Lord Alton of Liverpool:

Moved by Lord Alton of Liverpool

31: Clause 13, page 7, line 9, leave out “knows or suspects that” and insert “intends that, or is reckless as to whether,”Member’s explanatory statementThis Amendment gives effect to the JCHR’s recommendation that the mens rea threshold for clause 13 ought to be one of intention or recklessness.

My Lords, the first part of day 2 in Committee deals with organised immigration crime offences. We will hear later about safeguards and modern slavery, and will return to the question of what might constitute a reasonable explanation on the part of an irregular migrant, but we begin with Amendments 31 and 41 in my name, which deal with mens rea. I am also happy to be associated with Amendments 32, 42 and 53, which are grouped with these. The Committee should note too that these amendments are linked to the next group, beginning with Amendment 33. I will keep some of my powder dry in suggesting why the Minister should also give them a fair wind or at least a promise of further consideration.

The Committee will know that the amendments in this and the subsequent group are among the recommendations contained in the Joint Committee on Human Rights report on the Bill, appearing in the report as amendment 3. I was grateful to the Minister for his assurance that, before we reach the next stage of the Bill in September, there will be a considered response to the JCHR report and its recommendations.

As a grammar school boy from a council estate with a mother whose first language was Irish rather than English, I remember being daunted as an 11 year- old by my first lesson in Latin. Later in life I read with some amusement that Winston Churchill questioned the use of the vocative case “O table” when learning the word mensa. His teacher’s explanation, that it was used to address a table, was met with Churchill’s practical, albeit impertinent, response, “But I never do”. However, I think the great man would have seen much more practical use for the words mens rea, meaning guilty mind in Latin.

Linguistics to one side, my barrister daughter assures me that it remains a crucial concept in criminal law. It refers to the mental state of a defendant at the time of committing a crime, specifically their intention, knowledge or recklessness regarding the prohibited act. That mental element, along with the physical act, actus reus, must be proven for a person to be found guilty of a crime.

My Amendment 31 would leave out “knows or suspects that” and insert

“intends that, or is reckless as to whether”.

This amendment would give effect to the JCHR’s recommendation that the mens rea threshold for Clause 13 ought to be one of intention or recklessness. Amendment 41, which is amendment 4 in the Joint Committee report, appears at Clause 14, page 8, line 9. It would leave out “knows or suspects that” and insert

“intends that, or is reckless as to whether”.

Amendment 41 would also give effect to the JCHR recommendation that the mens rea threshold for Clause 14 ought to be one of intention or recklessness. It would have the same effect as Amendment 31, but in a different clause.

Put these amendments into the context of Clauses 13 to 17, which create three new precursor offences to target the activities of facilitators and organised criminal gangs that look to profit from organised immigration crime. These amendments seek to raise the mens rea threshold for which someone might be caught by the offence of supplying, offering to supply or handling a relevant article for use in the commission of certain immigration offences. The words in Clause 13, “knows or suspects that”, are a lower mens rea threshold compared with intention and recklessness, which is what the JCHR recommendation is urging us to substitute.

The JCHR report notes that

“comparable precursor terrorism offences have a higher mental element, requiring intention to commit or assist in the commission of terrorist acts”.

In paragraph 17 of the JCHR report, Liberty provides an example in its written evidence. It illustrates how a woman fleeing persecution who has had her phone stolen, and her British grandfather who provides her with a phone to help her—despite suspecting that she will use it to contact smugglers—might both be caught by this offence. In paragraph 19 of the JCHR report, ILPA, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, provides a further example:

“A well-meaning individual providing voluntary humanitarian assistance in Calais hands out SIM Cards. A father receives one and passes a mobile phone and the SIM card to his daughter”.

They may both be prosecuted for having supplied a relevant article.

Paragraph 38 of the JCHR report concludes that

“the breadth of these precursor offences” captured in Clauses 13 to 17

“poses a risk of unintended harms to those who are most vulnerable”.

These relevant amendments seek to mitigate this risk by seeking greater circumscription and more robust safeguards.

Paragraph 50 of the JCHR report similarly concludes that the precursor offences captured in Clauses 13 to 17

“create uncertainty, extend beyond the Government’s stated … aim, and risk inadvertently criminalising persons who ought to be protected from criminal penalty”.

I hope the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Hanson, agrees that some fine-tuning, while not preventing prosecutions, could strike a better balance. I commend the amendments to the Committee and beg to move.

My Lords, I did two years of Roman law, which did not stick, but the mens rea in criminal law did stick. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, and I are very much on the same page here. He did not quote the rather neat line from his committee’s report: that it considers that the

“precursor offences would benefit from greater circumscription”.

I thought that was very circumspect, and rather typical of the careful language our Select Committees use.

My Amendments 32, 42 and 53 are, if you like, more instinctive and a bit more amateur; the noble Lord’s are technically better, and I am happy to support them. My amendments go to the words “suspects” and “suspicion” in Clauses 13, 14 and 16. That is a very low threshold, with the burden being on the person charged to show beyond all reasonable doubt that they had a reasonable excuse. I looked up the definition, and the Oxford English Dictionary defines to “suspect” as to

“imagine … on slight or no evidence”,

and

“to believe or fancy to be guilty … with insufficient proof or knowledge”.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, on the first day in Committee, working from a superseded group of amendments—although it was not his fault—described all the amendments in the group, which included these, as being “well meaning”. I choose to take that as a compliment, although I am not sure that it was intended quite directly as one. He said that they would

“significantly change the burden of proof in respect of evidence

Exactly, and that is the point. These are criminal offences with substantial penalties, and that should require a high burden of proof. I am very uneasy that, in the circumstances, a term that I could describe as casual does not require much from the prosecution. We will come to the content later, but I will raise this point whatever the content of the offence.

My Lords, I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and have a great deal of respect for the side of the argument he is coming from. But the piece missing from his argument, and from that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is the concept of deterrence.

What the Government are trying to do, as far as I understand it—the Minister will correct me if I have got this wrong—is to put in place a framework that actually stops the organised criminal groups, as well as those who pay them and those who help facilitate that immigration crime. The intention is to stop them doing these things in the first place, and there is a balance to strike between the criminal law regime you put in place and the penalties. It needs to be sufficiently tough that you actually deter people in the first place.

The Joint Committee’s report says that the

“scope is broad, the thresholds are low, and the penalties are high”.

That is correct, but that is because the Government are trying, I think—and if so, I support them—to set those penalties so that people are deterred from trying to cross the channel. Let us remind ourselves that they are doing so from a safe country. They are not fleeing persecution in France; they are already in a safe European country. They may have been fleeing persecution in the country from which they originally came, but they are now in a safe European country. Of course, we also know that a lot of the people undertaking these journeys are not fleeing persecution at all; they are travelling, perfectly understandably, for economic reasons, but those are not reasons we should allow.

Let me just pick up the examples the noble Lord, Lord Alton, quoted from the Joint Committee’s report, on which I have a slightly different take. Their presentation in the report is intended to make the reader think that, self-evidently, we should be on the side of the people in the examples—I think that is the purpose—and therefore we follow through and, in effect, support the amendments. I am afraid to say to noble Lords that I do not necessarily follow that at all.

The example is given at paragraph 22 of a teenage boy in northern France who sends his mother in the UK a screenshot of a weather report showing that the channel will be relatively clear, and he crosses to the UK the following day in a dinghy. She has committed an offence because she read the message, as has her son. Well, yes, he should have committed an offence: he was in a safe country, and he has just crossed into the United Kingdom, facilitated by people traffickers, via a journey we are trying to stop him taking. I think it is the Government’s intention that he is committing an offence. They want him to think he would be committing an offence and are trying to deter the action that is currently happening, because we are trying to stop people coming to this country. That is the point of this legislation.

The danger with the Joint Committee’s report is that it is coming at this from a particular angle—only from the point of view of the person undertaking the journey, not the wider position, which is what we are trying to do by having a border control regime that deters people entering the UK when they do not have a reasonable reason for doing so.

Is it not sensible to look at it from the point of view of the person who may be undertaking the action? If there is to be deterrence, you have to look at it from that point of view. Whatever your objective, you have to look at it from the point of view of the person who may be affected; otherwise, you cannot assess whether there is a deterrent effect. Does the noble Lord think that people who reach the northern shores of Europe are as aware of the detail of legislation as his argument would require them to be?

I shall address both the points the noble Baroness has made. On the first, in one sense I am very much looking at it from the point of view of the participants. I want them to be clear that carrying out that particular set of actions would indeed be an offence with a significant penalty, because I want them to then conclude that they do not want to do that and do not want to cross the channel to the United Kingdom from the safe country in which they currently reside. That is the point of the legislation.

On the second point, I am clear, having had some experience of running the immigration regime, and particularly of the development of technology, that the noble Baroness will find that most of the people concerned have mobile telephones and are very well aware of what is going on. There are many groups out there that provide detailed information to migrants about the law and those who can facilitate their being smuggled into the United Kingdom. They are very well aware of changes we make and of the legal position. We were very well aware—I am saying this only because it has just occurred to me—that in the run-up to the election, lots of communications were being made with people in northern France about the likely outcome of that election and whether they should stay put or make the crossing to the United Kingdom. They are very well aware of what is going on, and that is very relevant.

The example that Liberty gave—the committee did not invent it—is built on a statement by the committee that:

“There is no express distinction in Clause 16 between those who engage in such conduct as smugglers, and those who engage in such conduct as asylum seekers, victims of modern slavery, or persons (including children) who may be coerced into carrying items such as phones”.

I am sure that, with his experience, the noble Lord will accept that that is the case. It is about trying to find a balance, so that we can deal with those making money from creating the circumstances to smuggle people in and out of this country and those who are genuine, including children like those whom the committee describes.

The noble Lord makes half a good point. I agree with him on people who are victims of modern slavery. I think my noble friend Lady May will speak to some amendments on that in later groups.

I am sorry if this disappoints noble Lords, but the fact that the example in the report was given by Liberty does not strengthen the case, in my humble opinion, but somewhat lessens it. When I was Immigration Minister, Liberty spent most of its time trying to undermine our immigration legislation and argued for not protecting our borders. It failed to understand, importantly, that if the British public do not think that we have a robust immigration and asylum system then they will become increasingly intolerant of protecting people whom I believe should be protected. You command wide public support for people genuinely fleeing persecution, for whom we should provide refuge, by being clear that we have the ability to stop those who are not entitled to that protection coming to our country and making a mockery of our system. Organisations in favour of our looking after genuine asylum seekers and people who would meet the test of being a refugee should sometimes reflect that being uncritical, as I am afraid many of them are, about those people attempting to come to the United Kingdom damages the public’s view and our ability to have a system that genuinely helps those who need it, as everyone then gets swept up because the system is not working.

Finally, I may have misunderstood the noble Baroness—I am very happy to take an Intervention if I have it wrong—but, on her amendments probing the removal of the defence, she said that she wanted the prosecution to have to make the argument. She said that the current drafting means that people would have to prove their defence beyond a reasonable doubt. That is not my understanding of how this works. It is for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that somebody is guilty of an offence and the legislation, as drafted, provides that there are defences that people can offer as to why they may have conducted themselves in a certain way. Unless I have misunderstood something very badly, that does not require the person to prove their defence beyond a reasonable doubt—all they have to do is, in setting out the defence, raise at least a reasonable doubt with the court that they were not guilty of the offence. That seems the right place to have the test in our criminal justice system. As currently drafted, the legislation does not have the effect that she thinks it does.

We debated the reverse burden of proof on the first day in Committee. I certainly do not take it from any of the briefings I have had, or from previous debates on the reverse burden of proof in other Bills, that it is as the noble Lord described it. As I understand it, you are charged and then you have to put forward a defence if you believe you have a reasonable excuse—which you have if there is sufficient evidence of the matter to raise an issue and the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It therefore throws the “not proved beyond reasonable doubt” on to the defence. Presumably the CPS, in the usual way, would have to believe that the public interest test is met and so on, but it upends the normal way that we do things.

I am grateful for that explanation. As I explained to the Committee, I could not be here on the first day but I have read through the debate and I am afraid I did not agree with that then either. I just do not buy that that is what this does. The prosecution has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that somebody is guilty of the offence. In the legislation as drafted by the Government, somebody can offer a defence and all they have to do for that defence to be successful is create a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury. That does not reverse the burden of proof at all.

To pick up on the point in the Amendment about changing “knows or suspects” to “intends that, or is reckless”, if you know or suspect something untoward is going to take place, that is a reasonably decent idea that someone should not really be doing it. If I know or suspect someone is going to commit crime, it is probably not very wise if I provide them with equipment that would enable them to commit that crime. I do not really see why I would want that test to be much higher. Let us remember that we are not trying to criminalise people who are thinking about doing this; we are trying to say to them, “If you do this, you will be committing a criminal offence and we’d like you not to do it”. That is the purpose of this. Ministers would be delighted if they did not have to prosecute anybody—certainly none of the people contemplating crossing the channel. They want to put in place a deterrent regime that stops them doing it. That is the objective of the legislation. Weakening it would just remove that deterrent effect and we would get back to the position in which we do not have control of our borders, significant numbers of people cross the channel and undertake unsafe journeys, and the British people have no confidence in our immigration and asylum system, which would damage it for the legitimate refugees for whom we want to provide proper protection. We can only do that if there is a system that commands public confidence.

If I have understood what the Government intend to do, I respectfully suggest that the Committee should not support the amendments tabled by noble Lord and noble Baroness. We should stick with the wording in the Bill.

My Lords, I can be very concise, mainly because I agree almost entirely with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said. We should not lose sight of the fact that this whole issue is a real concern to the public. They think we are being made fools of and they are largely right. It is time that the law was tightened up and the authorities got a grip on the situation. I support the Government’s drafting and I hope it will be widely supported.

My Lords, I oppose these amendments. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was gracious in absolving me of my stupidity in jumping ahead. I misread the amendments last week, but we are now in group 2, so we can discuss mens rea.

It is quite in order for noble Lords in this House to test the efficacy and appropriateness of new offences; there is nothing wrong with that. I have read in detail the report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is ably chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, and I have even read the ILPA briefing on the Bill—which takes some doing if you come from my perspective. I concur with the pithy remarks of my noble friend Lord Harper—who has great experience as a former Immigration Minister—that one does not always take Liberty’s briefings as the true gospel.

However, the reason I oppose these amendments is that I am not convinced by the argument prayed in aid by noble Lords, even in the JCHR report. I thought the comparison on page 10 was a specious comparison of precursor offences when they were compared with terrorism offences. I did not think that was an appropriate offence to compare it with, frankly. It is quite right to test the limits of the mens rea doctrine in respect of intention, recklessness and the reverse evidential burden of proof contained within the reasonable excuse provisions. But one has to look at the real-world consequences of what would happen if we accepted these sweeping amendments in terms of the interpretation by the judiciary and others of an amended Bill with this wording in it. I used the words “well-meaning” and it is absolutely not ignoble to put forward these amendments. However, there is a degree of otherworldly naivety about the damaging implications of the Bill being amended in this way.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, for whom I have great respect, and others talked about the importance of balance. This unbalances the Bill. In many respects, its wording is not tough enough, but the Government have made a huge strategic mistake in scrapping the Rwanda plan. It was not perfect and I accept that it was costly and did not deliver in the timescale that we all envisaged. But there has to be a plan B if you scrap plan A. Even allowing for that, this Bill is trying to deal with a significant public safety and security issue that may even be considered an emergency if the numbers keep rising. So, I do not agree with the amendments, because it would be wrong to alter the mens rea threshold. The case has not been made for that.

I would challenge the Minister, incidentally, on Clause 13(3)(b)(i) on “reasonable excuse”. In my mind, that is a get-out clause too far and there is a potential for it to become subject to abuse. It is not a unique subsection to put in a Bill, but it is unusual to carve out certain groups, individuals and actions in primary legislation, effectively for special treatment in such a difficult situation.

So, in essence, I oppose the amendments because they are designed, maybe not deliberately, to make prosecutions and enforcement more difficult. They weaken and invalidate the legislation, or at least the draft Bill as it now stands, and ignore the wider public interest in preventing illegal immigration and the current significant concern at uncontrolled immigration. The amendments disregard the acute and urgent geopolitical pressures around irregular or illegal immigration. They reduce the push factor and increase the pull factor in people trafficking and that business model, and the business model of organised crime gangs. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, will not like the next few words, but the amendments place international treaties above the safety and security of British citizens, thereby moving accountability and decision-making in this key security and safety area even further away from the electorate, from ordinary British voters.

For those reasons, these amendments do not stand up. With all due respect, the case has not been made by noble Lords and it would be damaging to amend the Bill in this way. For those reasons, I oppose the amendments.

My Lords, what we have just heard is not unexpected. I understand that the Conservative Benches really want to stop everyone from coming across and making those dangerous crossings, which everyone would want to do, but it is quite surprising that we are debating how these matters will work between ourselves and France when the man holding the reins of the other half of this continent is in the next room to us, telling Members what he thinks on these matters. So I ask the Minister what he has heard so far about the issue of the exchange mechanism that has been trailed in our newspapers so strongly.

Secondly, I thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee for acting as what the Minister called the “super-prop” or the “super-sub” last week when some of us were away working in the Council of Europe.

On these very particular amendments, it is my reading of the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights that these two amendments were agreed unanimously by all committee members, including the Conservatives. If that is the case, it is not just simply a matter of people saying, “We want to try and stop this happening in broader terms”, but there are Conservative members who have looked very closely at this particular part of the legislation, are trying to work out what is most appropriate and have committed themselves to it, both in this House and in The other House as well.

First of all, the noble Lord, Lord Harper, raised the issue that having to prove yourself not guilty is not something we do in this country. You have to be charged, but you do not have to go into the case from the other end of it. The issue here before us is what it will capture in that state between people who might or might not be guilty of what they are being charged with.

For example, two weeks ago, I was lucky enough to go to the northern coast of France and meet all the French authorities, from the préfecture downwards right through to on the beaches. One of the things pointed out to me was a Catholic centre where people were being helped because of normal life. They were being helped with food and trying to get appropriate clothing, and they were also being given SIM cards. If the Catholic priest who was giving out the SIM cards is going to be caught by this legislation, we ought to be very careful about the words that we use.

The change is in the words “intends that” from “knows or suspects that”. Though the cases we are going to discuss later are very proper and important offences, they are really focused on the smugglers and not the smuggled, and the smugglers getting 15 years in prison, which is the maximum sentence before us, yet the only test of getting into that process is whether somebody knows or suspects that a relevant article will be used by a person in connection to an offence.

So it is not that simple to simply say there is no link between the nature of the offence and the target for it. I am rather hoping that the Minister will tell us that this is a very tricky issue, it is something in respect of human rights that has been reflected throughout our law—international law as well as the law of our own country, both put together—and in the international conventions: not just those we were a signatory to but those we signed up to and those we created, and not just the ECHR but others as well.

Will the noble Lord give way? I am listening with great care. If I can direct him back to the issue of reverse burden of proof, he will know that this is not unusual—it is not common, but it is not unprecedented. Section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 states that, if someone is found with a blade in a public place and the prosecution proves possession, the defendant must prove they had a good reason for possessing it. The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 places a reverse burden on the defendant to prove that they took all reasonable steps to avoid the offence. These things are not unusual. For such an important public safety issue, surely the noble Lord will concede that it is not unusual or unprecedented for the Government to seek to take these matters in the legislation in the way they will.

I do not think that either of the noble Lords were in the House when we put forward the same arguments about the burden of proof regarding blades and, I think I am right in saying, chemicals which could burn and disfigure, which can also be domestic—

Acid.

I thank the noble Lord— I knew there was a word for it. We do not deny that there are examples on the statute book, but we objected to them at the time.

I think the answer is related to the nature of the offence which is before us. An offence which is punishable by a 15-year maximum jail sentence is a very serious and big crime to have committed. To put it simply, the suspicion threshold is seldom applied in our criminal law because such a low threshold —the noble Lord was saying that there are examples—is a disproportionate response to where someone has not been intending to commit a crime and with such a disproportionate sense of what harm they might be doing. The balance between the nature of the offence and the nature of the judgment which creates that offence is what is disproportionate.

In this discussion about reverse burden of proof, something is being missed here, which is why the knife example the noble Lord gave was not a good one. There are two parts to the test in Clause 13, which is that you have to have supplied the article but also have to know or suspect the use to which it is going to be put. So it is not just enough for somebody to show that you did the thing; the prosecution has to prove that you knew or suspected something as well. So that is not a good example, and therefore it does not flip the burden of proof around. It still lies with the prosecution.

I did not use the example of a knife. I can refer the Member to the Hansard of the previous day in Committee, which I have already apologised for not being at it because I was working with colleagues on immigration matters in another parliament at which this Parliament is represented. It would be unwise to try and deal with arguments that we had last week, of which I was not a part, but I simply say that the relationship between the offence in this case and the threshold which is being put before it is not significant. I suspect that we will treat and think about this throughout the course of the debate on the whole Bill today when we relate ourselves to the fact that this is meant to be aimed at the smugglers.

One of the things in common to all the people on the north coast of France, who represent so many different parts of the structure that is trying to stop the people taking these dangerous routes, was that they were concentrating on the smugglers. Everything was determined in terms of how they could get at the smugglers, and protecting human life and being humane in what they do as well.

The challenge in the Bill as we go through, and to the Minister, who I hope will give me a hopeful reply on what the man in the next room is saying, is the fact that this is a distinction between making very powerful offences for challenging those who are guilty of this horrible crime of taking people in terrible conditions on what are very dangerous routes indeed.

I have just one final point about the messages which smugglers send to the people who are going to be smuggled. I am sure they will not be saying, “You’d better be careful: the British are changing their Laws in these directions”. As we were told by those who intercept their telephones in France, it is much more about where they should go and what they should avoid going to, what they should avoid doing and what they should do in terms of getting their journey. That is really the whole challenge from the smugglers. I welcome the response from the JCHR on the reason why, unanimously, it posed and passed these resolutions.

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, I am grateful that he ended on that note, because I just want, for the sake of the record, to say that although paragraphs 1 to 52 were agreed unanimously, the entire report was not—two members voted against and one abstained—but it was a very thorough report, conducted, I might say, on all sides with a great deal of diligence and thoroughness. All my colleagues participated in that in a robust way, as the noble Lord might imagine.

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed. Just, I hope, to bring a little clarity to the latter discussion between my noble friend Lord Harper and the noble Lord, Lord German, as I read it, Clause 13, “Supplying articles for use in immigration crime”, sets out in its first subsection the offence, and it does so neatly separating the actus reus, the actual act—here, offering to supply a relevant article—from the mens rea, which is knowledge or suspicion. Subsection (2) goes on to state:

“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that they had a reasonable excuse”.

It was subsection (2) that we debated at length on the previous day in Committee on this Bill, and it is at that point that the burden of proof shifts to the defence to prove their defence under the subsection.

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for bringing these amendments. It has proved to be a very stimulating debate. As others have said, I have an immense amount of respect for him, given his long and distinguished career, and I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. I listened very carefully to what they both said. I have to say that I fundamentally disagree with the amendments that they have brought, however. They seek to alter the mens rea principle in Clauses 13, 14 and 16, by replacing the current standard of knowledge or suspicion with one of “intent” in the case of the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, or “belief” in the case of the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It does not seem to me to be in dispute that these amendments, if passed, would introduce a higher and more complex threshold for the mental elements of the offences, thereby raising the requirements for securing conviction and making it significantly more difficult to hold to account those involved in supplying equipment for illegal crossings and other articles used in the facilitation of unlawful entry into the United Kingdom. In doing so, they would risk creating precisely the kind of ambiguity that organised criminal gangs thrive on.

I think it is important to remind ourselves what this clause is designed to address. It is aimed at those who provide the tools that make dangerous, illegal crossings possible: those who supply forged passports, false work permits, dinghies and outboard motors that fuel the people-smuggling trade. These individuals are the logistical agents of criminal networks responsible not only for undermining the security of our borders but for endangering lives.

Let us not forget that more than 20,000 people have now crossed the channel in small boats in 2025 alone and, tragically, some have died in the attempt, fundamentally because the journeys are facilitated by those who care more about profit than human life. If we are to be serious about tackling this, we must ensure that the legal framework is as robust and usable as possible. If we replace the standard of knowledge or suspicion with intention or belief, prosecutors will be forced to demonstrate not merely that a person knew or suspected that their goods would be used for immigration crime but that they positively intended or actively believed that they would be used as such. That is a much higher bar, and one that would inevitably lead to fewer prosecutions, fewer convictions and fewer disruptions to these dangerous criminal networks.

The very thorough report from the Joint Committee said that the current standard in the Bill is a low threshold compared to, for example, intentional recklessness. We note that comparable precursor terrorism offences have a higher mental element, requiring intention to commit or assist in the commission of terrorist acts. I think this was quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Alton. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, correctly said, these terrorism offences are not precursors and so are not comparable.

The mens rea test of knowledge used in this Bill—the one that the noble Lord and the JCHR have criticised—is the same standard that is used in offences under the Immigration Act 1971, albeit about entry and not the supply of articles. Section 24B(1) of that Act states that:

“A person who … requires leave to enter the United Kingdom under this Act, and … knowingly enters the United Kingdom without such leave, commits an offence”.

The operative word here is “knowingly”. This is the same standard that is applied to the offences in Sections 24(A1), (C1), (D1) and (E1), and Sections 24A, 25 and 25A, of the Immigration Act 1971. In short, existing immigration offences all use the test of knowledge to determine the mental element of an offence. It is therefore entirely consistent for the offences in Clauses 13, 14 and 16 to use the same test.

These are not minor procedural safeguards. These are the tools that we need to dismantle the infrastructure of people smuggling. The law should be a shield for the vulnerable, not a loophole for the criminals who exploit them. We have to construct a strong legal framework, not one that is diluted and less able to protect vulnerable people as a result. My noble friend Lord Harper made the point very powerfully that this is about creating a deterrent. We need to confront this threat with a strong legal arsenal, not a weakened one. We should not be inserting language into this Bill that makes it harder to prosecute those who supply the means for deadly journeys. These are serious offences with serious consequences, and the law must reflect that seriousness. In this instance, I oppose these amendments.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for tabling their amendments. They have stimulated a discussion on important points that the Committee needs to consider. I am also grateful to noble Lords for attending this debate when such powerful alternative options are available not 200 metres away—I will use metres instead of my normal yards—where the President of the Republic is addressing both Houses of Parliament.

The noble Lord, Lord German, tempts me to discuss what the President of the Republic is currently saying. Our relationship is very strong. There are a number of issues on which we are expected to make positive statements in the next couple of days, and we are working very closely on re-intensifying our activities on the northern coast. I will allow further discussions to take place prior to any announcements from this Dispatch Box about the outcome of any discussions between the Prime Minister, the Government and the President of the Republic. I am sure that we will return to those points when the discussions have taken place in a positive framework—as they will.

I start by saying to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that I welcome the JCHR report that was published on 20 June and thank the JCHR for its work. As the noble Lord knows, I have given commitments that the Government will respond in due course. It is worth putting on the record that all measures in this Bill are considered to be compliant with the UK’s human rights obligations, including the European Convention on Human Rights, and that the Government are fully committed to human rights at home and abroad. As my Right Honourable Friend the Prime Minister has made clear, the United Kingdom is unequivocally committed to the European Convention on Human Rights. We will respond to those issues in due course, but I wanted to set that out at the beginning, because it is important and part of the framework that the noble Lord has brought forward.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for moving his Amendment. He started by giving a couple of caveats. Like him, I am a product of a council estate and proud of it, and like him, Latin passed me by at my comprehensive school—I think some people did it, but it passed me by. That does not mean that we cannot address the substance of the points that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness have made. These important issues deserve full merit and consideration.

Amendments 31 and 41, on changing the mens rea in Clauses 13 and 14 from “knows or suspects that” to “intends that, or is reckless as to whether”, follow the findings from the JCHR. Those findings have unanimous support, and we will return to them in due course. In bringing those amendments forward, the CT-style power is now more in line with the counterterror legislation, which is what the noble Lord is intending. Reasonable suspicion is the same threshold as for the offence in Sections 57 and 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000. In fact, Section 57 does not have a “reasonable excuse” defence; instead, a person must show that

“his possession of the article was not for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism”.

The Section 57 and 58 offences contain no more safeguards when compared with the offences in Clauses 13 and 14.

The mens rea of the current drafting of the Clause is designed to enable law enforcement to act earlier and faster to disrupt these criminal smuggling gangs—the very point that the noble Lord, Lord Harper, has alluded to. Day in, day out, these ruthless people smugglers put vulnerable people on boats in the channel or into the back of refrigerated lorries, not caring if they live or die. As the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, mentioned, people have died as a result. Changing the mens rea to require law enforcement to show intention or recklessness would place undue pressure on those on the front line of tackling organised immigration crime and would slow down the response to stopping these evil criminals undertaking their actions. It is right that we do whatever we can to support law enforcement in tackling these criminals at the earliest possible stages of criminality. For that reason, disappointing as I know it will be to the noble Lord, I cannot accept the amendments.

Amendments 32, 42 and 53 seek to change the mens rea for these offences from suspicion to belief. For the supplying and handling of articles and collection of information offences, amending this threshold would significantly raise the bar for enforcement. That is a point made by His Majesty’s Opposition front bench, along with the noble Lords, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, Lord Harper and Lord Green of Deddington. I find myself on occasion in company that I am not normally in, but it is right that, if noble Lords are right and make a sensible case, that support is welcome—as it is on this occasion.

A “suspicion” threshold allows for earlier, preventive action, which is a core feature of the legislation. It is designed to enable authorities to disrupt organised crime at the preparatory stage, while still requiring a proper investigation into an individual’s activity, and not in any way damaging a defence’s ability to put up a defence to the prosecution’s case in due course. The shift from suspicion to belief would narrow the scope of these clauses, undermine their preventive purpose, reduce the chance of successful prosecutions and place a greater strain on investigative resources in the first place.

It is important to note that the “knows or suspects” threshold is not novel. It is well established in UK criminal law, especially in regimes aimed at early Intervention. For example, under Section 330 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, professionals commit an offence if they

“know or suspect that another person is engaged in money laundering” and fail to make a disclosure.

Similarly, Section 19 of the Terrorism Act 2000 criminalises failure to disclose information where someone “believes or suspects” it might be useful to prevent terrorism. In both the Proceeds of Crime Act and the anti-terror legislation, the mental thresholds are designed to trigger preventive action and have been consistently upheld in the courts as proportionate and compatible with Article 6 and Article 7 of the ECHR. I go back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Harper, mentioned: namely, that the offences in the Bill serve a preventive purpose. They are not about punishing people after harm has occurred but are instead about stopping harm happening at all.

I will also speak to the concerns that the current offences might criminalise those who are acting innocently or for humanitarian reasons. Each of the relevant clauses includes the reasonable excuse defence, which is non-exhaustive and allows courts to consider the full context of the person’s action. Any good defence would bring forward those defences if, again, the thresholds were passed by the police and the CPS for bringing prosecutions under any legislation that was ultimately passed by both Houses.

This is a very well-recognised safeguard in UK law. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, raised from the Opposition Front Bench on the first day in Committee that there is comparable UK legislation whereby the burden of proof lies on the accused—for example the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, where there can be a burden on the accused to prove a reasonable excuse for why they had a controlled drug in their possession. This is also the case in the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, which I served on when in the House of Commons, and, similarly, the Companies Act 2006, which requires an accused director to prove that all reasonable steps have been taken to avoid committing an offence.

I happen to think—and I think there is a common theme on many sides of this Chamber—that the courts are well equipped to assess whether someone had a legitimate reason for their actions. In practice, the burden on the defendant is only to raise an evidential basis for the excuse; it is then for the prosecution to disprove it. That is what prosecutions are about: they face defences, they have to prove that those defences are wrong, and they have to prove their case.

I will take the Minister back to the reasonable excuse in Clause 13(3). I am sure he has a view on why the wording is quite open ended. It says:

“The cases in which a person has a reasonable excuse for the purposes of subsection (2) include”— these are the key words—

“(but are not limited to) those in which”,

et cetera, including that the organisation

“does not charge for its services”.

Without being too irreverent about this, Albanian people traffickers do not give you a standing order or a direct debit. There might be another way that a payment can be made, but that whole subsection is pretty open ended. Does he have any views on whether it might potentially be misused and abused if it remains as it is?

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, would expect me to defend the Bill. We have taken judgments on the legislation and taken legal advice internally in the Home Office, and we think that that is a reasonable legislative framework for the operations that we are discussing. We will discuss in later clauses the scrapping of the Rwanda Act and that preventive deterrent, but the whole purpose of the Bill is to provide some measures of deterrence and of punishment for offences that aid and assist the dangerous illegal crossings for individuals who, in being trafficked, face very serious injury or potential death.

I want to be clear that these powers are not designed for indiscriminate use. Investigations under these provisions will be intelligence-led and focused on enforcement activity on serious organised crime gangs and their enablers, not on the migrants fleeing persecution or those acting with humanitarian motives. I am not giving the Committee theoretical reassurances: these are reflected in how this will operate. The forces trying to stop the criminal gangs will use any legislation that this House passes to ensure that we act as a deterrent but also, therefore, target those individuals who have committed offences under this legislation. They will have the potential to put forward a defence; the prosecution will therefore have the potential to chop that defence to bits and prove that the actions were malicious, as under the legislation before us.

In summary, these clauses contain strong safeguards, including a list of non-exhaustive reasonable excuses, to protect those acting legitimately and in good faith. These safeguards combine with the investigatory discretion that is at the heart of the police’s focus on the real potential criminals in this process, and with the prosecutions that are taken through the CPS and the prosecutions test for charging decisions to be made. Therefore, in my view, the enforcement is targeted, fair and proportionate.

I hope noble Lords will reflect on those points as we continue our scrutiny of the Bill. I urge the noble Lord and the noble Baroness to reflect on what I have said and to consider whether I have convinced them. That is a matter for them to consider in due course, but at the moment I cannot accept their amendments. I assure the noble Lord that the report he has produced will be examined and we will give a full response in due course. I urge him to withdraw the Amendment.

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the Minister for the way in which he has dealt with this group of amendments and for the thorough response he has given to your Lordships in Committee this afternoon. For the avoidance of doubt, I reiterate that the Joint Committee on Human Rights welcomes the overall aims of the Bill—to deter organised crime and prevent the loss of life at sea. It is right that the Government do all they can to ensure there is a legislative framework in place to help eradicate this dangerous criminality. All of us who have spoken in the debate today are agreed about that.

The issue comes down to one of judgment about whether it is preventive, whether it is a deterrent and whether it will really make any difference to those who will anyway try to break these Laws. Are we doing the right things to combat this criminality? I do not know all the answers to that any more than the Joint Committee on Human Rights does, but I am grateful for what the Minister said about the importance of the report the committee produced and many of the questions we have rightly raised.

In parentheses, I am glad that organisations such as Liberty take these issues as seriously as they do. They gave very valuable evidence to the committee during its inquiry. You do not have to always agree with the positions of NGOs or groups to know that they are part of the civic response to issues of this kind. We are very fortunate to have such organisations in our country.

My Lords, if the noble Lord would give way on a point of agreement, I would be grateful to him. To be clear, I am also grateful that organisations such as Liberty exist and that they have views on things—I just do not agree with them. I too am very grateful that we live in a country where such organisations exist and have contrary views. On that point, we are in complete agreement.

I was about to say that I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harper, for the other points he made but, yes, we are agreed about that too. I thank his noble friend, the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, and, on the front bench, the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for the way in which they put their arguments this afternoon. I was not surprised by those arguments, which were put quite eloquently in our committee, incidentally, as some here will almost certainly remember, by the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, who was of course a Minister in the last Government. We can disagree about these things without having to fall out over it.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Green. We do not agree about many of these questions, but we know there is a public conviction that wants something done about illegality. That is why I argue for safe and legal routes, which my noble friend and I disagree on. We have to find other ways forward of tackling the root cause. I can sound like a broken record about this, but there are 122 million displaced people in the world today and that has doubled in the last decade. If we do not deal with the root causes, we will go on introducing Bills such as this indefinitely, ad nauseam, and will still not get to the root of dealing with the problem.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, presented the arguments perfectly as she always does. I strongly agree with her remark that we are taking these actions on slight or no evidence. She said that it does not require much for a prosecution. We must not emasculate our Laws or commitments to things such as the refugee convention to try to tackle something we all know needs to be tackled; it is a question of striking the right balance.

I have listened to what the Minister has said in Committee this afternoon. He is right that we should all reflect on this. I look forward to seeing what he has to say to the Joint Committee when he publishes his response. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment 31 withdrawn.

Amendment 32 not moved.