Great British Energy Bill - Committee (1st Day) – in the House of Lords at 3:56 pm on 3 December 2024.
Moved by Lord Offord of Garvel
1: Clause 1, page 1, line 2, leave out “company” and insert “subsidiary of the National Wealth Fund”Member's explanatory statementThis would probe into the relationship between Great British Energy and the National Wealth Fund - formerly the UK Infrastructure Bank.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who are present for this important debate, which deals with an essential topic for the future of our nation: our energy production, security and ownership. I will also speak to Amendments 3 and 5 in my name.
Amendment 1 seeks to probe into the relationship between Great British Energy and the National Wealth Fund, which was formerly known as the UK Infra- structure Bank. Amendment 3 seeks to probe into the fact that Great British Energy may be designated a company only if it is wholly owned by the Crown. Amendment 5 would specify that Great British Energy would be owned by the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero.
We cannot discuss this Bill without giving due consideration to Great British Energy’s relationship with the UK Infrastructure Bank. We have not seen an explanation of how this body is different from the UK Infrastructure Bank, which was set up to do the exact same thing that Great British Energy claims it will do. In fact, Great British Energy is almost a duplicate of the UK Infrastructure Bank, which was established to provide loans, equity and guarantees for infrastructure to tackle climate change, funded by £22 billion of taxpayers’ money. Great British Energy seeks to do something extremely similar, or so it claims, but the Bill gives far greater powers to the Secretary of State. I must ask why this is and why taxpayers should be burdened twice.
The UK Infrastructure Bank Bill had important accountability and reporting measures which have been removed from this Bill. It had a clear and structured framework for accountability and transparency. It was governed by rules to ensure that taxpayers’ money was used efficiently and was subject to rigorous annual reporting, providing the public with the necessary details on its investments and performance.
Given all of this, why, then, has Great British Energy been set up to replicate so much of what the UK Infrastructure Bank is already doing? The two institutions overlap in many areas, from providing funding for green energy projects to ensuring that infrastructure investments are scaled up to meet net-zero targets. If we are to create another institution with overlapping responsibilities, we should ask what the real added value is here.
As I said, the UK Infrastructure Bank was set up with specific checks and balances to prevent the misuse of funds and ensure that the public has visibility into its operations. Great British Energy hands over far greater powers to the Secretary of State, yet there is no explanation of why such sweeping authority is necessary, nor are there are any safeguards to ensure that these powers are not abused or left unchecked. The Secretary of State will therefore have the power to make key decisions without sufficient scrutiny. Again, we must ask: what accountability will there be for the £8.3 billion of taxpayers’ money being handed over? The Bill seems to grant too much discretion without the proper frameworks to hold this body to account.
If we are to create a new company with such significant powers and such an enormous financial commitment from taxpayers, we must ensure that there are clear and enforceable accountability measures. Otherwise, how can we trust that the British taxpayer will get value for money if we are not putting in place the necessary safeguards and reporting structures to ensure transparency and greater governance?
I have outlined the similarities between the UK Infrastructure Bank and Great British Energy, and I have highlighted that the UK Infrastructure Bank has far more accountability and reporting measures. Amendment 1 in my name will therefore ensure that Great British Energy is a subsidiary of the UK Infrastructure Bank.
I will now speak briefly to Amendments 3 and 5 in my name. In Clause 1, page 1, lines 2 to 6, the Bill states that Great British Energy may be designated a company only if it
“is wholly owned by the Crown”.
However, this brings to light issues surrounding equity. If Great British Energy were to raise equity, as suggested in Clause 4, “Financial assistance”, it will no longer be wholly owned by the Crown as required by the Bill. Therefore, the Secretary of State will not be able to designate a company as Great British Energy. These two clauses do not align with each other, and the Bill therefore cannot be read as a coherent draft piece of legislation. I hope that the Minister will recognise this confusion that I seek to address in Amendment 3 in my name. Therefore, I look to the Minister to clarify how these two clauses work cohesively alongside each other, and to confirm whether the ownership of Great British Energy, as outlined in Clause 1, is an issue in the drafting of this legislation.
If the Government’s intention is indeed for Great British Energy to be wholly owned by the Crown, Amendment 5 in my name will specify that Great British Energy will be owned by the Secretary of State in a professional capacity. This amendment seeks to add clarity to the ownership of Great British Energy and will result in both the designation and ownership of Great British Energy to fall under the responsibility of the Secretary of State.
I am pleased to be able to open this group and look forward to the corresponding debate over the course of today. The designation of a company as Great British Energy and the ownership of the company are central to the Bill and, as such, they should be central to the deliberations of our debate in this place. I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 4, 6 and 7 in my name. I start by reminding the Committee of my interests as a micro-generator of hydroelectricity.
Amendments 4, 6 and 7 are designed to probe—a bit like Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Offord—whether it might be desirable to allow Great British Energy to accept minority equity finance. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Dillington, for his support on this. As these are simply probing amendments, I will try to be brief.
As the Bill is currently drafted, Great British Energy can be designated as such only if it is wholly owned by the Crown and will lose its designation automatically if that changes. It follows, therefore, that none of its shares can be owned by another party, and therefore no equity finance could be raised, at least at the Great British Energy level, from parties other than the Crown.
I can imagine situations where being able to introduce external capital into GBE could be a good thing. Clearly, I can understand why the Government would wish to retain control, which is why in my amendments I have set a required level of ownership of at least 75% of the issued share capital. Shareholders with more than 25% have the right to block special resolutions; so as long as the Crown controls 75% or more, it would still have full control of the company.
In that aspect, Amendments 4, 6 and 7 are more restrictive than Amendment 3 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Offord of Garvel, although they are probing the same question. Can the Minister explain why the Government feel that they need GBE to be wholly owned and why they would not want the flexibility to raise external equity finance in future, while retaining control?
I am also interested to hear the answers to the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Offord, on his Amendment 1 on the relationship with the former UK Infrastructure Bank, now called the National Wealth Fund. I see from the letter that the Minister kindly sent us after Second Reading that the activities of GBE will in fact be carried out, at least initially, by the National Wealth Fund,
“in line with the NWF’s investment and operating principles”.
The letter goes on to say:
“This will enable GBE to invest quickly and draw on the NWF’s experience and existing pipeline of projects”.
That raises a serious question as to why we really need GBE at all. If the National Wealth Fund’s investment and operating principles and its existing experience already cover what GBE is being set up for, as the Minister’s letter confirms, and if it already has an existing pipeline of projects, would it not make more sense simply to provide the National Wealth Fund with the additional finance and resources to carry out the activities that are envisaged for Great British Energy—whatever those are, given the lack of detail in the Bill—and to leverage the experience and scale already built up in the National Wealth Fund? Are we in danger of duplicating responsibilities and adding another unnecessary layer of cost and bureaucracy with the Bill?
We could go further. The Bill carves out an area of activity that is currently already covered by the National Wealth Fund’s objectives and activities—again, as confirmed by the Minister’s letter—and puts that into a vehicle that has substantially less clarity on the way it will behave and substantially less accountability for what it does, as both your Lordships’ Constitution Committee and the noble Lord, Lord Offord of Garvel, have pointed out. One wonders what the Minister would have said if the previous Government had tried to do that—I suspect we know.
While Amendment 1 is a probing amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Offord, might have hit on a very neat solution in proposing to make GBE a subsidiary of the National Wealth Fund, where it would be subject to the accountability regime that already exists, which has already been accepted by Parliament. It would not in any way prevent Great British Energy meeting its objectives, but it would solve a lot of the issues that will come up later around accountability and transparency, as well as reducing the possibilities of cost duplication and ensuring that the expertise already built up in the National Wealth Fund is fully utilised. It would streamline the way the two organisations work together, removing the potential for future conflicts. There is no reason why the subsidiary could not still be separately located in Aberdeen as planned. In fact, ownership by the National Wealth Fund would not stand in the way of any of the plans that the Government say they have for Great British Energy.
The more I think about it, the more it seems that a simple change of ownership from direct to indirect would solve a lot of the issues that we will debate as this Committee goes forward, with no obvious downside for the Government or their plans for Great British Energy. I strongly encourage the Minister to give Amendment 1 serious consideration.
My Lords, I support what both my noble friend Lord Offord of Garvel and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, have said about the confusing overlap between what is now the National Fund Wealth and Great British Energy. I am one of those sad people who look at annual reports and accounts, and I was anxiously waiting for the UK Infrastructure Bank’s reports and accounts, which finally dropped last Monday. Through that, I discovered that it had legally changed its name to the National Wealth Fund two or three weeks ago, although no announcement seems to have been made about that at the time.
I agree that Amendment 1 is a very neat way of tucking Great British Energy into a more satisfactory set of governance and oversight arrangements, which we wrestled with when the UK Infrastructure Bank was set up. But my main reason for speaking today is in connection with Amendment 3 in the name of my noble friend Lord Offord of Garvel and Amendments 4, 6 and 7 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.
I do not support these amendments, because I think the concept of minority stakes in government-controlled companies is a complete nonsense. Over the whole history of nationalised industries and publicly owned corporations and companies, there are relatively few examples of entities in which minorities held equity stakes. The exceptions are normally accidents of history—such as in the case of RBS/NatWest—rather than acts of conscious design.
I cannot think of a single good reason to encourage the Government to seek private capital in Great British Energy, as opposed to seeking to leverage private capital alongside public investment in projects that need public involvement to help to de-risk them. Equity is always more expensive than debt, and minority holdings in illiquid shares are even more expensive. The Government do not need to pay that premium. They can borrow money, to the extent that GBE needs it, by issuing government debt. That will be much cheaper than raising equity for GBE, even after the post-Budget bond yield increases.
Equity costs more to raise than debt because it carries more risk than debt. It is the first bit of the capital stack to be wiped out in liquidation—at least, that is what happens in the private sector. But does anybody believe that minority holders would be wiped out if the state decided to liquidate an insolvent Great British Energy? The Secretary of State has so many powers over Great British Energy that in practical terms the Government will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to escape underwriting all the liabilities of Great British Energy, and that includes its minority holdings. If the Government did try to wipe out the minority holdings in a liquidation, I predict a decade or more of shareholder litigation.
Having minority holdings can also engage a lot of unnecessary legal problems around protections for minorities that are built into our company law to prevent minorities being treated unfairly. It can raise issues about dividends, which are not normally part of the regime for state-owned enterprises since retained earnings, if there are any—and history tells us that there are not usually any—are generally kept within the public corporation. I am not a fan of state-owned activity, but we should accept it for what it is, which is taxpayer or debt-funded activity, and not try to mimic the real world where equity investors genuinely do take on risk.
My Lords, I added my name to my noble friend Lord Vaux’s Amendments 4, 6 and 7. This was largely because when the Bill went through its stages in the other place, the Government made frequent references to the fact that an essential quality of Great British Energy was that it would be flexible, vibrant, resilient and fleet of foot. These are all good qualities to allow this new company to take advantage of opportunities in the marketplace, maybe even sudden ones when, say, an international investor is looking to throw its weight behind a tidal initiative or a new hydrogen production plant but is looking for a commitment from the UK Government in the form of some investment from GBE.
What happens in these circumstances if the Treasury reduces its annual funding for GBE in future or if GBE’s annual budget has already been spent and there is a danger of this vital project going overseas unless GBE invests? Will the opportunity just get missed or, as my thinking goes, should GBE be truly flexible, vibrant, resilient and fleet of foot and be able to go out into the financial marketplace and draw in sufficient funds to promote and thus enable this one-off opportunity?
I recognise that, to be effective, GBE must be part of government and yet not part of government. That is why the figure of 75% government ownership is crucial; 24% of outside investment would not prevent the Government remaining in total control and, more importantly, being seen to be in total control, but it could also mean that the private sector could help contribute to the success of GBE.
Your Lordships may ask why the private sector cannot just invest in the proposed investment itself. The answer is that by investing in the parent company, GBE, the private sector would be hedging its bets by spreading its risk across the renewable sector generally rather than just putting its money into, say, a hydrogen project or whatever. Furthermore, allowing GBE to attract some outside investment would be a good way of taking some of the risk away from the Treasury.
There may of course be other ways of doing this, such as issuing class A shares with a different standing from ordinary shares, but I do not believe they would ever be as attractive as the solution in our Amendments 4, 6 and 7.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and I are keen to see GBE succeed, but we think it needs the greater flexibility of being able to attract some investment from outside government.
My Lords, I approach this amendment, and many others that are coming, broadly with sympathy and understanding about the enormous complexities of what we are dealing with. Obviously, I also wish to see us succeed, in the sense that a nation with a bad, interrupted or poor energy supply will be a nation drained of blood. It will be an absolute catastrophe if we do not somehow get all this right; whether in five, 10, 15 or 28 years remains to be seen, but right we must get it, because the dangers are overwhelming.
I also declare my interests in the register as connected to energy-related firms. Also, at one stage in the not very distant past, I attempted to do the same two jobs as the Minister is trying to do now, which is, first, in his department, to begin to piece together in very precarious and dangerous world conditions all the necessary equipment and organisations for energy policy success and, secondly, to explain it all to the House of Lords. That is a double job, which I am sure he will try to do with all his abilities, but this is very tough going in a very dangerous area.
We now come also to a third vast task that lies behind these amendments in particular, which is: do we need entirely new relations, far away from the old polarities of left and right in politics, between the state, with all its overload and difficulties in the digital age, and the role of the markets and the private corporations in achieving the energy transition that we somehow have to achieve? That question hangs in the air. One can see these questions about the relationship between GBE and other bodies and whether it should collaborate and have minority stakes, and so on, as the shower of questions that come out of that task. I hope that somewhere, in government and indeed in the politics of all parties, that is being worked on. We have to develop a whole new generation of co-operation, particularly in the energy field and in infrastructure, to replace the difficulties and problems that we and Labour ran into with PFI 10 or 15 years ago, which was a good idea but it did not work, and unless we understand why it did not work, we will not get it right this time.
The amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, are of course probing but are very interesting. I beg the Labour Government of today, who want a national reset, a renaissance and all that, not to fall for the old socialist Adam, which is that you can solve problems by creating more and more institutions, bodies and bureaucracies. That is not the way—we have to be cleverer than that. That is the old socialisation pattern, which always goes too far and never works.
So I am in considerable sympathy with these amendments and I hope that, when the Minister answers, he will show some sympathy for the importance of flexibility and the importance in the energy field of not making too many rigid definitions and delineations. The trouble, as we will find as we debate, is that everything is connected to everything else. We are trying to rule out nuclear in debates on later amendments, but in fact you cannot—nuclear is intimately connected with all other public investment decisions. We are trying to work out about the National Wealth Fund, which is very interesting. It is having a show here in Parliament tomorrow and I am looking forward to hearing its views in detail on its relationship with GBE.
We had the famous letter from the Minister, describing some of the connections and linkages that he wants to see developing, telling us how all these things are going to be linked together. He lists straight off six or seven organisations that have to work together: the National Wealth Fund, Great British Nuclear, the Crown Estate, the National Energy System Operator, the Climate Change Committee—and of course there are dozens of others beyond those. There is the office of energy resilience; there are regional co-operation planning organisations—dozens of them. I can hardly read my writing, but there is a list that practically goes off the page of organisations that think they are in the business of investing in either the supply chains or the actual projects related to energy transition.
This is the biggest thing since—in fact, it is far bigger than—the Industrial Revolution. It is the most enormous project ever undertaken in the modern world and certainly in this nation. There is a huge amount of co-ordination and tidying up to do before we have even started. Yet, in examining this one further new organisation, far from tidying up, we are tidying down—we are untidying—the pattern of the future. So these are very important amendments and I look forward very much to some clear answers on how we can go forward towards a greater effectiveness and focus in this whole area, rather than scattering assignments, arrangements and responsibilities in every direction, always with great complications and always at great cost.
My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Offord in his amendment but, funnily enough, not for the same reasons that he does. He says that Great British Energy should become a subsidiary of the National Wealth Fund. I am very worried—I do not know whether anybody else is—about the enormous powers that Great British Energy will give to the Secretary of State. It strikes me that we are right back to Ministers choosing winners, when on the whole the role of government in choosing winners has been pretty abysmal.
I am old enough—I am reluctant to admit how old I am in case somebody suggests I should retire—to remember Ted Heath, who started out as being the “Selsdon Man”, supposed to believe in free trade and free enterprise, and then bailed out Upper Clyde Shipbuilders. I do not think he did that because he thought he was choosing a winner—I think he knew he was choosing a loser—but he was, of course, faced by critical political embarrassment at the fact that this shipbuilding company was going bust, and he had the thought that he would use taxpayers’ money to try to bail it out.
I have been reading that the fund will be have £8.5 billion of taxpayers’ money put into it and it will be sitting there and there will be the temptation for Government Ministers to say, “Oh well, we’ll bail out this or that company, or we’ll take a punt on the fact that we do not have a battery maker” and perhaps the reason for that is that the market will not support that; or, with electric cars, for instance, we are having great difficulty making enough of them. So we will see taxpayers’ money being put into ventures which the private sector would never support. But it will be done for good political reasons. No doubt, rather like DeLorean, we will find that the enterprise will be pitched in some part of the country where there is high unemployment and not enough activity and the Government might think that they will be able to buy themselves a few votes in those areas or whatever. But, for all the wrong commercial reasons, we will end up using taxpayers’ money on ventures that will never succeed and would have been picked up by the private sector if they were profitable.
This is what worries me about energy generally. We rather fancy that people who put up wind turbines are really concerned with renewable energy. I have to tell your Lordships that they are not; they are financiers. What they do, long before they put up any wind turbine, is put up an experimental one to find out how much wind is blowing over a long period, and then they work the feed-in tariffs and, by the time they have done all that, they then have a cash flow on which they can then borrow money and put up the wind turbines. So it is a financial venture which is basically controlled by government in terms of all the criteria that matter and I do not really see that venture capital using taxpayers’ money has any great role to play in this. So I support my noble friend’s amendment and hope that he puts it to a vote.
My Lords, I rise very briefly. I thank noble Lords for bringing forward these amendments. These are really important issues that are worth examining in Committee. However, on these Benches we do not feel that any of these amendments really provide proper solutions to some of the problems that are contained within this Bill.
We feel that GB Energy is separate and distinct from the National Wealth Fund; as GB Energy grows and develops over time, that will become clearer. We welcome the setting up of GB Energy, and we think it is absolutely essential that Britain has a chance to own and manage part of its energy resources and that we are investing in having our energy security and independence.
I read recently on the old Government’s website a press brief from No. 10 during the Sunak Government, which proudly proclaimed that they had spent £40 billion subsidising home owners and businesses through the energy price crisis that we had in the last few years. Obviously, that cannot continue, and our bill payers are suffering, which is not good for us.
We do not really feel that having minority equity stakes is the answer to these problems either. There are problems in this Bill: the Government have chosen to have a very short Bill; the strategic priorities are not written up and are not ready; Clauses 5 and 6 give more control than the Government should have without adequate parliamentary scrutiny—I recognise that this has been picked up by reports in this House. Those are all matters we can discuss and work constructively with the Government to find solutions to them. Ultimately, this is a useful conversation, but we do not see the answers within these amendments; we see the answers within other amendments that are yet to come.
My Lords, we have started our proceedings in Committee with a very interesting discussion about the relationship between Great British Energy and the National Wealth Fund. I certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Offord, on the importance of our debates on energy and net zero more generally and with the noble Lord, Lord Howell, about the complexities of our energy system and the challenges that we have undoubtedly set ourselves. The recent report by NESO, the National Energy System Operator, sets out those challenges, but gives us some confidence that we can achieve them.
Amendment 1, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Offord, seeks to require that Great British Energy must be a subsidiary of the National Wealth Fund. Clearly, he indicated he wanted to explore in more detail the relationship between the two organisations. I should say at once to the noble Lord, Lord Howell, that we are certainly not creating organisations for the sake of it. As someone who has spent most of my life dealing with NHS structures and restructuring, I have learnt over the painful years that simply creating new organisations and merging other ones very rarely leads to a successful outcome. We believe that Great British Energy is a key component of our energy and net-zero strategy; that is why it was a manifesto commitment and why we are determined to plough on with this proposal.
On the relationship and the difference between the National Wealth Fund and Great British Energy, the Government have stated very clearly that we see the National Wealth Fund as the state-owned investment bank and wealth fund. It will invest across clean energy sectors, including green hydrogen, green steel, gigafactories and ports, as well as other sectors central to delivering our industrial strategy. On the other hand, Great British Energy will be the UK’s state-owned energy company. It will own, manage and operate key energy projects across the country, including making investments across the clean energy sector and supporting the development of clean energy technologies. It will also support local power and community energy projects as well as supply chains. This is a distinct role, which is why GBE should be a stand-alone company focused on its important mission.
I always enjoy the interventions of the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton. He said that Ministers should not be attempting to pick winners. I sympathise with that, but Ministers will not be attempting to pick winners. We will have an expert company—GBE—working under the framework of the Secretary of State’s strategies, as referred to in Clause 5. We have appointed a chair of great calibre.
Is it not the case that the Secretary of State can override the chair of Great British Energy?
The noble Lord is referring to a power of direction. We are coming on to relevant amendments later in the Bill, but let me make it clear that this power is often contained in legislation, although we believe it will be used very rarely indeed. I certainly would not expect it to be used. I think the noble Lord is suggesting that the Secretary of State will attempt to micromanage Great British Energy through the power of direction. I simply do not believe that this will happen under any Secretary of State.
I listened to what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said about duplication. At the beginning, we think it is sensible for GBE to use the National Wealth Fund’s expertise. He suggested that this is duplication; I think it is a pragmatic, sensible approach. We have certain expertise within the National Wealth Fund that can help as we establish GBE, but they are complementary functions. Having listened to the debate, I can assure noble Lords that my department will work closely with His Majesty’s Treasury to provide clarity to the market on how the two institutions will complement each other, and set out how this relationship will evolve in time.
I turn to Amendments 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Offord, Lord Vaux and Lord Cameron. There was an interesting discussion about whether GBE could or should be allowed to raise equity through the sale of shares while it remained majority-owned by the Crown. Amendment 3 proposes enabling external equity ownership of Great British Energy without its losing its status as a Crown-owned company. Similarly, Amendments 4, 6 and 7 specify enabling third-party ownership of up to 25% of the shares in Great British Energy without its losing its status as a Crown-owned company. Amendment 5 seeks to specify that Great British Energy is owned by the Secretary of State, rather than by the Crown.
We do not think that it is necessary for Great British Energy to sell its own shares to bring in external equity funding, or any funding, for its projects. In the case of the example which the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, gave, it would, though, be possible for Great British Energy to encourage private sector investment into the scheme to which he referred, or to co-invest with external partners, each taking an equity stake in a project that Great British Energy wished to support. I understand that the model has been used successfully by similar bodies, such as the former Green Investment Bank.
Clause 4 enables the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance to Great British Energy. This is so it can take action to meet its objectives. To be clear, our intention is for Great British Energy to become financially self-sufficient in the long term. It will invest in projects that expect a return on investments, but it would be prudent to ensure that the Secretary of State has the power to provide further financial support, if required.
Just as private sector companies would rely on the financial strength of their corporate group to raise funds, that could be the case for providing GBE with further financial support for specific projects in the future. However, we believe that any such financial assistance should be provided by the Secretary of State and, as such, be subject to the usual governance and control principles applicable to public sector bodies, such as His Majesty’s Treasury’s Managing Public Money.
It is also unnecessary to specify that Great British Energy is owned by the Secretary of State rather than the Crown. The Bill simply follows normal legislative practice in its drafting. For instance, Section 317 of the Energy Act 2023, which the Government of the noble Lord, Lord Offord, took through, expresses the ownership requirement for Great British Nuclear in the same way. Other legislation, including Section 6 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, uses the same formulation. Clause 1(6) of the Bill explains that
“wholly owned by the Crown” means that each share is held by a Minister of the Crown, which includes the Secretary of State, or a company wholly owned by the Crown, or a nominee of either of those categories.
We also think that it is entirely appropriate for the Secretary of State to be the sole shareholder in Great British Energy. I very much agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on this. Introducing minority third party ownership, whether held by one minority shareholder or several, would add unnecessary complexity to its governance. A shareholder agreement or agreements would need to be put in place. They would need to cover elements relating to the control of Great British Energy, setting out which matters required approval of a simple majority of shareholders and which might require unanimous consent. For an organisation such as Great British Energy, playing such a key part in our mission to deploy clean energy—I take note of what noble Lords have said about parliamentary accountability—is it not surely right that Ministers both are accountable for their actions and can exercise full shareholder rights?
This has been an interesting debate. I am aware of noble Lords’ issues around the role of Great British Energy and the National Wealth Fund and its ability to draw in private sector investments, but we think—and it was a manifesto commitment—that this is a very important body that should stand alone. We are grateful that the National Wealth Fund is able to provide some support at the moment, but we think that this is the right way forward.
I thank noble Lords for their insightful contributions on the designation of a company as Great British Energy and the ownership of such a company. I welcome the amendments from the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Cameron—Amendments 4, 6 and 7. They were designed to probe the benefits of having flexibility to allow minority external equity ownership of Great British Energy. However, I cannot disagree with anything that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said about introducing private equity into what is, in effect, government-underwritten risk, which means that it really should be debt.
The fact we are debating this indicates that there is no clarity about the substance and purpose of the Bill or about the exact ownership of Great British Energy. Given that we are debating £8.3 billion of taxpayers’ money, and that there is no limitation on how that financial assistance can be given or structured, we have a concern that will continue through Committee.
The experience of the House was brought into the debate by the noble Lords, Lord Howell and Lord Hamilton, who looked back over previous generations to instances of how overarching powers given to Secretaries of State can be used if not abused, sometimes with the best of intentions. Again, it speaks to how there could be more clarity in the Bill about how those powers will be allocated. We believe that accounting and reporting measures are absent from the Bill and that we need further detail and clarity on the priorities and plans of Great British Energy. I expect that we will return to those matters on Report but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment 1 withdrawn.