Lord Blencathra:

Moved by Lord Blencathra

11A: After subsection (3) insert—“(3A) The consultation paper under subsection (3) must assess the implications of securing a democratic mandate for the House of Lords for its powers and conventions, which may include—(a) the powers of the Lords in relation to money bills;(b) the powers of the Lords in relation to statutory instruments;(c) the Salisbury Convention;(d) the Prime Minister being drawn from the House of Commons;(e) the limitations in the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 on the powers of the House of Lords;(f) the role of the Lord Speaker and their relationship with the Speaker in the House of Commons.”

My Lords, Amendments 11A and 11B would amend the Lib Dem Amendment 11 to say that we should first consult on the role of the Lords, if it were elected, and have a referendum to see whether the public actually wanted an elected Lords.

Let me reassure my noble friends that I am completely opposed to having a consultation paper on this, and to having a referendum. My amendments are a response to the usual deliberate attempts to advance the case for an elected House without first working out how the whole balance of powers between the Lords and the Commons would change if this House were composed of elected Members.

My Amendment 11A seeks to deliver what the Government Chief Whip, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said to the House magazine on 13 July 2021. He said:

“We have to be very clear, what are the powers of the Lords, what do you want the Lords to actually do, and why is it there? Answer those issues, and then we can decide”.

Those were very wise words from the noble Lord. Even the commission chaired by my noble friend Lord Wakeham avoided this by suggesting just 150 elected Peers, so that their membership was so small in comparison to appointed Peers or hereditaries that the supremacy of the Commons would not be challenged.

Then we had the ludicrous Gordon Brown proposals suggesting an assembly of just 200 elected Members from the regions, with our current powers reduced and the Lords just a regional talking shop. I can do no better than quote the words of our new noble ambassador to Washington, who described the Brown proposals as

“a sort of multi-layered cake with an assortment of very diverse ingredients in it with a thin layer of icing at the top, which is called a new second chamber of the regions and nations, which has barely been put in the oven yet, let alone fully baked”.

Thank you, Mandy. So it is raw, not even half-baked—but that is Lib Dem policy for you.

There was one report which suggested 450 elected Members, but most suggest just 300 elected Lords senators. Thus, we would have an elected Lords with about half the number of Lords senators as MPs. Before looking at the new roles of the two elected Chambers, we need to consider who those new senators would be. First, they will all be party-political people—Conservative, Labour, Lib Dem, SNP, Northern Ireland Members—exactly the same as the House of Commons. Just look round this Chamber and see how many here would be selected as candidates. Will the Cross-Benchers form a party? Possibly, but highly unlikely, so we would lose all that expertise. What about the older hands here, those who have had 30 or 40 years’ experience in their various professions, business or industry? Will they apply or be selected as political candidates? Even we older politicians, who have the scars and experience of doing things in government in the past—we will be out too.

I have always predicted that in 10 to 15 years’ time, a bunch of new MPs with no institutional memory will say, “Let’s invade Afghanistan and sort out the Taliban. What could possibly go wrong?” The greatest error in politics is no institutional memory.

Those likely to offer themselves for election and be selected by political parties will be the same sort of young political animals some of us may have been in the past. Some will be using it as a stepping stone to the Commons, and others will have failed to get into the Commons. Those 300 full-time political animals will, more than anything else, change what this House does and how it interacts with the Commons.

How many of us, as new Members of the Commons, had a clue about the Lords’ powers and conventions? Newly elected Lords senators will not know, nor have any regard for, the conventions I have listed in my Amendment 11A. Let us imagine that we are one of these new male or female young Turk senators with an electorate and a majority twice the size of MPs’, and therefore with twice the moral authority to legislate. If our constituents write to us asking us to vote against the national insurance increase, we say, “We agree entirely, but we can’t vote on that because there’s a convention that we don’t vote on money Bills”. If they want us to amend or vote down a statutory instrument, again we say, “While we are not permitted to amend it, we could vote it down, but the Commons will not like it”. The last time that happened, my noble friend Lord Strathclyde was called in to write a report on the constitutional crisis that that created. That is another convention up with which elected senators will not put.

How long will our self-imposed restrictions last when our constituents say that a newly elected Lord is just a waste of space if we will not vote on the things that matter to them? Why would democratically elected Lords senators accept the 1911 and 1949 limitations on stopping legislation for just one year? They would demand equal powers to the Commons to vote down a Bill, and could and would hold up legislation until they got that power.

Then we have the Salisbury convention, which both parties, sometimes reluctantly, adhere to. If the elections to both Houses were on the same day, there might be a possibility that the majority party forming a Government in the Commons might also have a majority in the Lords. But if elections were at different times, as Gordon Brown proposed, there could be a majority of elected politicians in the Lords opposed to those in the Commons. If there were a regional PR system, it is highly likely that the governing party in the Commons would never have a majority in the Lords. As we know, that does not matter as long as the Lords adheres to the Salisbury convention, as we currently do, but I suggest that a highly politically elected Lords Chamber would never endorse the Salisbury convention and we would have a US-style Senate/Congress deadlock.

If we are democratically elected Lords senators, why should the Prime Minister come from the Commons? It is only 60 years ago that Sir Alec Douglas-Home—Lord Home of the Hirsel—was Prime Minister. In the United States, 17 Presidents have come from the Senate and 19 from Congress—not that I am holding up the United States as a fine example of democracy in action at the moment. The Conservatives and Labour may make a party rule that the leader can come from only the MPs, but they would soon ditch that if polling suggested that some charismatic young Turk from this place was an election winner.

Of course, our Lord Speaker gives precedence to Mr Speaker, but that would have to change. The speaker of an elected upper House would inevitably have superior status to the Speaker of an elected lower House. The names are res ipsa loquitur. All the items in my amendment are things that fanatical advocates of an elected House deliberately do not talk about because if they are properly considered the public will reject them, as the Commons would.

My Amendment 11B calls for a referendum on whether the public want an elected House. I love the hypocrisy of the Lib Dems’ Amendment 11. It is to introduce a democratic mandate and give the public a say in who is sent to a new House of Lords. They propose consulting all political parties in both Houses, all territorial Governments, 400 local authorities and goodness knows how many organisations that are supposed to be representative of local authorities in the UK. Everyone is to be consulted, except a little group of people—48,200,000 of them—who are the electorate of the UK. They will have no say whatever on whether they want an elected House of Lords foisted on them by the great and the good, who know what is best for the plebeian herd, and we know why: because once the public get the facts, this Lib Dem proposal will face the same fate as their PR plan—soundly rejected in a referendum.

That proposal will be rejected not only for the reasons I have advanced but on cost grounds. Last year, according to the figures produced by IPSA, MPs’ salaries cost over £64 million, staff costs were over £133 million and other costs were over £34 million. The total cost for 650 Members of Parliament was £233,138,000. We can assume that elected Lords senators will have the same salaries, staffing and accommodation allowance, so at just £300 instead of £650, that will be a cost of £100 million for an elected Lords.

There is a rather nasty petition by the Electoral Reform Society, which says inter alia:

“It seems the only time the public is allowed into the House of Lords is to pay the bill. The House of Lords isn’t just an affront to voters, it’s an unacceptable burden on the public purse. Peers are able to claim £361 a day tax-free each day they attend, plus some travel costs … A smaller, fairly elected second chamber would be better for tax-payers”.

Really? That is the greatest lie from those who want to foist their unworkable ideas on us. The total cost for Peers in the House of Lords last year was a mere £22.1 million, so we are cheap at the price. Our current system is five times cheaper than any proposed new elected Lords Chamber. When the public are told that, as well as the consequences of what an elected Chamber would be—another bunch of party politicians, no different from the Commons—they would overwhelmingly vote down an elected Lords, as we should Amendment 11. I beg to move Amendment 11A.

My Lords, I have signed the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, but I really enjoyed listening to my noble friend Lord Blencathra, who raised many sensible points. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, did not quite give the case for a democratic House as much justice as it deserved. I am sorry to see that most of his Benches seem to be relatively deserted. On the whole, his party has not turned out to support him as ably as I will now try to do.

It is interesting that today we very much turn to a new phase of discussion of the Bill. Last week, we discussed the issue of heredity and whether to fling out certain Peers. I think the Committee broadly agreed, overwhelmingly, that heredity was no longer an acceptable way of choosing a House of Parliament, but there was substantial disagreement about transitionary arrangements, grandfather rights and creating life Peers. No doubt we will return to those at length when we meet again and discuss those amendments on Report.

When discussing a democratic mandate for this House, it is always worth having a look at history—what my noble friend called the institutional memory. I do not think that any of us can go back to 1911, which may not have been the first time that democracy was discussed for this House, but it is a key point because it led to a statute of Parliament which fundamentally reassessed the relationship between the two Houses.

What is important about the 1911 Act is its preamble. I will not quote it exactly, but it said that we should substitute the House of Lords for a Chamber constituted on a popular, instead of a hereditary, basis. That was in 1911 and here we are in 2025, and we are no further to getting that. In the 1920s, after the First World War and the devastation it produced, several commissions looked at the case for an elected House, which came to nothing. In the 1930s, there were other matters. In the 1940s, there was of course the Second World War.

The extraordinary Parliament in 1945, with all those radical Labour policies under Attlee, did so much. Of course, with only a few handfuls of Labour Peers, that Labour Government managed to pass everything they wanted to through this House, which goes to the nub of my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s argument that convention plays an important part in the relationship between these two Houses of Parliament. However, I am not entirely sure that my noble friend was quite so keen on those kinds of conventions existing. They were very powerful in the 1940s, and they are still powerful now.

In the 1950s, there was the introduction of the Life Peerages Act which, at a stroke, fundamentally changed how this House was viewed and injected a good deal of new blood into it. That is what has kept us going ever since. But the dream of democracy did not quite die. Lord Longford introduced a Bill in 1968. That Bill was talked out in the House of Commons by two MPs: Enoch Powell and Michael Foot. They decided that the reason there could not be a democratic mandate for the House of Lords is that it would compete with the House of Lords, and that level of competition was completely unacceptable. The noble Baroness is trying to intervene.

I only wanted to correct the noble Lord. He said that they could not have an elected second Chamber as it would compete with the House of Lords; I think he meant the House of Commons. He just misspoke—that was all.

I thank the noble Baroness for putting me right.

I just proved I was listening.

Anyway, that took us to 1998-99 and the promise in the 1997 Blairite manifesto that there would be a democratic reform. Here we are, 28 years after that, and there is no further movement at all. At the beginning of the century, there were various royal commissions and White Papers, which came up in favour of a more democratic House, but none was pushed forward. I think Prime Minister Gordon Brown had an attempt in 2009-10 at a democratic House. But it was not until the Government of my noble friend Lord Cameron that we saw the introduction into Parliament of a Bill for real democratic mandate—an 80:20 elected House—and the noble Lord, Lord Newby, explained very well what happened to that.

It is worth pointing out in this debate about the democratic mandate that the amendment I have signed is not for an 80:20 elected House; it is for a 100% elected House. That would mean that the House would lose the benefit of the Cross Benches. I think having 20% unelected is extremely important. The Cross-Benchers bring something to this House which no democratic mandate would be able to do. You just have to look at the Cross Benches for an example: former judges, trade unionists, businesspeople, churchmen, archbishops, and so on. They would never dream of standing for an election, but they bring their knowledge and experience to bear to the workings of this House and legislation, which is extremely effective. I am in favour of an 80% elected House, not a 100% elected House.

Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, made the case for a directly elected House. I wonder whether it is worth considering, and whether the noble Lord has considered, that, given the enormous changes in devolution over the last 25 years in our major cities and, of course, in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, there may be a case for looking at the capacity of this House to accept some form of indirectly elected Members, which would perhaps go to stopping what my noble friend Lord Blencathra regarded as too strong a democratic mandate that would challenge the House of Commons.

My noble friend Lord Blencathra, in his Amendment 11A, poses some genuinely important questions about how the relationship between the two Houses would work. In 2012, when we looked at this in detail before the Bill was published, we rather imagined that the powers of the House of Lords and the House of Commons would remain the same. My noble friend was kind enough to refer to a study and a report that I published and presented to the Government about secondary legislation. I have to say that, from that moment to this, it has hardly been mentioned again and has sunk without trace. That does not mean that it is not still relevant and important, and I hope that it will be taken up again.

On the question of a referendum, there was no need for a referendum in the Bill that was published in 2012. I think that, for a change of the enormity that is proposed in these amendments, and indeed by my noble friends, you probably would need to seek some sort of popular mandate—whether that is a referendum or something else, I am not sure. I think we would have to wait until then. Since the amendment suggests that the Government should come forward with some proposals over the course of the next couple of years, perhaps we will not have too long to wait.

Finally, my noble friend Lord Brady wants to reduce the House to the very small number of 200. That would fundamentally change the role of the House of Lords. It is clear that we would be unable to continue to do the kind of scrutiny work that is currently required, but I can see which way my noble friend is thinking, I think it should be taken seriously and I hope that it will be debated to an extent over the next short while.

My Lords, I have also signed the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and I am surprised and delighted to say that I agreed with every word that he said. I think that there are some real problems with the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I always enjoy his speeches, but he made an awful lot of assumptions in that speech. While it was very entertaining, I am not sure that it would hold up to close examination. Does the noble Lord want to say anything? No.

I am not against getting rid of hereditaries: I think it is a long overdue move. I am extremely fond of some of them—not all of them, but some—and they play the most incredible role in this House. Once they are gone, we will see some really big gaps in all our processes, so we will miss them. However, it is time. It is something that is way past its sell-by date. Quite honestly, my main objection to the Bill is that it is so timid. Why not be braver and think seriously about the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby? Why not do something that has really forward-thinking, constructive ideas, rather than just the rather mean-minded blunt instrument of kicking out the hereditaries? I am not defending privilege; I do not like it at all, but in this case, it just seems so petty.

On the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Brady—he has not even introduced his amendment yet, but we all have views on it—I agree that 200 is too small. If I could give my own short history lesson, back in 2013 my noble friend Lady Bennett and I tabled a Bill to redraw the whole House of Lords under PR, and I think that the figure we used was 350, essentially at least reducing this House by half, because we are a bloated, undemocratic, archaic, ridiculously old-fashioned House and it is time to move on.

I am trying not to make a Second Reading speech, but I am not sure I am succeeding. The Labour Government told us they were going to modernise the House, which is fair enough. If I could see that this was the first of many alterations and many different Bills, it would sit easier with me. We have heard that everyone over 80 is going to be kicked out; I personally do not mind that, but the Government have been bringing in new Peers who are over 80; they will not have a very long shelf life. I am curious about that.

I argue that this amendment is a very good one because it covers the crucial aspect of the House being more representative. Certainly, if we had it under PR there would be a lot more Greens, which I know would be very welcome to your Lordships’ House.

Finally, in the Bill I tabled, there was an element of Cross-Benchers—I forget exactly how many, but it might have been about 100—and we can do that under a different form of election. We all agree that Cross-Benchers, hereditary or not, are extremely valuable, and so to lose their skills and expertise would be a mistake. However, I think that one of the first things this Labour Government should do is to stop the ridiculous appointment system by the Prime Minister which brings in people who love having a title but really do not love the work.

My Lords, in the interests of institutional memory, I will add a footnote to that. I was very surprised to see the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, as I know his passion for democracy in this House and the way he has pursued it in the Delegated Powers Committee. His explanation was more than welcome.

It occurs to me that in the historical palimpsest that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, offered, the one thing he omitted was the report from the Joint Committee of both Houses in 2011-12 on the coalition Bill. Had the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, served on that Joint Committee, it would have taken two weeks rather than 18 months to write our report. We would have had infinitely more fun and would have come to conclusions that were infinitely crisper and more persuasive. In that report, we took exhaustive evidence from the authors of the Bill, from Ministers, from all the usual suspects and beyond, and—I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, takes some comfort from this—we came to exactly the same conclusions as the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, has about the dysfunctional relationship that would be set up automatically with the House of Commons.

As we worked through our list of Ministers giving evidence, it became perfectly clear that none of them had asked themselves those questions about the implications it would have for the House of Commons, its legitimacy, its effectiveness and its relationship with the House of Lords. They had not considered whether there would be constituents who had competing notions of what was right or what would happen if we had different parties in command in the two Houses. It was an exhaustive review and there were differences of opinion—the chair was Lord Richard—but it was conclusive in its recommendations: the House of Commons must think again about the Bill it had been presented. It was the last time that either House looked at this issue in depth with any sophistication.

My point is simply—just as the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Strathclyde, have said—that this is a constitutional issue of massive significance. It can hardly be dealt with through an amendment to such a narrow Bill on such a narrow point and where, frankly, these amendments have no place anyway. We should be addressing the substance of the Bill. Since the issue has been raised, however, we are right to remember that we had worked out our proper views on the implications of this subject separately in 2012. I wonder what happened to that Bill: why was it ever withdrawn? Unfortunately, the Prime Minister at the time is not in his place; otherwise, we might have been able to get an answer after all these years.

My Lords, there is one assumption in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, that needs to be questioned, and that is the total identification of democracy with direct elections. There are other forms of democracy that include indirect elections. I was particularly glad to hear the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, bring this up. The debate has moved on since the time of a great standoff between those in favour of a totally elected House and those in favour of a totally appointed House. Ideas were floated by the former Prime Minister Gordon Brown, for example, about a House that truly represents the nations and the regions. You can imagine a House that was indirectly elected by the Scottish Parliament, the Senedd, the Northern Ireland Assembly and the English regions. I am not arguing for or against it at the moment; I am just questioning the assumption that the only form of democracy is direct elections. You could have a form of democracy with the indirect elections by the nations and the regions.

I have just one other small point in relation to the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. He mentioned the royal commission chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham, which I had the great privilege to be a member of. The noble Lord suggested that we had recommended that the elected element would be only a third—150, I think. But, in fact, that commission recommended a series of stages in which the elected element would grow. I think on the commission’s recommendations, it would eventually grow to a majority. It is only a small point but that is what it envisaged.

My Lords, in speaking to the amendment that stands in my name, I reassure your Lordships that I neither seek nor anticipate achieving consensus on this point but rather hope to stimulate the kind of debate and discussion that we are already starting to hear in the Chamber this afternoon.

To the noble Lord, Lord Newby, I say that my proposal of geographical constituencies would ensure the kind of geographical spread that he would like to see, possibly more effectively than a PR system would. I am not wedded to a membership of 200, although I think it is reasonable for the House to be smaller, and I suspect it could be a lot smaller.

Unsurprisingly, I agree with a great deal of what my noble friend Lord Blencathra had to say. Perhaps my concern comes down to his central point, which I think we usually fail to address and tackle sufficiently in this discussion: this House does a very limited and specific job and does it very well. The point I made at Second Reading is that the hereditaries are actually at the forefront of that and, on average, contribute more than life Peers do. But given that the Government are determined to change the composition of a House that works so well in that limited and specific function, should we not take a moment to reflect on wider questions, not just how the House should be composed but whether our function should be so tightly confined?

We might also pause to reflect for a moment on what the public think of this House. I note from a YouGov poll just a few months ago that 42% of the public have a negative view of the House of Lords and 49% think it is not useful. By a margin of 62% to 16%, there is support for having no hereditaries. But, also, interestingly, 50% of the public, compared with 22%, say that they oppose a wholly appointed Chamber.

We are moving the composition of the House—I have no doubt that the Bill will become an Act—but we are moving to something that is already disliked and disapproved of by the wider public, and to something that possibly has even less legitimacy than a House of Lords comprising jointly life Peers and elected hereditaries. The justification for the current composition, or indeed for moving to a wholly appointed House, is circular and, in many ways, peculiar. It is deemed essential that the House should lack legitimacy and that its composition should be hard to defend, precisely and deliberately to ensure the primacy of a House of Commons that does have legitimacy, derived from elections.

Having spent 27 years in the elected House—which I found to be very largely controlled by the Executive, and in which the majority of Members are either Ministers or shadow Ministers or are seeking, often very hard, to become Ministers or shadow Ministers—I saw that patronage exerts huge control. My amendment seeks to probe the question of whether the Commons should and could benefit from more challenge, and whether Governments could benefit from a greater capacity for Parliament to hold them to account. Crucially, it would avoid the danger of moving to an elected House chosen in a way that increases the power of Prime Ministers, such as PR systems using a party list, which might lead to even more power of patronage in our Parliament. My purpose, fundamentally, is simply to ask noble Lords to reflect on the question of whether the House of Commons does its job well enough to have earned the absolute assumption that it should have primacy in our Parliament.

I close with a quote from Tom Paine’s book Common Sense. He said that

“a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being right”.

I fear that in this matter, with the assumption—always unchallenged—that the other House should have primacy, we are falling into Tom Paine’s trap.

My Lords, I support Amendment 11 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, my noble friend Lord Strathclyde and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb.

As I have said in earlier debates, the 1999 agreement always envisaged that the House would, as stage 2 of that agreement, adopt proposals for introducing elected Members to the House of Lords. However, I am not sure that all were firmly agreed that the elected Members should be directly elected. I believe that some kind of indirect election system—perhaps one representing the new estates of the realm, such as the CBI, the TUC, the BMA, the Bar Association, et cetera—should also be considered as an alternative way to introduce a more democratic and representative element of the House’s composition. The difficulty would be in agreeing which organisations should be entitled to select or elect representatives, but the possibility should certainly be explored. An alternative way to select indirectly elected Members of your Lordships’ House might be by granting election or selection powers to devolved legislatures and principal councils.

After the Second World War, and under pressure from the American occupation forces, the Japanese Government introduced constitutional changes that replaced the House of Peers with the directly elected House of Councillors, to which elections from large multimember constituencies are held. This introduced an element of proportional representation. Japan has two elected houses and, while they sometimes clash, the new upper house’s powers are restricted in a similar fashion to those of its predecessor House of Peers, and so it more or less works most of the time. I am not supporting moving directly to an all-elected, alternative second Chamber, but the Japanese example should be closely looked at.

Although I support the outcome that could flow from this amendment, it is wrong to make changes to the membership of the House before shaking the sand out of the shoe. To let the Bill go through with this amendment alone will not guarantee that it would definitely lead to any enactment of a Bill laid before your Lordships’ House and another place.

It is clear that the 1999 agreement was that the 92 hereditary Peers would remain until the enactment of proposals incorporating a democratic element. Nevertheless, I will support this amendment, but I believe the House should also adopt something similar to Amendment 6, as previously debated. I will support my noble friend Lord Lucas if he brings back on Report an amendment that would retain an elected and independent element within your Lordships’ House, which would keep the sand in the shoe. A combination of Amendment 6 and this amendment could well be developed to a level where a programme of change would enjoy a broad level of support across your Lordships’ House.

I also support Amendments 11A and 11B in the name of my noble friend Lord Blencathra, both of which seek to ensure that referenda will be held to make certain that proposals for an elected House really would be enacted with popular support. As my noble friend Lord Strathclyde said, some sort of popular support should be sought in making a constitutional change of this nature.

I cannot support Amendment 70 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, and the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, because a review would most probably conclude that a House composed of only appointed Peers and Bishops would lack appropriateness—that is an understatement. Such a review would just be kicked into the long grass.

I like Amendment 72, but I think that the 92—or 88—should remain until the end of the Session prior to the new House being convened, following an election under a new electoral model.

I am not sure about Amendment 90D in the name of my noble friend Lord Brady, although I agree with much of what he said in his most thought-provoking speech. Clearly, a House comprising only 200 Members would have no room for people retaining activities outside the House and would lack the capacity to scrutinise legislation as it does at present, or to operate the number of Select Committees it does today. It would be a very different kind of House. However, I am certainly attracted by my noble friend’s proposal that elections should be held one year later than general elections. That should be considered as a part of any move to a partly elected House.

Lastly, Amendment 115 makes sense. The Bill should not be enacted without the adoption of at least a partial democratic mandate at the same time.

My Lords, I thoroughly support Amendment 11. People have tried picking holes in it, but it does not say that all have to be elected. It says:

“introducing directly elected members in the House of Lords”.

The proposals, which would be thought through and brought with a Bill within 18 months, could contain all sorts of different proposals, which I know everyone wants to debate in a moment. I will leave that to everybody else because there are some very good ideas in there.

The whole point about Amendment 11 is that it gives voice to that promise of Privy Council oath, given from the two Front Benches, that there would be further democratic reform of the House of Lords. That is what Amendment 11 states, and it puts a time limit on it. Therefore, the Secretary of State has to do something about it, not just kick it into the long grass. We will not be here, but those who follow us will be here to see proper further reform of the Lords, introducing a democratic bit to it. As I said before, without that democratic element, it will eventually have all its powers removed because it will have no democratic legitimacy.

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Brady spoke very eloquently, but he did not refer to his Amendment 90C:

“A person can only be a member of the House of Lords if they are not a Minister of the Crown”.

I do not know why he did not refer to that, but it is a very bad idea.

One of the most striking features of politics in the more than 50 years since I was elected to the House of Commons is that as the diversity in gender and ethnicity has widened—which is a good thing—the diversity of life experience has narrowed considerably. When I was first elected to the House of Commons, there were people who had a lot of business experience, people who had been active in trade unions—

My Lords, the amendment that the noble Lord is speaking to is actually in group 18, whereas we are starting with group 1. We will debate Amendment 90C later.

Then I will move to the other amendment which I wish to speak to and take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Newby.

Democracy is the central feature of our governing system, and the House of Commons must always be the superior House. However, precisely because MPs’ experience has narrowed to the extent that it has, we have seen that the House of Commons has given up on its scrutiny function over time. When I was first elected, guillotines were very rare. They are now very common. Bills come up to this House that have barely been scrutinised.

My question to the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and those who support his amendment, is: would an elected House be interested in the scrutiny function? The House of Commons has its representative functions. It does a great deal of useful work in different areas, but in terms of scrutiny it has rather given up the ghost. That has been left increasingly to the House of Lords. That is not a desirable situation, but it is the situation that exists. Would an elected House have the interest in scrutiny that we need? If we did not have scrutiny in the second Chamber, we would not have enough scrutiny at all.

It would be wise to consider that a democratically elected second Chamber is not the only way forward. It may well be better to look at some alternatives and at the function first rather than the form. At the moment, we are all talking about the composition and the form of the House but not its function. If one looks at the function of the House, what system of election, selection, appointment—whatever—would be most appropriate?

My Lords, no doubt there are two different ways of furthering a democratic mandate for the House of Lords. One is, as we have heard, through a directly elected House, maybe following a referendum on that principle, as advocated by my noble friend Lord Blencathra in Amendment 11B, and perhaps including a partially or fully directly elected House of 200 Peers with constituencies, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Brady of Altrincham in his Amendment 90D.

The other solution is advocated in a later amendment, Amendment 75, to which the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth, and my noble friend Lord Trenchard have already referred. This is through an electoral college, representative of all parts of the United Kingdom and responsible for indirectly electing two-thirds, or 400, political and temporal Members of a reformed House of 600, where one-third, or 200, Members are non-political Cross-Benchers directly appointed by a statutory appointments commission.

It can be strongly argued that this is a much better formula for three reasons. First, it avoids conflict with another place, which direct elections to a reformed House of Lords would lead to, as my noble friend Lord Blencathra eloquently pointed out. Secondly, it is far more likely to preserve our current high standard of legislative and government scrutiny. Thus, thirdly, through this quality function, to which my noble friend Lord Tugendhat has just referred, it would thereby be better in preserving and improving democracy itself in the United Kingdom.

My Lords, my Amendments 70 and 72 are included in this group. On recent comments relating to the function of the House, I tried to table some amendments about the function of the House but it is out of the scope of this Bill, so it is not part of what we can debate.

Amendment 70 calls on His Majesty’s Government to review the appropriateness of an unelected Chamber. While I am a Member of this place, it is my mission to see this House abolished and replaced with an elected Chamber that better represents the needs, diversity, backgrounds and lived experiences of people across all four nations. As the late Earl of Sandwich pointed out in his valedictory speech, I will do my duty right up to abolition. My position on an unelected Chamber has been clear from my maiden speech in this place right up to today. An unelected Chamber is inappropriate, outdated and obviously undemocratic. Why is it that the UK promotes democracy at home and abroad, yet fails miserably in ensuring that our own nations are governed by a democratic mandate? With record low levels of trust in politics and a Government who have pledged to restore public confidence in the political system, surely now is the time to radically transform this place.

A recent poll by the Electoral Reform Society found that just 2% of the British public have confidence in the House of Lords. We must ask ourselves why that is. I suggest that an element of distress stems from the fact that this Chamber could not be further removed from the lives of the people we make decisions on behalf of, given that the public have no influence over who gets to become a Member of this place. In fact, the Prime Minister’s hold over appointments to this House was even challenged by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, who said on our first day in Committee on this Bill:

“I simply will not be able to get a life peerage”.—[Official Report, 3/3/25; col. 80.]

We have become a gated community of more than 800 Members, without the public having a say in who those Members are. Democracy is built on the principle that people get to choose; they have a say in how their lives are governed. It seems contradictory that a body with no direct mandate from the electorate should have influence over matters that deeply affect people’s day-to-day lives.

Will the noble Baroness give way?

As we are in Committee, we will all have the opportunity to contribute.

An unelected Chamber is, at best, an assault on democracy. I ask your Lordships to reflect on whether an unelected Chamber is appropriate in 2025. Amendment 70 calls on His Majesty’s Government to do just that. The Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, has himself previously stated that it is indefensible. It is time for His Majesty’s Government to act.

I now move to my second amendment in this group—

Before the noble Baroness moves to her second amendment—

As we are in Committee, if possible, I will complete my remarks.

Amendment 72 fleshes out how we could have an elected Chamber. There are currently 78 bicameral parliaments globally, with 55 of those being largely or wholly elected. We are an exception to that rule. The UK has one of only two second Chambers without any elected element, the other being Lesotho.

Another poll by the Electoral Reform Society found that an elected second Chamber was the most popular option, with 47% of the British public saying that they should have the power to choose through elections. Does this figure not clearly highlight the public’s desire to see a second Chamber that reflects their needs and values? We are not here to serve our own interests; we are here to represent the people across our nations. If we believe that, which I hope everyone here does, we have no problem in accepting and indeed promoting the abolition of an unelected Chamber in today’s world.

It has been reassuring to see several Members of your Lordships’ House tabling amendments to probe the establishment of a democratic House. I will briefly speak to these amendments before moving on to my own proposal on how we might want to achieve this through Amendment 72. Amendments 11 and 115, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, function as good starting points for reforming the composition of this House, which I support. However, I do not believe that they go far enough in outlining the model that might bring about a Chamber that best represents the people of these nations. However, they have my support in progressing and securing a move to a democratic mandate for this House.

Amendment 72 seeks to address these gaps and offers a further fleshed-out solution. Plaid Cymru believes that proportional representation should be the mechanism used to elect representatives. Specifically, we favour the single transferable vote electoral system. This system allows voters to have a real choice on who represents them by reducing the pressure to vote tactically. I believe this system would establish a second Chamber that is truly elected by the people, creating a balanced Chamber where everyone is represented.

Adopting this system also results in a greater diversity of candidates, with multiple candidates selected by a party. That a second Chamber in the UK desperately needs more diversity if we are to see a more representative legislative body cannot be disputed. This is not wishful thinking; far from it. Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Malta and Scotland already use this system in some of their elections, and noble Lords noted other examples earlier.

Australia’s second Chamber also adopts this system, and it works. This has ensured that the Government are much less likely to control the Senate, meaning that the Senate is not always swayed by changing political tides, and the Chamber more accurately reflects the first voting preference of the electorate.

While I firmly believe that STV would be the preferable choice, there are multiple ways it could be implemented. Neither my own amendment nor the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, specify it being 100% elected; there could be space for a Cross-Bench group to be represented as part of that model. It is crucial to consult a broad range of stakeholders to ensure that such a constitutional change follows a fully democratic process. That is why, in new subsection (2) proposed by Amendment 72, I have specified that the Secretary of State must consult various bodies, including devolved Governments, political parties and representative organisations.

If we are to establish a Chamber that generally serves the people of these nations, constitutional decisions must not be confined to the remit of Westminster alone. I call on His Majesty’s Government, as well as everyone in this place, to reconsider the appropriateness of an unelected Chamber in the 21st century and join me in my mission for abolition.

Before the noble Baroness sits down—

I apologise, my Lords. I think it might help everybody if I confirm the normal courtesies of the House. This is a debate and Members can take interventions, but they can also choose not to; that is in section 4.29 of the Companion.

The noble Baroness made a very passionate speech in favour of democratic accountability. Why then did she not stand for the House of Commons instead of coming here?

My Lords, I do not think the noble Baroness wishes to answer the noble Lord’s question, and she has every right to do that.

I rise very briefly to support my noble friend Lord Newby. This is a very straightforward and simple amendment that seeks to place a duty on the Government to do something after this Bill has passed.

Some of us have spent a great deal of time on Lords reform. I started in this place just under 30 years ago and had 27 years between the two places, and one of the things I have observed in that time is that chances to do something to reform this place do not come along too often, and legislation comes along very rarely.

I greatly enjoyed the eloquence and oratory of the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, although I have to say that he has once again convinced me that the more eloquent he is, the more incorrect his arguments are. I very much appreciated the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, with grace and gentleness, rebutted them.

The key point in all that—I am desperately trying not to give a history lesson—is that, when we did the draft Joint Committee of both Houses in 2011-2012, so ably chaired by the late Lord Richards, we came to a compromise position that addressed every single one of the points the noble Lord put forward, and they went into the draft Bill that went before the Commons. That Bill had a Second Reading and, had it had not been for a slightly sneaky operation by Jesse Norman on the programme Motion, it would have gone through and been discussed by both Houses.

So I support my noble friend simply because there needs to be reform. There needs to be reform because we need more legitimacy. In 1832, we were powerful and the Commons was not. From 1832 onwards, the power has moved to the Commons. We now need to regain some legitimacy so that we can again be a powerful part of a Parliament that holds the Executive to account. In asking for this amendment, my noble friend is simply saying, “Let’s hold our feet to the fire and get it done”.

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, on the eloquence of her speech. But she put forward a point of view about this House that I think is mistaken when she said that it is supposed to be representative of the people. It absolutely is not and it never has been. It has other purposes, for better or for worse, and we all sit here as representatives of nobody but ourselves. That is particularly true of Cross Benchers and the non-affiliated, but actually it is true of all party Members as well, and there are important reasons for that. We are well placed to bring to bear on the proceedings of Parliament as a whole a disinterested point of view, in the proper sense of “disinterested”: in other words, not representing an interest but trying to think as hard as we can about what is right.

The speech by the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, was very important here, because, if we think about the function of this House, we may come to realise that its current composition is not so idiotic. Its function is to scrutinise, and the type of people that want to scrutinise are not the type of people who want to get on in life. The people who want to get on in life are those in the other place who are, as was eloquently pointed out by the noble Lord and others, trying to get the next position, higher marks on social media, more likes and jobs. Most of us have gone beyond that stage of life. That is obviously not true of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, because she is very young, but she disinterestedly and kindly sits here in order to contribute her wisdom.

The trouble with the Bill is that we are not thinking about function but droning on about composition. As long as we think that it is a good thing to have a powerful House of Commons that forms most of the Government of the day, it is perfectly reasonable to have a not-very-strong House of Lords that tries to scrutinise. If we think that that is perfectly reasonable, we might consider that perhaps we should not be mucking around with our composition.

My Lords, we have already spent more than an hour on this and I do not intend to prolong that for more than two or three minutes. However, I am getting a bit alarmed by the breadth of the discussion we are having.

I remind the House—maybe the Procedure Committee needs to look at this—that the Bill is the House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill. From looking at the amendments, of which this is a particularly bad example, not in the quality of the argument but in the dangers it presents for anyone looking for Lords reform in the future, we can apparently have absolutely any amendment whatever so long as it conceivably, by some long-stretched argument, has some effect on the future composition of the Lords.

A lot of people have been saying that we need to do more things once this Bill has become an Act, but, my word, I have been very much put off thinking that is a good idea having listened to today’s debate, because any one of the other issues—whether it is the age of retirement, the length of service, or the number of Bishops, for example— could apparently lead to precisely the same kind of debate that we have had today on amendments to this Bill. I have to say—and probably anyone could say it about me—that it is very unusual that you hear any new arguments in these debates, of which we have had many in the past.

If I were advising the Government, which I am not, and they were thinking of bringing in a narrow Bill—let us say about an age limit or the Bishops; I do not think they will, but if they did—I tell them not to, because it would lay itself open to a whole series of amendments just as we are seeing here today on a very narrow Bill. I am baffled as to why the House authorities here and in the Commons thought that it was absolutely in order to have this kind of huge debate on a very narrow proposition. At the very least—I know that the horse has bolted and that we are having these discussions now—I hope that the Procedure Committee will look at this, because it will be a massive deterrent to any future very narrow debate on a Bill relating to this House, let alone a Bill of the scope of that of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, which would take most of our lifetimes to discuss. That is my simple proposition: please let us get over all this stuff that is not directly related to the Bill. Perhaps the Procedure Committee should have a look at it.

My Lords, my first point in response to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, is that the Bill will pass—the noble Lord does not need to worry about that. Secondly, simple constitutional changes can have very serious consequences. We have only to think about a simple change that my noble friend Lord Cameron introduced, the Fixed-term Parliaments Act, which created a disaster.

I think it would be helpful to the Committee if the noble Lord, Lord Newby, could tell us what he thinks the role of the House of Lords is now, and what he thinks it will be in the future. My noble friend Lord Blencathra touched on that. The noble Baroness said that there was mistrust from the public, and I think that arises largely from extremely misleading reporting in the media, which little is done to counter. I would ask the same question about the role of the House of Lords of the Leader of the House, but I expect she would be quite cautious, especially as regards the future. I remind the House that I intend to retire in the spring, so I am fairly neutral.

Many noble Lords—and others inside and outside the House—fall into the trap of proposing to alter the composition of the House of Lords without first considering its role, both now and in the future. I thought that the Labour Government had already studied this matter carefully by means of the Wakeham commission, to which the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, and other noble Lords referred. There is a solution very carefully worked out by my noble friend Lord Wakeham and his commission.

I have always believed that the role of the House of Lords is to revise legislation—and I mean revise, not just scrutinise. In the last Parliament, the House revised the Rwanda Bill: it did not merely scrutinise it. It should be an additional check on the Executive but not determine who the Prime Minister is or financial matters. Most importantly, it should be a source of expertise.

The noble Lord, Lord Newby, pointed out that we have a difficulty in that we are hideously London-centric, but getting rid of the hereditary Peers who are chained to their castles and estates up and down the country will make the situation worse, and it is not clear to me how being elected, either in whole or in part, will make us any better at performing our role—a point touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Moore. Of course, it may make us much less willing to give way to the elected House. Many advocates of an elected House suggest that we would be more effective and legitimate if elected. I suggest that being elected can be a disadvantage. For instance, about two years ago, I was dealing with a problem with a high street bank debanking a business in the wider defence industry—noble Lords will recall that recently the Secretary of State for Defence was forcefully raising this issue in public. I needed to have a meeting with senior executives of the bank in circumstances where a Member of another place would be blanked by the bank; they would get nowhere. Why was I able to secure the meeting and then understand what the problem was? The answer is that the bank trusted me. It could be sure that I was not getting involved in order to burnish my local credentials, my media profile or anything else.

I have a question for noble Lords proposing a change to the role of the House or introducing an elected element. In their proposed reformed House, would it be intended that the Government of the day could still easily be defeated? If it was, surely the House would claim democratic credentials and be far more challenging to the House of Commons, as noble Lords have already pointed out. However, if the new House could only very rarely defeat the Government, then in the case of something such as the Rwanda Bill, surely the courts would step in to fill the vacuum.

Finally, can the Leader of the House say whether she agrees with my view of the current role of the House of Lords? I appreciate that she cannot comment about its future role, which is a much more difficult question. When in the 2010 Parliament the Conservative-led Government tried to reform the House, I gleefully went around my friends in the House of Commons saying that I was looking forward to being Senator Attlee of South Hampshire. They obviously got the message.

My Lords, when we debated the role of the House of Lords last November and on every occasion that we have debated the subject to which I have contributed, I have started by saying, as I say again today, that in a modern, 21st-century democracy there must be a case that the legislature should be elected. Although it puts me therefore to some extent at odds with friends of mine on different sides of the House, I have to say that I generally support, not necessarily every detail, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Newby.

If that was all I had to say, I probably would not have bothered saying it, because I think the Lord Privy Seal must have grasped that there is support for the noble Lord’s amendment from different parts of the House, and all I would be doing is adding my name to that. However, I want to go a little further into the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and point out that it is really very clever and has a lot of lot in it that should attract noble Lords, because although it sets a clear destination, it is very non-specific about the details of how we should end up and what the new House of Lords would look like in its elected form. What he is doing in his amendment instead is putting in place a process.

I think we all know what a process looks like. It has the sort of things that we find in this amendment: steps that need to be taken, in a certain order, and dates by which those steps should ideally be taken. The Lord Privy Seal seems to have some difficulty with the word “process”. She used it in Committee last week, when we talked about various matters to do with the future of this House beyond this Bill. She said that we were in a process, but the Lord Privy Seal is not actually in a process. She may think she is, but she is not, because if she were she would be able to tell us the steps, the milestones and the target dates that we find in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Newby.

The only thing we know for certain about the process in which the Labour Government are engaged—the process that so is so important not only to this House, but to anyone who takes an interest in our constitutional balance—is that her door is always open. That is the process as far as the Labour Front Bench is concerned. There is no timetable, there are no milestones and there are no commitments as to what is going to happen, in what order or when. While it is perfectly legitimate for the Lord Privy Seal to say that she does not support the process proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, it now becomes almost impossible for her, given what she has said before, both to oppose the noble Lord and to fail to come forward with a process of her own—which is what so many noble Lords in this House would like to hear. Otherwise, she will show that she is not being wholly candid with us in the way that we would hope.

The essential point about Labour’s sense of direction is that it came forward in its manifesto with a package of measures and obtained a mandate for a package of measures. Some of those measures were to be taken at an early stage—the Lord Privy Seal and I have had this argument about the weight of the full stop, and I am not going to go through that now—and at least one was going to be taken later. It was going to be a consultation involving the democratic character of the House and the representation of the nations and regions and so on. Clearly, anyone reading the Labour Party manifesto would say that that was something to be done in the latter half of the Parliament. It also explains to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, why these issues arise in what appears to be a very narrow Bill: it is because that very narrow Bill sits in a context of a manifesto commitment and a mandate which is very much broader. It cannot be separated out; those threads cannot be pulled apart without having an effect on the rest of the fabric.

I will come to a close very quickly. If I tremble to find myself in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Newby, I tremble even more to find myself in disagreement with my noble friend Lord Blencathra. While any new system or composition of the Lords is absolutely bound to require a crunching of gears as the two Chambers find a way of working together, the notion that this is impossible—that two democratic chambers cannot work together—is, as I have said before, simply belied when one looks round the rest of the democratic world, where it does work, with crunching of gears and not always ideally, and sometimes with surprises and unexpected turns of events—but of course it is possible to have two democratic chambers.

I agree with my noble friend Lord Blencathra that these matters are so weighty that there is a strong case for a referendum. I am rather more sympathetic to referendums than many people here and in the other place, and I find myself rather out on the extreme wing on this, but I certainly think there is a strong case for a referendum on the constitutional future of your Lordships’ House.

Coming back to my original point, I very much hope that the Lord Privy Seal will stop hiding behind her open door—if that is not too much of a mixed metaphor—and come out into the West Front corridor and tell us, if not in this Chamber today, if she does not like the process proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, what process she has to offer us.

My Lords, I will focus on paragraph (3) of Amendment 11, suggesting what should be in the consultation paper on methods for introducing elected Members to the House. House of Lords reform has been unfinished business now for well over a century, as emphasised in the Parliament Act 1911. I believe the Bill provides an opportunity for looking at several different ways of reform for the House: elected or appointed, or a mixture of both.

The Electoral Reform Society produced an interesting paper on an elected House in December 2023. I will first explore how other countries select members of their upper houses, to give comparison for an elected House of Lords here. The majority of second chambers choose their members by election, whether direct or indirect. The Inter-Parliamentary Union—the IPU—categorises 55 second chambers as predominantly chosen by either direct or indirect election, and only 22 as predominantly chosen by appointment. Many chambers do, however, combine a direct and/or indirect election with a small element of appointment. For instance, while the Italian Senate is nearly wholly directly elected, a handful of life seats are held by ex-officio members, formerly presidents, and up to five citizens are appointed by the President for outstanding service.

In Ireland, of the 60 members of the Senate, 43 are elected by panels representing different vocations, six are chosen by graduates of the two major universities, and 11 are nominated by the Taoiseach, creating a mix of direct and indirect election for some appointments.

In Spain, the Senate combines direct and indirect election based on different territories. The majority of senators are directly elected in multi-member constituencies based on the 50 provinces. Around a fifth are appointed by the legislatures of the autonomous communities, which are themselves elected by closed-list proportional representation—PR.

Concerns are often raised about the potential conflict arising from having two directly elected chambers. Wholly directly elected second chambers can be found in Australia, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Switzerland and the USA. Within this group are significant differences in the electoral system used, which in turn affects their composition. It is generally agreed that one party should not have a majority in both chambers. Because of this, few parliaments with direct elections for both chambers choose similar electoral systems for both chambers.

Two notable exceptions are Italy and the United States. Italy employs a similar mixed system for both the upper and the lower house, with both chambers also electing on the same day. Because of this, while there may be some differences, the party balance tends to be the same in both chambers. The United States is the only country to use a majoritarian system for both chambers. While using the same system, the two USA chambers have different compositions because of the difference in size of their constituencies and the length of term. However, with party competition forcing a two-party shape due to the nature of the electoral system, the opportunity for gridlock is high. In both Italy and the USA, similar electoral systems are also matched by similar powers.

The majority of parliaments with wholly directly elected upper chambers use different electoral systems in the lower chamber. Brazil, the Czech Republic, Poland and Switzerland have PR-elected primary chambers and use majoritarian systems for their second chambers. Australia has a majoritarian-elected lower house and a PR-elected upper house. Japan and Mexico use mixed systems for both chambers.

Using different electoral systems for both chambers tends to produce different electoral outcomes, which are also supported by arrangements such as different term lengths and staggered elections. For a wholly or partly elected second chamber, the question remains as to which system of election to use. If direct election is chosen, there are many options for the type of electoral system that could be used.

Previous suggestions for Lords reform have put forward different options, including versions of party lists and single transferable vote, STV. The STV option was recommended in the cross-party Breaking the Deadlock proposals in 2007 and the House of Lords reform draft Bill in 2011. As Liberal Democrats will know, STV is a proportional and preferential election system in which voters get to choose their choice of candidate. Constituencies are multimember, returning usually around three to five candidates per district, although constituencies can be larger, and voters can put a number to as many or as few candidates as they like. Candidates who reach the quota are elected, and any votes over and above what they need are redistributed to vote as second preferences, and so on until the places are filled.

The 2011 draft Bill selected STV to ensure that those elected have

“a personal mandate from the electorate, distinct from that of their party”.

STV is a candidate-based system, which means that independents are placed on an equal footing with party-political candidates. In addition, because it is a candidate system, voters are able to choose between candidates of the same party, putting an emphasis on which party candidate they think will be most suitable. Candidates such as community leaders, who have a party leaning but would rather stand as independents, are able to do so without harming their party’s chances by splitting the votes.

According to the Electoral Reform Society:

“In the Scottish local elections of 2017, between a third and a fifth of voters gave their second preference to a candidate of a different party to their first choice. And, whilst many voters are loyal to their party, when no more candidates are available for their first choice party … the majority go on to give lower preferences to candidates of other parties. This opportunity for voters to make more nuanced choices would likely result in a chamber that has a different political character to the Commons.

STV could also help elect a more diverse chamber. Because STV is a multi-member constituency system, it encourages parties to put forward candidates who differ from each other in order to maximise their vote. District magnitude, the number of people being elected in an electoral district, has an impact on the diversity of those elected, so larger STV districts are … more likely to create a more representative chamber without needing additional measures … STV would likely go furthest to fulfilling the goals of a more politically diverse and independently minded chamber where voters would be able to select candidates according to their expertise and experience, as well as ensuring representation from across the regions and nations of the UK”, which I believe the Labour Party wished for the Lords in its manifesto.

Another form of rank ordering preference is the AV system. While STV is considered a form of proportional representation using multimember constituencies, AV would operate in single-member constituencies and is not. There are of course other forms of PR, namely list PR, which was recommended by the Wakeham commission and the subsequent White Paper in 2001. In 2010-11 the House of Lords reform draft Bill put forward semi-open regional lists. List PR systems can be open, closed or semi-open.

With apologies to the Lib Dems, I will briefly go into the three main types of list. First, there is the closed list PR; secondly, the open list PR; and, thirdly, the semi-open list. There is a range of these types of list PR. Finally, we must not forget the first past the post system.

The 2008 White Paper modelled the options for election to the House of Lords on the basis of an 80% and 100% elected Chamber of between 420 and 450 seats. Using the four different systems I have outlined, while the first past the post and AV options produced results close to those in the Commons, the list modelling showed a greater proportion of seats for other parties, with no single party gaining an overall majority, but highlighted the problem for independents to get a place under this system.

My Lords, with all due respect to my noble friend who has just spoken, there is no point in going into all those details about methods of election, interesting as they are. Amendment 11 is wrong, and I oppose it because it would undermine the very basis of our democracy, which actually works very well.

The noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, referred to the Joint Committee report published in 2012. I had the duty—I almost said pleasure—to sit on that committee, along with the noble Baroness and others, for eight months while we went into these matters in very great detail. I recommend that report to noble Lords. The report itself was critical of the then Government’s plan to introduce a directly elected second Chamber. The minority report, which was signed by 12 of the 25 members of that committee, was even more critical of the Government; I especially recommend that to noble Lords.

If we had direct election to this upper House, it would not only upset the delicate balance of our constitutional settlement. It would also totally undermine the delicate relationship between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I seem to recall that in speaking on this matter back then in 2012, I said something like, “Mr Speaker, I don’t care about the House of Lords; I care about the House of Commons”. If I may correct myself, I do now care passionately about the House of Lords. It is for that very reason that I hope Amendment 11 does not have support here.

The great value of your Lordships is that the majority are not politicians, as the noble Lord, Lord Moore, most articulately said a few moments ago, whereas if we had direct election, the moment anybody stands for election and puts their head above the parapet, they become a politician. I can be critical of politicians because I am one to my fingertips; I have been a full-time one for more than 30 years. As a new Member of this House, I appreciate just how valuable noble Lords who are not politicians are in the work that they do and the scrutiny that this House brings to holding the Government to account.

My second point is that if the upper House is elected, that undermines the position of the House of Commons. It undermines the authority and accountability of the House of Commons. The electorate have to know where the buck stops. There is a direct relationship between the voter and the elected person, which is embodied in our House of Commons, one of the best democratic institutions anywhere in the world. If the upper House were to have democratic accountability and authority, that would challenge the House of Commons—and then the electorate would not know where the buck stops. As Tony Benn used to say, “If you don’t know how to get rid of the people you elect, then you don’t have accountability and you don’t have true democracy”. It is very strange to find myself agreeing yet again with Tony Benn.

My third point is simply that a well-functioning democracy is not just about elections. Our democracy works because of the checks and balances of civic society. That includes the work of your Lordships’ House as a revising Chamber, not as a representative Chamber. I beg your Lordships not to support Amendment 11.

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow my noble friend, for two reasons. First, I served with her on the Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform Bill. Secondly, I intend to follow her in actually referring to the text of Amendment 11, which makes me somewhat exceptional in this debate, because it has been about an elected second Chamber. The amendment does not actually stipulate that.

Let me begin with one or two quick points. First, it is not self-evidently the case that an appointed second Chamber is undemocratic. I have developed this case before; there is a democratic argument for an appointed second Chamber.

Secondly, it is not self-evidently the case that elected second chambers fulfil functions that benefit the political system, certainly not in terms of facilitating good law. Following what the noble Lord, Lord Moore, said, this Chamber is defined by its relationship to the other place. This is a complementary second Chamber. It adds value by fulfilling functions the other place does not have the time or political will to carry out. That renders it distinct, it adds value and I would argue that good law is a public good that deserves to be preserved.

I turn to the amendment before us. It does not stipulate that the second Chamber should be elected. It refers to a “democratic mandate”. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, made no reference to this. A mandate is an authority to carry out a particular policy. If one looks at the precise wording, one sees that you can use it against the argument for an elected second Chamber, because a mandate is something normally conferred on a party seeking election. If this Chamber had a mandate, that presumably would distinguish it from the other Chamber, which would have a mandate of its own. There would not necessarily be symmetry between the two. That could invite conflict.

The problem is, when you have two elected Chambers, who determines the outcome of public policy? Quite often it is the result of deals done between the Chambers—a process that is opaque and has results that are not accountable to the electors. Under our system, by having one elected Chamber through which a Government are chosen, that Government will remain accountable to electors for the policy they pursue. Having an appointed second Chamber does not challenge that core accountability. We add value, but we work within what the Commons can stipulate as the ends of public policy. We focus on the means. We improve them, but we do not challenge that fundamental accountability. That is the value of this system. That is why it is worth preserving.

I finish by accepting that we have a problem in terms of public perception. We have to work hard on that. At the same time, we need to be aware that the public can be persuaded. I remind your Lordships of a survey of the public carried out some years ago, in which several statements were put, and people were asked whether they agreed with them. One statement was: “At least half the Members of the House of Lords should be elected, so that the upper Chamber of Parliament has democratic legitimacy”. Some 72% agreed with that. Another statement was: “The House of Lords should remain a mainly appointed House, because that gives it a degree of independence from electoral politics and allows people with a broad range of experience and expertise to be involved in the law-making process”. My Lords, 75% agreed with that.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, and I both grew up in the post-war era. When I sat in front of our coal fire as a little boy, I used to love pulling at the threads of my woolly jumper and holes appeared elsewhere. My mother, who had knitted it, was furious and pointed to those holes. So it is with this Bill that would create an all-appointed House; holes appear elsewhere, and it is perfectly reasonable for your Lordships’ House, which is uniquely affected, to address some of the consequences.

The noble Lord, Lord Newby, in advocating work on a democratisation of the House—he is doing just this thing—follows a position long taken by his party. The preamble to the Parliament Act was referred to, which said that the House of Lords should be supplanted by a House constituted on a popular, instead of a hereditary, basis. It so happened that Asquith and Lloyd George, who believed in strong government, were not that keen on PR. In fact, Lloyd George, famously told CP Scott that PR was

“a device for defeating democracy, the principle of which was that the majority should rule, and for bringing faddists of all kinds into parliament and establishing groups and disintegrating parties”.

That was a wise man. Probably the father of the noble Lord, Lord Newby, did not know Lloyd George.

Asquith’s Government did not take democratisation forward, although, as the noble Lord said, Sir Nick Clegg and my noble friend Lord Cameron did go for reform in 2010. At the time, the Liberal Democrats saw that as part of a programme to entrench a Lib Dem hold on future Governments, with a PR wedge in both Houses. That did not succeed, but that potential Lib Dem lock is probably why many here, on both sides, would regard a Lords elected by PR as a less than enticing prospect.

However, beyond the principled arguments we have heard in this debate, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Newby—and it is a legitimate, principled argument—and by others, such as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, there are two reasons why calls for democratisation might intensify after this Bill. They may appear to be in contradistinction, but they could interlock.

The first is potential overreach by an unelected Chamber. I remember that, when most hereditary Peers left in 1999, the then Leader of this House, the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, declared that the new House, stripped of most hereditary Peers, would be “more legitimate”. Will the new House created by this Bill, freed of the drag anchor of so-called illegitimate hereditary Peers, be more assertive? Will it view itself as the rather more expert House, one with more wisdom and authority than an inexperienced House of Commons, where 335 Members are new and only one in 10 was a Member more than 15 years ago? I sincerely hope not.

Will the new House be more confident in pressing its arguments? In the absence of sensible working arrangements such as I have suggested, that is possible. Indeed, the current campaign in the Guardian shows what is already being said about the legitimacy of the unelected House, life Peers and hereditary Peers alike. Faced with challenge, an elected Government might see merit in pressing forward with reform. Which takes one to a second, very plausible scenario, where successive Governments, copying the precedent created by this Bill, simply tear groups of Peers out of your Lordships’ House to adjust numbers here to their party-political convenience.

I have spoken about this before. When I did, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, challenged me to say what other groups might be taken out of the House. I cited an example of Peers who have served for over 15 years, term limits being a very popular proposal for Lords reform. I checked what the effects would be if term limits came in in 2029 without grandfather rights, as this Bill plans for hereditary Peers. Removing in 2029 all Peers who have served over 15 years and denying them grandfather rights would deliver the Conservatives a significant net gain of nearly 70 over the Opposition parties and some 190 against all groups in the House. It would remove 59 Liberal Democrat Peers, which is throwing out more than 75% of them. What about that as a prospect? Before anyone says “threat”, it is not threat but fact. There are really grave dangers and deep unfairnesses in this game of “remove a chunk of Peers here and there”, and they are redoubled if grandfather rights are denied. I do not think that any unelected House could long survive such manipulation. The calls to allow the public, rather than the Government, to choose political Members of the House would inevitably grow. So, like it or not, the debate about democratisation posed by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, will not be shooed away simply by removing hereditary Peers.

After the 1999 Act and the challenge to us on a stage 2 House, my party, as my noble friend Lord Strathclyde reminded us, came forward in 2002 with an idea for an elected Senate of 300 members, with 60 seats reserved for unelected Cross Benchers to damp the electoral mandate. Our manifestos in 2005 and 2010 maintained that, and we sought to put it into action in the coalition Government. As we have heard, that attempt was frustrated, but what is the Labour position? It is the party in power. It is the party proposing, in its manifesto, replacing your Lordships’ House. The gracious Speech for the 1998-99 Session said that the 1999 Act would be

“the first stage in a process of reform to make the House of Lords more democratic and representative”.

Labour’s 2001 manifesto pledged a “more representative and democratic” House. Sounds familiar: is that not the line that we keep hearing spun by the party opposite on this Bill and this package of reforms? I did not believe it then, I am sceptical now and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Newby, has every right to ask for the kind of work that he is proposing. So I must ask how the Minister will respond—I hope that she will.

After succeeding Tony Blair, whose party had been publicly advocating for a democratic second House for years—and then voted against any element of election at all in 2003—Gordon Brown tried to revive Labour’s idea of a representative House. In Labour’s 2009 Bill, he looked to end the entry of new hereditary Peers, but he included grandfather rights: a provision that all existing Peers should stay. It was a different Labour Party then, perhaps. Instead of backing plans for election put forward by the coalition, however, Labour allied with rebels in the Commons to frustrate progress. Given the track record of the party opposite, I am a little sceptical as to the future. Will the Minister set out her plans in detail when she responds? If not, can she place a letter in the Library of the House?

The absence of a stage 2 destination overshadows the whole debate on the Bill and provokes many of the questions being asked. When Sir Keir Starmer became leader in 2020, he pledged the abolition of this House in his first term in office and the creation of a new elected Chamber. He was ecstatic when Gordon Brown’s commission reported in December 2022, acclaiming the idea of a new assembly of the nations and regions and, as he put it, rebuilding trust by

“replacing the unelected House of Lords with a new, smaller, democratically elected second chamber”.

Yet Labour’s 2024 manifesto merely said that

“Labour is committed to replacing the House of Lords with an alternative second chamber that is more representative of the regions and nations”.

The word “democracy” was not there. Where in the long grass is it now?

In conclusion, I will ask the Minister some specific questions. Can she confirm whether Labour’s alternative second Chamber will be wholly or partly elected by the people? The manifesto said there would be a public consultation on this Chamber, but you cannot have a meaningful consultation without a proposition on which to consult. When will consultation start? My noble friend Lord Blencathra asked for one form of consultation: a referendum on an elected House of Lords. Does the noble Baroness leave the door open to such a referendum?

Can the Minister tell us whether the Government will publish a White Paper, or any other guidance, to inform your Lordships as we move towards Report? As my noble friend Lord Moylan said, what is the current timetable envisaged for replacing your Lordships, as the manifesto pledged? It is causing concern and confusion on all sides. Will the Minister, who is Leader of the whole House—a responsibility she carries out, in my judgment, with a high sense of responsibility—set out a clear direction as to the Chamber that will replace us before we come to Report?

My Lords, I am grateful for what has been a long and interesting discussion; I thank the noble Lords, Lord Newby and Lord Blencathra, and others, for giving us the opportunity to have it. As with most debates we have had on the Bill, it has gone rather wider than the precise amendments in front of us. The noble Lord referred to some of the things he mentioned at Second Reading, the King’s Speech and other debates. I welcome that there is a focus on other issues beyond the Bill, but that is not what is before us now. However, they are all worthy of longer-term consideration.

The amendments in this group raise the introduction a democratic element to the House. Amendment 11, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, Amendment 72, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, and Amendment 90D, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Brady of Altrincham, all seek to impose a duty on the Government to take forward proposals to ensure a democratic element of your Lordships’ House once the Bill has passed.

Amendments 11 and 72 would require the Government to consult specified persons and bodies, including from this House and the other place, on proposals for introducing elected Members, whereas Amendment 90D would not require consultation and focuses on legislative proposals for a far smaller House of Lords elected under a first past the post system. I am not sure, if we were elected under any system, that it would be a “House of Lords”; I cannot remember which noble Lord said that they were tempted by the title “senator”, but it certainly would not be a House of Lords if that was the proposal. Amendment 90D also asks the Government to bring forward a draft Bill. A very similar amendment was placed in the other place, which was resoundingly rejected by a majority of 262.

I will comment on some of the comments that were made about Amendment 90D. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Newby, that his party’s dedication and commitment to an elected second Chamber has been known for many years. He may well be right that it would create more diversity. It certainly would give more geographical balance. I do not really accept that castles, as the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, said, make for the best geographical balance the House of Lords could have. I am sure he did not mean for that to be taken seriously.

I dispute the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, that an elected second Chamber would have greater public support. A number of noble Lords, such as the noble Lord, Lord Brady, mentioned this, and the noble Lord, Lord Norton, touched on opinion polls. I remember discussing opinion polls about how the House of Lords is perceived with my party colleagues. A number of Members said that we are very low down in the opinion polls, but the elected House does not do too well in the opinion polls either. The public do not like politicians terribly much full stop, so I am not sure whether being elected gains greater support. But it certainly is the case that there are more attacks on Members for being unelected.

That comes back to my wider comments: as I said, his party’s support for this has been well known, as has that of the party of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes, Plaid Cymru. I am interested to see that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, and other noble Lords are enthusiastic supporters and transferred their allegiance to an elected second Chamber. It may put them at odds with their party, but I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Newby, welcomes their support.

My Lords—

No, I will not take an intervention. I have listened to everybody with great courtesy throughout the whole debate. Would the noble Lord mind letting me answer the questions?

My Lords—

I shall take one short intervention. I am sure the noble Lord would not want to detain the Committee any longer than necessary.

My Lords, I intervene simply to say that I have long been a supporter of an elected House, as many noble Lords are aware—certainly since 1997. I am on the public record. I supported the Bill in 2012.

I am happy to be corrected on that, and I am sure noble Lords will welcome his support.

I found Amendments 11A and 11B from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, really interesting. Amendment 11A seeks to impose a requirement on the Government to include in its consultation

“the implications of securing a democratic mandate for the House of Lords for its powers and conventions”.

The interesting thing about his amendments is that he was the first in the debate to talk about the functions of a second Chamber rather than the form. Other noble Lords then commented on that, but he was the first and he did so in some detail. My starting point on a second Chamber has always been: what does it do, how does it do it, why does it do it, and how do we best fulfil the role? I was pleased that some noble Lords mentioned the role of the Cross-Benchers, because we all welcome that role, and I think the public would too if they were asked. However, the noble Lord would also require a referendum on the principle of an elected second Chamber. If I understood him correctly, if that principle was endorsed it would have to be followed by a further referendum on the methods of election.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, spoke significantly more widely than her amendment, which seeks to place a duty on the Government to lay before Parliament a review of the implications of Act for the appropriateness of an unelected Chamber. She complained that she could not get the functions into her amendment, but the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, expressed surprise at how wide amendments could go on membership when the terms of the Bill are so narrow. But that is the ruling we have: anything to do with membership of the House is seen to be in order, which leads to quite a broad approach.

Underlying all those amendments is the argument that further reform of this House is required. I welcome that, because although this Bill is narrow and noble Lords have commented on the next steps, the Labour Party’s manifesto was clear. I am surprised that noble Lords seem so surprised. The manifesto talks about the steps. It says—I think the noble Lord, Lord True, read this out—that we are committed to replacing the Chamber we have now with

“an alternative second Chamber that is more representative of the nations and regions”, and that we

“will consult on proposals seeking the input of the … public”.

The noble Lord, Lord True, seems to expect me to have a ready-made proposal to bring forward. I do not; this is a longer-term proposal, and I would have thought noble Lords would welcome the opportunity to have an input into it, which, obviously, they will have. There is a range of proposals. We have already heard today that even those who support an elected second Chamber have a range of ways they would do it, so there is no ready-made blueprint: there are lots of thoughts and suggestions, and we have put forward suggestions in the past, but we want to consult more widely. That is a manifesto commitment.

However, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Newby, said himself, this Bill is not the right vehicle for delivering that proposal and we would not accept those amendments. This is a focused Bill that seeks to deliver the manifesto commitment by removing the right of the remaining hereditary Peers to sit and vote in the House of Lords. I remind noble Lords that that principle was established 25 years ago. This is the final part of that principle. My noble friend Lord Grocott seemed surprised this has taken so long and asked why people had made interventions on a range of other issues. This is a focused Bill on immediate reform, following the principle established 25 years ago.

We heard quite a lot about the history of different parts of legislation. The proposals that matter at the moment are those in our manifesto that we are delivering with this Bill, but the Government are committed to more fundamental reform, as I have said. More geographical representation is clearly part of that.

I come back to the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra. I also thought that the noble Lord, Lord Brady, made a thoughtful speech. I know the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, was not proposing an elected second Chamber, but the primacy of the first Chamber is about its elected status. It is accountable to the electorate. If I understood the noble Lord, Lord True, correctly, he thought this Chamber should have a more enhanced role because we have been here longer and have more expertise. You could also argue that an elected Chamber is more in touch with the electorate who have more recently elected them. That is a very important principle.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, raised a number of points to be considered during a consultation on the form an alternative second Chamber should take. One point, of course, is primacy. I am intrigued by the idea that we could have a Prime Minister in a second Chamber; I will not apply for any such role. The noble Lord made an important point about the conventions that apply to an unelected second Chamber. Those conventions have stood the test of time through many changes, and they remain. They serve this House, the primary Chamber and democracy well. I anticipate no change to those conventions; it would be a different kind of Chamber if we did not abide by them. The hereditary Peers leaving in 1999 did not alter the conventions, and it will not alter the conventions now either. It is those conventions that protect the primacy of the Commons, which is extremely important.

These issues are not for your Lordships’ House today in this Bill. The Government are making an immediate start to reform this House with this Bill. Part of the reason why there has been no progress over the past 25 years is this argument that nothing can be done until everything is done. But nobody can agree, even in the debate we have had today, on what “everything” is and the result is that we do nothing. Completing this part of the reform shows good faith and good intentions.

The noble Lord, Lord True, tempted me on a number of points, and I want to challenge him on one. He referred to the exit of some Peers—that is, losing our hereditary colleagues—as being some kind of political attack because it affects the numbers. I ask him: did he feel the same when his party racked up appointment after appointment, creating a much larger disparity between the two main parties than we have ever seen before or than would happen under this Bill? What he suggested is not our intention. I have been very clear in Committee, as well as in Select Committee and in the other place, that this House works well with roughly equal numbers between government and opposition parties—and that is not a party-political point at all. Because of the work we do, we should be a more deliberative and engaged Chamber. The noble Lord is laughing at me, and I am not quite sure why; I am making a serious point about how this House works best. It is important that we do our best work and that we figure out how we can do that.

The noble Baroness challenged me on one thing, and perhaps I can make it clear for the Hansard record that I was certainly not laughing at her, even if other noble Lords were. I think she acknowledges that from a sedentary position.

The noble Baroness asked whether I was concerned about certain things. I did not particularly like it when Sir Tony Blair created the largest number of life Peers ever known, but that was his prerogative. The point I am trying to make—this is a House point, not a party-political point—is that a very dangerous precedent opens up when it is felt that a group can be dismissed from the House. That has never happened in this way, and the Conservative Party has never removed people from other parties. I will not repeat what I said in my remarks, but I believe that this is a profoundly dangerous precedent, and we should find ways to avoid setting it.

My Lords, it is a party-political point. I was trying to make the very non-party-political point that the House operates best with roughly equal numbers. It has taken 25 years to get here. The principle was established when the hereditary Peers left in 1999—I have to say that any trade union would have snapped up Viscount Cranborne in a moment—and, in effect, 92 of their number remained in perpetuity. Those were the arrangements then. This Bill will end those arrangements, so that the House can move forward.

The noble Lord talked about a term limit, an issue on which some noble Lords have put down amendments later. That would have to be discussed and debated by this House. That is not one of the proposals we are putting forward, but if someone wants to propose that during the consultation we will have on an alternative second Chamber, they are at liberty to do so. I think there would probably be quite lengthy arguments about the duration of a term limit, but that is not included the proposals before us today. Although 25 years is perhaps quite a long time to take to move forward, it is right that we take time to consider these issues.

I am grateful to noble Lords for the points they have made. Certainly, some useful points for the future have been made on how an alternative second Chamber may be constituted. That is not before us today, but in due course, when we are able to come forward with proposals, we will consult quite widely. At this stage, I respectfully ask that noble Lords and Baronesses take their amendments back and reconsider them, and I beg leave to ask that they not press them.

My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken, and I slightly apologise for initiating such a long debate. I am grateful to noble Lords who have supported our proposal, and doubly grateful to those who have supported me today who have never supported me before—I thank them very much. I obviously cannot deal with all the points made, and I will try to be brief.

The noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, made the classic argument for not having an elected House of Lords, the nub of which relates to the primacy of the Commons. The only thing I would say is that, in 2012, the House of Commons voted by a majority of 338 to have an elected House of Lords, so presumably, it did not think its position was being fatally undermined at that point. The noble Lord was the first person to raise the possibility of Cross-Benchers being included under our proposals, and they absolutely would be. There was a provision for Cross-Benchers in the 2012 proposals, and having them would be perfectly possible under my amendment.

On the question of looking at functions, as I said in my introductory remarks, there is no bar to that happening during the consultation period. However, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, that, at worst, wherever one ends up, one is likely to get a crunching of gears rather than a car crash.

I am obviously extremely pleased to have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. I was grateful for his description of the history of this proposal. My only criticism is that he did not go back far enough: he forgot to refer to the cogent arguments made by the radicals in favour of an elected House of Lords in 1836; however, I will forgive him. He was the first noble Lord to raise the possibility of indirectly elected Members of a reformed House of Lords. My problem with that is, if they come via an intermediate elected body such as the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly or local councils, they are members of those bodies, in which case they will not have time to do this job as well; or they are appointed by those bodies, in which case we will be in the same position that we are in now—political patronage deciding the composition of your Lordships’ House, which is not a good idea.

The noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, asked why the 2012 Bill was withdrawn. I am afraid that it was not because people had seen the light; it was because of a bit of straightforward political skulduggery. I do not think that she gets anywhere by asking that question.

The noble Lord, Lord Brady, objected to the possibility of a party list on the basis that it would bring about more patronage. I am afraid that that is impossible, because we have 100% patronage now for the party-political Peers. Whatever system of PR you have, the degree of patronage would be reduced.

The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said that we should not be debating any of this, and I rather agree. I was amazed that the clerks in the Commons decided that the scope of the Bill could include anything to do with Lords reform, but, once they had, I felt it incumbent on me to set out what I would do.

The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, asked whether, under our proposals, the Government could be defeated in future in the House of Lords. It would depend on the elections that led to this Chamber being elected, but in all likelihood, yes, they could.

The noble Baroness, Lady Laing, said, as a demerit of elections, that the House would be composed principally of people who were politicians. Let us not fool ourselves about what we are: this is a House of politicians. She is no less of a politician now than when she was in the Commons. Politicians would arrive by a direct, rather than indirect, route. Frankly, the idea that we are not politicians is strange.

I am grateful to the honourable—

Noble Lords:

Noble!

I think I just proved the point there. I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. My point was not that I am not a politician, but that I am a lesser person for being a politician. The great thing about this Chamber is that it has a very large number, if not a majority, of Members who are not politicians, and that is what gives it its value.

My Lords, I am happy to debate the numbers, but I disagree that the majority of people who take a party Whip can legitimately not call themselves politicians. The Cross-Benchers are not politicians, although they are very political in many cases. Under my proposal, they are not being abolished anyway.

On the noble Lord, Lord True, I was intrigued by his reference to Lloyd George. Lloyd George does not come with a totally unblemished record when it comes to matters relating to the House of Lords.

As I said at the start, this amendment is to set up a process. It is not a blueprint. We on these Benches believe that this process should now be commenced. We believe that it is very long overdue, and we will return to this amendment on Report with that in view.

To the best of my knowledge, we are presently debating Amendment 11A, an amendment to Amendment 11.

My Lords, I did not intend to respond at length, or indeed to respond at all to the debate. It has been a thorough debate—two hours and 10 minutes.

I raised the point about the problems we would have in this House if we concentrated only on form, rather than on function. That point has been eloquently made by all sides. I have no intention of summarising the debate any further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 11A (to Amendment 11) withdrawn.

Amendment 11B (to Amendment 11) not moved.

Amendment 11 withdrawn.