Lord Hanson of Flint:

Moved by Lord Hanson of Flint

217: Clause 40, page 59, line 27, after “over” insert “who is in a part of the United Kingdom (“the relevant part” of the United Kingdom)”Member’s explanatory statementThis Amendment defines “the relevant part” of the United Kingdom for the purposes of this clause and Clause 41 as the part of the United Kingdom in which the person aged 18 or over engages in conduct towards or in respect of a child.

My Lords, the government amendments to the child criminal exploitation offence in Clauses 40 and 41 are intended to provide legal certainty and further tighten the grip of the law against those who seek to draw children into criminality.

At the request of the Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Department of Justice, the child criminal exploitation offence was extended UK-wide in the other place. As the offence is committed where an adult intentionally takes action to cause a child to commit criminal conduct, it is now necessary to provide further clarification about where the child’s conduct must be criminal. This is owing to the fact that the criminal law is devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland, and a child’s conduct that is criminal in one may not be criminalised in another.

Perpetrators who exploit children for criminal purposes do not care about the UK’s internal borders, so it is right that we ensure that this new offence prevents them from taking advantage of them. Government Amendments 217, 220, 221 and 223 to 230 ensure that it does not matter whether the intended conduct of the child is criminal in the part of the UK where the adult is acting to exploit them or the part of the UK where they intend the child to act. If it is criminal in either one, the perpetrator can be prosecuted. If it is not criminal in either one, the offence is not committed.

Amendment 231 puts beyond doubt that a perpetrator commits the child criminal exploitation offence where the child they have exploited is under the age of criminal responsibility. Even though a child under 10 in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, or under 12 in Scotland, cannot technically commit an offence or be prosecuted for it, they can still be exploited, and it is right that this offence says so clearly and explicitly on the face of the Bill.

Amendments 487, 493 and 510 make consequential amendments to the general provisions at the back of the Bill. Together, these amendments demonstrate the Government’s unwavering commitment to leave no space for perpetrators who target children for criminal purposes to expose loopholes or to escape to.

There are a series of other amendments in this group; the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, have Amendments 218, 219, 222 and 222A. I want to listen to what noble Lords say and will respond to any comments on those amendments at the end of my comments. I beg to move.

My Lords, the amendments in this group, as the Minister has explained, are about child criminal exploitation. This is something that, quite honestly, when I started my career, we did not think of—it is something that I think we all became aware of in the last decade, particularly during Covid. I declare my interest as having worked with Action for Children and its previous iteration, National Children’s Home, for many years—most of my life, really. I was in its governance for 10 years and have been a long-term ambassador ever since.

Action for Children has worked with a number of children who have been criminally exploited. Some of them we would talk to when they had been picked up during Covid, for example, and exploited by being made to carry drugs and move them around the country. The threat that they and their families are frequently under is unbelievable and harmful to them, their future and family cohesion. Even where I lived in County Durham, where the police used to say we were among the safest in the country at one stage, the grandson of some friends of mine, who was bored and had been left just playing on his computer, went into the small town and met up with his mates, but they were spotted and the exploiters got them involved in drugs. The result was massive mental health problems and lots of suicide attempts. The family have worked and are still working to try to bring some reality back to their lives, make them safe and enable them to continue to grow, learn and develop. I cannot tell your Lordships how excruciating the life of the family has been. I know this is an important issue, and I am relieved that the Government are looking at it and seeking to address it in the Bill.

It is important that the Government are introducing a new criminal offence of criminally exploiting a child, along with other measures, to deal with those perpetrators. That is a positive move that has my full support. However, Action for Children thinks that there needs to be a means of protecting the child victim, whatever happens to the perpetrator—because sometimes it is difficult to find and catch the perpetrator. One of my later amendments deals with introducing another measure to protect the child even more, but I shall deal with the amendments in this group first.

Amendment 218 simply tries to be clearer about what is involved in the exploitation of children in these circumstances. I just want to make sure that all of us recognise that this is something that police forces are only just now coming to terms with handling. In the past, they have not had to think of the child as both a perpetrator and a victim. How do they do something totally outside their normal activity? Instead of simply treating the child as a perpetrator of a crime, they can now recognise that that crime has come about because of the manner of the exploitation of the child. Because this is new, and because police forces and others in the criminal justice system have not dealt with this sort of thing for very long and are really not sure how to handle it, we thought that it would be useful for Parliament to discuss it and consider putting more detail about what has happened to the child in the Bill. That is what this amendment is, and I would be interested to know what others and the Minister think. Being more specific, I recognise there are problems with that in any legislation, but I also think that, because this is so new in many senses in the criminal law, we really need to be a bit more forthright in how we describe what can happen.

Amendment 219 really relates to the fact that, as the Bill stands, a child would need to be coerced into criminal actions, but very often the actions of the child may not in themselves, if you just saw the instance, be criminal. For example, they may have been asked to carry money—but actually that is exploiting them and leading them into danger, which will have subsequent consequences. Again, it is very difficult to work out how you handle people. This is simply about trying to make sure that even if the act, such as holding or carrying money, is not in itself illegal, it is none the less part of the exploitation that makes the life of the child virtually impossible because of the threats around whether they carry the money and whether the offender gets the consequences of the child carrying the money in the way they want. That then becomes very serious for the child, even if the act itself was not illegal. This amendment will make it clear that an action that supports or facilitates criminal activity, while not being a crime itself, should none the less be taken into account. I think that would be helpful to the police, prosecutors and the courts as well.

Amendment 222 is just about how we determine that a child is 18 or not. There is a lot of debate on that in a series of areas of work at the moment, many of which my noble friend on the front bench will be pleased he does not have to deal with. Well, I suppose he does have to yes, in the Home Office. There is a big debate around migrants: how do we actually know how old the child is?

This amendment has been tabled because we are concerned that there would be a defence in the Bill that the perpetrator thought the child looked 18. We must think about that, because we need to know that children are children until they are 18 and that young people are still exploitable. We have to take account of this and say, “That is wrong, and you cannot do it”. Simply saying “I thought they were 18” is not a good enough excuse. I know so many young people who are leaving care at around that age. Criminals may believe that it is okay to exploit them, because yesterday was their 18th birthday, and they are now out of the foster care or children’s home that they had been in. That happens, and it is unacceptable not to think about it, at least, when we are looking at this provision. We need to understand what this order is about, and what we can do to make sure that we more effectively protect children than we have been able to do in the past.

My Lords, I speak to Amendment 222 in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, which she has so ably explained. All the amendments in this group seem to be a good idea. I also acknowledge the help of the Children’s Commissioner and the children’s coalition.

This is a very simple amendment: there is a concern that the offence of child-criminal exploitation, as written in the Bill, gives the perpetrator a defence if he or she reasonably believes that the child is over 18. We understand that this is a common part of legislation around other forms of abuse and exploitation; we believe that it will hinder the prosecution of perpetrators. During the Jay review into child criminal exploitation, many witnesses pointed to the role of adultification and racism in the criminalisation of children. The Modern Slavery Act 2015 is clear that children cannot consent to their own exploitation. However, the Jay review found that perceptions of children’s complicity in their exploitation meant that some groups of children, and black boys in particular, were not receiving an adequate safeguarding response. We strongly recommend that this part of Clause 40 is removed. It is a small piece of text that would have a profound effect on young victims.

My Lords, I was happy to put my name to Amendments 218, 219 and 222. The Minister mentioned that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has Amendment 222A. She apologises for not being here this evening, but said that she thought that the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, were so much better than her own, that she would not move them anyway—so that deals with that.

I am a governor of Coram, and used to be a trustee there. Coram is very involved in some of the activities that we are talking about. The Jay review is like a gut punch to the stomach. I had heard of it; I had not actually read it, but did so last night, and did not have a particularly undisturbed night’s sleep. What it contains is pretty horrifying.

I think Charles Dickens and Charles Booth would recognise the same forms of criminality and the same ability of some adults to use childhood as a training ground for extending their criminal activities in a way that is unconscionable but, when done efficiently, I suspect is highly profitable. The fact that it has a potentially lifelong effect on the children who are being drawn into this is, for the perpetrators, completely and utterly irrelevant.

Thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, some of us were able to attend a meeting in your Lordships’ House organised by Action for Children, and Professor Jay herself was there. It is perhaps important for the Government and Minister to understand that, in the case of the amendments the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, has spoken to and which we will talk about in future groups, Professor Jay herself has said how important she thinks they are. They deal with parts of the review that she went into in detail. From her point of view, while she and I think all of us are extremely pleased and grateful for the Government taking on board so much of what Professor Jay was trying to illustrate needed to be done, there are some tidying-up bits around the edge, and it is felt by those who have the most knowledge of this form of criminality that it will be extremely important to try to make this legislation as effective and watertight as it can be. For those reasons, I fully support those amendments.

My Lords, from these Benches we welcome the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong of Hill Top, and the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, which strengthen and clarify key issues. Amendment 218 from the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, would define how children are affected by child criminal exploitation. This should help police and reduce the chances of inconsistent decisions. It is necessary because, as seen with other crimes where the police or CPS have latitude to define such matters, it often works to the detriment of the child or young person.

Amendment 219 is equally helpful. It would make provision for the occasion when a child has committed something that may not be illegal, but which might lead them into future criminal behaviour. The way that child criminal exploitation works is often very similar to grooming. Without support and education, a child or young person may end up in trouble.

Amendment 222 from the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and recommended by the Children’s Commissioner, clarifies that a perpetrator of child criminal exploitation does not have to believe that the child or young person was under 18. This makes sense as Clause 40 currently provides an easy get-out for perpetrators to say, “But I thought they were 18”. The Joe Dix Foundation welcomes this new stand-alone offence but has also called for a national register for all perpetrators who are convicted of child criminal exploitation. Can I ask the Minister whether this is something the Government might consider?

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this important debate. The group largely seeks to clarify the Bill as it stands and that is important when we are addressing child exploitation. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hanson of Flint, for the amendments tabled in his name. I know we may not always see eye to eye at the Dispatch Box, but I can wholly support the principle behind his amendments in this group.

It may seem like semantics to clarify that offences may differ in different parts of the United Kingdom, but it is an important point. We must ensure that the legislation allows crimes to be prosecuted only where they are crimes. His Amendments 217 and 220, and the many consequential amendments, aim to ensure that this is the case. Similarly, his Amendments 487 and 493 extend the devolutionary power to make regulations for the area of child criminal exploitation. It is right that this is consistent. Those who create the Laws should have the legislative right to make provisions within their remit.

We also broadly support the principles behind the other amendments in this group, which aim to give more protections to children. Amendments 218 and 219, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, seek further to define what constitutes child criminal exploitation and extend the provisions to actions that may support criminal activity while not being criminal themselves.

Amendments 222 and 222A aim to narrow the scope of reasonable excuses that offenders can give when claiming to believe that the child was over the age of 18. The sentiment behind these amendments is a noble one. Whether the adult believed they were a child is largely inconsequential to the exploited child. Therefore, if the adult is not to be prosecuted, the court must be absolutely certain that they did not believe the child was under 18. That being said, I am slightly wary of completely disapplying reasonable excuse as a defence. It would take away the opportunity of defence in the very rare cases where the adult had a genuine and proven reason to believe the child was an adult. As I say, this is very rare, and it is still criminal exploitation, but we must still account for it.

Overall, this group is sensible, procedural and necessary; I therefore offer my support to the Minister’s intentions.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, and my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top for their amendments, and to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for putting his name to them and for his supportive comments.

Before I lose the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, about a national register, I will just say that the Police National Computer and the child criminal exploitation prevention orders can impose notification requirements on persons subject to orders requiring them to inform the local police of their name and address. I had that on my phone before I peered at my notes, and I did not want to lose that point.

I will start by welcoming Clause 40. It is a positive, forward-looking clause that will help support the reduction of child exploitation. I am grateful for the amendments that have been tabled, and I am also grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for the amendments I have tabled.

Amendment 218, tabled by my noble friend Lady Armstrong of Hill Top and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, would require that, for the child criminal exploitation offence to have been committed, the perpetrator had used

“threats, physical force, intimidation, persuasion or any other means” against the child. In doing so, my noble friend seeks to illustrate the ways in which children can be criminally exploited. However, I put it to her that, in specifying the required means by which an adult gets a child to commit criminal conduct, the way in which the amendment is phased risks narrowing the application of the offence, because the prosecution would have to additionally prove those means of exploitation took place. Currently, the child criminal exploitation offence does not require proof that the child was subjected to threats, physical force, intimidation or any other harmful ways in which the child’s compliance was obtained by their exploiter. This is because, as a Government, we are very clear that children cannot consent to their own exploitation, so the offence could be committed regardless of whether and how the child was compelled to engage in the intended criminal activity.

Although my noble friend’s amendment includes the words “any other means”, which mitigates against any narrowing of the scope of the offence, I do not consider it necessary to include an illustrative, non-exhaustive list in this way. It would cause courts potentially to wonder about its purpose as a legal test and may have the unintended consequence of limiting the circumstances in which the child exploitation offence may be made out. I want my noble friend to think about that. I suggest to her that the prosecution wants to get the best case, and, by accepting her amendment, we might end up narrowing the potential success of legislating against this offence.

My noble friend also tabled Amendment 219, which would more specifically capture adults who intend to cause a child

“to engage in actions that support or facilitate” crime. My noble friend indicated in her speech that the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the offence of child exploitation also includes causing a child to commit an action which, while not itself illegal, can lead to future criminal behaviour. We have looked at this amendment in some detail, but I consider the objective is already met by subsection (1)(a)(iii) of the clause, which captures where the adult does something to the child now to facilitate or make it easier to cause the child to commit a criminal act in the future—the noble Baroness can find this on page 59 of the Bill as currently drafted. I hope she will look at that and reflect on it as part of these discussions, before any further discussion takes place on Report.

Furthermore, actions that support or facilitate crime may already amount to an offence, such as the offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007. Where an adult intentionally causes a child to commit an offence, the child criminal exploitation offence may be committed.

I am grateful for the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, in support of his Amendment 222. This amendment seeks to remove the requirement that, for the child criminal exploitation offence to be committed, it must be proved that the defendant does not reasonably believe that the victim is aged 18 or over. My noble friend Lady Armstrong mentioned the issue of migrants—we are currently examining facial recognition issues in relation to migrants, and we had a discussion about that in the other Bill that I am taking through the House at this moment on immigration very recently. But she makes a very important point. I sympathise with the noble Lord’s desire to ensure that all adults who target children to draw them into crime can be caught by this offence, but that is precisely why the reasonable belief test is important—to ensure that perpetrators who deliberately and intentionally target children to commit crime are correctly identified and prosecuted. If there was no requirement to prove a lack of reasonable belief that the alleged victim was a child, it would risk criminalising people as exploiters of children who genuinely did not intend or contemplate involving a minor in criminality.

We must remember that the child criminal exploitation offence requires no proof of harmful behaviours against the child, such as coercion, force or threats. This goes back to the first point that I mentioned in response to my noble friend’s first amendment. It is committed simply when an adult engages in any contact or conduct towards or in respect of a child intending to cause them to commit a crime. The exploitative nature of this offence is the imbalance of power, which is exercised by an adult in deliberately and purposely seeking to involve a child in crime. Where that is not a factor in a case, as demonstrated by what they believed about the child’s age, there are other more appropriate offences that might be charged. For example, where a person encourages or assists someone to commit an offence regardless of their age, there is already an offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007.

Again, I welcome the discussion that we have had this evening, I welcome the contribution of Action for Children, and I welcome the discussion that we have had from the Children’s Commissioner for England, who called for this amendment due to concerns that perpetrators will seek to take advantage of considerations around the reasonable belief of age to undermine the credibility of victims and potentially escape prosecution. I welcome those contributions to the debate. I want to give them, with my colleagues in the Home Office, serious consideration. However, I make the point to the noble Lord that at the moment we do not consider reasonable belief of age to be a loophole, as is suggested—and in support of that I make a number of points.

First, there is a test of reasonable belief that does not necessarily require that the defendants have specific knowledge about the victim’s age, which would be a higher burden. Secondly, a perpetrator’s claim as to their belief alone will not be enough to escape prosecution, as prosecutors can and, I hope, would establish either that they did not believe the victim was 18 or, even if they did, that that belief was not reasonable. Thirdly, it only applies to children aged 13 to 17, not the most vulnerable children aged under 13. Finally, it follows established precedent in other offences, where the core offending relates to an adult’s conduct towards a child—for example, to child sexual exploitation offences in the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Russell of Liverpool, for referring to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, on Amendment 222A—she is not here today. It is commendable that someone has looked at other amendments and decided not to move their own; it is a very un-egotistical way of approaching this business.

Cross-Bench.

The noble Lord, Lord Russell, says “Cross-Bench”. I will take that as a bonus point for the Cross Benches. It is a noble approach to take towards the Amendment. So I will not deliberate on those points as I would potentially have done, but I ask the noble Lord simply to pass on my thanks to the noble Baroness for her self-awareness on that issue, which is commendable.

I hope that, with those comments, my noble friend and other noble Lords will not press their amendments, will reflect on what I have said and, if need be, will consider this outside the Committee. I commend the amendments in my name to the Committee.

Amendment 217 agreed.

Amendments 218 and 219 not moved.