Lord Davies of Gower:

Moved by Lord Davies of Gower

106: After Clause 38, insert the following new Clause—“Unaccompanied children and power to provide for exceptions(1) The duty in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal)(1) does not require the Secretary of State to make arrangements for the removal of a person from the United Kingdom at a time when the person is an unaccompanied child.(2) The Secretary of State may make arrangements for the removal of a person from the United Kingdom at a time when the person is an unaccompanied child.(3) The power in subsection (2) may be exercised only—(a) where the person is to be removed for the purposes of reunion with the person’s parent;(b) where the person is to be removed to a country listed in section 80AA(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (safe States for the purposes of section 80A of that Act) which is—(i) a country of which the person is a national, or(ii) a country in which the person has obtained a passport or other document of identity;(c) where the person has not made a protection claim or a human rights claim and the person is to be removed to—(i) a country of which the person is a national,(ii) a country or territory in which the person has obtained a passport or other document of identity, or(iii) a country or territory in which the person embarked for the United Kingdom;(d) in such other circumstances as may be specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State.(4) Regulations under subsection (3)(d) may confer a discretion on the Secretary of State.(5) For the purposes of this section a person (“C”) is an “unaccompanied child” if—(a) C meets the four conditions in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal),(b) C is under the age of 18, and(c) at the relevant time no individual (whether or not a parent of C) who was aged 18 or over had care of C.(6) In subsection (5) “the relevant time” means the time of C’s entry or arrival in the United Kingdom by virtue of which the duty in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal)(1) would apply in relation to C apart from this section.(7) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for other exceptions from the duty in section (Duty to make arrangements for removal)(1). (8) Regulations under subsection (7) may make provision—(a) for this Act or any other enactment to have effect with modifications, in relation to a person to whom an exception applies, in consequence of the application of the exception to that person;(b) for an exception, or for any provision made by virtue of paragraph (a), to be treated as having had effect from a time before the coming into force of the regulations.(9) Regulations made by virtue of subsection (8)(a) may, in particular, disapply any provision of this Act or any other enactment in relation to a person to whom an exception applies.(10) In subsections (8) and (9) “enactment” includes—(a) an enactment contained in subordinate legislation within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978;(b) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, an Act of the Scottish Parliament;(c) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, a Measure or Act of Senedd Cymru;(d) an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, Northern Ireland legislation.(11) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (7) must be laid before Parliament after being made.(12) Regulations contained in a statutory instrument laid before Parliament under subsection (11) cease to have effect at the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the instrument is made unless, during that period, the instrument is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(13) In calculating the period of 28 days, no account is to be taken of any whole days that fall within a period during which—(a) Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or(b) either House of Parliament is adjourned for more than four days.(14) If regulations cease to have effect as a result of subsection (12) that does not—(a) affect the validity of anything previously done under the regulations, or(b) prevent the making of new regulations.(15) In this section—“human rights claim” has the meaning given by section 113(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002;“national” includes citizen;“protection claim” has the meaning given by section 82(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”

My Lords, I will also speak to Amendments 107, 108 and 111 standing in my name. They are all linked to the amendments in the previous group and once again are aimed at understanding exactly why the Government are repealing each of these clauses.

First and foremost, Amendment 106 rightly acknowledges the unique vulnerability of unaccompanied children. Unlike adults, these children do not have the benefit of parental guidance, support or protection, which fundamentally changes the context in which any immigration or removal decision should be made. The exemption from removal under proposed new subsection (1) reflects the humane principle that children, especially those who arrive without guardians, require special consideration. At the same time, the amendment incorporates a balanced discretion for the Secretary of State to make exceptions, but, crucially, only in narrowly defined and principled circumstances. This discretion is limited to cases of family reunion or removal to a safe state to which the child has a clear connection, such as nationality or passport holding. This would ensure that the state maintains the ability to act in the best interests of the child and public policy without resorting to indiscriminate removals.

Amendment 107 would bring much-needed clarity and accountability to the handling of European Court of Human Rights interim measures, in relation to the duty to remove under Amendment 105. Interim measures, often issued to prevent irreparable harm while a full hearing is pending, are a critical tool in safeguarding human rights. However, this amendment rightly recognises that these measures must be balanced with national sovereignty and the Government’s responsibility to manage immigration effectively. First, the amendment would establish that the decision to give effect to a European Court of Human Rights interim measure is the discretionary personal responsibility of a Minister of the Crown. This personal involvement emphasises the gravity of the decision, ensuring that it is not delegated lightly or handled bureaucratically. Such a provision would enhance political accountability, requiring Ministers to engage directly with complex legal and humanitarian issues rather than allowing automatic suspension of removal without sovereign consideration.

Furthermore, by restricting the obligation of immigration officials, courts and tribunals to give effect to the interim measure where a Minister has chosen not to recognise it, the amendment would prevent conflicting mandates within the system. This avoids a confusing legal limbo where different authorities might take contradictory positions regarding removal actions that undermine coherence and efficiency in immigration enforcement. This provision strikes a pragmatic balance between respecting international human rights obligations and preserving the Government’s capacity to maintain effective border control. It avoids rigid, automatic enforcement of interim measures that could paralyse immigration functions while still providing a structured framework to engage with the European court’s decisions.

Amendment 108 is a crucial step towards ensuring the duty in Amendment 105 is not needlessly hobbled, and that anyone who enters illegally is removed no matter who they are. It would tackle head-on abuse of asylum and human rights claims, a process that can delay removals and undermine the integrity of the immigration system. The amendment would make it clear that, for individuals meeting the statutory conditions for removal, any protection claim, human rights claim, trafficking or slavery victim claim or application for judicial review cannot be used to delay or frustrate the removal process.

This is vital. Currently, the system is frequently exploited through repeated and sometimes frivolous claims, causing prolonged uncertainty, administrative backlog and resource drain on the Home Office and courts. Declaring claims inadmissible at the outset when conditions for removal are met would significantly reduce abuse. It sends a strong message that these legal routes are not loopholes for indefinite delay. This also enables faster removal decisions, preserving our ability to control our borders effectively.

We have also included a judicial ouster Clause in this amendment to prevent courts from setting aside inadmissibility declarations, promoting legal certainty and finality in removal proceedings. This avoids protracted litigation and vexatious legal challenges, which often tie up judicial resources without improving outcomes for genuine claimants.

Finally, Amendment 111 addresses the question of what support, if any, is available to individuals whose asylum or related claims are declared inadmissible under these amendments. By amending the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and related legislation, the proposed clause ensures that the withdrawal or withholding of support aligns consistently with the inadmissibility framework. This is essential for legal clarity and operational coherence. Without these amendments, there would be a disconnect between the removal of rights to remain and the removal of support, potentially creating gaps or confusion in how support is administered. The amendment ensures that, when a person’s claim is declared inadmissible under the new rules, the support framework adjusts accordingly, reflecting that the individual is no longer entitled to certain forms of state assistance. It also protects the integrity of the asylum support system by preventing those whose claims do not meet the admissibility criteria from accessing support intended for genuine asylum seekers. I beg to move.

My Lords, I know that the Government vigorously opposed the Rwanda Bill, and indeed the Prime Minister described it as a gimmick, or words to that effect. I understand that that is the Government’s position, and I do not expect them to change their mind. But the point worth making is that, although the Rwanda scheme as a whole may not have found favour with the Government, it does not follow that some of the provisions in that Act are not appropriate to whatever policy the Government ultimately may think is appropriate. I know that this is something of a moving picture, as the Minister acknowledged.

I will not repeat what I said in the wrong group in relation to Amendment 107, but I place particular emphasis on that amendment because that issue was a pretty obvious excess of jurisdiction on the part of the European Court of Human Rights. This Government, whatever the final form their policy takes in statutory terms, may find that they have an interim ruling from the European Court of Human Rights that offends natural justice. The fact that—as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, quite rightly said—it needs a Minister before a decision is taken to reject it is an important safeguard. It is not a question of casting it aside and ignoring it; it is considered at an appropriate level, having regard to the unsatisfactory nature of the interim order that the court made under Rule 39. It is important that that provision should be inserted, whatever form the policy takes.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for the Amendment. As I have said previously, the Government are trying to ensure that we have a properly functioning immigration system. The Illegal Migration Act 2023 included provisions that, in my view, prevented asylum decision-making, increased the backlog of asylum cases awaiting an outcome and put impossible pressure on asylum accommodation, with significant costs to the taxpayer, which we have discussed on other groups.

The Act has largely not been commenced, and it is this Government’s policy—I confirm this to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—that we will not commence the Act, as we have accordingly stated in our manifesto and elsewhere. Therefore, Clause 38 repeals the Majority of the measures contained in the Illegal Migration Act 2023, including Section 2 on the duty to remove and associated provisions. However, it is not a blanket approach to repealing the Act. The six measures that the Government intend to retain include provisions that are in force and that have been identified as having operational utility and benefit. The Government see all these powers as important tools to allow for the proper operation of the immigration system and to achieve our wider priorities, along with the other measures that we brought forward.

Amendment 106 seeks to retain Section 4 of the Illegal Migration Act. I believe this measure to be unnecessary. The new clause would, for example, preserve the power to remove unaccompanied children under 18 in specific circumstances when the duty to remove applies.

Section 55, which the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, referred to and which Amendment 107 seeks to retain, would provide for a Minister of the Crown to disregard an interim measure of the European Court of Human Rights where the duty to remove applies. I have heard what the noble Lord said. We have made a judgment that we do not need that provision, and therefore this is part of our proposals on the repeal of the Act.

Section 5 of the Illegal Migration Act, which Amendment 108 seeks to retain, would have meant that an asylum claim and/or human rights claim would be declared inadmissible and would not have been substantively considered in the UK where the person had entered or arrived illegally and had not come directly from a country in which their life or liberty were threatened. It would also have meant that an asylum claim and/or human rights claim would have been declared inadmissible if the person was from a country of origin considered generally safe.

Section 9 of the Illegal Migration Act, which Amendment 111 seeks to retain, would ensure that individuals whose claims are disregarded as a result of being subject to the duty to remove and disregard of certain claims provisions—these are a result of amendments we have considered earlier, such as Amendment 105, and now Amendments 108 and 109—are entitled to support only under Section 4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. This would align their entitlement to support to others declared inadmissible under Sections 80A or 80B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, akin to that of failed asylum seekers. This clause is also unnecessary.

The sections included in this group of amendments were designed to operate alongside Section 2 of the IMA Act, which imposed the duty to remove. As we are now repealing Section 2, this group of amendments has no legal or practical effect. Leaving them in place would simply create confusion. Repealing these sections is a necessary step to ensure the law reflects the Government’s policy direction and avoids ambiguity. Again, I appreciate the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Faulkes, and the front bench, but, on the basis of the comments I have made, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Davies, to withdraw his amendment.

My Lords, I am not sure that the noble Lord has explained fully why the Government are removing these sections of the Illegal Migration Act and why they oppose these amendments. The first Amendment sought to protect unaccompanied children from automatic removal, while allowing for carefully defined exceptions. The second amendment aimed to clarify ministerial discretion when it comes to interim measures from the European Court of Human Rights—a safeguard that balances human rights considerations with the practicalities of border control. The third amendment addressed the worrying practice of disregarding outright certain protections, human-rights trafficking claims and judicial review applications—something that risks undermining access to justice. The fourth amendment ensured the coherence of asylum support provisions in cases where claims are declared inadmissible, preventing gaps and confusion around entitlement to state assistance. I make it clear that these concerns remain very much alive with us and may well be brought forward again in the future. But for now I beg to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 106 withdrawn.

Amendments 107 to 109 not moved.