Amendment 55C

Part of Crime and Policing Bill - Committee (2nd Day) – in the House of Lords at 9:00 pm on 17 November 2025.

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Photo of Lord Blencathra Lord Blencathra Shadow Minister (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) 9:00, 17 November 2025

My Lords, in moving Amendment 55C, I will speak also to my Amendments 55D and 55E. My three amendments here are all similar, as I argue that a value-based penalty is more effective than a maximum fixed fine. The issue of illegal knife sales on the internet is a matter of serious public concern. It is big business with big consequences when those knives—machetes and zombie knives—are used to kill and maim, as is increasingly the case.

The proposals in the Bill to fine individuals and businesses up to £60,000 for selling illegal knives online seem hefty at first glance. However, the effectiveness and fairness of such a fixed penalty are questionable. A more effective approach would be to impose a fine equal to 500% of the total value of all the illegal goods advertised. I want to convince the Minister that a proportional penalty is, in some cases, superior to a subjective fixed maximum fine.

First, there is the subjectivity of the fixed maximum fine. Setting a maximum fine of £60,000 for selling illegal knives leaves the final penalty to the discretion of the court. This introduces subjectivity into the process, as judges must determine what amount is appropriate in each case. The outcome may vary significantly depending on the judge’s interpretation of the offence’s severity, the defendant’s circumstances and other factors. Consequently, similar offenders could face vastly different penalties, undermining the consistency and predictability of the law. Then, of course, I come back to my favourite organisation, the Sentencing Council, advising that the £60,000 fine should never be imposed—but let us leave that aside for the moment.

Moreover, a fixed cap may not reflect the true scale of the illegal activity. For example, a small-scale individual seller and a large business operation could both face the same maximum penalty, despite the latter potentially profiting far more from illegal sales. This lack of proportionality can result in fines that are either too lenient or excessively harsh, depending on the specifics of the case.

In contrast, my suggestion of a fine set at 500% of the value of all illegal knives advertised is directly linked to the scale of the offence and the profits. This proportional penalty approach ensures that the penalty increases in line with the seriousness of the crime. Large-scale operations, which are likely to profit more and cause greater harm, would face correspondingly larger fines. This not only achieves greater fairness but strengthens the deterrent effect. As we have said on many occasions, criminals are primarily motivated by profit. If the financial penalty reliably exceeds any potential gains—by a factor of five in this case—the risk heavily outweighs the reward. I suggest that that creates a strong disincentive for individuals and businesses to engage in illegal knife sales.

The proportional system also ensures that penalties remain meaningful, even as the market or profitability of legal knives fluctuates over time. The proportional penalty system is more likely to deter criminal behaviour, because it removes ambiguity and subjectivity from sentencing. Offenders know in advance that any profits from illegal activity will be entirely wiped out and replaced by a substantial loss. That clarity and certainty are crucial in discouraging would-be offenders. Furthermore, tying the fine to the value of the legal goods ensures fairness across all cases. Small-time offenders are punished proportionately for their actions, while major players face penalties commensurate with the harm they cause and the profits they make. That upholds the principle that the punishment should fit the crime.

In summary, I submit that a fixed maximum fine of £60,000 for selling illegal knives online introduces subjectivity and inconsistency—whereas a penalty of 500% of the value of all illegal goods advertised is fair, more predictable and far more likely to deter criminal activity.

I do not need to speak to my Amendment 55E; it is the same concept but suggests a mere 100% proportional penalty for a lesser offence. I urge the Minister to consider adopting a proportional penalty system to effectively combat the sale of illegal knives over the internet. I beg to move.

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