Baroness Hamwee:

Moved by Baroness Hamwee

155: Clause 46, page 43, line 28, leave out “reasonably practicable to do so” and insert “reasonable or reasonably practicable to do so having regard to other matters before or likely to come before the Tribunal”Member’s explanatory statementThis Amendment is intended to probe whether the resources of the Tribunal and legal aid practitioners are sufficient to ensure cases are heard fairly within this 24-week timeframe.

My Lords, this need not, I hope, take anything like as long as the last group of amendments. Clause 46 relates to an appeal when a protection claim has been removed, and Clause 47 relates to protection and other human rights. The issue I am probing is the scope that these clauses give for the Government or Parliament to impose deadlines on the tribunal in determining appeals—in this case, a deadline of 24 weeks from the institution of the appeal. I am not arguing that appeals should not be dealt with as speedily as possible; instead, I would like to understand the scope for the tribunal to say, “Sorry, we can’t meet this timeframe”. In particular, how far can regard be had to other cases? Is it just for particular cases?

The wording is

“where the Tribunal considers that it is not reasonably practicable to do so”.

Is that confined to a particular appeal or is it about the workload in general? I am very uneasy about a statutory deadline on how tribunals of the judiciary operate. I know that we will be given some opportunities to be briefed on and to discuss the new procedures that the Government have in mind, but we must deal with this legislation as it is in front of us now. I beg to move.

My Lords, at the heart of Amendment 157, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Cameron of Lochiel, is the fundamental principle that we must reduce the backlog, unblock the immigration system and ensure that people are not left waiting endlessly for a decision on their appeal. It is in no one’s interest that asylum seekers should be kept in hotels and HMOs for weeks on end while decisions are being made on their appeal. Delay does not serve anyone.

The present situation is intolerable. Recently reported statistics cited by the Law Society show that the waiting time for an appeal decision is, on average, nearly 50 weeks. There is almost a year of uncertainty, during which applicants remain in taxpayer-funded accommodation and support. It is in precisely this space that vexatious claims can be lodged, with the appeals process used not to seek justice but to delay removal and prolong the benefit of support. This is not acceptable, and it undermines public confidence in the integrity of the system.

Our amendment seeks to require the Secretary of State, first, to publish a clear date by which he expects appeals to be determined within a 24-week period, and then, within 12 months, to provide a report on how many cases have not met that standard; in other words, the Government would have to set out their ambition and then be held to account for whether or not they deliver it.

Amendments 203F and 203G, tabled by my noble friends Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Jackson, and the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Alton, are fundamentally about transparency, requiring that all judgments of the Upper Tribunal in immigration and asylum matters are published promptly and made accessible to the public. Why does this matter? First, it is because transparency allows us to assess the quality of the initial decision-making process. A high rate of successful appeals is a clear signal that something is going wrong further upstream, either with the application of the law or with the evidential standards being applied. Without clear and timely publication of judgments, it is difficult to see where those problems lie.

These amendments are about shining a light on the system. If the Government have nothing to hide, there can be no objection to Parliament and the public being able to see how decisions are being made. Indeed, such transparency will strengthen confidence that our border security is being upheld in the way that Ministers assure us it is. I hope that the Government will seriously consider this principle in light of the points than I and other noble Lords have raised.

A noble Lord:

That is in the next group.

I know, I just realised that.

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I know that we will have a full discussion on Amendments 203F and 203G at a later date. I will take that as an hors d’oeuvre from the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower. It is important that he trails those issues because they are linked. I value that he has done that today. However, I will focus on the amendments before the Committee, Amendments 155 and 156, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. These seek to confirm that the resources of the tribunal and legal aid practitioners are sufficient to ensure that appeals are heard fairly within the 24-week timeframe.

Clauses 46 and 47 already set out that the statutory timeframe should be adhered to unless it is not reasonably practical to do so. This enables the judiciary to take into account any relevant factors when exercising its discretion and responsibility over case management and the listing of appeals. We in the Home Office are working very closely with the Ministry of Justice to ensure that the tribunal has the resources it needs to meet the growing backlog. and we want to ensure that we deliver on that backlog as a matter of some urgency. The tribunal has been given additional funding to boost the number of days it will be sitting in 2025-26 to near maximum capacity, and we are also consulting on uplifts to immigration and asylum legal aid fees to support that capacity.

The period of 24 weeks is carefully chosen, as it balances the importance of resolving cases quickly, while the Government recognise the need for appropriate safeguards to ensure access to justice for all. To provide further reassurance to the noble Baroness, the resources of the tribunal are taken into consideration, and these provisions will not apply immediately following Royal Assent. There will be a period of implementation and operationalisation, during which the Home Office, the MoJ and the Courts & Tribunals Service will ensure the tribunals’ readiness in the coming months. I hope all that will give the noble Baroness some reassurance on those issues.

Amendment 157 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, seeks to place reporting requirements on the Secretary of State to publish a statement setting a date on which appeals will be heard within the 24-week framework and then further to report on the number of cases subject to Clauses 46 and 47 that have not been determined within 24 weeks. If I am honest, that would require a considerable amount of detailed work between the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice operationalising this measure, when we are committed to implementing the new framework in the shortest possible time. There is a process in place for the MoJ to collect and publish tribunal data on a quarterly basis, including the timeliness of appeals, and the amendment would, therefore, I say with respect, set unnecessary frameworks which would be limited to fixed points in time and would not assist the speedy dealing with this matter in an efficient way.

We all in this Committee wish to speed up and ensure that we deal with these matters in a speedy, timely manner. I suggest that Amendments 155, 156 and 157 would not meet the objectives set by the noble Lords who have proposed them, and I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw Amendment 155.

My Lords, the Minister has quite fairly answered the Member’s explanatory statement to my amendments. As I say, that is perfectly reasonable, and I am grateful for that. Of course, the new Lord Chancellor will have taken an oath, as did the previous one, to provide resources to the courts. My question, which I accept was probably expressed in a slightly strangulated fashion, was about what the tribunal can take into account in saying what matters it is not reasonably practicable that it should have regard to.

Given that it is now 9.50 pm and there is a lot more we are expected to get through—which we may or may not get through, I do not know—I would be very happy if the Minister could write to me. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment 155 withdrawn.

Clause 46 agreed.

Amendment 155A not moved.

Clause 47: Timeframe for determination of certain appeals brought by non-detained appellants liable to deportation

Amendments 156 not moved

Clause 47 agreed.

Amendment 157 not moved.

Clause 48: Refugee Convention: particularly serious crime