I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, for tabling these amendments. As she said, they are probing amendments, and I hope to be able to give her an explanation. She again mentioned the letter that Minister Pennycook promised. I have asked to be informed whether that letter was sent. If it was, I will provide the noble Baroness with a copy, but it would not be usual, I suspect, for copies of letters that were circulated to a committee in the other place to be automatically circulated here. If that letter exists, I will send it to her.

All the amendments in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seek to amend the operation of the redirection process as set out in Clause 3, including the replacement of regulation-making powers with time limits or statutory guidance. I recognise that Amendment 17 is probing, so I will first seek to explain how the redirection process has been designed before addressing some of her concerns head on and then turning to Amendment 23. I apologise if these explanations seem very detailed, but it is important to take the time to explain properly.

The NSIP regime was designed to provide a single route through which to consent all types of large-scale infrastructure schemes. As we know, on occasion this one-size-fits-all approach is not proportionate for specific developments. Clause 3 seeks to address this by creating a new power for the Secretary of State to issue a direction disapplying the requirement for schemes above the NSIP thresholds to seek development consent. Clause 3 sets out the circumstances in which a request for a direction may arise, what a request may contain and the steps the Secretary of State must follow in responding. Crucially, the Secretary of State may direct development out of the NSIP regime only if they consider an alternative consenting route to be appropriate given the particular circumstances of the development in question. Enhancing the flexibility of the planning system in this way should reduce burdens on applicants which are otherwise disproportionate and support the Government’s ambitions to have a streamlined planning system. This level of flexibility already exists under the Planning Act.

Section 35 enables the Secretary of State to direct into the NSIP regime those projects which fall outside of the statutory thresholds but which have none the less requested to follow the process for nationally significant infrastructure schemes. This has been invaluable, as we know, for enabling numerous water schemes to progress.

Clause 3 provides that flexibility but in the other direction. It may be that a transport scheme is located in an area with a supportive local authority and does not require the acquisition of land. Instead of requiring the entire scheme to become an NSIP, an applicant could now request to follow the route that is most appropriate to their project. As the Government’s working paper on proposals to streamline the consenting process for infrastructure acknowledged, the existing thresholds have not kept pace with technological advancements. This has held back projects from coming forward—for example, medium-sized schemes—because the process of obtaining development consent was out of kilter with the relatively straightforward nature of the scheme.

Clause 3 is intended to be flexible so that the Secretary of State may choose the appropriate consenting route depending on the particular requirements of a scheme. As noble Lords have pointed out, this means the power could be used to direct a scheme for a local decision under the Town and Country Planning Act. It may direct a scheme to seek consent under the Highways Act or the Transport and Works Act. As the Housing Minister explained in the other place, the Government will publish policy setting out the key factors the Secretary of State will take into account when making a decision as to whether or not to give a direction. Given that the intent of the power is to increase flexibility, it is critical that potentially viable planning routes are not excluded.

Amendments 17 and 23 seek to prevent the power being used to redirect an NSIP project to be consented via a special development order. Amendment 23 goes further. It would also require all redirected onshore energy generation NSIP projects to be consented through the Electricity Act 1989. Additional steps are outlined in cases where a Secretary of State is the applicant for an NSIP project being redirected. We recognise that the noble Baroness’s concerns stem from an interest in protecting a local and national democratic say in the consent of important projects. However, similarly to other types of consents, development orders are an established part of the planning system in England. They are made by statutory instrument and are laid before Parliament under the negative procedure. Development orders have in the past been used to grant permission for certain classes of development—for example, for the purpose of national defence.

An alternative example may be that a commercial development that could otherwise be consented through a special development order also requires an access road which, under existing legislation, could be consented only through a development consent order. This power would enable that project to be consented under a process which is proportionate to the complexity of the scheme.

Amendments 17 and 23 would not only remove the option of a development order but would force an onshore energy generation scheme redirected out of the NSIP process to be consented via the Electricity Act 1989. This process under Section 36 of that Act is outdated and was not designed to deal with modern energy demands. That is why it was replaced by the Planning Act 2008.

In keeping with the spirit of the noble Baroness’s amendment, the Government agree that, where appropriate, we should ensure that onshore electricity generation can be consented through other appropriate consenting routes, which might enable local decision-making. However, this amendment would not deliver this in practice.

The proposed amendment would remove the ability to handle a request for an NSIP project to be directed into an alternative consenting route where it is the Secretary of State who proposes to carry out the development. This would require them to make a written request for a direction to themselves. This is clearly impractical and unnecessary. Noble Lords can rest assured that, if those circumstances were to arise, the Secretary of State would follow the planning propriety guidance in the same way as already happens for planning casework decisions.

I turn now to amendments 18, 19, 20 and 22, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. Clause 3 empowers the Secretary of State to make provision by regulations about the time limit, including the extension of such a time limit, for determining requests for redirection. These amendments instead would set a fixed three-month time limit in primary legislation and would enable a further period of a month after the initial determination to consider further interventions before reaching a final decision. The Government want requests for redirection to be determined promptly. However, proportionality and flexibility are needed to ensure decisions can be made in a timely fashion and fairly. The most appropriate timeframe will depend on a number of factors, including the demand from applicants and the complexity of projects coming forward.

By taking a power to make regulations, the Government can adjust the timetable as they learn more about the types of requests they are likely to receive. Setting out the timeframe in primary legislation may disincentivise the Government from improving and speeding up decision-making over time. Not only would this amendment introduce greater rigidity by effectively requiring decisions to be taken in three months when perhaps they might be able to be taken sooner, which is what we all want to see in certain cases, but it could result in an unrealistic or unworkable time limit in, for example, particularly complex decisions. The Government plan to lay regulations to set a timeframe as quickly as possible, when parliamentary time allows.

I come to Amendment 21, the final amendment to Clause 3, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. Clause 3 gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations about the timetable for deciding requests for direction. This includes the timetable for the provision of information to the Secretary of State in order to make such a decision. The proposed amendment would replace this provision with a requirement for the Secretary of State to publish statutory guidance about the timetabling of information required to decide a request for direction.

Making a decision to direct a project out of the NSIP regime would be a significant endeavour. It is right that the Government can be clear about when such information will be required from applicants, to enable robust and fair decisions to be made. It is the Government’s view that specifying this information in statutory guidance would reduce certainty for those making a request. The Government want to ensure that requests can be made and determined quickly, and that qualifying persons have certainty about when information is needed for such requests. It is therefore important that the Government retain the ability to make such provision in regulations. These will operate alongside non-statutory guidance to provide further detail about this measure as a whole.

I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, has found helpful my explanation of the operation of this clause and the justification for why these regulation-making powers are unnecessary. I therefore kindly ask her to withdraw her amendment. I apologise for the length of the explanation, but it is a complex area.