Lord Clement-Jones:

Moved by Lord Clement-Jones

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, at beginning insert “Subject to a review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2014 being conducted and completed by an independent person appointed by the Secretary of State within six months of this Act receiving Royal Assent,”Member's explanatory statementThis Amendment requires the Government to review current anti-social behaviour powers within six months of the Bill becoming law, before the new measures proposed in the Bill take effect.

My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I will speak to other amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey.

I welcome the start of Committee and the opportunity to engage in detail with Part 1 of the Bill concerning anti-social behaviour. We on these Benches recognise the imperative to make our streets safer, and we support measures designed to tackle genuinely persistent and disruptive anti-social behaviour. However, the Liberal Democrat approach to public safety demands that new Laws be not just tough but fair and proportionate. We reject measures which risk the erosion of civil liberties or the criminalisation of the vulnerable. This debate on respect orders goes directly to that principle.

Clause 1 introduces the respect order for adults, which partly replaces the old anti-social behaviour injunction. The fundamental difference is severe. While breach of an ASBI was treated as a civil contempt, breach of a respect order is explicitly categorised as a criminal offence that can lead to an unlimited fine or up to two years’ imprisonment. If the state intends to use a civil tool granted merely on the balance of probabilities to impose prohibitions whose breach results in criminal sanctions, that tool must be subject to the most rigorous safeguards. Unfortunately, respect orders currently risk replicating and arguably worsening the problems and abuses associated with past anti-social behaviour regimes.

The Manifesto Club—I declare an interest as a member of its advisory board—highlights several fundamental flaws in the previous regime under the 2014 Act, which civil liberties advocates argue must be addressed before new anti-social behaviour powers such as respect orders are introduced.

The core legal powers underpinning PSPOs and CPNs are inherently flawed due to their low legal threshold and vague scope. PSPOs can be implemented if activities are deemed to be having a detrimental effect on the quality of life in a defined public area. The Manifesto Club notes that this is an unprecedentedly low legal test for criminal Intervention and argues that there is often no requirement to show substantial evidence of this effect. PSPOs are vague and subjective restrictions and are often drafted broadly, which leads to them functioning more as a tool applied at the discretion of officers than as a precise law, and this has resulted in what the Manifesto Club calls

“absurd, stigmatising and authoritarian orders” that ban diverse and sometimes anodyne non-criminal activities.

A major criticism centres on the weak governance and poor assessment of these powers. Manifesto Club research found that nearly half of all PSPOs issued by local authorities in one year were signed off by a single council officer, without passing through scrutiny procedures within the council, such as approval by Cabinet or full council. Despite legal requirements for consultation, the Manifesto Club points out that the legislation requires consultation only with the police chief, the landowner and whatever community representatives the local authority thinks it appropriate to consult, meaning that there is no requirement for any public consultation or minimum standards for one.

There is a significant lack of official data collection and central government scrutiny on the use and effectiveness of anti-social behaviour powers such as CPNs and PSPOs. The broad and unchecked nature of the powers creates inconsistency of enforcement across the country, leading to postcode lotteries for victims, where enforcement depends on location rather than circumstances.

PSPOs and dispersal powers are often unfairly imposed on or enforced against homeless people, including bans on rough sleeping and begging. Homeless individuals report being moved on by police multiple times a day and feeling that the system is set against them. Examples of arbitrary and overzealous enforcement include fines issued to an 82 year-old man for cycling his bike in a town centre, for the feeding of stray cats, for the flying of model aircraft, for keeping a wheelbarrow behind a garden shed and for using foul language. Community protection notices have been issued with restrictions on how people conduct themselves in their own home, sometimes based on weak evidence reliant on hearsay.

There is increasing commercialisation of enforcement of anti-social behaviour powers. Many councils outsource the issuance of fixed penalty notices for PSPOs and CPNs to private companies. The most common contractual arrangement involves companies receiving a percentage of FPN—fixed penalty notice—income, which directly incentivises officers to issue as many penalties as possible.

This practice is explicitly stated to contradict statutory guidance, which notes that enforcement should in no circumstances be used as a means to raise revenue. Private officers employed under this system have been accused of setting daily targets, hiding badges, intimidating people and ticketing minor offences or non-offences. This intensification of busybody offences and penalties risks increasing injustice, particularly for vulnerable people.

Amendment 1, tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Doocey, and signed by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, would require the implementation of respect orders to be delayed until a comprehensive review of existing anti-social behaviour powers under the anti-social behaviour Act 2014 is conducted and completed by an independent person within six months of Royal Assent.

Before we introduce a new measure, we should assess whether the myriad existing tools—ASBIs, community protection notices and public space protection orders—are truly fit for purpose. The process of anti-social behaviour governance is already widely criticised as confusing, inconsistent and prone to arbitrary enforcement.

Without undertaking this vital review, we risk merely layering a new, complex civil order onto a system that is already confusing, ineffective and unjust, leading to overlapping powers and making enforcement decisions more difficult. Additional support for this delay, and an independent review, comes from key stakeholders, including Justice and the Victims’ Commissioner. We must pause, review what we have and then legislate effectively.

The core legal test for imposing a respect order is dangerously permissive. It rests on two conditions: the civil standard of proof—the balance of probabilities that the individual has engaged in anti-social behaviour—and the judicial belief that it is merely just and convenient to make the order. This is an alarmingly low threshold for an order that can severely restrict an individual’s liberty and lead to imprisonment. We must insist on a higher standard.

Amendment 5, in the name of my noble friend Lady Doocey and signed by me, proposes to replace the vague phrase “just and convenient” with the essential standard of “necessary and proportionate”. This change is essential to ensure that the restrictions imposed align strictly with the principles of the Human Rights Act 1998, ensuring that the conditions are tailored and appropriate to the specific case.

Amendment 4, also in my noble friend’s name, probes the wording that allows an order to be made if a person “threatens to engage in” anti-social behaviour. This vague phrasing gives excessive scope for judicial speculation, allowing the state to impose serious orders based on future suspicion rather than concrete, proven past behaviour.

Amendment 7, also in my noble friend’s name, seeks to specify a maximum length of time for an order, challenging the Bill’s proposals that a respect order can be imposed for an indefinite period. An indefinite order, based on a civil standard of proof, is inconsistent with the framework of other behaviour control orders. We propose a maximum duration, such as two years, to align respect orders with other established orders and requiring judicial review for any extension.

We must ensure that these powers cannot be weaponised against those struggling with homelessness or mental health issues, as seen with past anti-social behaviour powers targeting people for begging, sleeping rough or feeding the birds. Amendment 12—I thank the noble Lord, Lord Meston, for signing it—seeks to remove the power to exclude a person from their home. This power, introduced in new Section C1, is disproportionate; exclusion from one’s home is an extremely severe sanction. While the Bill limits this to cases involving violence or a significant risk of harm, such threats should be handled exclusively through the criminal justice system or specific protection orders to ensure that the necessary safeguards and standards of proof are met. We on these Benches are particularly concerned about the risk of this power being used inappropriately against victims of domestic abuse, potentially leading to their eviction instead of the perpetrator’s detention.

Amendment 18 would remove the provision creating interim respect orders. Interim orders lack proper procedural safeguards and carry the inherent risk of disproportionate interference with liberty, particularly when they are made without notice to the respondent. If a situation is so urgent that it requires immediate prohibition, a more specific or criminal intervention is warranted. Anti-social and behaviour measures must possess strong democratic and public accountability to counter the risk of arbitrary local restriction.

Amendment 9 in my name requires respect orders to pass through full council and be subject to a full public consultation before the relevant authority makes an application to the court. This would ensure that elected representatives approve decisions that directly impact civil liberties, which would mitigate the democratic deficit seen in the implementation of other local orders such as PSPOs.

Amendment 21, in my name and signed by my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mandates that the Secretary of State must conduct a full public consultation exercise prior to issuing any statutory guidance on respect orders. This guidance must be informed by groups including the police, victims’ interests groups, housing providers and, crucially, homeless persons and legal practitioners. This would prevent guidance aimed at curbing behaviour being developed in a vacuum and ensure that it is practical and trauma-informed, especially when dealing with those struggling with addiction or homelessness.

In conclusion, these amendments collectively seek to address the historical weaknesses of the ASBI regime —weak judicial thresholds, arbitrary enforcement, indefinite application and a lack of accountability—before they are codified in a new measure that carries the full weight of the criminal law. If respect orders are to succeed where previous civil orders failed, they must be founded on evidence, necessity and transparency. I urge the Minister to recognise the fundamental importance of these safeguards. I beg to move.

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 1 and 21 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, which have just been moved so well. I agree with all the amendments in this group, although I am not quite sure and have reservations about Amendment 2 on lowering the age to 16.

The proposition seems to me straightforward. The powers to tackle anti-social behaviour are currently contained in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. So, before the state affords itself even more powers—which, by the way, often duplicate what we already have—should we not assess whether what we have actually works in improving outcomes for victims and fundamentally reducing anti-social behaviour, which is what we want? We should note that 82% of anti-social behaviour practitioners surveyed by Justice have called for such a review of existing powers and criticised the lack of proper consultation, or even engagement, by the Government. It is shocking that there has never been a formal review of the 2014 Act, and that data on the use of existing orders is not collated centrally, nor their use monitored, by government. Surely the Minister agrees that the Government should be working to identify and address problems that are inherent in existing anti-social behaviour powers and orders before creating more, and that that would be an evidence-based approach to this question.

We are largely focusing on respect orders in this group. They are almost duplicates of anti-social behaviour injunctions but will provide, the Government has argued, more effective enforcement. Experts and practitioners in fact suggest that they could confuse enforcement agencies. What is more, as respect orders are so close to ASBIs, the fear is that they will just reproduce and increase the problems with those injunctions, which research shows are overused, inconsistently applied and sweep up relatively minor behaviour problems alongside more serious incidents. At the very least, can the Minister explain why the discredited ASBIs are staying on the statute book? Why not just dump them?

If, as the Government tell us, the key difference with respect orders is to deal with persistent and serious anti-social behaviour, that should be made explicit in the legislation. Otherwise, the danger is that they just become another overused part of a toolkit, handed out promiscuously. That is a particular concern because of the use of the phrase by the Government and in the Bill that these orders are “just and convenient”.

“Convenient” is chilling, because—here is the rub—respect orders are formally civil orders but, in essence, are criminal in character. I am worried about the conflation of civil and criminal in relation to respect orders, which the noble Lord explained so well. The Government are removing that rather inconvenient problem of a criminal standard of proof because it has all that tiresome “beyond reasonable doubt” palaver that you have to go through. However, if you are found guilty, as it were, there is a criminal punishment doled out via a respect order and you can, as we have heard, receive up to two years in prison, which rather contradicts some of the emphasis in the Sentencing Bill on trying to stop people going to prison and keeping them in the community—so this is not entirely joined-up government either.

At Second Reading I quoted Dame Diana Johnson, who made clear the “convenience” point by explaining that the problem with a civil injunction such as an ASB is that,

“if a civil injunction is breached, the police officer has to take the individual to court to prove the breach”,

and she complained that there was no automatic power of arrest. That bothersome inconvenience has been overcome by creating a new respect order, which Dame Diana enthusiastically states

“combines the flexibility of the civil injunction with the ‘teeth’ of the criminal behaviour order

However, that convenient mash-up of a legal solution is something that we should be wary of. It has a dangerous precedent, showing that a cavalier attitude to legal norms and justice can lead to great injustice.

When I read all this, I thought of the single justice procedure, which we were told would allow public authorities to bring cheap and speedy prosecutions for law breaches, such as not paying the BBC licence fee or dodging transport fares. However, with quick prosecutions conducted in such a way—and, in that instance, behind closed doors, as exposed brilliantly by Tristan Kirk, a journalist at the Evening Standard—we have seen thousands of people on an industrial scale being found guilty, often of small unintended mistakes. We have to remember that, if you try to bring about justice quickly and using these new methods, you can cause huge amounts of problems. There are harrowing stories of people who are very ill, people who have dementia and even people who have died, who have been victims of these single justice procedure issues.

I hope the movers of the amendments in this group will recognise that fast-track systems of convenience can lead to some terrible unintended consequences. I am reminded, in similar vein, of the growth of those monstrous non-crime hate incidents—again, a legalistic mash-up that have caused so many problems for free speech, using paralegalistic language and confusing us over what constitutes guilt. I was therefore glad to see the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, in this group, and I look forward to his comments later.

This group of amendments is one to which I would like to hear the Minister respond positively. They are well intentioned—no one has been dismissive of anti-social behaviour—but we do not think respect orders are fit for purpose and, on the other hand, anti-social behaviour orders in general are in a mess. At least let us review what works and what does not before we move forward.

My Lords, I add my support for Amendment 1. There should be a review of all these orders before layering another one on. In fact, some of that work has been done: freedom of information data demonstrates that people from minority ethnic communities are far more likely to be subject to this range of orders—Gypsy and Irish Traveller people are also more likely to receive disproportionate criminal punishments on breaching the orders—so the lack of monitoring of the use of behavioural orders is disturbing. I am sure that my noble friend the Minister does not want to continue this cycle of criminalising vulnerable and disadvantaged communities, so please can we have a formal review of the impact of the orders currently in place?

My Lords, I find myself in agreement with many of the genuine human rights concerns already expressed around the Committee. I find myself in a bit of a time warp because these concerns were evidenced by the use, abuse, disrepute and ultimately disuse that anti-social behaviour orders fell into all those years ago. The criminalisation of vulnerable people, people with addiction problems, people with mental health problems, homeless people and so on is not hypothesis; it was evidenced by the practice of the original anti-social behaviour orders.

I therefore hope that, in his reply, my noble friend, who I know to be a very thoughtful Minister, will go some way to expressing how he thinks these new respect orders will improve on the very unhappy history of ASBOs. Other members of the Committee have already set out what happened in the interim. It would be useful if my noble friend the Minister could explain what will be different this time, why and how.

In a nutshell, my concerns are, first, that the threshold of behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress is low and vague. To be blunt, some people are easily alarmed and distressed. Harassment is the more objective, higher part of that threshold. That is the entry point at which vulnerable people can first fall into this quasi-civil criminal order that can sweep them into the criminal justice system rather than diverting them from it.

The second concern is that, once one is under the jurisdiction of such an order, it becomes a personal, bespoke criminal code for the individual. I remember the suicidal woman banned from bridges and the pig farmer who was given an ASBO because the pigs wandered on to the neighbours’ land. Is it really appropriate to have bespoke criminal codes for different people in different parts of the country? The postcode lottery point was made well, but there is also the issue of vulnerable people and minorities, who find themselves disproportionately affected.

Once you breach your personalised criminal code—which could be to keep away from a part of town where your close relatives live—you are then swept into the system. That is my third concern about these quasi-civil criminal orders: the ease with which vulnerable people with chaotic lives who have been let down by social services and society in general are now swept into the criminal justice system rather than diverted from it.

Finally, I share the concerns about making such orders available to even younger people, who really should not be anywhere near the criminal justice system. In a much later group—sometime next year, I think, when we will still be in this Committee and will be older, if not wiser—I have tabled an Amendment, with the support of the noble and learned Baronesses, Lady Hale of Richmond and Lady Butler-Sloss, to tackle the shockingly low age of criminal responsibility, 10 years-old, that we still have in England and Wales.

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 3 and 10. Superficially, Amendment 3 may look radical, in seeking to reduce the age from 18 to 14. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, certainly might not like it, but, if we want to tackle the lack of respect or anti-social behaviour of those aged 18-plus, that will not be possible unless we tackle all the anti-social behaviour that has built up from age 10 or even younger.

We cannot get into pre-14 behaviour today, but I discovered some frightening statistics from the Met Police, which it was forced to publish under an FOI request last year. They show that, for the year ending December 2023, 879 crimes were committed by children aged 10 to 17. Of these, 173 were violence against the person, 64 were robbery, 81 were theft, 28 were arson, 385 were drug offences and 81 involved possession of weapons. That is fairly frightening. But if that was not bad enough, the Met also published a breakdown of crimes committed by children aged one to nine, of which there were 653 offences. Some 128 were theft and 95 were arson and criminal damage, but the really frightening statistics were the 85 sexual offences and—the largest group—191 crimes of violence against the person. As I say, we cannot deal with that age group today, but I simply ask what kind of sick society we are becoming when in the Met area alone we have 85 children aged between one and nine accused of sexual offences and 191 accused of violence against the person.

These statistics are important background, because we all know there is almost always a progression in the level of criminal behaviour. Very few people commit rape as their first sexual offence. Very few criminals—indeed, I suggest none—commit an armed robbery without starting first with some anti-social behaviour or a bit of shop theft, then burglary, more serious theft and a bit of violence, before running up to full-scale armed and violent robbery. That is why I want 14 to 18 year-olds included in the respect orders, as it just possibly might lead to fewer violent crimes when these people are older.

It is difficult to get accurate statistics for crimes committed by children, since the Office for National Statistics and the Youth Justice Board seem to hide them away in dozens of tables. There seems to be a concerted effort to make it difficult to find important statistics. If you google the number of children aged 14 to 18 convicted of homicide, you get referred to FOI requests and vague, inexplicable government statistics in the Office for National Statistics.

In October 2024, Sky News ploughed through all the tables and discovered that the number of convictions of children for murder have doubled since 2013 to one in 25 of all homicides. Commenting on this, Dr Simon Harding, a criminology expert, said there has been an

“increase in serious violence in young people”,

and that there is a greater

“acceptance of extreme levels of violence between” children. He said:

“Even something that might have been settled with fisticuffs or anti-social behaviour can suddenly dramatically turn into something much more serious and extreme. What 10 years ago might have been a punch in the face, five years ago might have been a stab to the arm or leg is now a stab to the neck or heart, which can lead to death”.

He concludes that there is a greater willingness to “inflict pain and suffering”.

I was only 15 when the most evil child-killer of all time, Mary Bell, was convicted of the vicious murders of two little boys. I was the Minister for policing and criminal justice and had to read the full details of the Jamie Bulger case, who was murdered by Thompson and Venables, as the Home Office was appealing against what we considered the leniency of the sentence. It made the most nauseating reading. I feel really sorry for the jury, who heard every single word of that and saw the photographs.

Those awful cases seem to be run of the mill now. Since then, the ages of our killers have dropped considerably and the viciousness of the killings has increased exponentially. As the Committee will know, Damilola Taylor was only 10 when he was murdered by two brothers aged 12 and 13. Last year, two 15 year-olds lured a transgender person to a remote spot in Warrington and stabbed the person 28 times in the back, neck and head with a hunting knife in what the court was told was a “frenzied and ferocious” murder that they had planned for weeks. Just last month, three girls aged 14, 16 and 17 were convicted of manslaughter after a vicious and unprovoked attack on a 75 year-old pensioner waiting at a bus stop, who died of his injuries the next day. For their sentences, one got two years and six months, another got three years and six months, and the third got four years. Of course, they will be out in just over half the time. I think that makes rather a mockery of the concept of punishment.

The measures in this rebranding of anti-social behaviour orders into respect orders are mainly okay, in my opinion. However, like the previous iterations, it will not work because we are not intervening early enough, or our interventions are ones which we make through rose-tinted spectacles, believing that all little kiddies can be saved by a bit of restorative justice and endless cautions. We are failing. All Governments have failed for over 30 years to tackle youth offending rigorously when bad behaviour starts. We need to invent a whole new regime for dealing with violent criminal behaviour from 10 years-old and upwards, but not today of course.

One small step, I suggest, is in my amendment: lower the respect order Intervention age to 14. “What difference would that make?”, noble Lords will say. Let us look at the Youth Justice Board’s latest statistics, for the year ending 2024, published in January this year. As might be expected, the rate of reoffending increases with the number of previous offences committed. For the year ending March 2023, those with no previous offences had a reoffending rate of 16.7%, compared with 72.8% for those who had committed 11 or more previous offences. Those who had committed no previous offences made up 51% of all children in the aggregated cohort—the highest proportion in the time series, and up one percentage point from the previous year. But they committed only 17% of all proven offences. Those with 11 or more previous offences made up only 9% of all children in the aggregated cohort, but they committed 29% of all proven reoffences.

That is why I strongly backed the then Home Secretary—now my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne—on our “Three strikes and you’re out policy”, although it would be more accurately called a “Three strikes and you’re inside” policy. I was hated by all prison detractors, but it worked in reducing crime because it took out of circulation the most prolific offenders. Of course, we should not lock up children who have committed their first few minor offences—proper community intervention can work for them. But every police area I visited had the same story: the superintendent would show me a graph of crime stats that was relatively level, and then it would spike to five or 10 times the average, with over 1,000 extra offences in one case. Then it would come down again after a few months. In every case, they would say that the spike was when little Johnny was released from the young offender institution, and the low level was when he was taken back or moved away.

Noble Lords might say that this is all anecdotal, but the Youth Justice Board’s stats show that, in the year ending December 2023, of the children cautioned or sentenced who had a criminal history of 15 or more previous cautions or sentences, 44 were sentenced to immediate custody, compared with just 1% of those with no previous criminal history. For the aggregated cohort in the year ending March 2023, children had a higher reoffending rate—32.5%—than adults, who had only 26%. Children had a higher number of reoffences than adults in the year ending March 2023 for the second consecutive year.

The question then is: will respect orders stop that trend? Possibly—probably not—but, if we can bring in the 14 to 18 year-olds as well, and if by that intervention we save just one other child from being viciously stabbed to death by other children, I submit that it will have been worth it. So let us at least try, while recognising that, in my opinion, we need a whole new regime for the terrible rise in child violence and crime, starting at an increasingly younger age every year.

My Amendment 10 is quite straightforward. We have another opportunity to attempt to get rid of the appalling non-crime hate incident fake reporting. Indeed, we had the announcement two weeks ago that the Met will no longer investigate them—great news and long overdue. But wait: the Met still intends to record them. Am I missing something here? It will not investigate them to ascertain whether they are true or not, but it will still record them as non-crime hate incidents. So tens of thousands of people could potentially have their names and reputations destroyed by false allegations that will not be investigated.

However, for the purposes of this Clause, I am content that “anti-social behaviour” means:

“conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person”— but only if the so-called non-crime hate incident is face to face. What would be completely unacceptable is for people to complain that they suffered alarm or distress because of social media or online messages. Our courts will be chock-a-block with claims that all the rubbish, including nasty rubbish on social media, could be included. The courts have better things to do. It is quite simple: if you do not want nasty messages on social media, get off it. I never once had a nasty or nice message on any social media, since I would not touch it with a 10-foot barge pole. It is a vile platform and, as a libertarian, I say: let the buyer beware.

In the spirit of Committee, I wonder whether I might challenge the noble Lord a little on this epidemic of child criminality to which he so graphically referred. I think we should park these arguably very rare cases of child homicide outside a debate on anti-social behaviour, but would he agree with me that, when it comes to fisticuffs—what would be common assault—or even theft, we know that quite small children in every home in the country are capable of fisticuffs with each other, between siblings, and taking things that are not their own? But is not a crucial difference in our response to those children? Anti-social behaviour on the playing fields of Eton rarely ends up anywhere near the criminal justice system, but looked-after children in particular are more likely to be reported to the police and end up criminalised at a very early age. So does the noble Lord agree that children in, for example, England and Wales are no more malign than children in Scotland, where the age of responsibility is 14? We should look to ourselves as adult society and our responses to these vulnerable children.

The noble Baroness says that child homicides are very rare, but they have doubled in the past 12 years. All the statistics that I quoted were from the Youth Justice Board and the Office for National Statistics, showing a huge increase in knife crime. Then there are the police forces themselves; there is an article relating to the Met, or a discussion on a blog from yesterday, asking whether knife crime by children was out of control—and those are their words, not mine.

There has been a huge increase in viciousness, knife use and violent crime by children, and I suggest in my amendments that lowering the age to include 14 to 18 year-olds in respect orders might make a difference, if we could hive them off early. Of course, I accept that children in Scotland, as in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, will also have violent tendencies. My concern is that we are failing to intervene early enough to do anything about them; that is the whole cause of the problem in the past 30 years—a lack of early Intervention to deal properly with children. For some, that will mean a caution or restorative justice; for others, it could mean better work from social services. But some prolific young offenders may need to be taken out of circulation, for their own benefit and to save the lives of other children.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, accurately pointed out that a respect order may be made merely on the balance of probabilities—the civil standard of proof. Will the Minister confirm my understanding that, if a criminal charge is to be brought for breaching a respect order, it will be brought under new Section I1, and the offence of breach of respect order? It is then for the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, on the criminal standard, that the person concerned has not merely breached the respect order but has done so without reasonable excuse. That may provide an answer to some of the more graphic and extreme examples that have been given in this debate of when a respect order may apply. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm whether my understanding is correct.

In this debate we need to take account of the fact that anti-social behaviour occurs in our society with alarming regularity and causes misery to law-abiding citizens. There needs to be some effective means of addressing it. Having said all that, I share some of the concerns that have been expressed as to the width of the powers that we are being invited to endorse. There are two particular concerns that I have.

The first is that in new Section A1(1)(b), it is sufficient for the court to consider it “just and convenient” to impose a respect order. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, referred to that—and I have great sympathy with the argument that that really ought to be a test of “necessary and proportionate”. All the sorts of cases that one would want to see prohibited by law could be brought within a necessary and proportionate test.

The other concern that I have—and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, was the one who mentioned this—is that in new Section A1(9), the test of anti-social behaviour is

“conduct that has caused, or is likely to cause, harassment, alarm or distress to any person”.

That means any person, however vulnerable they may be, or weak-minded, which is a purely subjective test. I suggest in this context that there really needs to be some objectivity written into the definition, whether or not by referring to a reasonable person; other types of drafting mechanism could be adopted. I share some of the concerns, but I also see the need for an effective and functioning system in this context.

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendment 22 and to Amendment 1. I believe that we need to look at the current rules as they stand and have a review of those rules, their effectiveness and who they fall upon. As someone who has been a youth worker for over three decades now, I have seen large parts of poorer communities, black and white, end up in very serious legal entanglements just because of what somebody else has subjectively decided was a piece of anti-social behaviour which has then led to some kind of legal sanction. These respect orders seem like a very fast track too. Many people’s behaviour is not what I would call traditional, is not recognised, and therefore these orders would become a real danger to them; there is a real danger that they have done something that was anti-social and all of a sudden, they are facing a criminal sanction.

Notwithstanding what the last Speaker said—that the court would then go back and test and would have to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, above the civil court’s level of proof—it would be too late for many young people, because it would have blighted them. Many young people act out once they realise they are in trouble, because they are afraid. If we are going to put someone through that mechanism, we had better make sure that they actually have a question to answer before we posit a question that leads them to end up in some kind of legal entanglement.

Another thing to consider is that, if we change the age of criminal consent, we have to be careful that we do not expose young people to gang grooming. If a gang is able to say that, under a certain age, you will not be legally held to account for your crimes, they will use that as a rallying cry, as a recruitment cry. Currently, most children of 10 years of age understand the risk they would be taking. If we remove that, we could be exposing those children inadvertently to high levels of gang membership, because they will be told, “You cannot be prosecuted, because you cannot be held responsible”. I really think that bears looking at.

All that said, my Amendment 22 is a very small amendment, but I believe it is very important. We all know that anti-social behaviour can be an absolute blight on a whole community’s life. It is often the beginning, the prelude, to a very large and long criminal career, so if we can nip it in the bud early, that is very important. When it comes to where people live, the ripple effect from small amounts of anti-social behaviour can affect hundreds, so I welcome the Bill’s aim to tackle anti-social behaviour in the UK, especially around housing developments. I think that is a very good thing to do. However, I am concerned that the Bill in its current form fails to extend the new powers to all housing providers. Currently, the Bill provides for social housing inconsistently. This does not appear to be a purposeful exclusion; rather, the Bill uses the definition of “housing provider” from the crime and policing Act 2014, a definition that talks about not-for-profit housing providers.

As the Bill is currently worded, institutional housing providers are not covered by these rules. I think it is very important that they are, because it is a huge sector, projected to grow to very large proportions in future, and it looks after the same vulnerable communities as any other housing provider. That is the important thing here. Whether they are institutionally funded or not is actually irrelevant; it is about who is their client group. Their client group is some of the most vulnerable communities in this country, which many of our RSLs are very good at catering for, but because they are dealing with the same client group, because the young people and older people in their purview are exposed to exactly the same situations, they should have exactly the same powers to help people.

We are talking about the ability to defend people’s life chances, because we can make where they are living safe. It can be dealt with properly. I have worked on many housing estates; I was born and raised on one myself. Anti-social behaviour that cannot be addressed by the landlord is an absolute blight on people’s lives, so we are just asking for that small wording to be changed. It would be a very small but very powerful change. I believe that it is not a purposeful exclusion; it is just because we are using the definition from 2014.

My Lords, I too agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said, and I have added my name to his Amendment 12 to ask the Government to amplify the basis upon which exclusion orders might be made and the quality of the evidence required. An order excluding someone from his or her home has always to be seen as a last resort —in this context, when other less drastic restraints have not worked or are clearly not likely to work. I therefore hope that the Government can clarify the likely scenarios and the criteria that will apply when exclusion orders are sought and granted.

As I understand it, under the Bill, the application will be based on the risk assessment to be carried out under new Section J1, supplemented by guidance yet to come. The Bill does not expressly say, as far as I can see, that the risk assessment should be included with the application to be made to the court, or that it should be served on the respondent where possible. Both requirements should surely be explicit, not implicit. I suggest also that at least the risk assessment should be expected to summarise the behaviour and attitude of the respondent giving rise to the risk of harm, and specifically to the need to evict him or her from their home. In addition, and by analogy with the family jurisdiction, with which I am more familiar, it should actually state the effects of making or not making the order on other known occupants of the home, including relevant children.

Finally, the assessment, I suggest, should set out clearly the reasons to believe that making an exclusion order will actually reduce the perceived risks. Experience shows—certainly, my experience shows—that in some cases, making such an order may do no more than move the problem on somewhere else.

My Lords, I echo a lot of the concerns that have been expressed so far in this debate. The scrutiny of the Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is something that I hope we will all take very careful note of.

I particularly support my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti in her first Intervention. She is very experienced in social matters from her days in Liberty, and she rightly warns us that there will be a lot of problems if respect orders are brought in as they are legislated. Incidentally, respect orders cover 11 pages of the Bill, a Bill that I, for legislative complaints, described at Second Reading as “a monster”. I shall not describe these 11 pages on respect orders as being a monster, because I think the Government have been trying very hard to get it right, but they have not so far done so, and therefore the sensible thing—and this is not to criticise the Government—is for there to be a pause, and for these new respect orders not to be brought in as such in the Bill but only after we have been able to review the entirety of these orders, anti-social orders and orders to protect citizens from being badly disturbed living in their homes or walking the streets.

I urge my noble friend the Minister to move with caution and to accept that the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, is not a destructive amendment but a sensible amendment to achieve the one thing that we should be achieving in the Bill, which is to get it right, as right as we possibly can.

My Lords, I associate myself with the remarks we have heard from around the Chamber, including from my noble friend Lord Bailey of Paddington and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about the seriousness of anti-social behaviour and the rationale of the Government in bringing forward the measures that they have in this part of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, summed it up as the requirement for an effective and functioning system—hear, hear to that.

My concern is aligned with the sentiment, if not the letter, of Amendment 1, which would require the Government to explain why they feel that this set of measures, including respect orders, will work, when previous similar measures—ASBIs and so forth—have not worked to the extent, perhaps, that the Ministers who championed them when they were originally brought in expected. I do not believe that this is the moment for an independent review, but I think the Minister could give the Committee a detailed explanation of the specific circumstances in which he feels that these new respect orders will be deployed, why they are more likely to work than the existing arrangements and, in particular, the degree to which they will really make a difference. The Minister has brought forward these measures for the approval of Parliament, and he must be able to justify the result he expects them to have once they are implemented.

We know that that Governments of all flavours—this is not a specific reflection on the current Government—tend to reach for the statute book to address knotty problems, when in fact the answer may equally lie in better execution of existing powers. That probably is the overall challenge that has been put to the Minister this afternoon. I very much look forward to his answer.

My Lords, I am grateful to the speakers in this debate so far. This Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. Sorry.

No problem.

My Lords, I rise to speak very briefly to Amendments 4, 5 and 7 in my name. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones has made a very clear case for each one, so I will speak briefly. I put on record my thanks to Justice, which has gathered insights from so many people working in this field and it has been really interesting reading case studies that are backed up by very clear evidence.

These amendments would provide essential safeguards, ensuring the powers contained within respect orders are proportionate. Amendment 4 would require orders to be made only where there is evidence of actual conduct, not speculation about what a person might do in future. Amendment 7 would ensure that an order is imposed with a clear end date, capped at two years. In my opinion, it is wrong that an individual could be subject to potentially serious restrictions in perpetuity as a result of behaviour that falls below the criminal threshold. In Amendment 5, we want to change the “just and convenient” threshold generally applied in civil proceedings to “necessary and proportionate”. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, put a very good case for this—much better than I could ever do, so I will not try.

Amendment 1, moved by my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones, calling for an independent review of existing anti-social behaviour powers before respect orders are rolled out, would improve the Bill considerably, because precisely what Laws are already used, and what works in practice, is critical to their success.

On the subject of likely success, I welcome the fact that respect orders can include positive requirements that people have to, for example, attend rehabilitation—perhaps to deal with addictions to drugs or drink or both. However, such requirements can work only if every region has capacity in drug and alcohol treatment programmes. I am sure the Minister is aware that only 12 of the 43 police forces returned data last year on how many cases were referred for such treatment. Without that information, we cannot know how such rehabilitation can work. I would be grateful to hear from the Minister, when he responds, about what efforts are being made to ensure there are places available. Legislation alone is no good without resources.

I now turn to some of the other issues that were raised. I give my wholehearted backing to Amendment 12, in the names of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones and the noble Lord, Lord Meston. It seeks to ensure respect orders do not exacerbate the suffering of those enduring the trauma of domestic abuse. His concern is around the potential impact on this vulnerable cohort, who are four times more likely to have an anti-social behaviour complaint made against them, due to being wrongly blamed for situations caused by their abuser. This amendment removes the considerable and sweeping power to exclude a person from their home.

I am sympathetic to the intentions behind Amendment 6, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. Requiring an individual “to do anything” described appears overly broad, and even more so when there is no specific end date.

However, on Amendments 2 and 3, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, we on these Benches take a different view. Lowering the age threshold to either 14 or 16 risks drawing more people unnecessarily into the criminal justice system, without effectively reducing anti-social behaviour. The Liberal Democrats cannot support this. Indeed, we believe that youth diversion should be a statutory duty for young people under 25. This is in all our interests; not only is it more effective in reducing future offending, but it is also much more cost effective—youth work provision costs less than £50,000 per year, compared to £200,000 per year for incarcerating a 16 year-old. It is also notable that nine out of every 10 young people in custody have some form of special educational need, primarily emotional and behavioural needs and dyslexia.

I share the concerns of my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones on the need for wider consultation and collaboration, as set out in Amendment 21. I also very much support the case he has made on Amendment 9.

We know that respect orders are going to be piloted before being rolled out. I hope the Minister agrees that this should be done with more transparency than was the case with the piloting of knife crime prevention orders, the results of which were made public only following a successful freedom of information request. Can the Minister provide reassurance that the pilot will monitor how these powers are used, who receives them and what their efficacy is, to minimise the risk they will be used disproportionately against specific groups?

I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I did want to hear what she had to say, but my enthusiasm to move on overtook me, unfortunately. I must learn to ignore nods from the Government Bench opposite as well.

As I said, the Committee stage will be a long haul, but I hope that we can continue this level of discussion and scrutiny throughout. On these Benches, we are not entirely sure of the need for new anti-social behaviour Laws, and the validity of the proposed measure will be touched on more thoroughly in group 3. We feel the focus should be on enforcement first and foremost.

But as this proposal will become law, there are several individual parts of it that would benefit from being amended. I begin with Amendment 2 in my name, which is intended to probe the age at which a person can be given a respect order. The Bill states that this will be 18 and that younger offenders will be subject to a youth injunction. I cannot see why there should be two different powers to deal with the same behaviours. One of the benefits of anti-social behaviour injunctions is that they can apply to any person over the age of 10, rather than having different powers for different age groups.

To set the age minimum at 16 seems like common sense, and I would be surprised if the Minister disagrees with me. It is, after all, his party that believes in treating children of that age as adults. Why should 16 year-olds be allowed to choose the people who create anti-social behaviour laws, but simultaneously be exempt from those laws? Perhaps the Minister can explain the rationale, should he oppose the amendment.

Amendment 6 aims to ensure that an issued respect order does not place excessive restrictions on the recipient. It is similar to Amendment 5, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, in seeking to ensure that orders are “necessary and proportionate”. As it stands, respect orders may require the recipient to do anything specified by the court—a power that does not contain any internal safeguards. This could lead to massive judicial overreach. The amendment in my name seeks to ensure that this is not the case. It is fair and proportionate that a recipient may be prohibited from doing anything that may cause a repeat of that which required an order in the first place. Prohibiting those actions is just, but that is where the powers of prohibition should end. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to this potential issue with the proposed policy.

Amendment 11 would remove perhaps the most egregious part of this Clause: giving the Secretary of State complete discretion not only over which authorities fall under the scope of respect orders, but the definitions that define respect orders themselves. It means that the already strong and limiting orders can be altered and twisted by whichever Home Secretary happens to be in office. I am sure each noble Lord could think of a different set of hands that they would not want this power to reside in. The amendment in my name would prevent that occurring and leave this already forceful power as it is.

Amendments 13 and 14 seek to improve the clarity in the chain of command in issuing orders. In a policy with so many moving parts, efficiency is key. A respect order would currently appoint a supervisor, who would then have the discretion to inform an

“appropriate chief officer of police” if the offender lives in more than one area. This adds an extra layer of responsibility to a supervisor already charged with monitoring the respect order’s recipient. I can foresee potential mix-ups and miscommunications whereby either no or multiple chief officers believe themselves to be responsible for a recipient. The easy solution would be to specify the relevant chief officer alongside the supervisor, disaggregating the chain of appointments and improving clarity. I hope the Minister considers this point.

Amendment 20 seeks to require that risk assessments are the basis of respect order applications. It seems wrong that, despite being required to carry out a risk assessment, an applicant can apply for a respect order without having to reference it to the court. Respect orders are potentially very freedom-limiting; the court that issues them should be able to reference the risks posed by the recipient as a justification for these sanctions. As always, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

I am grateful to the noble Lords who have spoken in this debate on the first day in Committee on the Crime and Policing Bill. I feel like I am at base camp at the start of a climb to Mount Everest—but, as ever, Mount Everest has been conquered, as I am sure the Bill will eventually be as well. It feels like we are at the very start of a long, fruitful and productive process.

I will start by outlining a little about respect orders, because it is important to put them into the general context of why the Government are doing what they are doing. There were over 1 million recorded incidents of anti-social behaviour in the last year for which records exist. That is an awful lot of anti-social behaviour and does not include even the underreporting that may well exist.

There is a government manifesto commitment to take action on respect orders. The new orders will enable courts to both ban offenders from engaging in harmful anti-social behaviour, and/or—as the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, noted—impose positive requirements to tackle the root cause of anti-social behaviour. That could be anger management or alcohol or drug awareness courses, which will hopefully tackle the root cause of that anti-social behaviour and stop it occurring.

Unlike existing ASB civil injunctions, breach will be a criminal offence enforceable by arrest and tried in the criminal courts. That goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. This goes to court only if an individual breaches the order put on them—the purpose of the order is to stop the behaviour taking place. Penalties for breach will include community sentences, unlimited fines and potentially prison time for the most serious breaches, but only on a breach. That is a really important point to recognise in our discussions today.

Because there are so many amendments in this group, although it is a slow process I will take the amendments in turn. Amendment 1, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Bailey of Paddington and Lord Clement-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, my noble friends Lady Whitaker and Lord Hacking, and the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, would require a Home Secretary within six months of the Bill becoming law to undertake a review of existing powers under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, prior to introducing respect orders.

First, the introduction of respect orders was a manifesto commitment, so the Government have put some thought into it. I also assure noble Lords that the Government are committed to ensuring that the powers to address anti-social behaviour remain effective. As such, they are subject to continuous review. I do not want to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, but there will not be a pilot on this, because the Home Office has regularly engaged with front-line practitioners and with the ASB sector to better understand how the powers of the 2014 Act are used and where improvements can be made.

In addition, under the last Government the department launched a public consultation in 2023 to understand how powers could be used more consistently and effectively. That consultation has helped inform the measures in Part 1 of the Bill. I draw noble Lords’ attention to Clause 7 of the Bill, which, to aid this ongoing evaluation process, provides for new requirements for local agencies to report information about anti-social behaviour to the Government to help us continually improve and review.

Therefore, the provisions in Clause 1 deliver on the manifesto commitment. We need to press ahead with respect orders as soon as possible to ensure that the police, local authorities and others have the effective powers to tackle the 1 million cases per year. Amendment 1 would require us to have a costly and unnecessary review, and it would slow and cause delay in the rollout. Therefore, with respect, I cannot accept it either today or on Report.

Amendments 2 and 3 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Blencathra, seek to lower the age at which respondents can receive a respect order from 18 to 16, or indeed to 14. Again, I hope the noble Lords understand that the Government do not wish to criminalise young people unless it is absolutely necessary, which is why our manifesto was clear that respect orders were aimed at tackling anti-social behaviour perpetrated by adults. The noble Lord, Lord Bailey, made some very valid points on that in relation to the potential criminalisation of younger people.

That does not mean there is no provision for the relevant agencies to deal with youth-related anti-social behaviour. The respect order, while replacing the civil injunction for adults, will remain in place for those under the age of 18, renamed as the youth injunction. Importantly, this will enable youth courts to impose behaviour requirements on younger offenders without resulting in criminalisation if they breach the injunction. There is still the potential for those orders to be placed, but it does not involve criminalisation.

Amendments 4 and 5 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and others would amend the legal test for issuing a respect order. Amendment 4 would mean that a respect order could be issued only in relation to ASB that a respondent had already engaged in, and not where the respondent had threatened to engage in this behaviour, as is the case with existing civil injunctions.

I stress to the House that respect orders are fundamentally preventive in nature. They are designed to stop bad behaviour by putting in place a restraining order that says, in effect, “Don’t do these particular actions”. If the offender abides by the terms of the order, there will be no further sanctions. That is an important point for the House to understand and grasp from the Government’s perspective. Anti-social behaviour can be insidious and difficult to prove and it can take many forms. We know that the threat of aggressive or anti-social behaviour can often escalate quickly into more serious, violent and criminal behaviour —a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. That is why it is crucial that we retain the ability to issue an order against those threatening to engage in ASB, in order to prevent that harm before it happens.

Amendment 5, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, would change the legal test for issuing a respect order, so that that the court would need to find it “necessary and proportionate” to issue the order to prevent the respondent engaging in anti-social behaviour, rather than using the legal test as currently drafted, in which the court must find it “just and convenient” to do so. The current “just and convenient” language mirrors that of the civil injunction and is therefore familiar to the courts.

Let me be clear—this again goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—that the current threshold still requires a judge, with all the relevant legal duties and safeguards that that entails, to be satisfied that the issuing of an order is just, reasonable and fair. Courts will already take the necessity and proportionality of an order into account as a result of their duties under the Human Rights Act. Given these considerations, the benefits of amending the legal test in this way are limited.

Moving on to Amendment 6—

Since the Minister rightly accepts that there is a test of proportionality under the Human Rights Act, would it not be better to put it in the Bill, so that everybody understands—whether they are magistrates, judges, solicitors or counsel—that that is the test? That would provide a great deal of comfort and protection for those who may be subject to the orders.

I have great respect for the noble Lord’s contributions. I have heard what he said, but I believe that this is the right way forward. We can always examine his comments again and I appreciate the way in which he has contributed to the debate.

Amendment 6, from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that any positive requirements placed on the recipient of a respect order are restricted to those which would prevent a future breach of the order. Positive requirements to address the underlying causes of the behaviour are an important aspect of the respect order. That is a key point that I want to impress on noble Lords today. While the legislation sets out a number of restrictions on how positive requirements can be used, it is the Government’s view that the amendment is unnecessarily restrictive and that courts and agencies should have the discretion to tailor positive requirements to the particular needs of each case.

Amendment 7, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and also spoken to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, would limit the amount of time that a respect order may be in effect to two years. As it stands, there is no limit on the time a respect order might be in effect for, and I think that is the right thing to do. Again, there will be secondary action under the respect order only in the event of a breach taking place. If, for example, someone has previously been a persistent offender and the order puts in place an unlimited time, that would be reasonable until such time as the behaviour is noted. Implementing a two-year time limit might be of some difficulty and would not necessarily tailor against the individual’s behaviour. I come back to the central point that, ultimately, no action is taken against the individual if they do not breach the order.

The duration of a respect order is dependent on the specific circumstances of each case. That will be determined by the courts. I do not expect that every respect order will be imposed for an indefinite period, but that option should be available if there are relentless adult ASB perpetrators. The legislation makes provision for respect orders to be varied or discharged depending on the circumstances of the case.

Amendment 9, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would make it a requirement that an applicant must gain full council approval for all local authority-led applications for a respect order. It is proper quite that, while some councils may seek full council approval for PSPOs, there is no legislative requirement for them to do so. It should be noted that respect orders, unlike PSPOs, are granted by the courts, which provides additional safeguards to ensure that respect orders are used proportionately—this goes back to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Whereas PSPOs impose prohibitions on the general public, respect orders will be for individuals who have a history of disruptive, anti-social behaviour.

I return to the fact that, if individuals do not breach an order, the matter will go no further. It is the Government’s view that, given this distinction, it would not be appropriate to require full council approval for all respect orders—which quite honestly is self-evident. I have been a councillor and spent time in council committees, so I know that there is potential for delay. It might take a long time to make an order, which would risk us not taking action quickly and supportively for the benefit of victims and communities at large. The amendment might also require a full public consultation when applying for a respect order, but I do not believe that that is the way to run respect orders or to impact on individuals.

Amendment 10, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, seeks to add non-crime hate incidents to the definition of anti-social behaviour. I respectfully say to him that we are going to use the phrase “non-crime hate incidents” during the course of the Bill in relation to a number of amendments, including those tabled by his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Young. As I have previously said publicly in the House, the College of Policing—under the chairmanship of his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Herbert of South Downs—will very shortly produce a review of non-crime hate incidents. There has also been discussion by the Metropolitan Police on what it is doing. I hope that the review will help inform later stages of the Bill. At this stage, I believe that, while we should not kick Amendment 10 down the line—we will come back to the subject of the amendment—we should not deal with it in relation to Clause 1.

I may have misheard the Minister, but if I heard him correctly, I want to correct what he said. I do not want to add it to the Bill; I want to add to the Bill a provision that it is not included under prevention orders.

I appreciate that. If I have misunderstood his intention, I apologise. None the less, the principle is still the same for me. There are specific amendments about this downstream. By the time we reach them, I hope that we will have further enlightenment from the College of Policing and that we can determine government policy on non-crime hate incidents in the light of that review. That is what I have said on a number of occasions in response to similar questions. Therefore, I respectfully suggest that Amendment 10 is slightly premature at this stage, and we will discuss that matter in full detail downstream.

Amendment 11, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to remove the provision for the Secretary of State to amend, by regulations, the list of relevant authorities that can apply for a respect order. The Secretary of State needs that power to look at the range of contexts, and a multiagency approach is often needed to tackle anti-social behaviour. To ensure that we have that, I believe that the Secretary of State needs to retain that power—that may be a source of disagreement between us, but that is where I think we stand. The Secretary of State should be able to add an agency to the list. It would not be done unilaterally; new regulations would have to be laid. Those made under new Section B1 of the 2014 Act would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure and, as such, subject to debate and approval in both Houses. It is not an unfettered power for the Secretary of State.

A number of important issues have been raised in relation to Amendment 12, which seeks to remove the power to exclude a person from their home as part of a respect order in cases of violence or risk of harm. As noble Lords have said, including the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Meston, excluding a person from their home is of course not something that should be taken lightly. However, we know that anti-social behaviour is not always trivial and can escalate into violence. We also know that, sadly, in some cases, anti-social behaviour is accompanied by domestic abuse. The ability to exclude perpetrators from their homes in such scenarios is a valuable safeguard in protecting vulnerable victims and ensuring that they do not face eviction for the wrongs of their perpetrator.

The key point on Amendment 12—this goes to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Meston—is that an exclusion can happen only when there is a significant risk of violence or harm. This will be key for protecting vulnerable victims who live with perpetrators or are in the same building. The applicant for the respect order will be able to make a proper risk assessment; that is the purpose and focus of that. The power to exclude remains a decision for the court and will be used only when it considers it necessary, in order to protect victims from the risk of violence or harm. I do not know whether that satisfies the noble Lord, but that is the Government’s rationale for the discussions we are bringing forward today.

This is a long group of amendments, so I apologise to the Committee for continuing to deal with them. Amendment 13 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to ensure that

“the appropriate chief officer of police” is specified where a respect order has been issued. The Bill also provides that a supervisor must provide details of the respondent’s compliance with positive requirements to the chief officer of police. While the police are among the agencies that can apply for these orders, the operational responsibility for enforcing requirement lies with the designated supervisor and not with the chief officer of police. It is intended that positive requirements would be managed by those closest to the respondent’s circumstances.

Amendment 14 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that the supervisor does not make the final decision on who the relevant chief officer of the police would be, where it appears that the respondent lives in more than one police area. Supervisors are directly involved in managing the positive requirements of respect orders. They have first-hand knowledge of the respondent’s living arrangements and which police areas are most impacted by the respondent’s behaviour. Specifying the chief officer of police prior to issuing a respect order could be an unnecessary burden on police forces that have minimal involvement, and therefore it is appropriate that the supervisor makes the final decision on these matters.

Amendment 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, seeks to remove the provision enabling courts to make interim respect orders. Again, I highlight that interim court orders are not a novel concept; they are generally available to courts in exceptional cases. There is currently the possibility for a civil injunction, and it remains the case for the respect order where it is necessary for the courts to grant an interim respect order to prevent serious harm to victims.

Victims are central to the proposals we are bringing forward. If an interim order has been granted, it is because there has been a case made to a court that victims need some assistance to prevent serious harm to them. An interim respect order can be granted by the court only when all the relevant legal duties and safeguards that that entails are met, and it requires the court to be satisfied that it is just to make an order. That goes back to the point the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made. If that order is placed, it is because the court has determined on the evidence before it that there is a real risk of threat to an individual and therefore that order has to be made.

Amendment 20 from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seeks to ensure that a respect order is based on a risk assessment. The introduction of the risk assessment offers a further safeguard in ensuring that respect order applications consider contextual vulnerabilities and agencies take a joint multilateral approach. I hope I can make it clear to the noble Lord that this is a statutory requirement, and all agencies must complete a risk assessment prior to applying for a respect order, so we have met the provisions that he wants in Amendment 20 to date.

Amendment 21 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would place a duty on the Home Secretary to conduct a public consultation before introducing new statutory guidance for practitioners on respect orders. I make it clear to the Committee that any updates or additions to the ASB statutory guidance are already subject to extensive consultation with relevant stakeholders. That will include the front-line practitioners for whom the guidance is intended. This will be the case for statutory guidance on respect orders, and I hope that satisfies the noble Lord. As respect orders partially replace an existing power, the civil injunction, a large portion of the guidance will therefore already be familiar to practitioners.

Finally, Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, seeks to add for-profit registered social housing providers to the list of relevant agencies that can apply for a respect order. For-profit social housing providers have grown in prominence since the 2014 Act came into force, and I recognise the importance of the relevant agencies having the powers needed to tackle anti-social behaviour. That is why, for example, we are giving both for-profit and non-profit social housing providers the power to apply for and issue closure notices. However, these are powerful tools, and it is also important that further challenges to the agencies that can use the powers, including respect orders, are considered carefully. But the noble Lord has raised some very important issues, and we will consider them carefully. I really appreciate his bringing them to the Committee today.

Earlier, I highlighted the importance of the Home Secretary being able to amend the list of relevant authorities that can apply for a respect order. This power enables the Government fully to consider the case for adding additional authorities such as for-profit housing providers. This is an important point for the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington: if we conclude that it is possible to make those changes through primary legislation—yes, in the Bill today—and we can make the changes he has asked us to look at in secondary legislation, if the Bill gets Royal Assent and passes all the stages, that can be done by secondary legislation as well. So, we will look at the issues he has raised, but primary legislation may not be required to make those changes happen.

That was a long climb, and I am still only about 10 feet up Everest, but I hope that those comments help the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. This has been a useful discussion, but I hope that we can reach a conclusion on those matters now.

My Lords, I think it is the Matterhorn at this stage, rather than Everest, but we will see. I thank the Minister for his very full reply, and I thank all noble Lords for their support for this set of amendments that I and my noble friend Lady Doocey put forward. The Minister has set out his stall; he is clearly very wedded to the current wording, and that will merit careful consideration. I recognise the point he made about this being a manifesto commitment, but Amendment 1 is not designed to negate respect orders; it is designed to review the existing suite of anti-social behaviour legislation in order to make sure that it is effective.

I recognise the point the Minister made about the 1 million incidents, but we do not know at this stage, other than from the Minister’s assertions, that the respect orders are going to be effective in dealing with those, or, indeed, whether existing powers would have themselves been effective.

The Minister did not really explain why the current legislation is inadequate. He also did not for one second admit that the current regime of PSPOs and CPNs had its faults.

The real difference between this legislation and the existing legislation is that action can be taken immediately. I think I did touch on that point, but if it was not to the noble Lord’s satisfaction, I apologise. We can take action immediately on a breach.

I think we are going to need some more convincing that that is the case, compared to anti-social behaviour injunctions. So, we remain somewhat unconvinced.

We have the common aim across the House of achieving an effective system that is fair and proportionate. The one chink in the Minister’s armour was that he was prepared, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, to consider the wording “necessary and proportionate”. I very much hope that he will consider that as a possible Amendment to his proposal.

I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, that Governments reach for the statute book; we need to consider whether existing legislation is sufficient. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, called for a pause. Whether it is a pause or a review, we will definitely want to return to this on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 1.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Amendments 2 to 7 not moved.