Baroness Brown of Silvertown:

Moved by Baroness Brown of Silvertown

232B: After Clause 41, insert the following new Clause—“Definition of the criminal exploitation of children(1) The criminal exploitation of children is a form of child abuse in which a child under the age of 18 is used for purposes that constitute, enable or facilitate an offence under the law in England and Wales.(2) The victim may have been criminally exploited even if the activity appears consensual.(3) The criminal exploitation of children can occur online and through the use of technology.”

My Lords, this is the first Amendment I have moved in your Lordships’ House and I hope I do it some justice because, in just one year, there were nine murders of young people associated with the pernicious drug trade colloquially known as county lines. As the MP for the Constituency, I worked closely with the police service and colleagues across the other House to identify solutions to effectively close down the business model that used, abused and destroyed children and their families.

Much of what I hope to see to tackle this abomination has been delivered by this Government, and I am grateful. I very much welcome the new child criminal exploitation offence and the hefty jail sentences that this can carry. I am hopeful that, once these new charges are in effect and have been successfully levied against these child abusers, the very lucrative and cruelly efficient business model employed by the drug dealers will be less attractive and eventually made redundant due to the high penalties they face when caught.

County lines, as we know, is organised crime. It is adults grooming our children, mostly our young boys, and sending them off as cheap labour to deliver and sell drugs across the country. It is a cycle of grooming, abuse and exploitation that has become an industry. The children ensnared by these groomers live a terrifying existence. They witness depravity and violence almost day to day. They are disposable children, making big profits for the criminals who control and exploit them. I am absolutely delighted that the new offence will apply not only to groomers but to all individuals who arrange or facilitate a child committing a crime, ensuring that gang leaders who may plead ignorance of their subordinates’ practice do not evade the heavy sentences.

I am acutely aware that the children involved are, in the eyes of the criminal justice system, both victim and perpetrator. This was brought home to me by the experiences of a young man on the fringes of a gang, who was groomed by his neighbour, kidnapped by the gang and forced on a drugs run. He was terrified. He phoned his mum, crying and begging her to rescue him. When he was finally allowed home, they both went to the police to report his experiences. They waited for action against his abusers, but none came. However, on his 17th birthday, he was arrested for the crimes that he had, in effect, confessed to the police while reporting the actions of his abusers. It is obviously easy in this case to feel genuinely appalled by the actions of the criminal justice system and really angry about the ruined life chances of this young man, who had at that time been accepted into the army.

I want to be clear that there are many other stories that are less easy for us to feel sympathy about—where the young person is both abused and the perpetrator, sometimes of heinous crimes. They are desensitised to the violence or fearful for their own safety, so that they cannot refuse an order from the elder. We need to create a system that can deal with the crimes while still recognising that the children were victims. This amendment is almost a mopping-up exercise, because we need a definition of child criminal exploitation in the Bill, to work in conjunction with the offence detailed in Clause 40.

I honestly do not understand why, over years, the Home Office has resisted this small but I believe necessary action. I gently point out that the Modern Slavery Act has a definition in it, so why is there such resistance to a definition here? I do not know whether it is okay for me to admit at this point that I am wedded not to the words but to the concept and spirit of my amendment, and I am hopeful that this exceptionally helpful Minister will take away my desire and wish and bring back something that will work, if he feels that my words are insufficient to the cause.

Although Clause 40 rightly introduces an offence to prosecute those who exploit children to commit criminal activity, it does not, as I have said, provide a statutory definition of what constitutes child criminal exploitation for safeguarding and identification purposes. A statutory definition would serve a fundamentally different purpose from the criminal offence. It would provide a clear and consistent framework for identifying and protecting children at risk and enabling front-line agencies to intervene early and prevent harm.

Evidence from the national child safeguarding review panel and Action for Children’s Jay review into the criminal exploitation of children shows that the lack of a definition contributes to significant inconsistencies in practice and persistent failures to identify children as victims. There is often a postcode lottery, shaped by variable interpretations and thresholds across agencies and jurisdictions. Although I am grateful that the Government have committed to putting a definition in the guidance, I do not think this will go far enough because, frankly, the guidance may not be adopted by all the agencies that work with victims of this form of child abuse.

A statutory definition in the Bill would establish a shared understanding across all services, ensuring that children receive support regardless of where they live. It would, I hope, enhance multi-agency working, helping to build a national picture of exploitation and improve data collection and reporting. Importantly, it would support early Intervention and prevention by providing a clear legal basis for services to respond to signs of exploitation before criminal harm escalates.

The Bill rightly focuses on ensuring that the criminals who ensnare children for their own ends, forcing them to commit serious crimes and destroying lives, will now face the full force of the law. As will the ringleaders, who believe themselves safe behind gated communities, making a fortune from broken lives. But please let us not lose sight of the children who are trapped by the gangs. Let us recognise that they have been groomed and ensure that there is a consistent definition and approach to give these children the opportunity to fully escape their abuse. In hope, I beg to move.

My Lords, I declare several interests. I am a co-chair of the All-Party Group on Modern Slavery and vice-chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Brown. She has done a brilliant first Amendment and I am delighted to support her. I played a very small part in the Modern Slavery Act: I was involved in the pre-legislative scrutiny and an earlier report that persuaded the then Home Secretary, now the noble Baroness, Lady May, to put the Bill in place.

Exploitation of children is in the Modern Slavery Act, but it is rather masked and has not been taken seriously, particularly by the police. Perhaps more importantly—this is one thing that the noble Baroness, Lady Brown, did not say—under the Act, a child who is exploited cannot consent to exploitation and cannot commit an offence. That is absolutely crucial, and it probably ought to be expressed again in primary legislation.

I enormously admire a great deal of what this Government are trying to do. I went on behalf of Action for Children to a very useful meeting with Diana Johnson and Jess Phillips, where I got the impression that they were going to move forward on this. But what is offered in this Bill does not really meet the need. To put into guidance what was put in primary legislation 10 years ago seems to make it less important. I ask the Minister to reflect on why you would want to put into guidance something that was expressed, not as well, in primary legislation 10 years ago.

The time has come to deal with county lines. A great deal of work has been done by the National Crime Agency. At long last, at least some magistrates’ courts realise that children who are ferrying drugs around the country—and cash, nowadays, as well as drink and various other things—are in fact victims and not perpetrators. But it is not fully known. The police do not seem to understand it. We need to explain, through primary legislation, to whoever is now in charge of modern slavery in the police that we are talking about child exploitation, of which modern slavery is a component. There is no doubt that these children are enslaved, but I suspect that, in this country, the word “exploitation” is rather easier to understand—and it is time it was there.

This amendment is brilliant. It could perhaps be improved in certain ways, but it asks the Government to do something really practical which, when I went to that very useful meeting, I got the impression they were going to do.

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown, but she may not need much support, having received the much-coveted gold star from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who, I am very proud to say, supports a later Amendment of mine on raising the age of criminal responsibility—which, I am ashamed to say, is barbarically only 10 in England and Wales. The UN recommends that it be 14. In Scotland it is 12 and the heavens do not seem to have fallen.

I have a couple of specific points to make in support of my noble friend’s amendment. If I may, I will be as bold as to predict what my noble friend the Minister and his advisers might be about to say in response. If they are about to say that my noble friend’s definition is unnecessary because the definition can be taken from the offence itself in Clause 40, I would like to get in first with two points to counter that. If I am pessimistic and wrong, so be it. Noble Lords know that I do not mind looking a fool.

The first point, which has already been made clearly by my noble friend Lady Brown, is that we need a definition that is about not just a specific criminal offence but interagency working and interventions across services, well in advance of any investigation or prosecution for a criminal offence.

I do not think the second point has been made yet. If the Committee compares the elements of my noble friend’s definition with the definition of the criminal offence in the Bill, it will see that the Government’s approach misses something very important that is to be found in my noble friend’s definition: enabling the child, not just causing the child, to engage in criminal conduct. That addition is important because “causing” is a harder thing to prove and a greater step in grooming. Currently, the Government’s definition is

“causing the child to commit an offence”,

or, indeed, “facilitating” somebody else to cause the child to commit the offence.

To prove causation in law is a serious matter. Enabling—making it easy, making the tools of the trade available, providing the opportunity—is a lower threshold, which is appropriate in the context of children. My noble friend made the point that currently in law they are treated as victims but also as perpetrators, and sometimes it is a matter of luck as to whether you will find the adult and the public service who will take the proper approach, in my view, of always treating the child as a child and as a victim, and not criminalising them. This is the point about “enabling”.

My noble friend the Minister is very experienced in these matters. Whatever he comes back with, I would like him and his advisers to consider the question of the lower threshold of enabling, not just causing. If there is to be a further compromise that includes some element of my noble friend Lady Brown’s amendment, I hope that that is taken on board.

The most formative time in my professional life was as a Home Office lawyer. I know what it is like to work on big Bills and to defend them as originally crafted and drafted. But it is wise, especially in this House, to take good advice and to bend a little when it might improve legislation for the benefit of victims.

My Lords, first, I absolutely congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, on her excellently motivated Amendment. It is very thought provoking. In particular, this sentence caught my attention:

“The victim may have been criminally exploited even if the activity appears consensual”.

That is one of the most difficult challenges. For some years I have been involved in the grooming gangs scandal, and one of the most horrible parts of that was when the police took the decision that the young 14 or 15 year-old, precocious though she—a general “she”—may have been, was somehow actively consenting to her own rape or sexual exploitation. It was about the notion of this being a child, because the young girl may have looked more adult—it was literally as superficial as that—and about the type, if we are honest, in class terms. Therefore, it was said that she could not be a victim and she was accused of being a prostitute, and so on. We are familiar with that. That is the reason why that sentence stood out to me.

However, I have some qualms, and I want to ask genuinely what we do about those qualms, because I do not know where to go. I am slightly worried, because county lines gangs, as the noble Baroness will know, are a young men’s game. Some of the gang leaders are younger than one would ever want to imagine in your worst nightmare. That is a problem with this, in a way, and with how you work it out. If you have a general rule that this is always a child, how do you deal with the culpability and responsibility of a 17 year-old thug, not to put too fine a point on it, who is exploiting younger people or even his—and it is generally “his”—peers? I am not sure how to square that with what I have just said. It also seems that there is a major clash with the age of criminal responsibility. I am very sympathetic with that not being 10, but how do you deal with the belief that someone aged under 18 is a child, yet we say that a child has criminal responsibility? Perhaps I am just misunderstanding something.

My final reservation is that if we say that everybody under 18 has to be a victim all the time, would that be a legal loophole that would get people off when there was some guilt for them to be held to account for? I generally support this amendment, but I want some clarification on how to muddle my way through those moral thickets, if possible.

My Lords, I join in congratulating the noble Baroness on how she moved the Amendment. It is very nice to see a Government Back-Bencher introducing an amendment and taking part; I wish we had slightly more of it.

To bring one back to Professor Jay’s review of child criminal exploitation, she made several important recommendations, of which the first and arguably most important is at the heart of what we are talking about at the moment. She called for a single, cohesive legal code for children exploited into criminal activity, and detailed what that needed to contain. The noble Baroness’s amendment goes to the heart of that matter. Having well-meaning explanations put into advice or regulation is not enough. There needs not only to be a common understanding across all government departments and agencies involved in dealing with these children and gangs; it needs to be completely clear for the police in particular, who are clearly looking into the criminal activity, exactly what it is and what it is not.

With the next amendment, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, and I shall speak, we will talk about ways in which a child who is both a victim and perpetrator can be defended—but we will discuss that in the next group. As for this group, I think that I probably speak for all noble Lords who are concerned about this issue in saying that absolute clarity about the definition, so there is no argument about it whatever, would be a giant step forward. The best-meaning attempts to deal with child criminal exploitation over the past decade have been hindered severely by the lack of consistency.

I ask the Government to listen very carefully to what the noble Baroness has asked for. She has said clearly that her wording may not be perfect—I think that in many Bills the wording is not necessarily perfect, even in the final Act—but we have a chance to get this right. I look forward to what the Minister says in response.

My Lords, I fully endorse the important points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brown. I had great pleasure in working with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on the Modern Slavery Bill. I am totally in awe of her experience and her willingness to share that experience, which, as a new Peer, was absolutely wonderful for me—although I could certainly do with it now as well.

The government amendments in this group provide more welcome detail on the definition and operation of child criminal exploitation prevention orders and include provisions necessary to cover the whole of the UK, not just England and Wales. As with other government amendments during the passage of the Bill, we welcome the expansion of detail in the Bill. Could the Minister confirm that each of the three devolved states has approved the relevant amendments in this group? It would be very good to hear that this has already been done. I do not disagree with anything that anyone has said so far—it has been an excellent and very clear unification of the views of everyone here.

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, for introducing this large group of amendments. As noble Lords will appreciate, many of the amendments before us today concern matters of clarification or technical improvement to ensure consistency across the Bill and the amendments tabled so far.

We on these Benches are broadly supportive of these changes, particularly when they strengthen child safeguarding protections and improve clarity, which we hope will eventually result in more seamless practical implementation. In this regard, we welcome amendments extending the scope of child criminal exploitation prevention orders to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and those clarifying procedural matters, such as the form of notification requirements when oral notification may not be practicable. These are sensible adjustments that contribute to ensuring that the Bill operates coherently across the four nations and in real-world enforcement scenarios.

I briefly draw attention to Amendment 235ZA in my name, which would remove Clause 43(3)(a). That subsection currently requires that, when a court makes a criminal exploitation prevention order, the terms of the order must avoid

“conflict with any religious beliefs of the defendant”.

Although religious beliefs are, of course, an important individual right, the purpose of these orders is to protect children from very serious criminal harm. It is, therefore, my view that safeguarding and public protection must take precedence over all other concerns and that no such exemption should hinder appropriate and proportionate restrictions when a court considers them necessary. I hope the Government consider the matter carefully and take the recommendation on board.

Finally, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, for bringing forward Amendment 235A, which would give the courts an explicit ability to impose a prevention order to protect a child from being threatened, intimidated or coerced into criminal exploitation. The intention behind the amendment—to intervene earlier and more effectively to safeguard children at risk—is one that I hope all sides of the Committee can support. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response and clarification of how the Bill will ensure that those protections are fully delivered. These are complex issues, but our shared objective is simple: to ensure that vulnerable children are protected and that those who exploit them face firm consequences. I hope the Government will reflect carefully on the points that have been raised here today.

My Lords, if the Committee will allow me, I will begin by detailing the government amendments in this group. We know that criminal gangs conducting activity such as county lines drug dealing do not stop at internal UK borders, and children are criminally exploited across the UK. To go to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned, this is why—at the request of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice—we are making provision in the Bill for child criminal exploitation prevention orders in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That is at their request, and I hope that also answers the point from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Since the Bill covers England and Wales, this means that the offence of child criminal exploitation will now apply UK-wide. These amendments have been tabled because, since the Bill was published, we have had those discussions and this is a way of making sure that we have a UK-wide approach.

These orders will give the police and courts across the whole of the United Kingdom powers to prevent child criminal exploitation happening in the first place, or happening again, by putting prohibitions and requirements on an adult who poses a risk of criminally exploiting a child. As I have mentioned, these provisions have been drafted in collaboration with the Scottish and Northern Ireland Governments and consequential amendments are therefore required for England and Wales to ensure that the orders function smoothly across the United Kingdom.

Finally, we have tabled some other amendments to put beyond doubt that assessment of whether an individual has engaged in child criminal exploitation, or associated conduct, in an application for, or imposition of, a child criminal exploitation prevention order is to be determined by the court on the basis of the civil standard of proof; that is, the balance of probabilities. This is appropriate given that there are civil rather than criminal proceedings in this case. The application of the civil standard of proof is well precedented in many similar preventive orders across the statute book and is important to ensure that an order can intervene earlier in the course of a child’s exploitation so that it can be prevented. I hope that I have wide support across the Committee for those measures—I think I do.

Amendment 232B is in the name of my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown. I welcome her moving her first amendment in such a positive way. She has secured the support of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which is a fairly impressive bunch on a first amendment, so I say well done to her on that. Her amendment seeks to create a further definition of child criminal exploitation.

I say to my noble friend—and I think that this was anticipated by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—that “child criminal exploitation” is already defined in Clause 40 by the description of conduct amounting to an offence. It is where an adult

“engages in conduct towards or in respect of a child, with the intention of … causing the child to” engage in criminality. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, raised a number of issues for which I am not accountable, but which my noble friend may wish to respond to. That is the Government’s view on the purpose of Clause 40. Clause 40 captures activity online, through the use of technology and whether or not it is seemingly consensual. This definition also operates for the purposes of the child criminal exploitation prevention orders.

My noble friend has made a very strong case, through personal experience as a Constituency MP in east London for almost 20 years, on the impact of county lines gangs on young people. I fully accept, understand and appreciate where she is coming from on those issues. That is why the Government introduced Clause 40 in the first place. It is also why the Government are introducing a bespoke stand-alone offence of CCE, along with the CCE prevention orders, to signal unequivocally that using a child to commit crime is against the law and that those children are victims of a crime. I also agree that any apparent consent of the child to involvement is irrelevant to whether they have been criminally exploited, and that criminal exploitation can occur online and through the use of technology. I understand my noble friend’s amendment, but these points are captured by the definition of CCE in Clause 40, which does not include a child’s consent and captures adults’ conduct by means of any method or control.

Obviously, I correctly anticipated the response that was coming, but I would be grateful if my noble friend would deal with this point about “enabling”, which is a substantive point of difference in the two definitions. Enabling is easier to prove than causing. “Causing” is closer to a child being used, which is reflected in my noble friend Lady Brown’s definition, but I do not think that “enabling” is in the Clause 40 definition as it stands.

I appreciate my noble friend’s comments. If she will bear with me, I will come on to that point in a moment. I am doing this in a structured order to try to address the points that are before the Committee today.

I say to my noble friend Lady Brown that, within the Bill, we are also taking the power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers. The noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, and my noble friend have looked at that, and I will return to it in a moment. The guidance will include a descriptive definition of CCE, setting out in lay person’s terms the conduct captured by the offence, and will provide practical guidance on how the CCE offence and orders should be applied.

An important point, to go particularly to what the noble Earl, Lord Russell of Liverpool, said, is that in Clause 60—which we will come to in later considerations—the Secretary of State has power to issue statutory guidance to chief officers of police about the exercise of their functions in connection with the prevention, detection and investigation of CCE offences and CCE prevention orders. I hope that the Committee will recognise that, importantly, the relevant police officers will be under a legal duty to have due regard to that statutory guidance when exercising functions in relation to the CCE offences and the CCE prevention orders. On the question of the statutory guidance, which my noble friend and others have touched on, the guidance has not been issued yet because the relevant legislation has not yet received the consent of this House or indeed Royal Assent. On the applicability of both of those conditions, statutory guidance under Clause 60 will be issued, which will place a legal duty on police officers to adhere to it.

My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti mentioned a very important point. There is a clear difference in what my noble friend Lady Brown of Silvertown has put forward, supported by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I hope this helps: the forms of conduct that are likely to enable a child to commit criminality are expected in most cases to also meet the test of conduct by an adult intended to cause, or facilitate the causing of, a child to commit a future crime. The nature of the offence, which is broad and large, will ensure that it captures offenders who will use children for crime. I believe that that is the right format. Both my noble friends have said that “enable” is a critical word. I believe that a separate definition is unnecessary, as it would have no legal impact over and above what is already in the Bill. It could cause confusion among police and prosecutors about which definition they should be applying.

The statutory guidance, which I emphasise will gave a legal bass and will be issued under Clause 60, is the appropriate place to provide the extra detail to understand proposals that are covered by the Amendment, but which are already in scope of the clear and simple legal terms of Clause 40. I know that that is the defence that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti expected me to use, but it is the defence: Clause 40 is what it is, and the guidance will also be statutory.

While statutory guidance is welcome, this particular case has similarities to other areas of the criminal law where the motivations and behaviours are complex, such as stalking and various areas of domestic abuse. In every case where regulation has been put in such a way that it becomes statutory, unless that goes hand in hand with appropriate and quite intensive training, you can have as many regulations as you like, as legally watertight as you like, but if the officials who are charged with implementing it do not understand the complexity that they are dealing with and cannot define and understand exactly how to apply the regulations, you are going to have confusion. We have a lot of history of that not happening. Good intentions are one thing; what actually happens when you put it out there and expect that everybody will understand and comply with it is another, and that is a concern that a lot of us have.

That is a valid point. I have considered with officials how we ensure enforcement of the guidance. I simply put it to the noble Earl—and we can debate this outside the Bill—that the statutory guidance is issued to chief constables of police forces under Clause 60 and they have a legal duty to ensure that statutory guidance is implemented, and officers have a legal duty to support and interpret that at a local level when they are faced with incidents of child exploitation as defined by the Bill. That requires a whole shift of culture and of training—I understand that. I will take from this comment and from the Committee generally that my colleagues in the Home Office need to look not just at the guidance but at its implementation. Ultimately, it has a statutory footing, and that is the key point for the Committee.

Will the Minister take on board the fact that countless inspections of police training, including by HMICFRS, have said that there has not been an independent assessment of police training since 2018, despite the fact that so many of the policing bodies themselves have asked for it? Taking the point, will he now say that there will be an independent assessment, so that police training can be much more appropriate and police will know exactly what they are supposed to be doing when we sit in this House and make legislation?

I will sound like I am repeating myself from Question Time, but, very shortly, we anticipate bringing forward a policing white paper looking at a whole range of mechanisms to improve police performance. If the noble Baroness will allow me, I will wait for further detail on the policing White Paper, which I have already said to the House will be published before Christmas, to allow for further discussion on a range of efficiency and improvement matters for policing. The point she makes is worthy of consideration, but I will park it until a later date in the parliamentary calendar.

I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his detailed response, but will he reflect on the potential distinction between “enabling” and “causing”? Will he go back to parliamentary counsel and be clear that enablers will always meet this threshold of causation? I am really concerned about that. I understand that my noble friend has rejected the idea of a separate free-standing definition and is worried about confusion between the offence definition and a general definition, but in blending the intentions of the Government and those of my noble friend Lady Brown, it would be helpful to know that that language of “causing”, without specific mention of enabling, is watertight.

I am grateful to my noble friend for further pressing me on the issue. I have tried to explain to the Committee where the Government are on this. We always reflect on debates in Committee, because there are always opportunities for my noble friend and others to bring matters back on Report. I am giving the Committee today the Government’s view that the definition in Clause 40, plus the guidance issued under Clause 60, will be sufficient to cover the objective of ensuring that we have this offence on the statute book and monitored and enforced by authorities.

To the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, I have just remembered that we will have further discussions on police training in later groups in Committee today, but the white paper will deal with a whole range of matters on improving police performance.

If the Minister can bear one more Intervention, would he be good enough to take back the Amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Brown? I cannot quite understand why that amendment is not listed nearer to Clause 40, because it would have been helpful to look at the two together, as has not been done to any great extent. I say politely to the Minister that I prefer the noble Baroness’s interpretation of exploitation.

The other point I want to make is that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is absolutely right—it is a point I have not made, but I am well aware of it—that at the age of 18, people who may have been victims become perpetrators. Some of them become perpetrators because they have no choice, but others—the young thugs she spoke about—are genuine perpetrators. Therefore, to specify the age of 18 in Clause 40 may be misleading.

I am grateful for the further pressure on this issue from the Cross Benches. My job is to set out to the Committee the Government’s view on these amendments, which I am trying to do. The measures in Clause 40 and the guidance in Clause 60 are sufficient to meet the objectives of my noble friend and, at the same time, to ensure—let us not forget this—that this offence goes on to the statute book for the first time. It will have a big impact on county line gangs and on defining further criminal child exploitation. I have put the Government’s view; we will obviously reflect on what my noble friend has said and I am happy to meet her, with other colleagues, outside the Committee to discuss that explanation further. I recognise the great motivation my noble friend had in bringing this to the Committee. I hope she will reflect on what I have said and withdraw the Amendment.

I believe I get another chance to speak. I am grateful to all contributors to my Amendment today. I can tell the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that I tried, but obviously not impactfully enough, to talk about the complexities involved and the differences between an abused child and a perpetrator, and how difficult it is for the criminal courts—and all of us—to understand the distinction.

I say gently to my noble friend the Minister that given that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Doocey, the noble Lord, Lord Russell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—if I might pray her in aid—are all pressing on this issue, it would be a good idea for the Government to reflect properly on it.

I knew that the argument was going to be that my amendment is unnecessary. With 20 years’ experience in Parliament, I know that there have been many unnecessary clauses in Bills, and indeed that some Bills have become Acts that some people believe are unnecessary. I cheekily ask what harm it could do. It would be fabulous if my noble friend the Minister could humour us and bung it in. I genuinely believe that this is an important part of the protection of our children in the future. In hope, therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 232B withdrawn.

Clause 42: Power to make CCE prevention order