Lord Hannan of Kingsclere:

Moved by Lord Hannan of Kingsclere

20L: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert “, subject to subsection (2A).(2A) Sections 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report assessing the potential implications for other British Overseas Territories that would arise from this Act and the Treaty.”

My Lord, I beg leave to propose my Amendments 20L, 20N and 20P. In the interests of brevity and immediacy, I will speak only on Amendment 20L, because I have covered the others in previous groups. This is the amendment that requires the Secretary of State to look at the impact of this treaty on other British Overseas Territories and the implications for their sovereignty.

Of course, we are always told in these situations by whoever is in government, “Oh, it’s a unique situation, you can’t compare”. On one level, that is a truism. Of course, all these situations are unique, yet I think it would be extremely naive not to consider the possibility that they will be fallen upon hungrily by people who want a change to the status quo. The idea that even now there are not politicians and lawyers in Buenos Aires or Madrid looking at the implications of this deal and saying, “How can we press this into the parallel arguments that we have for claims over British Overseas Territories?” is utterly fanciful.

They may already be putting out feelers to British lawyers, who seem very happy to work against the interests of the Crown on these questions. The representative of Mauritius in this case gave an interview in which he gloried in the fact that he lived in a country where you could humiliate the Government. If he is not available, perhaps by then the Attorney-General will no longer be in politics, or indeed perhaps the Prime Minister. They also both have long records of working on cases of this kind.

I suspect that the briefs that will be put in front of them will make the claim that Britain has now, in practice, for all that there was no jurisdiction, for all that it was an advisory ruling, for all that Commonwealth disputes were excluded, conceded this extraordinary and perilous precedent that, if a territory was at one time or another ruled from somewhere else, that establishes the basis of a sovereignty claim. I do not think it is completely fanciful for these elements in foreign countries to feel that they will be dealing with sympathetic elements within the United Kingdom.

Indeed, they have had experience of that. If we think of the experience of our relations with Argentina prior to the war in 1982, we can understand why the Argentines felt that Britain was going to move on the subject. We had the 1968 Anglo-Argentine memorandum, which expressly talked about sovereignty being on the agenda. We then had the persistent proposals throughout the 1970s for the leaseback arrangement, and then the withdrawal of HMS “Endurance”. Argentina is a country I know well, and indeed I have had the privilege of visiting the Falkland Islands as well. To this day, I am often told by Argentine politicians that Margaret Thatcher led them on to the punch—that Britain deliberately looked as though it was preparing to withdraw from the islands in order to provoke this conflict. I think that is nonsense. None the less, you can understand why they think that there are sympathetic elements here.

Similarly, if we look at relations between Britain and Madrid in the run-up to the Córdoba agreement over Gibraltar, the 1990s were a time of constant proposals from this side for some kind of joint sovereignty. It was only a referendum of the Gibraltarian people that put a stop to that process. By the way, it was a referendum that official Britain detested and for a long time did not reconcile itself to and ignored, until it became politically impossible and a new dispensation was reached. So, yes, this will be looked at in Buenos Aires and Madrid.

It will be looked at, I am sure, by those in Nicosia. They will think that there is an extremely close parallel there, in the sense that this is a military installation rather than an ethnically separate population. Again, they will say “This was ruled from somewhere else and we have a claim”. When I was a Member of the European Parliament, I would often get petitions and resolutions from Greek Cypriot MEPs raising the issue of the base.

What all these claims have in common is that final resolutions are never treated as final by the other party, any more than the final and binding resolution was with Mauritius in 1965. I do not want to bore noble Lords on this, but I feel it bears repetition. Mauritius trousered a large sum of money in exchange for perpetually renouncing any claim over the Chagos Islands.

In fact, there are very few British Overseas Territories that have not at some point been ruled from somewhere else. In addition to the ones I have mentioned, I was listing just now which ones have at some point had some other seat of government. Cayman, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and Caicos, St Helena and Montserrat were all, at some point or another, ruled by someone else. All of them will be looking at this as a precedent and a claim.

What all our overseas territories have in common is that they are all content with their present status. The British Empire was unusual in the peaceful and voluntary nature of the way it was relinquished: not completely, not universally—there were tragic exceptions in Cyprus, India and Kenya—but they were the exceptions. They were not the rule. Decolonisation in Malaysia was a perfectly peaceful process, for example. The only argument was about whether the British should stay longer to defeat the Communist insurgents. It was a generally peaceful process in the Caribbean and in most of Africa, so the places that have stayed are the places that wanted to stay, and they made that very clear, in the cases of the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar in quite recent memory, with overwhelming referendums. It seems to me that they will now be looking to those referendums as their one shield: the only thing that potentially distinguishes them. But of course they will be vulnerable to the argument that, if we are treating Mauritius rather than the Chagos Islands as the unit, why should we not treat all of Cyprus as the unit, since that was once partitioned in a similar way at the time of independence? They will all be extremely alarmed by that precedent.

It seems to me there is only one way of reassuring these countries, which is to allow a referendum of the Chagossians, dispersed and scattered as they may be. Then, if the Chagossians vote in favour, it does not matter. We would not be setting any precedent. We would be following the principle of self-determination. If the Chagossians vote to be Mauritian, that is of no concern to Gibraltarians or Falkland Islanders or anyone else, because the principle of self-determination would be upheld. But at least let us give them the vote.

We are privileged in this country to be custodians, stewards, of a largely maritime sovereign area. If we put together the oceans around our overseas territories, they are about the same size as India. We are in charge of some of the richest and most important marine environments, and that is our real string of pearls. The pearls are there because in every case they want to be on the string. Let us not set the precedent of tearing one of those pearls off and hurling it away in defiance of the wishes of the people most involved. I beg to move.

My Lords, in his remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has tried to pre-empt the comments that I was about to make. I remember well the Falklands War in 1982. I remember many negotiations with Spain about Gibraltar. I remember the struggles with China over Hong Kong. I remember discussions about the future of the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands—both of which I have visited—as well as discussions about the future of St Helena, Ascension, Tristan da Cunha, Anguilla and the sovereign territories in Cyprus. In each case, the discussions took place on the basis of the interests of each sovereign territory concerned and I believe that that will remain the case. I cannot see why this treaty over the British Indian Ocean islands and the Chagos Islands will affect the discussions that we will have with our other overseas territories about their futures. I think that the situation will remain as it has been in the past, so I do not feel that I can support this Amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hannan.

My Lords, I certainly do support the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I will be very brief. The amendment on which I want to focus is not one regarding referenda and consulting the Chagossian people, even though that is very important. Amendment 20L simply states—and I would be surprised if the Government could not accept this—that the Secretary of State needs to come up with a report

“assessing the potential implications for other British Overseas Territories that would arise from this Act and the Treaty”.

What is wrong with that amendment? Nothing. It would cost the Foreign Office a certain amount of time and effort to put together a report but, in the context of what has been said—at Second Reading, in the debate that we had on the treaty, on the first and second day in Committee—it is not asking a lot.

The noble Lord, Lord Jay, was looking specifically at the interests of the citizens in those different territories. He has a huge amount of knowledge, wisdom and experience, and what he said made a huge amount of sense. What he perhaps did not address is the signals that this Bill, if it becomes an Act, and the treaty, will send to other countries. The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, made some specific points about Argentina—where we know that the dispute will not go anywhere; it will go on and on—as well as Gibraltar. I will also mention one other territory that could well—

I hesitate to interrupt, but I think we need to remind ourselves before it gets repeated again that we have just done a deal on Gibraltar with Spain. That has been welcomed by the Government in Gibraltar and that situation is no longer as is being implied by the noble Lord.

I understand that, but circumstances can change and this may well be seen as a precedent in the future.

I want to mention one other territory: Anguilla. As the Minister will know, Anguilla went through a period of huge unrest to resist becoming part of St Kitts and Nevis. The consequence was that a UK battalion of the Parachute Regiment had to deploy to Anguilla to control the unrest that took place. This is a small but incredibly proud territory that wanted to remain British. In the past few years, there have been a number of attempts by St Kitts and Nevis to reopen the whole issue of Anguilla.

There will be consequences of this treaty going through, which could be to some extent alleviated if the Government would accept this very simple Amendment, Amendment 20L. This is the amendment in this group that concerns me most. I do not think that it is asking a great deal of the Government to put this in the Bill. This would be a very important signal in the Bill that those other territories would be properly considered.

My Lords, I want to say a few words. I have been rather sparing in the Committee debate today, but the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has prompted me to speak.

I have been a passionate supporter of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, I have served on this Parliament’s executive committee of the CPA UK and I have had the great privilege of visiting a great number of Commonwealth nations in all parts of the world, including early this year Malaysia. We have to be very careful, particularly perhaps in this House of Parliament, when we debate a process that has been very difficult on decolonisation. We have to be very cautious with how we approach it and very mindful of the language that we use.

We had 12 years of the Malayan Emergency and I have met the relatives of those who were affected by that. There is not a Commonwealth country that does not have difficult stories, on many occasions. We are still living with this today. I would counsel anybody that, yes, of course, we are free to make any contributions, but we have to be very mindful.

The noble Lord, Lord Bellingham, whom I greatly respect, indicated that perhaps the precedent was this deal. Now, there may be circumstances where a bad deal might be seen by other people as some form of precedent, but I do not think that that is the point that is being made in this group. The point that I hear being made in this group is that the very point of principle that we opened negotiations to cede sovereignty is the precedent. Well, that decision was made in 2022. If we are to see the consequences of decisions taken by a British Government to recognise that negotiations should take place to cede sovereignty, then we have had three years of knowing what the consequences of that will be. I have heard nothing from anybody on this group saying that they have seen the consequences of that decision taken by the previous Administration in November 2022.

My Lords, I want primarily—perhaps later—to talk about my Amendments 20Q and 20U, but I will say something about my noble friend Lord Hannan’s Amendment 20L to emphasise one particular precedent he mentioned in passing but seems the most compelling and dangerous. Indeed, in line with the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I have been rather cautious about discussing this because I did not want to put ideas into people’s heads, but, for two reasons, I will go ahead and talk about it now. First, there is no better way to keep a secret than to pronounce it in the House of Lords; and secondly, as my noble friend Lord Hannan said, there are lawyers in every country looking to see whether this is a precedent that they could use to right some past wrong or to change some past circumstance which they would like changed.

The most compelling comparison is between what we are doing now and the reasons given for doing it and the independence of Cyprus, where we severed off the sovereign bases. They were part of a whole. The territorial integrity of Cyprus was divided between the sovereign bases and the rest. That is exactly what we are accused of doing in the case of the Chagos Islands. It is actually much more true in the case of Cyprus than in that of the Chagos Islands, because Cyprus was always governed as one unit by us whereas the Chagos Islands had separate Laws, even if they were transmitted from somebody resident in Mauritius. Therefore, if we are saying that there is compelling reason for us to say we cannot separate the Chagos Islands from Mauritius, of which it has never been part, then surely there are compelling reasons why we should never have separated the sovereign base territories from the rest of Cyprus.

Those bases are hugely important. They played a role time and again in recent disputes and interventions, and in the prospect of interventions in the Middle East. We have been able to help fly from them and intercept missiles from Iran coming towards Israel. In previous conflicts, we used the bases there. They of value not only to us but to the whole of NATO. If we put them at risk by saying to the world that we have no right to have separated them then we would be doing something very foolish.

The only difference I can think of—I am offering a solution to this dilemma, because I do not want the issue of the sovereign bases to be opened up in a dangerous way—is that the decisions in Cyprus were taken before the United Nations General Assembly resolution on which the advisory opinion of the ICJ was based, and therefore it did not apply to them. Of course, advisory opinions are not actually binding—they are wrongly taken as being binding but they are not—but do they apply retrospectively? In many cases when courts rule, they say, “This has always been the case; we’ve only just now ruled it”.

I would like to hear how the Minister proposes to defend the sovereign bases in Cyprus from this precedent. She is obviously not doing this willingly; she is obviously unwilling and she is a wonderful Minister, but she has been given a tough job to do. I would like to hear some justification for this. I do not know whether the precedent in Committee allows me to sit down now and stand up later to deal with my amendments, but assuming I can do that, I will.

My Lords, I will briefly make two points. First, on behalf of my noble friend Lord McCrea, who has had to leave for a family wedding, I will speak to Amendment 57, which principally brings to the Committee’s attention the role of British legal firms in this issue.

We have been critical in this House of the current and, to some extent, the previous Government. Those criticisms are not entirely without merit on the issue of sovereignty. There has also been further British involvement in any number of aspects, the four most significant legal interventions being two cases in connection with UNCLOS; one relating to the advisory opinion of the ICJ; and one on the drafting of the UN security resolution. In each of these four cases, the Mauritius Government used British firms as their legal representation in order to further their aims. In effect, British firms acted on behalf of a foreign Government to challenge British sovereignty, British defence rights and the wishes of British citizens. We cannot do anything about what happened in the past, but I suppose the amendment queries whether there is an appropriate way forward in terms of that level of support for Mauritius. Raising my noble friend Lord McCrea’s amendment gives the Government an opportunity to respond to it.

I want to deal briefly with the wider point. We do not always see eye to eye, but I agree with at least one phrase that the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, used: he said that we have to be careful about words, and words matter. One of the major concerns, as highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, and others, might be described as the precedent and the ripple effect. It is undoubtedly the case that in the past we as a nation have made mistakes in dealing with overseas territories. In particular, we have sent out the wrong signals on both the Falklands and Gibraltar. It is probably the case that some, at different points within Governments in the past, would have been quite happy to see those territories dispatched to another sovereign territory on that basis. They can best speak for themselves but, fortunately enough, in each case we have drawn back from what might be described as a fatal mistake. The danger with this is that it crosses the line in handing over that level of sovereignty.

Mention has been made of a range of overseas territories. The one thing that largely unites them is that whatever discussions we have had with different Governments, about whatever level of co-operation, they have ultimately respected the self-determination and the inhabitants’ will for sovereignty. That is what at times has drawn us back. I think this goes beyond that and moves towards a situation regarding the wishes of the Chagossian people and their right to self-determination—and that self-determination may, because we do not know definitively, express itself in them saying, “We want to be part of Mauritius”. If that is their self-determination, so be it. I think it is unlikely to be the case; nevertheless, so be it. The concern is the signal that this sends out to the outside world.

The Minister mentioned the arrangements as regards Gibraltar. I think there has been work ongoing with both this Government and the previous Government to try to find arrangements that are in the best interests of Gibraltar. I entirely acknowledge that, while it is sometimes easy to criticise when looking from outside, the Gibraltar Government themselves have been supportive of those actions and have backed the moves made so far.

It is really important that there is not a dispute with regards to Gibraltar. There is an arrangement that is agreed with Spain and it is not in question at all, in any sense.

Absolutely. I have taken the Minister and the Government to task on a range of things, but this may be one issue on which we are in vigorous agreement. I do not question the Government’s bona fides as regards Gibraltar or the Falkland Islands. I know there is a strong commitment to both. I fully acknowledge that and believe it would be the case under a future Government, but this is not a concern over the attitude of this Government or other UK Governments over the ripple effect. It is the danger of what message will be sent out; as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said, there is a ripple effect towards Madrid and Buenos Aires, which might take a very different approach in future.

I am really sorry, but we have an agreement with Spain. The matter is settled. Madrid takes the same view that London takes; it is the same view that the Government of Gibraltar take. It is settled, and it is beyond unhelpful for noble Lords—unintentionally, I realise, as this is a relatively recent development—to suggest in any way that that is not the case.

I am not querying that. What I am saying is from experience and from having spoken directly to Gibraltarians in relation to this. They know that a very good agreement may have been done with this Government, but Spanish Governments down the years have sometimes tended to blow hot and cold as regards Gibraltar.

It is agreed.

Yes, but part of the problem is that sometimes in this country we fall into a trap where we see agreements as final settlements. There are sometimes other Governments who either see them as a process or, while they may be fully committed to them, cannot say whether a future Government would feel bound in their attitude towards them.

I appreciate that we have it in black and white as regards Gibraltar and I do not doubt the actions taken by the Government. I fully support them, beyond any question mark of doubt, but we have been told by Gibraltarians that sometimes what happens in Madrid can run contrary to what happens in the border provinces with Gibraltar, which want to have a much stronger relationship. Depending on what attitude they want to take, they can turn hot and cold on the relationship. I have no doubt that the Government have done a very good job in nailing down that agreement but, again, I just express the concern for a future situation—perhaps it is more pertinent for Buenos Aires, which down the years has had a much more volatile approach to some of these issues—over the signals that we inadvertently send by way of this to other Governments. I have no question over the bona fides of either this Government or future UK Governments in relation to that.

Does the noble Lord accept that perhaps a closer analogy is where a party has one position when it is in government but a completely different one when it is in Opposition, which is true of His Majesty’s Opposition towards this treaty with Mauritius?

That is true of a party that votes against it at Third Reading in the House of Commons and then seems largely supportive of the deal here. So, yes, that could be a perfectly good opportunity, but that can be applied in several parts of the body politic.

I am getting rather tired of this Front-Bench thing about what the last Government did. The reality is that the last Government did not sign any treaty. They may have been talking. They could have talked and talked, but they did not sign a treaty. This Government came in and signed a treaty.

I do not hold a brief for either the Government or the main Opposition. I am happy for them to spell it out. Undoubtedly, what the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, has said is correct, but rather than essentially being in a position where we look to see where the lines of accountability and blame should lie, we should ultimately be focusing on ensuring that we support the self-determination of the Chagossian people. That is the fatal flaw with this agreement.

My Lords, I just want us to remind ourselves of the history of the British Empire and how Macmillan suddenly said: there are now winds of change and, if we resist, we may lose something very good. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II created this wonderful thing called the Commonwealth. She put in a lot of effort and energy, and those countries that were once ruled are now part of the Commonwealth, and what is interesting is that in most of those countries the national language is English. So there can be a transition that does not destroy a lot of goodness nor give the impression that those territories where the sovereign is still His Majesty the King will simply look at this and say, “They did it, so we can”. You will find that politically, in Jamaica and other places, the Crown has made it very clear that this is a decision of those nations. If they wanted to become independent, that is their decision. They are not going to force themselves on anybody.

I thought the treaty that was entered into with Mauritius was to create a long-term use of Diego Garcia and the archipelago. If we did not, the challenge was soon going to come because of what happened at the United Nations. We would have found ourselves with a big challenge. Even China was interested in challenging British sovereignty, but now a treaty has been signed and has secured this.

Another good thing on which I want to congratulate the Government is that they did not simply sign a treaty so that this base can be used for 99 years. Because sovereignty is now being transferred, they also provided a trust fund for the Chagossians to be better looked after than when the British had sovereignty over the place. This is a win-win situation for the Chagossians and for Britain. We now have security of the base for a 99-year lease. That is quite a long time. I do not think you and I will be here in 99 years, but those who are here may say we did a good thing at the time. As for the fear of the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, of what other places may do, it is their right to do whatever they want to do.

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity also to speak to my Amendments 20U and 20Q. Amendment 20U would provide that the Bill shall not come into force until the Secretary of State has published

“a report on how the Treaty may increase any political or legal risks”— that is what we have been told underlie it—

“related to … reliance on third countries required to service the base … risks of litigation from Mauritius regarding the base in Diego Garcia in the International Court of Justice”— and I hope this will include some explanation of the Government’s reactions to the Mauritian declarations of 23 September 1968 which, as I understand it, mirrored our determination that the ICJ should not have jurisdiction on disputes between previous and current Commonwealth states and ourselves; Mauritius likewise said that any such disputes should be settled reciprocally. Finally, the report should include the

“risks of litigation in an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII of UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”.

The Minister said a little while ago that we spent many hours discussing the reasons or rationale behind the decision to cede sovereignty. In fact, we have spent many hours dragging out from the Government an explanation of their decision to do so. It is pretty clear that the decision came first, and their justification has been cobbled together in response to each successive challenge that has been put forward to it. The more it has been challenged, the more tenuous the rationale has become. It has been spread out like an elastic band and has become thinner and more transparent. It is very clear that, if we keep on this process, it will eventually break and then the Government will be without any rationale at all.

The Government first suggested that the ICJ decision was purely advisory but Mauritius might come back and somehow get a definitive ruling out of the ICJ. However, that was then abandoned because, of course, we had the specific opt-out when we signed up to the ICJ that it would not be able to consider disputes between ourselves and present or previous Commonwealth countries. One thing has puzzled me. Looking back through the record, I have never seen Ministers refer in words to that opt-out. They have tacitly acknowledged it, because they move on to talking about the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Likewise, when we have heard from the great mandarins of the Foreign Office, none of them has ever explicitly let past their lips—if I have read the transcript correctly—the existence of this opt-out. That is a great mystery. When people do not say something, one wants to know why, particularly when they tacitly admit it.

Oh dear, I hope I have not caused the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, to leave in disgust. We were hoping he would be able to break this omertà that has forbidden him and his colleagues ever to mention this.

My suspicion—of course it is no more than a suspicion, and the person who could have set that right has left the Chamber—is that the Permanent Secretaries in the Foreign Office and the other mandarins who have spoken in defence of the Government on this never actually told Ministers about this opt-out and they do not like to admit that. Ministers do not like to admit that they did not know about it, because that looks pretty difficult. Maybe in the course of debate we will find that that is an unworthy consideration and they were told explicitly at the beginning there was no possibility of the ICJ reaching a binding judgment on the sovereignty of the Chagos. They tacitly accept that is the case and move on to the possibility of a judgment coming from the tribunal set up under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

My amendment would force the Government to be more explicit about that. What precedents are there for this tribunal ruling on sovereignty? The noble Baroness said that she thought it was very unlikely— I think that was her phrase—that the tribunal would directly rule on sovereignty. I think she is more than right on that, because there are no precedents I can find for it ruling on sovereignty. But then she said that it might rule on other things and sort of assume sovereignty. I would like some examples of that sort of thing happening, if it is a sufficiently big risk for us to be doing this nefarious deed of ceding sovereignty over the Chagos Islands. We have not had that up to now.

The tenuous justification moves on to say that there may be a ruling that would somehow assume sovereignty, but what negative effects would that have? It would apparently put the base at risk, because of its reliance on being supplied from other countries. From which other countries is the Diego Garcia base supplied, and in what way, and how would that be put at risk? Is it supplied from Aden? Would the Suez Canal be closed to British shipping if it was thought to be supplying the base? Would we get labour from mainland Africa to help run the base? Would the Philippines refuse to send Filipino workers to help run the base? When we are given such a tenuous reason, at the end of a long chain of tenuous arguments, we need some substance to it. This amendment would require the Government to give that.

Amendment 20Q would provide that the Bill would come into force only

“when the Secretary of State has published a report into the governance of the Chagos Archipelago under the Treaty, including local administration and democracy”.

The Minister has said that there was never any settled population in the Chagos Islands, nor any system of local administration. I am sure that was said in good faith, and I can well understand that the detailed history of the Chagos Archipelago is not something most of us have studied, but a letter has now been sent to the Minister, and to the committee that has been asked to consult with the Chagossians, pointing out that, in the absence of the British, who sort of came and went, the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands elected a chief to help with the governance and local administration of the islands. Therefore, the settled inhabitants did have a local administration in the past, and we want to know what is going to replace it in future.

We know that Mauritius, while it has no obligation to, will be able to resettle the islands. It may, of course, settle them with Mauritians, not Chagossians. Either way, what system of administration will there be, and will it be democratic or autocratic? I think we should know. My Amendment 20Q would require the Government to spell that out, and to acknowledge and accept that it was a mistake to say that there has never been any system of local administration, when clearly there has.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hannan of Kingsclere for leading this debate. He set out a very strong argument for his amendments in this group, as did my noble friend Lord Lilley and the noble Lord, Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown.

Amendment 20L, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hannan, is a very helpful amendment in Committee, as it affords the Committee the opportunity to debate the impact of the Government’s decision on the Chagos Archipelago on other overseas territories. While I accept that there are, of course, legal arguments here, we believe that they should be explored fully. I want to focus on the impact of the UK Government’s treatment of the Chagossians, and on our reputation among other overseas territories, which look to the UK for steadfast support and security. How do residents, and descendants of the residents, of other overseas territories feel now that the Government have caved in to pressure from their international lawyer friends on the question of the Chagos Islands?

As my noble friend Lord Hannan observed, the British Indian Ocean Territory is not the only overseas territory subject to legal claims by foreign states. Does the Minister accept that the behaviour of our Government on this issue will have ramifications for the level of trust in the UK held by residents of other overseas territories? We should be standing up for our overseas territories and protecting those who live on them, not caving in to activist international lawyers. In my view, it really is that simple. Can the Minister confirm that the UK Government are not considering ceding sovereignty over any other British Overseas Territories? Will she rule out such a move in future? We want residents of the overseas territories to feel secure, and I hope that the Minister’s words in response to this group will help to give them that security.

On Amendment 20N, I can be brief on this point, because we discussed it during the debate on the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act that we had at Second Reading and on the previous day in Committee. The simple reality is that the statutory process under CRaG 2010 and the procedural conventions of the two Houses of Parliament should afford the other place less power to scrutinise treaties than it does your Lordships’ House. That was never meant to be the case; it is a perverse outcome from an attempt to enshrine the Ponsonby rule, as it was, in statute—and of course that has not worked. The Government were supposed to have allowed a substantive debate in the other place on the treaty, and it is appalling that they did not. It shows that, for all their high-minded talk of values before the General Election, this Government are unwilling to adhere to long-established conventions on treaty scrutiny. I shall not dwell on this any further, other than to remind the Minister that the Ponsonby rule was established under a Labour Government and it is ironic that it is now a Labour Government who have effectively killed it.

On the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, I agree with him that the Government should provide more clarity on the plans for Mauritian administration of the islands and plans to manage the democracy there. As we discussed in the previous group, Ministers must have done at least some work assessing Mauritius’s plans and capabilities in respect of the archipelago. I hope that the Minister will be able to provide the Committee with a full answer to that.

On the increased legal risk, my noble friend is absolutely right that the international law case is definitely not cut and dried. There are agreements that confirm British sovereignty, and we do not understand why the Government are ignoring those agreements. With that, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

My Lords, a large number of the amendments that have been tabled seek to mandate the Government to renegotiate the treaty with Mauritius on various points. The noble Lord told me this on many occasions in the last Parliament, so I am sure that he understands the point that I am about to make: treaty-making and international negotiations are a matter for the Government, in exercise of the royal prerogative. It is simply not practical for that to become a matter where Parliament seeks to direct this or that isolated element of what can be intense, dynamic and sometimes difficult negotiations. In this case, I can assure the Committee that the Government have thoroughly considered all aspects of the treaty that the UK has entered into and used all their efforts throughout to achieve the best possible deal for the UK. These requests to reopen negotiations on different points are not realistic and would make the UK appear an unreliable counterparty on the international stage. This treaty has gone through a rigorous assessment and been agreed at the highest levels of the US security establishment.

Our reasons for rejecting Amendment 20U are, essentially, those that I set out earlier in relation to Amendment 20J, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow. I do not intend to repeat them.

Amendment 20L was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hannan. I enjoy the noble Lord’s contributions. His speeches are as entertaining as they are, unfortunately, inaccurate and misleading sometimes. My grandfather fought in Malaya, in the Green Howards, and so it was an unfortunate example that the noble Lord chose to resort to—but I forgive him for this, because he puts so much into his speeches. I assure him and other noble Lords that this deal has been welcomed by both Gibraltar and the Falklands Islands. As the noble Lord, Lord Jay, said, their Governments have both stated that there is no read-across to them, and we should respect what they have to say.

Through Amendment 20M, the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, seems to be suggesting that the Government have not complied with the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act in respect of the treaty. I respectfully disagree with him on this. The treaty was laid in Parliament on the day that it was signed, under the process set out in the Act. CRaG requires that a treaty is laid in both Houses for 21 joint sitting days before it may be ratified. The period expired on 3 July 2025, with neither House resolving against ratification. During that 21-day period, two committees in this House held evidence sessions, including with the Minister for Overseas Territories, and produced reports, which we have responded to. There was a debate and a vote on the Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, against ratification, which this Government defeated. As a matter of practice, the UK Government do not ratify treaties until the necessary implementing legislation is in place, and that is what the Government are currently doing with the Bill.

Amendments 20P and 20Q appear to misunderstand the archipelago. I feel uncomfortable making this point, as it feels very cold, harsh and legalistic, particularly given the testimonies, many of which we have heard directly from Chagossians in their accounts of what happened in the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not feel comfortable repeating it but this is the legal situation as it is, and it is important to be clear. The archipelago has never had a permanent population. The islands have not been inhabited since the population was removed in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As such, there is no “economy” of the Chagos Archipelago. Once the treaty enters into force, Mauritius will be sovereign and will have jurisdiction over the regulation of commercial activities unrelated to the operation of the base throughout the archipelago, subject to the constraints of the treaty. On the exclusive economic zone around the archipelago, Mauritius has announced its intention to establish a marine protected area and, importantly, there will be no commercial fishing allowed. It will be for Mauritius to decide how any resettlement will work, including in respect of governance of the islands.

Amendment 57, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, and spoken to on his behalf, cannot be accepted. The UK’s legal services industry and the English Bar are internationally recognised for their expertise. That includes expertise in public international law, and UK-qualified lawyers act for states all around the world on various matters, facilitating the peaceful settlement of disputes. The standing of UK legal expertise should be a matter of pride for this House, not a tool for manipulation by politicians to achieve narrow and short-term advantage. An attempt to place a prohibition on who can utilise our world-leading legal services would undermine access to legal representation—an important element of the rule of law. It is wholly inappropriate for the Government to dictate who can be represented by whom. It risks undermining our standing on the world stage.

I hesitate to repeat the debate we had last week, but I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, that, had there been no legal risk to our position, why did the United States stop investment in the base at that point? It was because it was sufficiently concerned about the legal risk. Had there been no basis whatever for our concerns on legality, why on earth did the previous Government even begin to negotiate, accepting that they did not manage to conclude a deal? Our view is that there was sufficient legal risk. The noble Lord disagrees, as is his right, but the fact is that the principle of this treaty, and the necessity for it, has been through the appropriate process. It has been voted on in this place and we have voted that this treaty should be ratified. We have already taken that decision in this Chamber. This legislation is about making the necessary changes to UK domestic law to enable us to sign, fully ratify and implement.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way, but I ask her to respond to the point I made: why, even now, does she refuse to let pass her lips any recognition that there was never any possibility of the ICJ reaching a legally binding decision that would affect us, because of our opt-out from the power of the ICJ to decide on disputes between ourselves and Mauritius? UNCLOS is a different matter, but would she let those words pass her lips?

My Lords, I accept that about the ICJ, but the point is that other countries will act on an advisory opinion even if we choose to ignore it. We have not chosen to ignore it. That is a judgment call. Partly, that is because we think that, by negotiating now, we negotiate from a stronger position than we would have had we waited for other, binding judgments. Those judgments can come from any treaty to which both parties are signed up. That is why we feel—and not everyone has to agree with the Government on this—that there is sufficient legal question that we needed to act and to negotiate. If they are honest with themselves—there is a lack of former Ministers who were responsible for this arguing the point that the noble Lord makes; they argue other points but not this one—there was sufficient legal jeopardy for the previous Government to enter into this process. I hope noble Lords will withdraw their amendments.

I am grateful to the Minister for dealing so comprehensively with all those points, and to all noble Lords who contributed: the noble Baronesses, Lady Hoey and Lady Ludford, my noble friends Lord Bellingham and Lord Lilley, the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Purvis, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu.

On finality, almost all treaties are said to be final at the time but they are not always treated as final by one or both parties. The treaty of Utrecht was pretty final. It said that Spain would have first refusal if Britain ever left, but it was pretty final about granting sovereignty. I absolutely agree, as the Minister says, that Spain has now agreed to a permanent settlement, but it is one of many, and experience tells us that incoming Governments do not always regard treaties signed by their predecessors as final. Indeed, the treaty we signed when Mauritius became independent and renounced all claim to the Chagos Islands was said to be permanent at the time, so I am less reassured than I think she hoped I might have been.

Let me put it the other way around: the way to make these treaties final is to stop inviting people, through our behaviour, to reopen them—to refuse to countenance it. The French had a very similar issue in the Comoros; they just refused to countenance it. I cannot see any other country doing what we are doing now. Indeed, I am afraid to say I cannot see any British Government other than this one having done it.

I do not want to get into the whole history of the Malayan emergency, but there is a wonderful record that, when Malaysia became independent, one of the first acts of the new Government was to give some very valuable land containing the house called Carcosa Seri Negara—a very fine house—to Britain in perpetuity as sovereign British territory. It became the seat of the high commission in Kuala Lumpur in recognition of all the things that we had done together. A young anti-colonialist Minister said, “But if we give them the best land in KL, no one will believe that we fought for our independence”, and there was a rather awkward moment around the Cabinet table because, of course, they did not: we were in Malaya supporting a democratic Government against a communist insurgency. We would have left much earlier had we not had the requests of that Government to remain and support them. That is getting slightly off topic so, with your Lordships’ permission, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment 20L withdrawn.