Lord Moynihan:

Moved by Lord Moynihan

27: Clause 3, page 3, line 15, leave out “influence or”

My Lords, in moving my Amendment 27, I will also speak to my Amendments 28 and 29. These amendments seek to omit reference to the “influence” a person can have over the activities of a club being considered for a licence to operate as a professional football club in England.

Walking through this maze of state-imposed regulation on professional sport, for the purpose of the amendments I assume that the Government intend to allow the government-appointed regulator to determine who is a fit and proper person to be granted a licence on the question of their “influence” over a club’s activities. If we try to seek clarity in the Bill, we are immediately referred to Schedule 1, where, in keeping with this hydra of a Bill, we are once again left totally in the dark. It says, at page 83:

“The Secretary of State must prepare and publish guidance about the meaning of significant influence or control for the purposes of this Schedule”.

So the Bill continues to blindfold parliamentarians before they take the knee and kick off their important scrutinising role, which is the central purpose of your Lordships’ House.

Perhaps the best way to seek clarification from the Government is to work through a specific example. Newcastle is majority owned and financially controlled by the Saudi sovereign fund, the PIF. The PIF became the majority shareholder and de facto owner of the club, with 80% of the shares acquired in October 2021. The chair of the PIF is Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, son of Saudi Arabia’s King. MBS, as he is known, runs the Saudi Government.

For once, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, cannot pray in aid that this is an inherited Conservative Bill, because in the Conservative Bill there was a protection against the Government-appointed regulator investigating whether, for example, the Crown Prince and chair of the PIF was a fit and proper person to exercise control over Newcastle through his chairmanship of the PIF. The current Government deleted the very protection that the Conservative Government put in the Bill that required the regulator to,

“have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives of His Majesty’s Government”.

This removal was a direct result of UEFA’s insistence to the current Prime Minister that this protection politicises sport. When faced with expulsion from the European Championship in 2028, which, incidentally, is to be hosted in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, and asked to jump, he said “How high?” and deleted the protection, clearly without the Government considering the consequences. This is a classic example of the need to beware of unintended consequences.

When the Prime Minister heads off to Saudi Arabia this month to promote trade and relations with Saudi Arabia, what will he say when the Crown Prince asks, “As I exercise influence over the PIF and since the PIF owns Newcastle, am I to be subject to detailed investigation by the regulator as set out in your Bill, and is there anything the regulator will not take into account about me as a ‘person of influence’ over the future of Newcastle United?”

Sadly, I can assure the Committee that for anyone who has read the Bill, the answer to Newcastle fans is that, unlike under the Premier League or UEFA rules, the Crown Prince is to be subject to investigation by the regulator. That is exactly what the Government intend the regulator to do, because they have removed the one protection it had. So let the Prime Minister be in no doubt that the answer he has to give to the Crown Prince and the PIF, which is investing billions in global sport and encouraging full British co-operation with the growth of boxing, golf, the International Olympic Committee’s Esports and tennis, to name just a few recipients of Saudi influence in global sport that is celebrated by many professional sports in this country, all of whom benefit from it.

When the Minister comes to answer, the Committee is looking for simple clarity. Yes, the regulator has full rights to use his or her many powers to investigate and opine on the suitability or otherwise of any owner who exercises a degree of influence over, for example, Newcastle United. That is just one example of such detailed and intrusive investigation which exists solely in the powers of the proposed regulator but nowhere else in football—not in UEFA, FIFA, the EFL or the Premier League. The intrusive investigation which this phrase leads to will be replicated across the Premier League unless we accept my amendments.

We have a clear understanding of the first meaning of an “owner”, which is those who control or exercise control over a club, and shareholders are a good example. However, to understand the second phrase, the concept of “influence” over a club, we need to understand what the Government mean by “influence”. What is deeply disturbing is that, from other parts of the Bill, it is clear that the definition conflicts with the approach to ownership of the government regulator, the Premier League, UEFA and the EFL, all of which would be conflicted with the government regulator’s role. I predict that it would be mired in litigation for years to come and lead to capital flight by current owners in the Premier League and other leagues, so I owe it to the Committee to explain briefly why.

The starting point is whether there is a difference in the definition of an owner between what is in the Bill and in the Premier League’s rulebook. If there is a difference, what will this mean in terms of whether a newly identified owner would have to go through a test or whether they would still be defined as an incumbent owner who, incidentally, will have to go through extensive new tests under this legislation?

This Bill tells us that the regulator must identify an “ultimate owner” as opposed to companies that have ultimate control. How is this defined in the Bill and what does it mean? At what point in the process must the ultimate owner be identified? For example, can he or she be identified for a provisional licence? I would argue that they have to be. If new individuals are identified, will they have to go through the full owners and directors tests as new prospective owners or will they be treated as incumbents?

To my understanding, an owner is defined as an individual or registered society that meets one or more of the conditions in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1. The first of these conditions is that a person has the right to exercise, or actually exercises, significant influence or control over all or part of the club’s activities. Remarkably, there is no requirement on the Secretary of State, who will write the guidance that determines what “significant influence or control” means, to consult anyone on the drafting of that guidance. We can speculate about what the definition might be by looking at other legislation where the same phrase is used, but there is no guarantee that the Secretary of State will follow the same approach on this Bill as has been taken for other legislation. It is not worth relying on the Companies Act guidance because there is no requirement for the Secretary of State to follow that guidance.

What is certain at this stage is that, because there is no definition in the Bill—again—it will be open to the Secretary of State to make guidance that would allow a wide group of individuals, companies or other bodies to fall within the category of persons having significant influence or control, and fans would be up in arms if he did not include a very wide definition.

The Premier League Handbook requirements about the requisition of control—just the word “control”, without “significant influence” attached to it—are, significantly and wisely, narrower in scope than the Bill. An acquirer falls within the Premier League Handbook only if they propose to acquire control of the club. That is different from the Bill, where the Secretary of State has added “significant influence or control” and taken the responsibility of defining it, so persons who exercise significant influence do not fall within the scope of the Premier League Handbook but fall within the scope of the Bill.

An individual or registered society will be an owner if they meet one or more of the conditions in paragraph 2 of Schedule 1. Here is the real nub of the issue, and it comes in the words of the Government in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill:

“If the trustees, partners, or members of the body meet one of the other four conditions in relation to a club, and a person has significant influence or control over the trust, partnership, etc, then that person is an owner of the club. This means that an owner cannot avoid being identified as an owner simply by, for example, placing” his or

“her 30% shares in a club into a trust. The test that will be applied is whether” he or

“she has the right to exercise, or actually exercises, significant influence or control over the activities of that trust (for example, will the trustees vote the shares however she instructs them)”.

This is a highly complex area, and I feel for the many clubs within the EFL that are going to have to face these questions.

Thinking about the common ownership structures for premier leagues, you can see that it might be a complex exercise to identify the ultimate owner, and that the requirement to identify ultimate owners is a significant departure from the way the Premier League currently identifies the person who controls the club. That is far more intrusive and onerous a test than any in the Premier League Handbook or UEFA regulations. It permits state control over ownership of football clubs through the influence clause, which the regulator has to follow.

Without any doubt, the Crown Prince is an owner in the context of the Bill—an owner who exercises influence over the activities of the club as defined in proposed statute and regulation. Premier League football is a particularly attractive investment for sovereign wealth funds due to its long-term investment potential. What is unusual about the provisions in the Bill is that, unlike other sectors, the owners, and ultimate owners behind these funds, will have to be identified by the government regulator because the Government specifically state that an owner cannot avoid being identified as an owner simply by, for example, placing their shares in a club into trust.

What is worse is that the identity of each owner and the ultimate owner must be identified to the regulator when the club applies even for a provisional licence. I ask the Minister: if new individuals are identified, will they have to go through the full owners’ and directors’ tests as new prospective owners, or will they be treated as incumbents? I emphasise again that we should think of the complexity and cost of this process for EFL clubs in the lower leagues as well.

It is a really important issue—possibly the most important issue that we have considered to date—because it goes right to the heart of one of the most intrusive and complex regulatory frameworks that I have seen anywhere, including in the Companies Act, and it is applicable to professional sport in this country, which should be based on the autonomy of that sport and the ability of the sport to self-regulate.

That has been the case for many generations. The regulator now comes into this sport and controls the game. In clause after clause, the game is controlled through government control and guidance—most of which, tragically, is not even in the Bill and is hidden under a cloak of anonymity. This is the most far-reaching, direct political intervention into the running of any sport in the history of this country—the country which once gave the world the rules and regulations for sport to be universal, autonomous and self-regulating. It is a historic irony that ours should now be the first Government in the western world to take control of sport and, by doing so, unleash the potential to do exactly the opposite of what the Government—and all football fans, from both sides of the House—want.

Think of the current owners and just look at the clauses we are considering in this group. The Bill encourages, not diminishes, the long-term potential of a super league. It may in the short term stop it in its tracks but, in the future, this onerous government intervention will do little to attract new investment—why should it? The losers will be the fans. Existing Premier League ownership tests are already onerous, as they should be, but there is no case to add the influence test.

Before I speak to the amendments in my name, I start by thanking my noble friend Lord Moynihan. This is yet another example where, as we understand this Bill further, we see more and more complexities and unintended consequences which will have a profound impact on the sport that we all love. Those points were very well made by my noble friend, and I look forward to the Minister’s response to them.

My amendments are trying to be helpful and practical, given the complications set out by my noble friend around how you determine who is an owner or who has influence on it all. At the very least, as proposed in Amendment 30, the regulator must inform who it considers to be counted as an owner. I hope noble Lords would agree that that is a fairly sensible move, given that such a person might not consider it themselves but might be deemed to have influence.

Just as we require a certain competence from officers, Amendment 177 suggests that owners should be subject to a similar assessment.

We are all mindful of the numerous situations we have seen where there is a timeliness to the acquisition of a club, particularly in the context of rescuing a club or where there are certain deadlines, as happened in the case of Abramovich and Chelsea. Amendment 186 states that the regulator must make a decision about an owner or an officer within one month. Officers can be critical to the running of a club as well, so we need timeliness there.

My two further amendments, Amendments 188 and 189, propose that where the regulator is seeking to act retrospectively—as has been pointed out, this gives it the power to reopen the issue of ownership and officers—there needs to be a high bar before it is allowed to go in; otherwise, before we know it, it could be investigating and unpicking the officers and owners of every club. Once again, this is a massive example of just how overbearing we are in danger of setting up this regulator to be.

Amendment 188 says that the regulator can investigate the current owners only if it believes that there is a reason for them not being suitable. It is trying to put an evidential burden or barrier on that. Similarly, Amendment 189 is about trying to determine the fitness of current officers only if it already has information in place suggesting that those current officers are not fit. Otherwise, if we add up all the multiple hundreds of officers of the hundred or so clubs, we would be setting up a whole logjam of investigations, which I would hope that all noble Lords think does not best serve the interests of those clubs or football as a whole.

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Moynihan and I commend him on his comprehensive demolition of the Government’s case. I have fundamental problems with this clause, as it stands, in respect of ownership. As my noble friend rightly says, it goes way beyond the admonitions and existing legislation of, say, the various Companies Acts. It is much more draconian and prescriptive than anything we have seen in company law. It is quite sensible, and not ignoble, for all Governments to take a value judgment on who is a fit and appropriate person to be a company director and to trade and take part in commerce. We all understand and support that, but what we see here is very oddly drafted legislation. It seems to me that it may be a reaction to the trade policy clause that existed in the original Bill, which was withdrawn.

At the same time, the Bill is extremely opaque, permissive and open-ended in the power that is bestowed on the Secretary of State. Looking at the schedule, I am very uncomfortable about giving those sweeping powers, not least because there is a differential between the “significant influence”, as contained in the schedule, that a director or a person involved in a football club may have and what we read in Clause 3, which is just “a degree of influence”. What does a degree of influence mean?

It is not all a case of the Saudi royal family and Newcastle United. We are talking about 116 clubs. Is “influence” popping into the dressing room at half-time and saying, “Great match, guys; here’s a beer”? Is it saying, “If you play better next year, my company might sponsor you more favourably”? It may seem ridiculous to use those examples, but this wording is so unclear—so opaque and permissive—in asking to give Ministers very significant powers that we need to think carefully, again, about whether it is appropriate to let it remain in the Bill.

For that reason, I strongly support the eloquent and comprehensive case made by my noble friend Lord Moynihan and, in passing, of course I support the amendment from my noble friend Lord Markham. This is a bad clause. It will give rise to very big risks of litigation. Ministers should think carefully about whether it remains in the Bill and we should think again, perhaps on Report.

My Lords, Norwich City were very fortunate to have Michael Wynn-Jones and Delia Smith as majority shareholders for the past 26 years. They have been fantastic custodians of the club. They joined the board when Norwich were in a perilous financial position and helped steward the club through the highs and lows of six promotions, six relegations, two play-off finals and 15 managers. Of course, Delia was not averse to some direct fan engagement with her “Let’s be ’avin’ you” rallying cry, which we all know and love.

In October, Norfolk Holdings, a group led by the principal owner of the Milwaukee Brewers, assumed majority control of the club, so a new chapter has begun. While Michael and Delia have relinquished control, they remain committed fans, as they always have been. I know that all Canaries are extremely grateful for their unwavering commitment to the club.

I raise this because Norwich have been very fortunate to have owners committed to running the club in a stable and—dare I say it—sustainable way over the last couple of decades. I entirely agree about the importance of proper scrutiny of football owners. Norwich have benefited from stability in ownership, basically because fans who had enough money to run the club were running it. But I have a couple of questions for the Minister about the impact of the Bill, which I would appreciate clarity on.

First, I would be grateful if the Minister could explain in more detail the potential implications for existing club owners. My impression—I may have misunderstood this from our meeting last week with representatives of the shadow football regulator—was that the provisions of the Bill would be applied in relation to potential owners after the Act comes into force. But, according to the Explanatory Notes, Clause 34 on incumbent owners opens the door to the IFR being able to make a determination about the suitability of existing owners,

“if the IFR has information that gives it grounds for concern about whether the … owner meets” the ownership fitness criteria. Can the Minister give some sense or some examples of what sort of information or level of evidence might need to be gathered to trigger this provision in relation to existing owners? For instance, pressure could be put on the IFR to test individuals where third parties raise concerns about them or, as my noble friend said, if they do not currently fall within the Premier League or EFL definition of ownership and therefore have not been subject to a test.

I am sure the Minister will agree that it is important that any process undertaken by the new regulator is transparent, robust and rigorous, as she will understand that the potential implications for any clubs that face such a situation could be catastrophic. A forced divestment of an incumbent owner would probably be disastrous for many clubs. The Bill appears to provide for that possibility, because it does not grandfather existing owners in, and it does not make clear the threshold for triggering a test. I would be grateful if the Minister could give us a bit more of an explanation of that.

Secondly, the Premier League has made clear its intention to maintain its ownership tests. In our meeting last week with representatives of the shadow regulator, they said that they had had conversations and knew that that was the situation—so everyone is working from the same page. But, obviously, that test is different from the test that the IFR will follow. Can the Minister explain what happens if the situation arises that the Premier League finds an owner suitable through its tests but the IFR does not? An even more tricky situation is if the IFR finds an owner suitable and the Premier League does not. Can the regulator overrule the Premier League in both these circumstances? Importantly, how would that difference be resolved? Obviously, that would be quite a critical situation and, for fans, a seminal issue for their club.

My Lords, in the debate on an earlier group we heard some dilemmas around the fact that, for example, Welsh teams such as Wrexham might not be in scope of the Bill. It is possible that Rob McElhenney and Ryan Reynolds will be relieved to discover that they might not be. Those following Wrexham’s progress will know that they spend a great deal of time complaining about the ridiculous regulatory framework that the football club has to negotiate. It is not football regulation but every other—as they say—bonkers regulation that means they cannot build. There are many hoops that they have to jump through.

This is slightly important because, when we have this discussion about suitability and fitness, we constantly see it as scrutiny because we are wary of charlatans. Everybody that has ever been involved in football is anxious about types of owner who might not have football at their heart, but the reality is that many owners of football clubs and many people with influence over them love the game and are nothing but great influences on the clubs. That is obviously why Rob McElhenney and Ryan are well-known heroes worldwide now. But there are also corporate interests that can be just as beneficial and important.

One reason why this is so tricky, why it needs to be clarified and why I am glad to see these amendments in this group is that any discussion about suitability and fitness that gives so much intrusive and overbearing power to a regulator has to be queried to understand exactly what it will mean. The last question from the noble Baroness, Lady Evans, was important: what happens if there is a clash?

Outside of football, the debates on who is suitable to run what are subject to all sorts of subjective and sometimes malicious trouble, caused by people who do not have the best interests of the clubs at heart. If noble Lords have ever spent any time with football fans, they will know that many do not think that their club’s owners are suitable or would pass any suitability test—as I will tell you over a pint. It might well be the gripe of the day.

My point is that the Bill has to be reined in, in terms of how much power has been given to make decisions that are not straightforward or scientific. Until we recognise that there is a danger of unintended consequences, the Minister might—not through any desire to—open a can of worms that will be damaging to many football teams.

My Lords, I rise to speak about ownership definitions and tests proposed in the Bill, and particularly to support Amendments 27 to 29 tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan.

Although everyone can support proper scrutiny of football club ownership, I have concerns that the current provisions create unnecessary complexity and uncertainty. It is important that we are clear about the purpose of the Bill in this respect. As my noble friend’s amendments demonstrate, the Bill proposes a new definition of ownership that goes beyond current football tests, introducing the concept of influence. This goes beyond the football authority definitions, which focus only on control. Yet the Bill provides little detail about how this extended scope will work in practice or what problems it aims to solve. It will apparently be for the Secretary of State to decide what is meant by “influence”.

Equally concerning is the lack of clarity regarding existing owners. As has already been asked, do the Government envisage using these new powers to retrospectively challenge current ownership arrangements? If not, why create a broader definition than the existing tests? If they do, this represents an extraordinary intervention into private property rights that demands much greater scrutiny.

The Premier League has significantly strengthened its owners tests, including in relation to the Abramovich case, and sanctioned individuals. What evidence suggests that parallel tests, with differing criteria, would improve outcomes, rather than creating uncertainty and potential legal conflict? Without such clarity, we risk creating a framework that deters responsible investment, while failing to address any real problems in football governance.

Let me be clear about another point. As my noble friend Lady Evans pointed out, the EFL is, I believe, very happy to give up its own ownership test to the regulator because it views the exercise as costly and time consuming—that is its right. But the Premier League fully intends to maintain its own ownership tests—why should it not? It is a fundamental right of a members’ organisation to determine its own composition, and the Premier League really is a membership body. We have only 20 clubs, not 72, and it is a fundamental part of how we drive forward the Premier League, grow in international markets and make collective decisions about the future of the game, together with the FA.

Determining who can come into the group is therefore a key part of how we collectively run the Premier League as equal shareholders. I would argue that we have one of the most sophisticated ownership tests in world sport. Yet the Bill would introduce a parallel test, and it would do so without defining its contents. Naturally, this creates immediate uncertainty.

The Bill is troubling, too, on detail. The planned test, which will be for the regulator to create and define at some stage in future, would appear to include more subjective elements than the Premier League’s existing criteria. That would be very strange. Surely it would be quite a good idea if prospective investors and owners could know with confidence, from the outside, whether they qualified to buy a football club. I would be grateful if the Minister could answer a simple question: is the test provided for in the Bill going to be a subjective or an objective test? It obviously cannot be both. As my noble friend Lady Evans said, the practical implications run deeper. What happens when the regulator approves an owner, but the Premier League does not, or vice versa? Can the IFR force the Premier League to take in an owner that it does not want? The Bill makes no provision for resolving such conflicts. Instead, I worry that it creates the perfect conditions for prolonged litigation—exactly what proper regulation should avoid.

Of course, all this uncertainty is likely to be very damaging to investment. Put yourself in the shoes of an investor examining Premier League football as a potential opportunity. They now face not one ownership test but two, both with different criteria. One test is not even defined in legislation. Either could result in rejection. Both could trigger lengthy legal challenges. What serious investor would begin spending the millions of pounds required to explore a transaction in football —on the investment bankers, the lawyers, the due diligence, the regulatory compliance, the tax advisers and the rest of it? Why would we want to introduce such fundamental uncertainty?

I worry that, without far more clarity in the Bill, we risk deterring the very kind of responsible, long-term investors that football needs and wants. I urge the Minister to carefully consider these points. At a minimum, we need clarity on: how conflicts between tests will be resolved; exactly how and why the IFR’s test is intended to be materially different from the existing tests; what provisions exist for managing litigation; why the definition of ownership is wider than that used by the football authorities today, and what the implications are; and, above all, how investment confidence will be maintained.

The goal of proper ownership scrutiny is, of course, completely correct, but we must achieve it through clear, workable mechanisms and not parallel systems that create uncertainty and confusion.

My Lords, I enter this debate from a slightly different angle—and I make no apology for that. My concern is linked more to what I might describe as preventing another Wimbledon, or to “Wimbledon-proofing” the legislation. That is what the amendments that we have in this group attempt to assert.

This is important, because Wimbledon was a warning shot across football when it happened—when Wimbledon Football Club was transported 61 miles away from its home community to Milton Keynes. Only one other club has had to move further than that, and that was Brighton & Hove Albion when we were shunted inexplicably—well, rather explicably, in the end—to Gillingham to play our home games. I know that I could go on about that for a long time, but I want to prevent that sort of thing happening in future. As part of the determination of suitability, we are trying to get a commitment—and perhaps the Minister can help us—that issues related to where the home ground is will be an important part of the test as to whether a person is a fit and proper person to become an owner of a regulated club. That is what our Amendment 182 seeks to clarify.

Fans need that long-term security. They need to understand that the people who take ownership of a much-loved community asset are there for the longer term and have a longer-term interest in the community and its football club. We need that because the majority of clubs most likely to be affected by this legislation are those smaller clubs with which there is a great affinity and community bond. I hope that the Minister can assure us that one of the relevant considerations when looking at a new owner will be their commitment to ensuring that the ground stays pretty much where it is and that fans are consulted about any changes to be made to it.

I read with interest the noble Lord’s Amendment 182. The wording says of the commitment to the home ground

“with said commitment to be codified in such form as the IFR may determine”.

Does he agree that it could undermine any existing contractual relationship and bring uncertainty into the business activities of that club, were this amendment to be adopted?

I do not think that it would. It is designed to stop owners disposing of the assets. I will give the noble Lord the example of Brighton, because what happened there is very instructive. Back in the 1990s, it was taken over by some rogue owners —Bellotti, Stanley and Archer. Apart from becoming local hate figures, they sold the stadium before they had anywhere else to locate the football club. Then they tried to blackmail us politicians in Hove Council and Brighton Council—we were not a unitary at the time—into providing them with a completely unsuitable site for relocation, with no planning permission and no business plan at all. That was wrong, and it destroyed that club for a period of time. It has taken us a long time to recover from that. It has taken the support of fans and the good will of good local politicians to rebuild Brighton into the excellent and well-run club that it is today. Now, I would say that, wouldn’t I? But it is the truth, and that was the situation.

This amendment is quite personal to me. I did not go on marches, protest or do what I could as the leader of the council to see that position undermined. I would hope that the noble Lord opposite, as a supporter of Peterborough, would have a similar passion for his club. That is the reason for this amendment. We want to make sure that we provide fans with that security and knowledge and understanding of the importance of that commitment.

My Lords, briefly, if we are talking about influence, it is reasonable that we know what it means. As the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has said, this is an example of why we have this Bill. There have been rogue owners, and one of the traditional ways they come in is by looking for a property deal on the site. It is important to remember that as an example of what happens when you get this wrong. We need to balance these two points together. I hope that, when the Minister comes to answer, she will at least start to shed light on how we will seek to do this.

My Lords, I have talked to quite a number of major new investors in English football and have not found one who opposes the general principle of having a regulator. They are quite relaxed about it, yet they are the major new investors. I think one reason is that, when people invest, they often find some hidden nasties that had not been disclosed about the investment and its finances. That extra element of transparency is not necessarily a discouragement to investors; it can be an encouragement, particularly to reliable, long-term investors.

If you talk to a random selection of football fans, one case that will always quickly crop up is the Glazers buying Manchester United, not with their own money but with leveraged buyouts. I am rather more benign about the Glazers, because their intentions were always very open: they were borrowing money from reliable sources and attempting to make a profit. I would not be too comfortable about that if it were my club, but it cannot be denied that what they did was clear, transparent and out in the open. Anybody who thinks that there are not people today who the fans believe are generous and beneficial owners who have put lots of their own money in, but who have in fact borrowed the money from sources that are not public, are being rather naive, because that is still a model through which people buy football clubs. Football clubs are easy to move money in and out of and speculative investment has proven over the last 20 years, particularly in English football, a reasonable bet and may continue to be so. Indeed, the whole case of the Premier League is that it will continue to be so, so the regulation being proposed is not necessarily an anti-business case.

There is another interesting aspect that does not come to light because we do not know about it. I hear from current and recent professional players about the impact and influence of agents. Are there now agents who are sufficiently powerful in the game, with the corporate entities they have created to own footballers and, more critically, footballers’ rights, that their unseen investment in a club could have an influence in ways that the wider public, including the fans, do not know about? It seems to me, from a fan perspective, that that is a problem for the health of the game. On balance, the good, long-term investor who could make good money —that seems to be a rational motive—will be in favour of this element of transparency and not against it.

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Mann, with his very pertinent points on agents and fans. I rise briefly to support my noble friend’s Amendment 27 and to make a point about owners being fit for purpose, fans’ interests and consultations and unintended consequences. Along with other noble Lords, I spent last Friday afternoon with the shadow regulator. I asked whether they were aware of how unpopular they could be. I used the example that has already been used of Newcastle United, which has a new owner and a sovereign wealth fund, and the fans are excited because of the potential that brings. That is great, but what would this regulator make of the new ownership? Compare and contrast that with the previous owner, Mike Ashley.

Noble Lords will be aware of what Newcastle fans thought about Mike Ashley: in their eyes the team was underperforming and he was not investing in the club and its players. However, he was probably being prudent and working within the constraints of the rules of the game, and the regulator might have judged him to be a perfectly fit and proper person to run and own that club. I ask noble Lords to imagine a situation where the regulator says to a sovereign wealth fund owner, a country such as Saudi Arabia, “I do not believe you are a fit and proper person to take over and own this club”, but the fans think it would be wonderful. The regulator could end up in a situation with literally tens of thousands of protesters going down to Manchester from clubs like Newcastle.

As the noble Lord said, Brighton and Hove Albion supporters are very passionate, and he clearly did a good job there as a council leader. However, we know that fans will travel all around the country to support their team and we could end up with the unintended consequence of the regulator denying the potential of an owner to buy a club based on his set of rules and regulations, but tens of thousands of fans would disagree and we could have a situation where they would go down and protest. That could be one of the unintended consequences, so perhaps the Minister could let the House know whether the Government have thought of that.

My Lords, I support Amendments 182 to 184 in the names of my noble friends Lady Taylor and Lord Bassam. I do so, as my noble friend Lord Bassam said, specifically in relation to Wimbledon—not AFC Wimbledon, at which I happen to be a season ticket holder, but Wimbledon, the previous club, which has now been moved 60 miles up the M1 to Milton Keynes. I want to focus on the situation prior to that happening, and that is why these amendments are relevant.

Ironically, in one of the debates on the Bill last week I talked about state intervention and mentioned the Taylor report. It was that report, published in, I think, 1991, which said that our grounds at the top level must be all seated. Wimbledon’s ground was too small and too cramped, with houses round about it, for that to be done, so they moved from there to a ground share with Crystal Palace, ostensibly on a short-term basis—it turned out that they would be there for more than 10 years, but that is not really relevant to this. The point is that the owner eventually sold the ground from under the fans to a supermarket chain, and subsequently sold the club to Norwegian owners. The point is that the fans were nowhere consulted in any of this, although they made their views clear. But the point is that the home ground is key to any football club and there has to be the long-term commitment to that.

My noble friend Lord Bassam talked about going up to Milton Keynes. The previous owner of Wimbledon FC wanted to move it to Dublin. That was a serious proposal. Thankfully, it came to nothing, of course. On this issue of whether a club can move, that is why the regulator is important. It is maybe lost in the mists of time that, when Wimbledon FC were about to be moved, the FA and the Football League opposed it, and the FA, totally wrongly, set up a commission, which gave the club permission to move to Milton Keynes. It was famously said that retaining the club in Wimbledon would be

“not in the wider interests of football”.

Well, 25 years later, Wimbledon FC, now in Milton Keynes, gets crowds of about 6,000 and AFC Wimbledon, the new club, gets crowds of about 8,000—so noble Lords can work out what is in the wider interests of football from that.

My concern is about the commitment to the club’s ground. It is important that, unless we can get a long-term commitment for when ownership is going to change, there is no reason why any ground could not be sold off, with a new owner claiming, “Well, I’ve had such and such an offer from a supermarket chain, I can’t possibly turn it down. I’ll build a new ground some time in the future, but I don’t know when”. That is why the word “codified” in Amendment 182 is particularly important. It needs to be nailed down, because the importance of the home ground cannot be overstated in terms of the investment of fans into their football clubs.

My Lords, I am conscious that the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, has not been able to be with us today to speak to her Amendments 187A and 187B; I know she has a commitment to chairing some Welsh sports bodies, which I know the Committee will understand and support. I just wanted to draw the Committee’s attention to the two amendments that she tabled, which have been grouped together with the others that we have debated here. As her explanatory statement sets out, they aim to provide a route for the regulator

“for other individuals and groups of people, who may have more inside knowledge than the average fan, to act as whistleblowers and raise any concerns they have about the suitability of an owner or officer”.

It is regrettable that the noble Baroness has not been able to be here to set out the case more fully, but I am sure that noble Lords will pay attention to that and consider those amendments as well.

I rise to speak to the amendments, in this rather large group, tabled in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham, to which I have added my name; they are Amendments 30, 177, 186, 188 and 189.

Amendment 30 requires the regulator to give a notice to inform any of those whom it considers to be an owner under the Bill. As my noble friend set out, this is to make sure that those who are liable for the duties under the Bill can be informed of that fact; that seems very sensible and I hope the Minister will look favourably upon it.

Amendment 177 standardises the language used in the Bill regarding owners and officers. Currently, owners are not required to have requisite competence, but officers are. But we know from experience that an incompetent owner can be just as damaging—if not more so—than incompetent directors, and we have heard some clear and powerful examples in the debate today. So, again, I hope the Minister will look favourably on Amendment 177, which sensibly tries to ensure that the same standards are applied to both.

I listened with interest to the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, set out on his behalf and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton. I understand his reasons; he spoke very eloquently about the club dearest to his heart. When one remembers iconic football grounds, such as Highbury and Upton Park, which have formed part of the bedrock of a local community, or, indeed, the case of MK Dons and AFC Wimbledon, which I was first told about by my noble friend Lord O’Shaughnessy, who is a fellow supporter of AFC Wimbledon—which the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie, might be pleased to know—we can certainly see the appeal here. There are later provisions in the Bill which seek to make sure that any move of a football ground involves consultation with fans, and I am conscious that we will have a chance to debate those as well. Weaving it into the regulation of owners could give rise to some of the concerns about overregulation that we have heard, so that is the reason I have not yet expressed support for them—but I will listen with interest to what the Minister says. It is a way of adding a further protection to the important area the noble Lord set out.

It is also important to remember that football clubs—like political parties, businesses and many organisations —do change with the times, and they have got to retain the freedom to evolve. The example of the Arsenal is probably the most profound one; it was originally a club founded in south London and named after the Woolwich Arsenal, but is now very much grounded in north London. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, set out her support for Arsenal and she is, I think, a south Londoner rather than a north Londoner, so is perhaps apposite in her allegiance.

While we are supportive of maintaining the historic links between clubs and their home grounds, and making sure that fans are properly consulted if a move is to happen, we have also got to be conscious of the fact that circumstances change. We have got to make sure that the regulator is not excessively prescriptive in its provisions. So I look forward to hearing what the Minister says on her noble friend’s suggestions.

Amendment 186 in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham seeks to limit to one month the period in which the regulator must make a determination under Clauses 28 and 29. We have heard concerns expressed across the Committee about the risks of overregulation and mission creep, and this amendment seeks to probe the Government’s intention regarding these judgments. As I hope the Government will appreciate, as is the case in any regulated sector, timely decision-making is crucial to prevent the regulator hampering good governance or having the sort of chilling effect that we want to avoid.

I hope the Minister will be able to give the Committee a sense of what the Government expect the relevant decision-making period to be. As currently drafted, the Bill leaves this timescale yet again to be defined in secondary legislation. That would allow the rules to be varied at relatively short notice and without the consent of the clubs that are being regulated. This is another example of our concern at the secondary powers here and the lack of clarity for those who will feel the force of them. The attempt through this amendment is to close the gap between the expectations of the regulator and the expectations on clubs. If we expect prospective owners to inform the regulator in a timely manner of their intention to buy a regulated club, then by extension we must surely expect the regulator to respond in a timely manner.

Amendments 188 and 189, also tabled by my noble friend Lord Markham, seek to insert the word “only” into Clauses 34 and 35. That is to link up the wording used in the Explanatory Notes and in the Bill, thereby limiting the ability of the regulator to investigate incumbent owners and officers. This will guarantee that the regulator can exercise its powers under Clause 34 or 35 only if it is in possession of information that gives it cause for concern. The tightening of the language here can only benefit the Bill.

Like my noble friend Lady Evans of Bowes Park, I was concerned about the implications of Clause 34 for incumbent owners when the Bill gains Royal Assent. Noble Lords might expect me to have alighted on the case of Newcastle United. As was powerfully set out by my noble friends Lord Moynihan and Lord Evans of Rainow, fans of Newcastle would be concerned by the implications that my noble friend set out in his very powerful and eloquent speech opening the debate on this group. Again, his forensic contribution underlined the problems of uncertainty and lack of specificity in the wording used in the Bill. That is something that has troubled a lot of us across the House and, indeed, has troubled the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I hope the Minister will respond to the specific questions he raised about what the Prime Minister might say to the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia when he is in that kingdom next month about what the Bill might mean for the fund and for Newcastle United.

If I may, I hope the Minister can answer another question, which is a timely one given the state visit that is currently under way. In 2022, our now Prime Minister, who dined with the Emir of Qatar last night—and I gather met him again today—banned his colleagues in the Labour Party from attending the football World Cup in Qatar. At the time, he said that

“the human rights record is such that I wouldn’t go, and that’ll be the position of the Labour Party”.

Given the importance of friendly relations with our partners across the Gulf and the diplomatic power of football, does the Minister still believe that was the right approach for the leader of her party to take? And if England was playing a match in Qatar tomorrow, would she go?

I thank the noble Lords, Lord Moynihan and Lord Markham, in her absence the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and my noble friends Lady Taylor of Bolton and Lord Bassam of Brighton for the amendments in this group. It is absolutely right that clubs have suitable owners, a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Evans of Bowes Park, among others. That is why a new statutory owners’ and directors’ test is a key element of the regulatory regime.

In response to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, the current tests have proven ineffective. They result in a drawn-out process that still allows unsuitable owners into the system. We have seen numerous instances of unsuitable owners and officers causing harm to clubs and detriment to their fans—that stops now. The definitions ensure that those who are responsible for clubs can be identified and tested. They cannot hide behind complex ownership structures to avoid this, as existing tests currently allow. My noble friend Lord Mann made a strong case for strong tests, and my noble friend Lord Watson of Invergowrie added his own experience of Wimbledon.

The noble Baroness, Lady Evans of Bowes Park, asked a number of questions around the owners’ and directors’ tests. In response, I will say that football authorities can still conduct their owners’ and directors’ tests if they choose to do so, but the regulator’s test is set in statute. Any owner who fails the regulator’s tests will be removed and any prospective owner must pass the regulator’s tests before taking ownership, no matter the results of the league’s tests.

Given the importance of this issue, I welcome the opportunity to clarify the Government’s position further. I start with Amendments 27, 28, and 29 from the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. The definition of an ultimate owner is an important part of the Bill, and we are confident that we have the right definition that achieves the Bill’s aim. The current drafting takes its lead from the precedent of other Acts that use “influence or control” together, including the Companies Act “persons with significant control” regime and the economic crime Act “beneficial owners” regime. This ensures that an individual who exerts significant influence over a club, more than that of any other owner, can still be identified as the ultimate owner, even if they do not have formal legal control.

That is an exceptionally helpful and clear answer; now she has given us the Government’s view on what “significant influence” means. Why, then, do the Government not put that in the Bill, rather than simply say that at some stage in the future it will come forward under secondary legislation?

The Government’s view is that we do not need to put it in the Bill.

It is absolutely critical to achieve the clarity that the noble Lords, Lord Mann and Lord Watson, have been talking about, and I agree with them completely. What is needed is clarity for investors. It is absolutely essential that it goes in the Bill; it is critical to the definition of ownership and to the whole regulatory framework that is being placed in a hugely lengthy enabling Bill. The clubs and owners at the EFL and the Premier League need clarity. The Minister has very kindly given the Committee clarity on the definition, as she sees it, of significant influence, so what is there to resist in terms of placing it in the legislation so football clubs can consider it in detail?

I am happy to meet with the noble Lord and discuss this further, but in our view this is not required in the Bill but will become clear from the work of the regulator. We think this will be clear in practice.

This is also a term and a part of the Bill that was within the iteration of the Bill laid before Parliament by the previous Government, notwithstanding the noble Lord’s right to object to the Bill that his Government may have laid before Parliament.

I am sorry to intervene again on that, but that is actually not correct. The one area of the Bill that is actually different from the previous Bill is the requirement on the regulator to have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives of the Government, which is why we used the example of Newcastle. The Minister has not answered the very clear question: as chairman of the PIF, does the Crown Prince, who exercises control over the PIF, now exercise control over Newcastle, and as a result would be captured by the regulatory requirements of the Bill and not by the Premier League requirements?

My Lords, earlier, I said that I was not confused. I am now slightly confused, because noble Lords were very clear earlier in Committee that any issue with the legislation that might lead to UEFA objecting to it was problematic; now, the Government have removed a part of the Bill that was problematic and objected to by UEFA, that risked us being able to compete as a country in leagues within overseas competitions. So, I am slightly confused on that point, but as I said, I am happy to meet the noble Lord.

The other point is that the Companies Act guidance on this is long and complicated. In our view, it has more detail than is appropriate for the Bill, and I assume that the previous Government took the same view.

Can I clarify this point once and for all? Anything—not just the clause on the Government’s foreign and trade policy objectives—that could put a stop to our entry into European competition or World Cup competition should not appear in the Bill. I have argued consistently that anything that would cause the independent bodies regulating international football—UEFA and FIFA—to stop our clubs competing in international tournaments should be resisted at all cost. UEFA intervened and said that the clause to which we were just referring was a political clause and should be removed from the Bill, and the Prime Minister immediately removed it—but the moment you remove it from the Bill, there are unintended consequences.

This is nothing to do with what I just said, but removing it from the Bill has the unintended consequence of not giving guidance to the regulator that it has to have due regard to foreign and trade policy objectives—that is now removed from the Bill—but allowing it to focus exclusively on the significant issue of influence. I simply put the point that the regulator therefore has no protection. Given that the regulator has to deem on influence, does the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, who has influence as chair of the PIF, which owns Newcastle, fall within the context of the regulation that this Government are putting before the House without the clause that was previously in the Bill? The answer is yes.

We cannot pre-empt or direct the regulator, which will make objective decisions on a case-by-case basis. However, I repeat that I am very happy to sit down with the noble Lord to discuss and go through the unintended consequences that he appears to be concerned about. I will move on.

I turn to Amendment 30 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Markham. When a club applies for a provisional licence, it has to submit a personnel statement setting out its owners, ultimate owners, officers and senior managers. The regulator will then approve the personnel statement, subject to any modifications, once it is satisfied that it is accurate. The club must then publish it, and this must be updated on an ongoing basis to ensure that it stays accurate. This, therefore, already provides clarity to the club, owners and fans as to who the owners, ultimate owners, officers and senior managers are.

A core part of ensuring that clubs have suitable owners and directors is the fitness test, which Amendment 177 seeks to expand. Let me be clear: the individual fitness test criteria for owners—honesty and integrity, and financial soundness—have been carefully designed. They are based on precedent and are specifically relevant to whether someone is suitable to be an owner of a football club. This amendment seeks for an owner’s competence to be assessed too. We do not believe that this would be relevant in the regulator’s assessment of someone’s fitness to be solely an owner. Some owners are hands off, and so their competence is not strictly relevant. If an owner also meets the definition of an officer, the regulator will be able to test them as both an officer and an owner. Therefore, as an officer, their competence would be assessed. However, an owner simply having a financial interest in the club does not mean that they make decisions that an officer would about how it is run on a day-to-day basis.

I turn to Amendments 181 and 183 in the name of my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton on the information that must be provided as part of a prospective owner’s application. I agree with the intention of the amendments —that the regulator will need information about an individual’s fitness in order to make an assessment—which is why Clause 28(2) already does that. It gives the regulator the ability to require information from an individual about their fitness. In fact, the Bill goes even further: it recognises that information about an individual’s fitness may come from, or be corroborated by, another source. That is why the Bill establishes information-sharing gateways with organisations such as the National Crime Agency. Specifically on Amendment 183, there is a risk that this amendment incentivises applicants to submit large volumes of unrequested information to the regulator, which could make it more difficult for the regulator to process applications efficiently.

The Government recognise and support the intent behind Amendments 182 and 184 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton: to ensure that football continues to be played in a club’s home ground and that owners are committed to this. However, in many instances, neither clubs nor club owners own their home grounds. This amendment would therefore place a requirement on prospective owners to commit to something that may not be in their control. The Bill already has a number of comprehensive home ground protections to safeguard against inappropriate sales or ill thought-out relocations, including duties on the club itself about selling the club’s home ground or relocating from it—an issue that my noble friend highlighted effectively today. Under the current proposals in the Bill, the regulator can hold senior managers to account if they are responsible for breaching these duties.

Amendment 186 from the noble Lord, Lord Markham, and Amendment 187 from my noble friends Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lady Taylor of Bolton concern the timelines and deadlines for testing prospective owners and officers. I absolutely agree and understand that timely decision-making about the suitability of new owners and officers is highly important. Without deadlines, we have seen league determinations drag on, unable to reach a decision and leaving clubs in limbo. We believe it is important that the regulator has the time to conduct tests with an appropriate level of scrutiny, but it also needs to make decisions in an appropriate time- frame to ensure that clubs are not unnecessarily impacted in what is a fast-paced industry—I think all noble Lords can agree on that. That is why the regulator will be bound by a statutory timeframe, as well as by its objectives, general duties and regulatory principles.

We are confident that, with these existing provisions, the regulator will already conduct tests as quickly as reasonably practicable. However, putting a specific deadline in the Bill would restrict the flexibility for this deadline to be amended in future. That is why we have proposed that the determination period, including the maximum amount of time by which it can be extended, will be set by the Secretary of State in secondary legislation. This will ensure that the regulator is bound by it but that there is still flexibility for the deadline to be amended in future. I hope noble Lords agree that future-proofing is a key consideration for this and any other legislation.

In the spirit of the debate, although the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is not in her place, I will speak briefly to Amendments 187A and 187B in her name. They concern whistleblowing on the suitability of an owner or officer, as the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, highlighted. I share the noble Baroness’s desire to ensure that concerned parties can blow the whistle on unsuitable owners or officers. However, I assure noble Lords that there is no need to amend the Bill to allow this. It is already open to anyone, including all those listed in Amendment 187A, to share relevant information with the regulator. Therefore, we do not see the need to create a separate obligation in the Bill for individuals to report information to the regulator.

The noble Baroness, Lady Evans of Bowes Park, raised a number of pertinent issues covered by the subjects raised in Amendments 188 and 189 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Markham. They seek to ensure that the regulator can test an incumbent owner or officer on their fitness only if it is in possession of information that gives it concern about whether the individual would meet the applicable fitness criteria. The Government very much agree with the intent behind these amendments, so I would like to reassure the noble Lord that the intent of these amendments is already delivered in the current drafting of the Bill. Clauses 34(1) and 35(1) give the regulator the powers to test incumbent owners or officers on their fitness if the regulator

“is in possession of information that gives it grounds for concern about whether the individual meets those criteria”.

If the regulator is not in possession of such information, it will not be able to test an incumbent owner or officer. The definition of an incumbent is clearly set out in Clauses 34(3) and 35(2). For the reasons I have set out, I will be grateful if the noble Lords do not press their amendments.

I am very grateful for the Minister’s very clear answer on the Premier League and the regulator’s suitability test clashing. She said that the regulator is statutory and therefore would override the Premier League saying that it wanted someone the IFR did not. It may be a very unusual situation, but does it therefore follow that, if the Premier League decides through its test that an owner is unsuitable but the IFR decides that they are, the IFR can, in effect, impose an owner on a club? The Minister answered half of my question, and I am very interested to hear about the other half. If she cannot answer now, can she write to me?

No, it cannot.

Before the Minister sits down, perhaps I could make a comment. The Minister has been very helpful in offering meetings to discuss a whole range of issues that arise, which we greatly appreciate, and to write beforehand. On one thing which she touched on—I will obviously have to read Hansard very carefully to check, because she moved on fairly quickly—was why companies legislation was not acceptable for the Bill. I just register that I would like when we meet to discuss this more fully. She referred to Companies Act legislation being very lengthy, but I am not clear on why, if it is acceptable in general Companies Act legislation, it is not acceptable here. We can discuss that, but I just wanted to register it at this point so that when we meet, it is a subject for conversation.

I am happy to go into more detail on that point when I meet the noble Lord and I will ask my officials to contact him to set up a meeting.

I thank everybody who has participated on this set of amendments. I heard a somewhat surprising answer from the Minister just now and I hope that it might be clarified. My noble friend Lady Evans put the question to the Committee as to which regulator takes precedence. My clear understanding of this Bill is that, through the licence procedure, the regulator we are setting up will take precedence over anything that the Premier League may choose to do. Indeed, that would be part of the contract of the licence issued by the proposed regulator, and that would take priority over, for example, the suitability and fitness tests, the degree of political interference or whatever the league might wish to do on the licensing of a club. However, I heard the Minister perhaps giving a somewhat different answer and, again, I would be grateful for clarification. A meeting is gratefully accepted and I look forward to meeting with the Minister, but, more importantly, these specific points need to be covered in writing to all members of the Committee, because I think there is wider interest than among just those whom she has kindly and graciously offered to meet.

I am sorry she did not respond to my noble friend Lord Parkinson’s question about Qatar. For the record, I am a great believer that sport is a catalyst for change. You know, when you win the right to host the World Cup, that you are shining a torch into the inner recesses of that country, which few other opportunities do. It means the world’s press and the football fans of the world are very conscious of what is happening in your country.

There is no doubt that hosting the World Cup in Qatar had significant influence on important social and employment changes that took place in that country. The fact that the ILO had an office there, worked there beforehand with the Government, was pushing for changes and continues to be there, is a great example. It is the only country in the Middle East that has that office. It is a great example of the power of sport for good and the power of sport for change. So I am sorry the Minister did not respond to that point, because I think it is an exceptionally important one.

I regret to say that I have not been persuaded by the Minister’s defence of retaining influence on the face of the legislation and yet not defining it, saying that it is for secondary legislation. It is one of many, many things that are for secondary legislation. For example, once the regulator identifies the owners and ultimate owners at the stage of the licence application, the regulator can, as the Minister said, make use of its powers under Clause 34 to determine the suitability of those owners. That includes whether the owner meets the individual fitness criteria and whether they have a source of wealth connected to serious criminal conduct. Serious criminal conduct is an extremely important concept that needs defining. If we look further towards the back of the Bill, it comes under “minor definitions” and will be for the Secretary of State to come forward with secondary legislation to define what he means by serious criminal conduct.

This Bill, I regret to say, is riddled with contradictory comments, huge regulation and a requirement to come back all the time with secondary legislation. I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Mann and Lord Watson, who have said many times, “Let’s have clarity”. We need clarity; football needs clarity; this Committee needs clarity. The wide potential interpretation of influence, rather than control, should really be a worry if we want to encourage owners to come in at all levels of football and make sure that they enhance the national game and increase the value of the Premier League, through which flows all the benefits down through the rest of the professional leagues. We do not even know which leagues we are talking about in the Bill. It is a huge pity—and I say that with a heavy heart, because I am in favour of many of the issues that come up later, not least some of those that come forward in amendments from the Labour Benches, because I think that they focus on the fans—and the fan side of this I do not have a problem with.

I really wrestle with the financial regulation set out in the 140-odd pages of this Bill, because I do not think it is clear, it is exceptionally onerous, it would deter investment and it requires clarity in the Bill. In my view, this set of amendments is about the most important that we will consider because, if we do not take this away and think carefully before Report about how we can improve this set of amendments and this part of the Bill to get greater clarity, we risk disincentivising owners in future—and if we do that, it is football that is damaged and, ultimately, the fans who will not forgive Parliament for the way it has gone about this regulatory framework. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 27 withdrawn.

Amendments 28 to 30 not moved.

Clause 3 agreed.

Schedule 1 agreed.

Clause 4: Meanings of “officer” and “senior manager” etc