Lord Udny-Lister:

Moved by Lord Udny-Lister

43: After Clause 34, insert the following new Clause—“Counter-terrorism measures in planning law(1) The Secretary of State must consult with local authorities on integrating counter-terrorism measures into the planning and design of new buildings which are likely to be designated “qualifying premises” for the purposes of this Act.(2) Following that consultation, the Secretary of State must introduce measures to ensure the incorporation of anti-terrorism design principles in new building projects, particularly those in high-risk areas, where the buildings in question are likely to be designated “qualifying premises” for the purposes of this Act.”Member’s explanatory statementThis amendment encourages the integration of counter-terrorism measures into architectural design, promoting safer urban environments from the outset.

My Lords, I will be very brief in moving this amendment. As I said at Second Reading, there is a clear opportunity within this legislation to design out terrorism by ensuring that anti-terrorism design principles are incorporated into new building projects that fall within the definition and scope of the qualifying premises. It is important that we take every opportunity to do this as we proceed with various bits of legislation that do have an effect on security.

Legislation, where possible, should always be forward-looking and include provisions that seek to prevent, rather than just address. I am therefore hopeful that noble Lords will see the benefits of mandating the need for the Secretary of State to work with local authorities on integrating the counterterrorism measures into planning and design policies, so that we can promote safer premises from the outset of their design. It is a sad reality that the threat of terrorism will not go away in the short term. We therefore have a duty to ensure that the venues of tomorrow are designed in ways that protect the public and prevent terrorism. I am confident that this amendment will achieve that, while further alleviating the financial burden of altering premises at a later date to ensure compliance with the Bill. I beg to move.

My Lords, I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, and although it is towards the end of the Bill and it is a small addition, I think that, without this change, the Bill becomes less effective, because the thing we know works best in preventing crime—or terrorism, in this case—is design. The problem we have at the moment with car theft is that the thieves know how to steal them and are pretty effective at it. Car stealing has gone through the roof over the last few years. For 20 years, it went down. So we can design things better to make the terrorists less likely to be effective, or so that, if they do get through, they do less damage.

Prevention is critical to the Bill. At Second Reading, the Minister said that they could not consider it in this Bill, and that it had to be considered elsewhere. As much as I love and respect him, I am not sure that I agree. The danger is that the Home Office forgets, and it gets buried somewhere else. This is the best place to do it. There is an equivalent: the Section 104 agreements on new buildings, which are about crime—keeping new buildings safe by being designed to prevent crime. Car parks are designed in order to make it less likely that cars are stolen.

I will give a few examples of what might be included in such design features. Something that terrifies everyone, including the people who run venues, is the thought that a person with a gun will rove around the building. We have seen it happen more in the rest of the world than we have in the UK, but sadly, one day it will happen. A ballistic shutter dividing off parts of our shopping malls, railway stations and airports would ensure that the gunman could not travel too far. At the moment, the attacks will stop only when the ammunition runs out—unless a police officer with a firearm confronts them before that.

We also know that rapid air-conditioning can be kicked in to produce a massive airflow through the building, which could be helpful, depending on the type of attack. There is also recessed emergency lighting, which is not hit by bullets. These things can make a real difference. These are just a few examples, and I will give one final one. I am looking towards the Liberal Democrats, as it is they who most often raise the issue of facial recognition being a challenge to civil liberties. I do not disagree, and I understand why they raise that issue. However, facial recognition could make a real difference here. If somebody is out on a terrorism prevention order—of which there are not many in this country—and they are roving around at a concert you are attending, you would want to know. At the moment, the chances of that are fairly low, unless they are being followed. Therefore, to allow the venue operators to notice that and do something about it might be a good thing. I am not sure that it would be a good thing for all venues—parish churches and village halls, for example—but at our bigger venues, where thousands of people gather, it could make a real difference. This amendment, short as it is, is vital and this is the right place to make it.

Finally, the Minister said that he was accepting plugs, so I will make another—it is always a mistake to open a door—concerning the police counterterrorism security advisers, who are based not only in London but in our regional police counterterrorism units. The Minister mentioned that the Government will look at resourcing for local authorities, for example. I hope that he considers this idea. They are relatively few in number. We are talking about, potentially, 180,000 venues, and perhaps not all of them will need this, but there will be a significant start-up volume. Will he at least consider that group? It is part of police funding and is the forward-facing part of the group that the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, mentioned. This idea deserves consideration, at least.

My Lords, I associate myself the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about counterterrorism security advisers. They are part of this defence mechanism; they certainly need to be better resourced and could do a great deal as a consequence.

The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, are extremely important and have great value; they reflect the comments that I made in my two reports on prevention of terrorism in London. A great deal can be done to design out different sorts of crime, or, as in this case, to make it more difficult for terrorists to act, or to make it easier to respond to a terrorist incident. I do not wish to prolong the discussion, because there is an issue as to whether this is the right legislation. Clearly, it needs to be considered in the context of the planning system, but I also take the point about that perhaps taking an inordinate amount of time, rather than trying to move this forward at this stage.

If I may inject a slightly partisan point at this stage, I do recall, at a lower level, the issues around designing out crime. At one stage, a whole series of recommendations were in the building regulations to make crime more difficult—for example, making it more difficult for burglars to kick in doors. The previous Government dismantled all that, which was extremely unfortunate.

My Lords, I support this amendment. I wonder whether the Minister and the advisers have been to Northern Ireland, where, for a long time, buildings have been designed for the exact threats he is talking about. I am not sure of the system, but I do not think that those designs originated from planning control or building control; they were brought on by the organisations themselves in order to provide protection. There must be lessons to be learned there on how best to stop these sorts of attacks; after all, although I hesitate to say it, we were under them for 40 years.

On the subject of the various organisations, including the SIA, we can point people in the right direction and get advice to them, but resources will have to be put into the communications between people and those organisations. The advice may be there but currently, there is not the manpower to communicate to the extent that will ward off terrorist attacks.

My Lords, I do not want to pour cold water on the proposal as it seems to be getting a lot of support, and I support the principle of it. I am very taken with some of the simple measures that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, outlined. However, they are not all simple measures. I have been on local authorities and seen how planners can get carried away with some of their proposals. All of a sudden, we are into not simple proposals such as those we have heard about today, but much more elaborate ones that would be impossible for the business or the community centre to implement.

We need to be careful about the proposal. I am happy with the principle, but the outworking could be much more difficult. I say in response to my noble friend Lord Brookeborough, let us not forget that a lot of the buildings in Northern Ireland that were protected against terrorist attacks were public buildings. That money was coming from central funds, not community organisations, churches, local football clubs or sports clubs.

I support the principle of this proposal, but I urge some caution as well.

My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Elliott, I think that this amendment has a lot of merit. It certainly raises some very important issues. Ahead of this Bill, I met with people from the insurance industry. They very much made the point that time and money could be saved by incorporating some of these security provisions at the design phase of public buildings.

The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made a very powerful case for why this amendment would make sense. Clearly, retrospectively trying to put in measures for effective and safe evacuations and invacuations is frequently going to be harder and less cost-effective than building them in at the planning and architectural design stage for new public buildings. As others have hinted, this amendment is perhaps not for this Bill but for a future planning Bill, but it raises a common-sense and important set of issues. I look forward to Minister’s reply.

My Lords, my two colleagues mentioned the situation in Northern Ireland. The Minister will be very familiar, from his service there, with a lot of this. A lot of the protections that were put in place were against blast. Terrorist tactics have changed and will continue to change. You cannot simply look at what the threat might have been 30 or 40 years ago: look at the threat that we face today, but in 10 years or 20 years, it may be very different.

The trick will be to have flexible thinking going into the actual design, so although the nature of the threat will change over time there will at least be a bit of future-proofing—that is the language we would need to use. All those lessons should be learned. I served on the Northern Ireland Police Authority, which had to deal with the threats to buildings in those circumstances and to other Civil Service facilities. The Minister will be very familiar with all that. The key is for those who design or adapt buildings—because more buildings are going to be adapted than built from scratch—to show a bit of flexibility in those processes and put a little thought into what might be coming down the road. Our buildings were largely protected against blast, which would not necessarily be the only thing that is at risk.

My Lords, I support Amendment 43, tabled by my noble friend Lord Udny-Lister. This has been a very interesting debate. The amendment seeks to introduce a new clause requiring the Secretary of State to

“consult with local authorities on integrating counter-terrorism measures into the planning and design of new buildings which are likely to be designated ‘qualifying premises’ for the purposes of this Act”.

It further calls for the introduction of measures to ensure that anti-terrorism design principles are incorporated into building projects, particularly those in high-risk areas.

The importance of designing safer urban environments from the outset cannot be overstated. In an era where the threat of terrorism continues to evolve, our approach to public safety must also adapt. The integration of counterterrorism measures into the planning and design of buildings offers a forward-thinking solution that enhances security while reducing the need for costly and disruptive retrofits. By embedding security principles into architectural design, we can create spaces that are both functional and secure. Measures such as blast-resistant materials, secure perimeters, control access points and natural surveillance through open and well-lit layouts can significantly reduce the vulnerability of public spaces.

Many countries have already embraced the concept of designing out terrorism. For example, in the United States and parts of Europe, urban planners and architects routinely incorporate security features into the design of transport hubs, commercial centres and public venues. The United Kingdom should not lag behind in adopting similar best practices. This amendment encourages a collaborative approach between the Government, local authorities and the construction industry to ensure that new developments are designed with security in mind. Local authorities are uniquely positioned to provide insights into the specific risks and needs of their areas, making their involvement in this process essential.

Incorporating counterterrorism measures at the planning stage is not only more effective but more cost-efficient. Retrofitting existing buildings to meet new security requirements can be expensive and disruptive, often requiring extensive modifications that compromise the original design and functionality. By contrast, proactive design reduces long-term costs and creates environments that seamlessly balance aesthetics, functionality and security.

I must stress that this amendment does not seek to turn our urban landscapes into fortresses. Good design can enhance both security and public experience without compromising the openness and accessibility that define vibrant communities. By working closely with architects, planners and local authorities, we can ensure that security features are thoughtfully integrated and do not detract from the usability and beauty of public spaces. I fully associate myself with the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, on this issue.

The amendment rightly prioritises high-risk areas where the likelihood of terrorism incidents is higher due to factors such as foot traffic, symbolic importance or previous threats. By taking a proactive approach in these areas, we would not only protect lives but bolster public confidence in the safety of shared spaces. In conclusion, the amendment would strengthen the Bill by embedding security into the very fabric of our built environment. It demonstrates a pragmatic and forward-looking approach to counterterrorism that balances safety, efficiency and community needs. I urge the Government and noble Lords to support this amendment as it represents a vital step forward, creating a safer, more resilient United Kingdom.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, for raising the important issue of how new buildings—his amendment mentions “new buildings”—and development should consider security in their design where it is appropriate to do so.

I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, and the noble Lords, Lord Elliott and Lord Empey, for bringing to the Committee their experience of Northern Ireland—with which I have a small element of familiarity but not as much experience as they do.

I welcome the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and particularly his invitation for CT advisers to be incorporated into an advice mechanism, whatever that might be. I will give him the same answer I gave to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. I reassure him that we want to have this simple advice, focused via the Security Industry Association, and I hope that I can at least refer his helpful suggestion and see how it can be incorporated into the advice given. I thank my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey for his contribution, and the Liberal Democrat and Opposition Front Benches for their comments.

I hope I can give some comfort to the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, on this matter. He will be aware that the National Planning Policy Framework, which is a document for England, is potentially an area where we could examine his concerns in a much more effective way than in the Bill. The National Planning Policy Framework for England and the equivalent policy frameworks in the devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland already contain provision on the need to promote public safety and take account of wider security requirements during the planning process. I take the points about building-in blast prevention that the three noble Lords commenting on Northern Ireland have mentioned.

The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, references new buildings, so I am focusing on that. Planning policy frameworks are where advice can be given on what happens with new build, and that logistical requirement is in place.

It may interest the noble Lord to know that there is a regular review of the planning requirements in the National Planning Policy Framework. The last consultation took place on 12 December 2024. It set out government planning policies for England and how they are expected to be applied. Guidance is being kept under review on the very points that he has made in his amendment.

All noble Lords who have spoken have raised important points about new build. The question is whether this Bill is the place to put that requirement or whether it is better placed in statutory advice for the devolved Administrations, and indeed for the National Planning Policy Framework, with the central government planning advice to date.

The requirement for local planning authorities in the policy framework is to take account of information available from the police and a wide range of other agencies and to consider steps that can be taken to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience, and ensure public safety and security. I am convinced that the policy frameworks will address concerns and ensure that planning guidance gives process details on how to identify and assess potential security-related vulnerabilities—and, where necessary, for new build, as the noble Lord has tabled in his amendment—and to address those in a manner that is appropriate and proportionate.

The guidance currently highlights that planning provides an important opportunity to consider the security of the built environment for those who work in it and the services that are provided. My noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey ably highlighted the impact that that can have on crime and, by extension, that planning guidance is really important to ensure that there is a focus on issues of concern.

This Bill places a legislative requirement on the responsible person for enhanced-tier premises to ensure, as far as practical, that measures relating to the physical safety of individuals and the security of the premises are in place. The proposals in the Bill are complementary to the objectives of planning regimes, and I hope that the amendment is not necessary because that parallel structure is in place. I hope that the important points that have been made by noble Lords, including the point made by the noble Baroness on the Liberal Democrat Front Bench, are part of the consideration of that.

I respectfully say to the noble Lord that I hope that, with those assurances, he will withdraw his amendment, but not withdraw the principle that we need to future-proof and future plan for the security of buildings. One of the best ways, as the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, is to ensure that in that future-proofing and future planning, we take account of the lessons that we learn from attacks that, sadly, have taken place and, wherever possible, future-proof new buildings by building in design to ensure that we do that. However, I reaffirm that the best place to do that is in planning guidance rather than in the Bill.

I thank everybody who supported this amendment and took part in this short but important debate. I think it would be a missed opportunity if this Bill is not used as a mechanism to remind local authorities and the Home Office to get the message out again and for the SIA to use it to get new buildings designed with security and terrorism in mind. I think that that would be beneficial, but having heard the Minister, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 43 withdrawn.

Amendments 44 and 45 not moved.