Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb:

Moved by Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb

28: Clause 38, page 32, line 20, leave out “11” and insert “12”Member’s explanatory statementThis Amendment would add section 12 (period for which persons may be detained) to the list of sections of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 to be repealed.

My Lords, these are meant to be helpful amendments and, if they are read with a favourable eye, they might be seen as such. To start, I remind your Lordships that freedom from executive detention is the most fundamental right of all. It is not only an international human right but a national one, reaching back 800 years to the Magna Carta. In the absence of any statutory time limit on the length of detention, other than for children and pregnant women, the right to liberty has been safeguarded in our common law.

Amendments to strip back Section 12 and uphold the common law during the passage of the Illegal Migration Bill in July 2023 were supported from all corners of this House by a quite motley crew of very noble Lords. Amendment 28 and the consequential changes made by Amendment 30 seek to simply restore the common law to the position it was in before Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023 was brought into force and sought to chip away at it. With so many other provisions of the Illegal Migration Act to be repealed by Clauses 38 and 39, Section 12 should be added to their number.

There are two reasons. First, the reasonableness of a period of immigration detention should not simply be in the hands of the Minister and down to her opinion; it should be entrusted to the responsibility of our courts in our world-renowned common-law system. This is not to say that courts will ignore the Home Secretary’s views. On the contrary, in 2007 our Court of Appeal specifically acknowledged that it will no doubt take account of the Home Secretary’s views as may seem proper.

Secondly, by returning to the common-law position, we would also uphold the right to liberty under international human rights law. In 2016 the European Court of Human Rights agreed that it is this consideration by domestic courts of the reasonableness of each individual period of detention that ensures the absence of a general fixed time limit in the UK system, because it does not, in principle, give rise to increased risk of arbitrariness.

Repealing Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act is consistent with the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. At paragraph 103 of its report on this Bill, it clearly stated:

“We agree with our predecessor Committee and recommend the repeal of section 12 to restore certainty and ensure compliance with Article 5”.

Turning to Amendment 32 in my name, I take forward the task of continuing to recommend that the Government leave out the retrospective element of the detention power in Clause 41—that is, the power to detain people when considering whether to make a deportation order on the basis of their presence. This amendment is modest when compared with the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which was to leave Clause 41 out of the Bill altogether. This amendment is simply about removing retrospectivity in subsection 17, which treats the new detention power as always having had effect.

The Government’s position appears to be that Clause 41 is necessary to clarify matters but that it is not retrospective. Both cannot be true. It is either necessary because it is retrospective and protects the Government from false imprisonment challenges, or it is unnecessary because it is already the position in law. The Government’s own impact assessment, when read carefully, shows that it has been unlawful since 20 October 2014 to detain people in the way that they have. Changing the law now and treating it as if it had always had effect will provide neither legal certainty nor foreseeability to people detained in these past 11 years. It only insulates the Government from challenge and inhibits people from having a domestic remedy and compensation for their unlawful detention.

This precedent of making the unlawful deprivation of liberty lawful places us on a very slippery slope. I ask the Government to reconsider their position on both these amendments, to repeal a section of the law that prior Governments passed in the Illegal Migration Act to erode our common law, and to leave out retrospectivity from their new detention order—all to uphold the right to liberty and to be free from executive detention, that most fundamental right of all. I beg to move.

My Lords, I will briefly set out why I do not think this is a particularly helpful Amendment, which I am sure the noble Baroness is not entirely surprised to hear. Despite what she said, I am not sure the amendment is entirely intended to be helpful.

This is an area in which there is a balance to strike. The noble Baroness is quite right that the Illegal Migration Act shifted the balance—a little—in favour of the Home Secretary; the balance had drifted too far in the other direction. I strongly support the need for some limits and constraint on the ability of the Home Secretary to use detention powers, but if you are not careful, those who try to frustrate the system inappropriately—people who have no right to be here—will use the rules to frustrate an attempt legitimately to remove them from the country.

I saw many cases of people who had no right to be in the United Kingdom, and who had failed on a number of occasions to stay here through the legal processes, using this as another tool. If you have strict, bright-line rules, the danger is that people game and frustrate the system. The Home Secretary does not want to detain more people than is absolutely necessary; there is a very significant cost in doing so. As she well knows, the Home Office does not have an unlimited budget, but it is necessary to have these powers.

Certainly, the powers that were in place before the provision the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, is trying to repeal needed strengthening. As I said, this moves things in the direction of the Home Secretary, but as with all the Home Secretary’s powers, she has to exercise them in a reasonable and lawful manner, and all the decisions she takes are challengeable by judicial review.

The Illegal Migration Act still refers to whether the detention is “reasonably necessary”. It still has that test, so the Home Secretary has to exercise that judgment. If somebody feels that the Home Secretary has got that judgment wrong, it is still open to them to challenge it. However, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that the balance has shifted in favour of the Home Secretary.

I come back to what I said in the earlier group: there is a balance to strike here. Much of the debate so far is coming from one particular angle. I do not criticise the noble Baroness for doing it, but the other side of the argument needs to be put, so the House can hear a more balanced argument. We need a firm system which allows people to come to and stay in the United Kingdom if they are following our rules or have a legitimate asylum claim; equally importantly, where they do not, they should not be able to use rules and regulations that are there to protect people, in order to frustrate the legitimate exercise of that power.

To all those who want an asylum system, or one that allows people to come here legitimately, I urge them to be careful what they wish for, because we are getting to the point where the public are losing patience. Ministers are ultimately accountable both to the House of Commons and to the House of Lords, but if the public do not feel that Ministers are accountable, or if they feel that they do not have the powers to deliver a system the public want to see, public belief and confidence in the system will disappear, and that would be very dangerous. Those who want a more liberal system would rue the day that that happened.

Therefore, having that balance is necessary. The changes made in the Illegal Migration Act to the powers on detention moved in the right direction. The fact that the Government, despite doing a pretty wholesale removal of the powers in that Act, have not removed this one suggests that Ministers think that shift in the balance was sensible. I therefore hope that it remains in place. Regretfully, if the noble Baroness presses her amendment to a vote, I will not be able to support it. I hope she understands why, and I suspect it will not be a surprise to her to learn that I am unable to support it.

My Lords, we should of course be aware of public feeling, but we should also not inflame it. We need to be careful with that. The noble Baroness’s Amendment 32 seeks to leave out Clause 41(17), which states that the amendments made by most of the subsections in that clause

“are to be treated as always having had effect”.

We should be very wary of the retrospectivity contained in them. The Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, is about to finalise, I hope, a report on the rule of law, and we point to retrospectivity, or retroactivity—I am never sure whether there is a difference—as threatening the rule of law, along with legal certainty and so on. I am therefore glad that the noble Baroness tabled this amendment.

My Lords, I will make just a brief Intervention from us on this matter, which was raised in Committee. I am grateful to the Minister for telling me what reasons he had for not taking out Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act. It raises some further questions, which I guess the Minister might have been expecting. Essentially, the noble Baroness’s amendments aim collectively to inject greater protection of civil liberties and to ensure proportionality in the use of detention powers, and they demand clarity regarding the mental element required for the new immigration offences in the Bill.

In his letter to me, the Minister said of Section 12 that

“policies to differentiate in line with the provision can be resumed if required”.

He said that they

“are not currently in use”,

and they have not been in use since this Government took office. He said:

“This Government is prioritising steps to restore order to the asylum system”,

et cetera, as one might expect. But, he continued:

“While the Government reviews the approach, it would not be appropriate to remove these provisions from the statute book”.

Can the Minister tell me what review of what approach will determine whether this provision should be removed, and whether, in the immediate future, there is any intention to recommence Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act?

In conclusion, having some clarity on this matter would be useful. The Law Society, as noble Lords might expect, says that the retention of Section 12, by removing the

“court’s ability to decide for itself whether the detention of a person for the purposes of removal is for a reasonable period”,

risks increasing unlawful and prolonged detention. There is currently a legal aspect to retention; I know that it is not being used, but we need to ensure that the fallback described by the Law Society is in place. I look forward to the Minister’s response to those questions.

My Lords, I begin by making plain our Opposition to the amendments in this group. In Committee, we spent much time rehashing the arguments over the Illegal Migration Act 2023. We have made our position abundantly plain. It is obvious that there exists a gulf in opinion regarding that Act between many of us in this House. This is Report, so now is not the time for me to repeat those arguments. As noble Lords know, we strongly oppose the repeal of the bulk of the Illegal Migration Act, but I should say that it is at least some solace to us that the Government have deemed it right to retain Section 12. Since we support the Government’s intent to keep that section on the statute book, we oppose Amendments 28, 30 and 32, notwithstanding the elegant arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, for her amendments and how she presented them. She said that she was trying to be helpful and supportive on these matters, and I am grateful for that.

Amendment 28 seeks to add Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act to the list of sections of that Act being repealed under this Bill. Section 12 of the Illegal Migration Act establishes that it is for the Home Secretary, rather than the courts, to determine what is a reasonable period to detain an individual for a specific statutory purpose, such as for removal. The noble Lord, Lord Harper, raised a point that I would wish to set out: the Home Secretary is a Member of the House of Commons, and I answer for the Home Secretary in this House on matters to do with the Home Office. Therefore, we are accountable to Parliament for the decisions that are taken.

The important point that I want to put to the noble Baroness is that, even with Section 12 in force, the courts will continue to have significant oversight over detention. That goes to the point that the noble Lord, Lord German, made today and my noble friend Lady Lister made in Committee. Individuals detained under immigration powers may apply at any time to the First-tier Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber for immigration bail, where a judge will assess whether their continued detention is justified. If they consider that it is not, they will grant immigration bail. Therefore, the Home Secretary will have more discretion, but there will still be judicial oversight of immigration bail.

Additionally, as I said in Committee, individuals can challenge the legality of their detention through a judicial review in the High Court, where the court will consider whether the Secretary of State made a reasonable decision in detaining a person or in continuing their detention. If the court considers that the Secretary of State did not act reasonably, it will ensure that that person has access to an appropriate remedy, including ordering a release if appropriate. Again, there will be greater discretion for the Home Secretary, but there will also be strong judicial oversight and parliamentary oversight of this matter.

Section 12 simply makes it clear that the Secretary of State’s judgment of what is a “reasonable” period of detention should have more weight. That is logical, since the Home Office is in full possession of all the relevant facts and best placed to decide whether continued detention is reasonable in all the circumstances. That could include safeguarding the public, safeguarding an individual or the issues of cost that have been mentioned. Ultimately, the Home Secretary will determine what is reasonable based on the information before her. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, from the Opposition front bench, added his voice to those general concerns.

Section 12 also provides for detention to continue for a reasonable period while arrangements are made for a person’s release. That is particularly important when, for example, we need foreign national offenders to be accommodated in a specific location in accordance with their licence conditions, or to make safeguarding referrals for vulnerable people. Previous case law established the principle of a grace period to enable a person’s release, and Section 12 now provides legal clarity by placing that on a legislative footing.

Section 12 applies to all immigration detention powers. The noble Baroness’s Amendment 30, which is consequential to Amendment 28, seeks to ensure that the provisions that apply to Section 12 are repealed. Although I know that the noble Baroness is trying to be helpful on this matter, for the reasons I have just set out, it is right that Section 12 is retained for all immigration detention powers, to give the Secretary of State an additional discretion. None the less, that will be subject to parliamentary oversight and judicial oversight.

The noble Baroness’s Amendment 32 seeks to remove the retrospective effect of Clause 41. As Members have discussed, Clause 41 clarifies the existing statutory powers of detention where the Home Office is considering whether deportation is conducive to the public good and consequential amendments to existing powers to take biometrics and searches upon being detained for this purpose.

I argue that it remains the Home Office’s position that the current detention power is lawful. This clause provides greater legal clarity regarding its application. The key challenge of not having the retrospective effect—this is the key point that a number of noble Lords have mentioned in their contributions—would be that such claims risk undermining the integrity of past deportation proceedings and frustrating future deportation proceedings. Clause 41 clarifies these powers. It is not expected to increase the use of detention powers, but it is intended to remove ambiguity and ensure that existing practices are legally robust.

The noble Lord, Lord German, asked when and how we can review this matter. We will keep all matters under review. There are further potential issues around immigration and asylum trailed with the immigration white paper. We have got to keep these matters under review at all times. I would argue to both him and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that the extension of the Secretary of State’s powers is still subject to all the legal oversight that she would wish it to have and is ultimately still subject to parliamentary scrutiny on how those powers are exercised. I will answer to this House if there are any abuses of that power that Members wish to draw to the attention of either House—to the Home Secretary or to me, as the Minister accountable in this House. I therefore urge the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

I thank the Minister for his reply. I deeply regret that I did not come to him with these amendments before to discuss them a little bit more. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken, even the noble Lord, Lord Harper, who started to raise deep, dark political waters that I definitely do not agree with him about. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment 28 withdrawn.