will speak to Amendment 283 in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, which would insert after Clause 72 the offence of intentionally concealing child sex abuse.

There is a real problem—and it is an omission from the Bill—because leadership and supervisory roles are completely excluded from the reporting duty. The duty applies only to individuals in contact with children, but we in this House and elsewhere all know that it is not just the social workers, the medics or the police who have direct contact with the child who know that there is sexual abuse at play. It is often the leaders, the CEOs, the chairs of boards, the staff who are too scared to mention it in case of reputational damage, and those in command who suppress incidents of child sexual abuse. This confines mandated reporters to only those who have regular unsupervised contact, creating a critical gap in the Bill.

It would be absolutely unforgivable to let this Bill to protect children go through with such a glaring gap in their protection. Furthermore, there are no criminal penalties proposed for failure to report, and without sanction it lacks teeth. An additional problem is that in two of the industrial-scale institutions of child sexual abuse that we have witnessed—the health service and religious institutions—confidentiality is a kind of get-out clause. We need to overcome that.

The UK Government launched the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse, which was explicitly tasked with uncovering the systemic failures that allowed such abuse to flourish untrammelled. The key recommendation was that the UK must introduce a mandatory reporting law for child sexual abuse. We welcome that this is now happening, but noble Lords have all encountered or understood that, very often, the protection of an institution, a company or an entity silences many who work in that institution but know what is going on, and that takes priority. That silence—actually silencing staff or members—is commonplace.

Look at the obvious ones, such as the Catholic Church. Across multiple countries, investigations found that Church leaders reassigned accused priests, maintained secret files and prioritised avoiding scandal over reporting allegations. Church of England independent reviews found that senior clergy discouraged reporting and protected accused individuals to avoid damaging the institution’s standing. In the health service, the BBC exposure of Jimmy Savile’s years of abuse demonstrated beyond belief how many people knew but said nothing. Internal discussions showed that investigations were discouraged or blocked due to concerns about reputation, and Savile’s celebrity and connections. In private schools and boarding schools, multiple inquiries documented quiet dismissals of staff and minimised complaints to preserve reputation, funding and donor relationships. It happens in sports clubs and organisations. Various youth sports organisations protected coaches, dismissed complaints and pressurised victims to stay quiet to maintain prestige. So often companies and institutions are too big to fail. They use threats or non-disclosure agreements and so on to cover up misdeeds in fear of reputational damage. This is intentional, and that is why this amendment would put a criminal offence of intentionally concealing knowledge of child sex abuse on to the statute book.

I have personal knowledge of such a case. In this instance, it was child abuse rather than child sexual abuse. Great Ormond Street, our national treasure, suppressed a report, the Sibert-Hodes report, that it had commissioned. It showed the hospital to have responsibility for the failing clinic where baby P, Peter Connelly, was taken multiple times with multiple injuries and subsequently died, and where it had employed an underqualified doctor who failed. In that clinic there were three other doctors, none of whom was present. Two were on gardening leave and the other had left.

Cover-ups are happening all the time. The Bill is an opportunity to stop this practice, where NDAs, threats and gardening leave are all used to prevent exposure. I believe this follows on from what the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is trying to do with her amendment; it would expand it. I hope and trust that the Government understand the importance of these amendments and move urgently to fill the gaping hole in this legislation as proposed.

While I am on my feet, I will speak to Amendment 287 in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, and the noble Lord, Lord Russell, about training for those subject to the mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse. I am indebted to the NSPCC for its help on this vital aspect of this new duty. In this amendment we are seeking to make mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse a reality, because without training—proper training, probably expensive training—it will not happen as intended in the Bill. It is vital that all those responsible for reporting under the new duty be trained effectively so that they feel supported and able, and are effectively trained to a high standard on their obligations.

The new mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse has the potential to ensure that anyone working or volunteering with children knows that the sexual abuse of children cannot be tolerated or ignored. It will be illegal to tolerate or ignore it, and proper implementation must be embedded from the very start. Those who are responsible for reporting child sexual abuse must be properly trained to know what, how and where to report. The onus for ensuring this cannot rely solely on individual organisations. If this duty is to have a widespread impact, we need cross-sector, cross-government buy-in so that all reporters, no matter what organisation, community or area they come from, are empowered to protect children.

That is why this amendment is so vital: to ensure effective training for all mandated reporters within the mandatory reporting duty. Recognising, reporting and, crucially, responding to child sexual abuse is not easy or straightforward, because we know that disclosures from children do not usually happen in one conversation. They can happen in many forms, verbally or non-verbally, and emerge over a long period of time. They will often be the result of consistent and skilled engagement from a trusted adult that helps the child feel safe and ready to share their experiences.

Reporters may also struggle to decipher whether what they have seen is indeed child sexual abuse—such as if they came across child sexual abuse material online but were unsure of the age of the victim—particularly if they are not already trained to identify recognised signs and indicators of abuse. Their responsibility to the child cannot stop at disclosure or witnessing abuse. It is vital that any child who discloses their experience of abuse is met with an effective response.

We know that there is already a significant need for greater training and support for skilled professionals to improve their response to child sexual abuse, as detailed in the recent reports from the Child Safeguarding Practice Review Panel and the review into child exploitation of the noble Baroness, Lady Casey. This is a gap in our child protection system that must be closed to better protect children, and this duty provides us with both the impetus and the opportunity to do so by taking a whole-system approach to embedding the duty. Therefore, those who are responsible for reporting on abuse and disclosures such as these must be trained not only in how to identify what child sexual abuse is, what a disclosure is and where to report it, but also in how to provide vital support to a child all the way through to after the report has been made and beyond.

This duty will apply not only to safeguarding professionals but to volunteers, sports coaches, youth club leaders and faith leaders, to name but a few. We cannot assume that all mandated reporters will already have the necessary understanding of child protection required to carry out their responsibilities under this really serious duty. This is essential, not only on the practical level of understanding the duty itself but, arguably more importantly, in providing this sensitive support to children in a way that does not put them at risk. My amendment seeks to ensure that an understanding of child protection is intrinsic to the duty, guaranteeing that all those with responsibility as a mandated reporter receive, at a minimum, initial and ongoing training—essential elements of their new responsibilities.

In conclusion, from how to recognise signs and indicators to judging when reporting should be delayed for the safety of the child, reporters must be supported. Otherwise, we risk putting children in danger of being harmed by the reporting process, in addition to the hurt they have already received. By baking this guarantee into primary legislation, the Government can be confident that their duty will be implemented and regulated consistently across different sectors. It would also reassure reporters that they will not face sanctions because the organisation they work or volunteer for cannot afford to resource and train them appropriately. We owe it to all the victims and survivors who have bravely called for a mandatory reporting duty over so many years to ensure that it is done properly.

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 283B. Schedule 8 relates to the duty to report child sex offences. Paragraph 17 of that schedule applies this duty to

“Activities of a person in connection with training, supervising or instructing a child for the purposes of a religion or belief, if the person has regular … contact with the child in the course of those activities”.

Some Catholic schools and faith schools obviously have religious objects, and Schedule 8 applies to them. But the problem with that is that all schools are also regulated by Section 21(5) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. That effectively means double regulation, which would put a burden on faith schools, with unnecessary bureaucracy.

The Catholic Education Service, which represents about 2,000 schools in England—that is not counting Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland, of course—has worked closely with the Home Office and has helped to draft my amendment. The amendment would remove from the scope of paragraph 17 activity that is already regulated and governed by the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, therefore preventing unnecessary double regulation. The Catholic Education Service has worked very closely with this Government and the previous one on ensuring the highest standards of children’s safeguards in schools. I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister would react positively to this amendment in his wind-up.

My Lords, I agree with every word of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and of my noble friend Lady Featherstone. I hope they will forgive me if I say no more about all that, because, if I do not catch my train tonight, I will have to sleep on the street. I will speak to Amendments 280A in the name of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and Amendments 282 and 285 in his name and mine.

Amendment 280A is straightforward in its intent. It seeks to fully implement recommendation 13 of IICSA’s final report. The current Clause 72 introduces a duty on adults engaged in relevant activity to notify police or local authorities when

“they are given reason to suspect that a child sex offence may have been committed”.

The Government propose non-criminal sanctions, such as referral to professional regulators or the DBS. We on these Benches maintain that this approach is insufficient. IICSA was clear: a failure to comply with the duty must be a criminal offence. Amendment 280A would insert proposed new subsections (10A) and (10B) into Clause 72, which would explicitly provide that:

“A person who fails to fulfil the duty under subsection (1) commits an offence”,

and that the person

“is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale”.

This criminal sanction is essential because relying solely on professional sanctions creates institutional loopholes. Professional sanctions apply to only a fraction of the mandated reporters and cannot effectively address failings in settings where professional regulation is absent, such as certain religious settings, where, as we have heard, many grievous failings have occurred. Nor do they cover volunteers in schools or other settings. Furthermore, criminalising non-compliance would align us with international best practice in countries such as France and Australia.

Amendment 280 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is similar to this one, except that it offers some mitigations that the court could consider. Whether this offers a loophole or a reasonable consideration for the courts is a reasonable discussion point.

Amendment 285 addresses the second vital component of IICSA’s recommendation 13. Incorporating the duty to report when a person recognises the indicators of child sexual abuse, the amendment would expand the trigger for the duty to report beyond direct disclosure by a child or perpetrator, or witnessing child sexual abuse, all of which is vanishingly rare, to include circumstances where a person

“witnesses a child displaying sexualised, sexually harmful or other behaviour, physical signs of abuse or consequences of sexual abuse”.

It has to be remembered that only one in three victims of CSA ever discloses what happened, and often it is many years later.

The fact is that, if the Bill passes as it is without amendment, it will undoubtedly fail in its stated objective. The Government themselves recognise this, as witnessed by the figures in the impact assessment. It says that the number of extra anticipated reports of CSA each year for England and Wales under the existing terms of the Bill is only 310, which is an average of 7.9 extra reports for each of the 43 police forces. The total number of cases estimated to be proceeded against in England is 26—with 15 cases in the Crown Court and nine in the magistrates’ court—and only 11 of those would see the award of custodial sentences. The total estimated increase in CSA referrals to local authority-designated officers is 2% per annum.

It would therefore be nonsense to suggest that widening the scope of the duty to report CSA to something like that which exists in countries that have high-standard mandatory reporting systems that have been functioning well for years, as this amendment proposes, would overwhelm our system. It would not. Neither would it result in some cases being hidden in the mass of reports, as some have suggested. On the other hand, widening the scope, as this and other amendments seek to do, would uncover a lot of evil and save many children from terrible lifelong harm, which has a cost to public services. Not doing so would perpetuate the culture of cover-up that led to the IICSA inquiry in the first place.

However, recognising that assessing such indicators can be subjective, Amendment 285 would maintain proportionality, as recommended by IICSA, by ensuring that failure to comply with the duty based solely on those indicators is not a criminal offence, but compliance should be done by any conscientious professional. This careful balance would ensure that staff and volunteers are encouraged to report any sign of potential harm without the fear of criminal prosecution based on subjective observation. This is crucial to fostering a reporting culture that prioritises the immediate safety and protection of the child, which is what we all want to see. It is vital to remember that the investigation of the report of, or reasonable suspicion of, child sexual abuse is not for the reporter to do; it is for the experts to investigate and the courts to decide—but they cannot do that unless they get the report in the first place.

Amendment 282 is designed to include in the reporting duty a comprehensive range of people who care for children, as defined in Sections 21, 22 and 22A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. To ensure that no relevant person is left out, these sections ensure the inclusion in the duty to report the management of settings where some kind of care is given to children, which is one of the gaping holes in the current wording of the Bill. With that, having just reaffirmed my support for the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and those of my noble friend Lady Featherstone, I will finish.

I rise to speak to my Amendment 286A, which proposes to fill gaps in Clause 79 so we can hold accountable all those who go out of their way to conceal the horrendous crime of child sexual abuse. This amendment is supported by multiple child protection organisations, including the NSPCC, Barnardo’s, the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse and the Lucy Faithfull Foundation. I particularly thank Gina Rees from the NSPCC, who has advised me.

Obviously, it can never be acceptable for anyone to turn a blind eye to abuse. Yet across the seven year-long investigation, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse exposed countless instances where those whose organisations had a responsibility to protect children from harm not only failed to report child sexual abuse but took purposeful actions that actively sought to cover it up. These acts of intentionally concealing child sexual abuse are separate from, and go beyond, just failing to make a report, something which the Government’s mandatory reporting duty proposes to address. It means choosing and acting to prioritise something else, be that community, relationships or company reputation, over the safety of a child. I think we can agree across this House that that is unacceptable.

These acts of concealment are not a thing of the past. Take, for example, this real-life contact at the NSPCC helpline for those with concerns about a child. A special educational needs professional told the NSPCC:

“I’ve seen what happens when people report any concerns, even minor ones. Management bullies you, reduces your shifts, stops giving you what you need to support the kids. You’re expected to buy everything yourself for them instead of it being provided. If you thought you were on track for a permanent job, forget it”.

Bullying, threatening job stability and removing support for the children who are meant to be protected—these are actions, along with intimidation of witnesses and destroying vital evidence, that have happened for many years and still happen, with impunity, across our society. They not only undermine efforts to increase reports of child sexual abuse; they can deny victims their right to justice and hinder their access to vital support services in order to help them begin to recover from what they have suffered. As such, it is vital that our criminal justice system be equipped with new Laws to catch these bad actors.

I appreciate that the Government’s current drafting of Clause 79 aims to do this by introducing a new criminal offence of preventing or deterring someone, under the mandatory reporting duty, from making a report. While that is an important part of thwarting the cover-up of child sexual abuse, this provision does not go far enough to cover the multitude of ways that reports of abuse can be concealed and could allow many of those who intentionally conceal this crime to slip through the net. This is because Clause 79 is triggered only when the person acting to conceal abuse does so by blocking or deterring someone, under the new duty, from making a report. This would not, for example, criminalise acts that could prevent abuse being discovered by a mandated reporter in the first place, such as intimidating victims or destroying vital evidence. Indeed, if the professional I referred to in my example earlier did not fall under the new duty to report, there is a strong chance that those who try to bully and intimidate someone in respect of doing the right thing would not be prosecutable under the current offence.

This feels to me like a glaring omission that could undermine the Government’s intentions with this clause. It also does not cover preventing those who are not mandated reporters from reporting, or acts to hinder this investigation of abuse after it has been reported. That is why I call on the Government and the Minister to look again at their current proposal and ensure that it is strengthened, so that those who intentionally act to cover up child sexual abuse, including those who threaten or deter those not under the reporting duty, are caught by this offence. I therefore urge the Government to accept Amendment 286A so that Clause 79 captures all individuals who intentionally cover up child sexual abuse.

My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendment 273, which is a very simple amendment that aims to put into action what IICSA recommended: that mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse should happen with no exceptions. The inquiry argued that, even if abuse is disclosed in the context of confession, the person—in this case, the priest—should be legally required to report it. It proposes that failing to report such abuse should itself be a criminal offence.

I am very glad that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester is in his place, because I know he has spent a long time on working parties looking at this issue. In earlier discussions in the House, in response to the right reverend Prelate, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, said that he had received representations from churches on this issue and expressed the hope that this would be further debated as the Crime and Policing Bill went through Parliament. My amendment is simply here to enable that debate to happen.

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of my noble friend Lord Polak and his Amendment 286A. As he lucidly put it, this amendment proposes to close several glaring loopholes in the offences outlined in Clause 79; otherwise, I fear it will fail to meet the aims and expectations placed on it by this Committee.

Our criminal justice system should be equipped with new Laws to hold accountable all those who cover up child sexual abuse. The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, put that case incredibly well and touchingly. It needs to be known that if someone acts purposefully to stop child sexual abuse being properly investigated and so denies the victims and survivors the protection and justice they are entitled to, they will face strong criminal penalties. That is why I support the Bill’s inclusion of Clause 79, which seeks to introduce new criminal offences for preventing or deterring someone, under the new mandatory reporting duty, from making a report. However, its drafting means that it would be limited in its ability to contribute meaningfully to the important mission of tackling child sexual abuse that we across the Committee strongly support.

Clause 79 is dependent upon the new mandatory duty to report. The clause not only requires the action taken to directly involve a reporter under the duty, it requires the person attempting to conceal the abuse to know that the person that they are deterring is a mandated reporter. This brings with it a whole host of legal complexities. What does it mean to know that someone is under the duty? Does it require them to also know that the child sex offence has taken place to trigger the said duty? How could it be convincingly proved by the courts that someone accused of putting the needs of their institution above protecting a child also understood what the duty is, who it applies to and how that factored into their actions? These are important questions that need to be reconciled.

As it stands, based on these questions alone, this offence would therefore be incredibly difficult to prosecute. Aside from the moral judgment, we must ask ourselves whether it can be right that someone who knowingly covers up child sexual abuse can walk away without consequences purely because their actions did not involve deterring a mandated reporter, or they did not know that they were one. If we do not close these loopholes, it will mean that active cover-ups by a person or an organisation will, at most, be treated as a failure to report rather than as a serious offence. This cannot be right. That is why I urge the Government to accept Amendment 286A. Its redrafting of Clause 79 would remove the requirement that the act of concealment involve a mandated reporter. It would also remove the need for the act of concealment to directly involve another person, enabling it to cover actions such as destruction of evidence or moving a suspected perpetrator on to another organisation, something which a senior leader could do by an order from afar.

However, although the amendment would remove barriers presented by the current offence, it would not broaden its applicability unnecessarily. I am concerned that were we to apply a duty to report child sexual abuse to our country’s professionals and volunteers working with children, where they were criminalised for failing to make a report or for inaction, this would actually deter people from working with children in the first place, and without people willing to work to support children, how can they protect them from and report child sexual abuse? That is why I do not support amendments proposed across the Committee that would attach criminal sanctions to the duty itself.

Amendment 286A offers us an alternative approach, where only those who take purposeful actions to conceal abuse, specifically with the intention of doing so, would be criminalised. This is a proportionate threshold for criminalisation, where those guilty of concealing this insidious crime are rightfully prosecuted, and those who just fail to report abuse, whether that be due to lack of knowledge or some other motivation, receive appropriate professional and civil sanctions. This duty should empower our child protection system to better combat child sexual abuse, and I believe that Amendment 286A strikes the right balance in enabling us to do just that. I encourage the Government to accept it.

My Lords, I am grateful for the chance to speak in this debate. Probably the most harrowing date in my life as a bishop was when I had to give evidence in person to IICSA as the Church of England’s lead bishop on religious communities— we knew that some of the horrific abuse that had taken place was in religious communities. Ever since then, I have worked really hard on these matters. I sought to add my name to Amendments 286A and 287, but I missed the deadline, sadly, so I am grateful for the chance to support them now.

I was going to say quite a bit about Amendment 286A, but the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, said just about everything I wanted to say, so I will not detain the Committee any further on it. On Amendment 287 on training, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Polak, and others. It is important that the Bill will apply not only to already knowledgeable professionals but to volunteers, who will have a whole variety of levels of funding, of safeguarding experience and of experience in dealing with child sexual abuse. We cannot assume that mandated reporters will already have the necessary understanding to fulfil these new legal obligations, so I think this is an appropriate probing amendment to see what support there can be to ensure that those who will have a duty are equipped to discharge that duty properly. Without that, I think we will fail to hit what we are trying to do.

I am sorry that it has taken us this long to get this far with the IICSA report. I think we have made a bit more progress implementing its recommendations in the Church of England than we have in this House, but I am glad that we got this opportunity today. I am grateful to the many noble Lords who have proposed amendments.

I want to say a few words about Amendment 273, as the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, invited me to do so. On the seal of the confessional, if it is possible for a churchman to say this, I remain a bit agnostic. I am interested in what will actually produce good safeguarding. I have heard people say, including survivors sometimes, that the chance to go and talk to a priest, and know it would not go beyond that priest, was what gave them the courage—often with a priest going with them—to make a disclosure to the relevant authorities. I can see that if we change that, some disclosures would happen but some would not, so I am keen to hear a bit more about that.

The other part of the amendment talks about extending it to all those who volunteer. I am not quite sure how wide that needs to go. Certainly, I am happy for it to apply to Church leaders, lay or ordained, paid or unpaid, but it should not be the person who cleans the coffee cups in the church hall on a Sunday morning, or who puts out the “No parking” cones, or who photocopies the parish magazine or arranges the church flowers once a month. Let us be clear exactly what categories we are going to extend any duty to, and whether that is dealt with best in the Bill or in some sort of secondary advice, guidance, legislation or other instrument. I am keen to explore that more. I am very grateful for these matters being raised, and not before time.

My Lords, I too support Amendment 286A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Polak, to which I also would have added my name if I had been slightly more efficient. The right reverend Prelate and I need to do better from now on. I acknowledge and thank the NSPCC and declare my interest as a teacher. To quote Keeping Children Safe in Education, which we have to read every year, child protection is everybody’s responsibility.

I was surprised to hear that this issue was not already completely covered. As we have heard now and in previous groups, it is essential that if someone acts purposefully to stop child sexual abuse being properly investigated, they should face strong criminal penalties. Actions like these can delay, and sometimes outright deny, victims their access to justice and the vital support needed to help them recover from such abuse.

The much-quoted Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse uncovered instances in which teachers were transferred to another school with no police referral, after a student was told: “You must not tell the police. We will handle it in-house”. Priests were moved from parish to parish, and there were examples of local authorities destroying files relating to allegations, which survivors perceived as part of a cover-up.

These are actions that can and do continue to happen across our society. While Clause 79 introduces a new criminal offence of preventing or deterring someone under the mandatory reporting duty from making a report, this provision does not go far enough to cover the multitude of ways that reports of abuse can be concealed. This is because Clause 79 is built on the mandatory reporting duty and requires the act of concealment directly to involve someone under that duty. This proposal is separate from applying criminal sanctions directly to the mandatory duty to report child sexual abuse in Clause 72, which I fear could create a defensive fear and blame-based child protection sector that criminalises those who lack the knowledge and training to report effectively. However, intentionally taking actions to cover up child sexual abuse cannot be tolerated and should be criminalised. I believe that this amendment strikes the balance.

My Lords, this is the first time I have spoken at this stage of the Bill. I must say that, in the presence of such expertise, I find myself entirely inadequate for the purpose. At Second Reading, I raised a question about the interaction of Clause 80 with the clauses that precede it. I profess no track record on matters of child protection, but I thoroughly subscribe to the principle of the duty to report contained in this section of the Bill. Because of its profound significance, it certainly has my full support.

However, I have come to the matter through a rather different route: the way in which crimes are recorded and, in particular, why they may not be recorded accurately or at all. My point is quite simple and revolves around the reliable translation of the definition in Clause 72(1)—namely, a reason to believe that

“a child sex offence may have been committed (at any time)”— into some sort of recording and/or further action. We cannot know what those reasons to believe might be, so variable is the range of circumstances, as we heard earlier. I note that “reasonable belief” has no definable limit, and nor should it have. However, it may very likely be based on the reporter’s knowledge, training, experience, powers of observation and so on, rather than hard evidence. Here is the point: otherwise, were that not the case, Clause 72 would surely have been differently worded.

I certainly expect that all such professionals involved with safeguarding in mind would have acute sensitivity in this area and, in reporting their beliefs, would themselves be believed as an evidential source. My concern is that their belief alone may still not be enough to generate action without further and better evidence. I think in particular of a situation where the child who is the subject of their belief is uncommunicative, if the information is partly second-hand, if it is about a child not in their immediate charge, and the myriad ways in which this information of relevance can come about. Then, the only purpose of reporting would be to get the matters into some sort of system for follow-up monitoring and investigations which necessarily involve the devotion of resources to confirm the commission of an offence or ultimately dispose of it on the basis that nothing sinister has actually occurred.

Therefore, reporting gets us only so far. What then? What is the follow-up process to be? Clause 80 does not actually tell us but makes a leap to police crime recording, in accordance with “applicable policy and procedure”—presumably meaning the Home Office guidance and the practices within the particular force concerned, attuned to local circumstances, resources and priorities within its area. This, as far as I can see, is the only backstop follow-up from the reporting of reasonable belief under the Bill. As such, its commendable aims are yoked to a general crime reporting principle that applies some way further down the line.

I hope I do not suffer from some sort of hallucinatory process in all of this, but I seek to plug a gap in which reasonable belief in any given instance is not guaranteed to pass the evidential standard for the purposes of police or, for that matter, any other recording of suspected crime. This is because the balance of probabilities test underlying the crime reporting guidance embodies a clear tendency towards such an evidential base. Home Office guidance places the duty on the reporting officer as to what they think has happened in the commission of a crime, not necessarily what the person reporting thinks. Any different approach, especially one involving time and energy in instances of hazy information in the circumstances described, might be difficult to get across the line.

My concern, notwithstanding the current focus on child sexual abuse in the press and everywhere else, is that things might easily erode over the long run and default to standard practices consistent with available finances, manpower and, not least, political pressures to show effective reduction in crime. This was highlighted by the Public Administration Select Committee in its June 2014 report, Caught Red-handed. Its findings were also associated with the demotion of police crime recordings and their removal for national statistics purposes.

The gap I see in the legislative architecture before us matters because of the special attention needed to protect young people. If we are now moving on to a situation where previous failings to protect the vulnerable from things too awful to contemplate are really a thing of the past, with better outcomes going forward, then, as I pointed out at Second Reading, Clause 80 risks merely undoing the policy objectives of Clauses 72 to 79.

Rather than tinker around with the detail, it seemed more appropriate to remove Clause 80 altogether—hence my intention for us to debate whether Clause 80 stands part—and simply leave in place the duty to report and the penalty for obstructing this duty. That would lead, I hope, to the establishment by the relevant duty holders, via their multi agency safeguarding processes, of other follow-up protocols to manage and monitor concerns falling outside police crime recording parameters, but on a structured basis. Otherwise, I cannot conceive of any route to ensure follow-up measures and resources being devoted to mere reasonable belief that does not require an evidential test for crime recording. Therefore, this needs a framework.

To summarise, the measure I seek is the certainty of a focused response and further action taken on grounds of reasonable belief, and that this shall be structured, consistent, effective and understood across all agencies, with roles and responsibilities clearly understood, nationally operative and adequately resourced. That does not deny the process and importance of crime recording. Clearly, if evidence is available and is known to the person reporting, I am confident that a constable would indeed report a crime and devote energy and resources to investigating it further. My concern is that it does not get that far.

The intention may well be that the answer lies in Clause 81—namely, the Secretary of State’s powers to amend all the provisions through what amounts to a significant Henry VIII clause—but the intention, scope and mechanics of what is intended need to be set out in the Bill from inception. In other words, they should not be left vague or unclarified pending some later reactive measure when it is found that things do not work.

I very much look forward to the Minister’s response. If it is not possible today, given the hour, perhaps I might receive a letter from him setting out the Government’s detailed answer on the point before the next stage. Depending on that, I may return to the matter on Report.

My Lords, as was clear from our debate, this is a very important group of amendments, which seek to clarify and improve a necessary measure in the Bill. When we discussed the fourth group today, we heard about the horrific crimes committed against some children in this country: the industrial-scale abuse of young, white, working-class girls over the past four decades, as well as abuse of other groups. This happened —and is still happening—because the people who commit these crimes are among the most depraved in our society. However, it has also happened because people familiar with the abuse, or even those who had mere suspicions, turned a blind eye or simply did not look at what was in front of them.

The victims were failed by everyone, from the police to the authorities, their teachers and community leaders. Too often, they were treated with a blind negligence that bordered on positively enabling the crimes that were occurring. We have heard many powerful speeches today; I cannot list them all, but I remind the Minister of the introduction by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and the powerful speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone.

I think we all now agree that safeguarding needs to be supported by sanctions. How else can we put a stop to bureaucratic failure to report? The difficult and important question is around striking the balance when doing that, to make certain that it is effective but that it does not have unintended, unhappy consequences. It is important also to make non-reporting a criminal offence, but, again, exactly how that is phrased will need considerable care. Many ideas have been canvassed today, and it would be dangerous for me to try to draft on the hoof at the Dispatch Box.

There was force in the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, as to why there should be an exception for what is learned in confession, and that was also important. I am not urging that there should be an exception, but it should be looked at. We have had arguments on both sides. What is the evidence? What are likely to be the benefits of opening that up? Personally, I think it should be opened up, but it should be looked at with care.

We heard earlier today from the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, all about the grooming gangs, so I will not go back to that, but they are an incredibly striking example of why we need a duty to report suspected child sex offences in general and why it is important that the Clause is properly drafted.

One important oversight, which was spotted by noble Baronesses, Lady Cash and Lady Grey-Thompson, concerns the reference to Wales. As has been established, it is necessary to correct an oversight in the drafting. As things stand, local authorities and police forces in Wales will have to be informed of crimes, but only if they are considered crimes in England. That must be redrafted, and I hope the Minister will agree to that come Report stage.

Amendment 283A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash—which was not moved, but it is sensible to make the point—would implement another recommendation of the Casey review, adding child criminal exploitation to the crimes for which there is a duty to report. It is important to look at all these points when drafting the obligations.

We on this side are largely supportive of the principles behind the several amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson. Leaving out subsections (5) and (6) raises an interesting point. It is obviously better to be safe than sorry. We will have to look very carefully at what removing those subsections would actually do.

We on this side worry about removing defences in cases where an individual genuinely fears for the safety of the victim or believes that someone else has definitely submitted a report. That must be looked at, too. Perhaps the Minister can guide us on how to ensure that genuine defences with merit will remain available without providing a route to or excuse for shirking responsibility.

The noble Lord, Lord Murphy of Torfaen, raised an interesting point about the bureaucratic burden on faith schools. Government obviously must look at that. It should not be a let-out; equally, we on this side would not support any extra unnecessary burden being imposed. However, it must be done properly.

My noble friend Lord Polak’s Amendment 286A raises important considerations. It is worth noting that he is supported by Barnardo’s, the NSPCC and other organisations with great specialist expertise and knowledge—and not just anecdotal knowledge; they really know what is going on. He is looking to prevent the intentional concealment of child sex offences. That must be the absolute minimum. My noble friend Lord Bethell was supportive of that amendment, and he was right to caution us about going too far, so that it has the unintended consequence of not achieving what we all want to achieve. His words of caution should be heeded.

As to Amendment 274 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, we are rather hesitant in our support. Ensuring that a report goes straight to the local authority, which then has a duty to inform the police, might risk slowing down a response that is often needed quickly. Indeed, it might never reach the police. If a child is in imminent danger of being abused, it is not the local authority which should know first; it must be the police, who have to respond. There should be a simultaneous notification, because it can be, in effect, simultaneous.

With this amendment, it seems that someone who reported child abuse to the police would be criminalised for not going to the local authority. That cannot be right. Leaving it to the discretion of the individual which authority to report to, while requiring that there be a duty to do so, seems to us to be the right thing. People will know generally where to go but they must go to one or the other, and not automatically to the local authority first.

I think I have addressed the amendments from the noble Baronesses, Lady Featherstone and Lady Walmsley. These are all interesting points. The Government and those behind the Minister must look at this very carefully. It is really important to get the drafting right.

Amendments 283 and 286A seek to create and expand the specific crime of preventing or concealing reports of abuse. These are largely in line with the amendments addressed in the group in which we debated grooming gangs, so we support the intentions behind them.

As I have said, this is a group of amendments that have been tabled with the best of intentions. The issue in question should be entirely non-partisan; it is simply a question of how best to manage it and get it right, making certain that children and young people in this country are not allowed to suffer in the way in which they have for the last 30 years. I hope that the Minister will take away the points which are being made and, not least, add Wales to the list of jurisdictions. That is all I need to say at this stage tonight.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for moving the Amendment on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and to colleagues who have spoken this evening. This has been a valuable debate on Chapter 2, Part 5. As noble Lords will know, introducing a statutory duty delivers the intention of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse. I am confident that the measures we have brought forward strike the balance that we need.

A number of amendments have been tabled, and I am sorry that Amendment 271F, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, was not moved. However, it is important to put on record that the reason the duty relates to the Welsh Government is that they have declined to legislate for a mandatory reporting duty in their own response to the independent inquiry. Therefore, we are respecting the devolution settlement by not including that legislation in the Bill. It is a devolved matter which requires the consent of the Senedd.

There are a number of other amendments which I will try to speak to. We know that child sexual abuse continues to go unreported. The reasons for this are complex, including fear, stigma and lack of awareness. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester covered some of those points in relation to the performance of the Church of England.

The unique nature of child sexual abuse as a type of harm requires the introduction of this new duty. I want to be clear that the introduction of the new duty establishes a floor, not a ceiling, and does not change or interfere with in any way the existing expectations set by government that all children at risk of harm should be referred to the appropriate authority for guidance and advice.

I want to first touch on Amendments 274 and 276, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, which seek to require that reports under the duty are made to local authorities only, removing, with minor exceptions, the option to notify the police. Allowing reports to be made to either the local authority or the police, as recommended by the independent inquiry, ensures that reporters can act swiftly, so I cannot accept that amendment.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and others, including the noble Baronesses, Lady Walmsley, Lady Grey-Thompson and Lady Featherstone, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, sought to introduce a criminal offence for those who conceal or fail to report abuse. The Government do not consider this type of sanction, which risks creating fear and apprehension among those with reporting responsibilities, to be proportionate or effectively targeted. That is why we are empowering reporters by focusing the criminal sanctions in this Bill on anyone who seeks to interfere with them carrying out their duty, rather than on the reporters themselves. This issue has been carefully considered by a number of agencies and has the support of, among others, the NSPCC, the Lucy Faithfull Foundation, Barnardo’s, the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse and the Children’s Commissioner, so I cannot support the amendments.

The noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson—via the noble Lord, Lord Meston—the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Murphy of Torfaen seek to extend the duty to a number of additional contexts. The purpose of the duty is to report and place a clear requirement on those most likely to encounter information relating to sexual abuse. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, and the right reverend Prelate that this does include members of the clergy. Proposals to extend the ambit of a reporting duty to those who do not personally come into contact with children would introduce another layer of procedural complexity.

Amendment 282 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, and others, seeks to insert a legislative reference to a “position of trust”. Adopting a definition in this way would import a framework which was designed around specific interpersonal relationships and the commission of sexual offences by an individual against a young person. Its value as a definition of a reporter is limited in practical terms.

My noble friend Lord Murphy’s amendment probes one of the technical definitions in Schedule 8. We have included a list of regulation-making powers to amend this list as necessary. We will keep Schedule 8 under constant review ahead of commencement. I hope that, at least for the moment, this will give my noble friend food for thought pending further consideration.

Amendments 275, 277, 278 and 286 seek to remove various provisions that allow for short delays, avoid duplication and enable planning conversations. These provisions mean, for example, that a professional will have to have some leeway in dealing with a situation where a child responds to losing control over their personal information by threatening self-harm. We have also sought to ensure that an inexperienced volunteer or newly qualified professional can refer the incident to their organisation’s designated safeguarding lead, to allow them the time for the duty to receive confirmation that it has been made. These are practical measures and essential for this duty to operate effectively.

The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, made a number of very important points on training and protection. Everyone who is responsible for the safety and well-being of children should receive appropriate training on what they should do in relation to encountering child sexual abuse. It is not appropriate to enshrine this in legislation, but I take on board what she said. We will reflect on the points that she made and work with regulators and professional standards bodies to ensure that we communicate those issues ahead of implementation. I am happy to talk to her about this outside the Chamber.

On the protections for reporters in Amendment 288, the Public Interest Disclosure Act already provides a legal framework for protecting child abuse whistleblowers. Attempting to legislate for, for example, social shunning, reputational harm or informal exclusion would pose significant legal and practical problems. Therefore, I cannot accept that amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Polak, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Bethell and Lord Hampton, seeks with Amendment 286A to remove the criminal offence of preventing a reporter from carrying out their duty and replacing it with a more general offence of intentionally concealing sexual abuse in any of the contexts specified. This is a real shift in focus from empowering our reporters to concealing punishment more generally. That may be the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Polak, but the proposed offence triggers when a person suspects that abuse has taken place. This is far broader and would be harder to justify or prosecute than interference with a known statutory duty. The Government’s preferred model for this type of offence is narrowly targeted, purpose-driven and clearly aligned with the mandatory reporting duty. We will reflect on what the noble Lord, Lord Polak, said, but the initial response to him and the noble Lords, Lord Bethell and Lord Hampton, is that this is a very difficult and challenging area for us.

The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, raised a number of queries in relation to Clause 80, including the necessity of the clause. This clause is necessary in view of the dual role of the police as both a category of reporter and a potential recipient of reports made under the duty. Clause 80 sets out that a police officer does not need to make a formal report of the offence to their own force where they have already recorded the matter in accordance with relevant policy and procedure. This clause also avoids situations in which, for example, a police officer whose role involves reviewing large amounts of child sexual abuse material would otherwise have to make numerous individual reports to their force on the basis of having witnessed a recording of a child sexual offence. We believe the clause is necessary. Again, we may return to this, and the noble Lord may wish to move his amendment to delete the clause at some point, but I would hope he will reflect on what I have said. I am happy to write to him in more detail when I have had a chance to reflect in detail on the comments he has made to date.

I suspect our debate today will not have resolved the long-standing disagreements over the duty’s design. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for moving the amendments. We have had a lot of discussion with the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, both on her original Bill and on her amendments and outside the Committee, and I have discussed that in wide terms. We will reflect on all the debates and discussions that have been had today. I believe that the Government have a duty to get this right, and, as we plan ahead for implementation, I will be happy to arrange further meetings with any noble Lord or noble Baroness who has spoken today to ensure we are not losing sight of the valuable questions raised in this debate. But I cannot accept the amendments today, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Meston, will withdraw his amendment. Obviously, we may return to this on Report, and the door is open to have further discussions on these matters.

My Lords, it is now appropriate for me to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 272, reserving our right to return to it, and others not moved, after proper discussion with the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, when she has seen our debate—and read and marked my homework.

Amendment 272 withdrawn.

Amendments 273 to 282 not moved.

Clause 72 agreed.

Amendment 283 not moved.

Schedule 8: Duty to report child sex offences: child sex offences and further relevant activities

Amendments 283A to 284 not moved.

Schedule 8 agreed.

Clause 73 agreed.

Clause 74: Section 72: reasons to suspect child sex offence may have been committed

Amendment 285 not moved.

Clause 74 agreed.

Clauses 75 to 78 agreed.

Clause 79: Preventing or deterring a person from complying with duty to report suspected child sex offence

Amendments 286 and 286A not moved.

Clause 79 agreed.

Amendments 287 to 288D not moved.

Clauses 80 and 81 agreed.

House resumed.

House adjourned at 7.09 pm.