Lord Jackson of Peterborough:

Moved by Lord Jackson of Peterborough

16: Clause 1, page 2, line 4, at end insert—“(3A) Notwithstanding the purpose of this Act, the IFR must have due regard to the potential economic harms of overregulating English football.(3B) As part of fulfilling its duty under subsection (3A) the IFR must assess the effects of its activities on the financial position of regulated clubs and submit a report to the Secretary of State within six months in the first instance and annually thereafter which must be laid before Parliament within 28 days of their receipt of the report.”

My Lords, this amendment, on the potential harms of overregulation, goes to the heart of this whole Bill. What we are discussing in this Committee is not just the role of a new regulatory body but the future of English football in its totality. The Bill introduces a complete overhaul of the entire system of English football. It creates an entirely new organ of state apparatus, which will no doubt introduce copious amounts of onerous rules and regulations that clubs and leagues will be forced to comply with—in addition to the already stringent rules that the leagues impose on clubs themselves.

The Premier League has a handbook on its rules and governance procedures that is 768 pages long. Contained within this vast document are reams of rules, regulations and duties relating to matters such as club finances, tests for the prospective owners and directors of clubs, the disclosure of relevant interests by club officers, requirements for directors’ reports, and so on. Under rule E.22, the league has the power to impose financial penalties, and under E.37 it can deduct points from clubs which violate those rules. All the things that the Bill seeks to address are already covered by the Premier League.

It is not just the Premier League that does this. The EFL already has an established financial regulation department, aptly called the club financial reporting unit, which monitors and ensures financial regulations that EFL clubs must abide by. The EFL can and does hand out penalties to clubs that fail to meet its standards. For example, in May 2023 Wigan Athletic FC was deducted four points, beginning the 2023-24 season on minus eight. That was because the club failed to comply with the EFL’s requirements that the club deposit 125% of its forecast monthly wage bill into a designated club account. In fact, in that season there were 15 disciplinary and enforcement proceedings against clubs by the EFL for breaching its rules. That existing self-regulation has clearly been effective. Despite some high-profile cases of failure, the vast majority of the time the current regulations do serve their purpose.

Since 2012, when the financial rules were strengthened, only six Football League clubs have gone into administration and only seven football clubs have been completely liquidated since 1945—these are remarkable numbers. Compare that to the finance industry, whose insolvency figures dwarf that of football. In the 12 months to September 2024, there were approximately 500 insolvencies in the financial services sector alone, according to the Insolvency Service’s official statistics. We talk about breakaway leagues, and yet we must not forget that the European super league was stopped in its tracks by the fury of the fans and the power of the current league regulators of football. Is that not a clear example of the self-regulation of the sport working very effectively?

It is not clear at all that self-regulation has failed. I put it to your Lordships’ House that English football is one of the great success stories of private regulation. The leagues already impose their own rules, which hold clubs to account for their actions. They have robust mechanisms for punishing those clubs that do not act appropriately, and the evidence of the success rate of football clubs proves that that has indeed worked. So I ask the Minister: why strangle the flourishing industry that is professional football?

I also point out that that seems to be the view of the Prime Minister. As my noble friend Lady Evans of Bowes Park noted at Second Reading, the Prime Minister himself said at the recent investment summit that

“the key test for me on regulation is … growth. Is this going to make our economy more dynamic? Is this going to inhibit or unlock investment?”

He went on to say that

“where it is needlessly holding back the investment we need … we will get rid of it … we will make sure that every regulator in this country, especially our economic and competition regulators, takes growth as seriously as this room does”.

There we have it. The Prime Minister himself understands that regulation and overregulation are fraught with economic danger. If he realises the risks of regulation inhibiting investment in that arena, does he also recognise the risks of regulation and overregulation within football?

It seems we are suffering from, as Harold Demsetz termed it, the Nirvana fallacy. This is where people look at private solutions and seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal and the real. If discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient. Their usual yet unfortunate response is that the only possible solution must surely be more regulation, more rules and more state diktats. But when we are considering whether this new regulator will actually improve outcomes for football, we cannot merely have reference to the supposed limitations of self-regulation. We must look at what this independent football regulator will become.

For that, it is particularly instructive to examine the recent report on the Financial Conduct Authority by the All-Party Group on Investment Fraud and Fairer Financial Services. That report has found that the body that regulates the entire financial sector in this country is

“an opaque and unaccountable organisation” that is

“incompetent at best and dishonest at worst.”

The noble Lord, Lord Sikka, who is not in his place, stated that the FCA was “complacent, conflicted and captured”.

Among the litany of failures that the report identified is one that is typical of regulators of all stripes: the culture of the organisation. The APPG found that the entire professional culture of the regulator was defective, and that

“errors and inaction are too common”.

The APPG has lined up a vast array of whistleblowers, who have shed light on the problems that the FCA faces. That report is backed up by the Institute of Economic Affairs, which points out that the FCA has been able to decide its own burden of proof and then levy fines running into billions of pounds, and all without proper accountability.

I will not reiterate the entire report for the Committee, but I was not surprised at all when I read it. The behaviours and the failures as described by the APPG are all too common when it comes to state-run bodies that seek to enforce their rules on to other private entities. They are too often encouraged to go further than necessary—mission creep—and then do not act when they are supposed to.

Why would this regulator be any different? Why would the independent football regulator break the mould and challenge these hitherto proven truths? I see no reason why the IFR would improve football in this country in any way. Previous state-run regulators have clearly failed, and I have no doubt that this regulator would potentially do the same. I therefore feel it is an absolute bare minimum to require the independent football regulator to have due regard to these risks of overregulation, as enunciated in my amendment. That should not be a contentious point.

I hope that the Minister can give me cast-iron assurances that the regulator will be ever watchful of the damage that it could very well inflict on football clubs and leagues. I ask her to guarantee absolutely that the IFR would be a light-touch regulator and not delve into the minutiae of each club’s finances and everyday operations. I want her to reassure the House that not one penny of a club’s income will be wantonly redistributed to another club, which would be tantamount to asking one private business to give its own earned assets to another private business. As I described last week in Committee, that would be a moral hazard. This is a matter of profound principle that I simply cannot disregard.

For the avoidance of doubt, I say again that this is a poorly drafted Bill. It was poorly drafted under the previous Administration, and it is worse now—but at least we have the opportunity to address its worst deficiencies and improve it in Committee. I hope that the Government and this Committee understand the dangers of the path that we are heading down, and that all possible efforts should be taken to shift us away from the constant move towards more regulation and to protect our nation’s proudest cultural export from the ever-encroaching arms and dead hand of the state.

My Lords, I will speak for the first time today to support my noble friend’s amendment, because it is important to set this Bill in context.

I, for one, am not in favour of the financial regulation in the Bill. I have a degree of support for many of the amendments that came out of the Tracey Crouch review, and the propositions on fan-led change are reasonable for the Premier League to consider. What worries me is that we are introducing—the only country in the western world to do so—the imposition of regulatory control over one of our major sports. Even countries such as Russia and China, which have sports laws, recognise the overall authority of the International Olympic Committee, FIFA and UEFA. They do so in recognition that they would not be able to host or to participate in their sporting events if they did not accept that overall authority.

On the first day in Committee, it was clear that the Government were not prepared to countenance putting the important rider in the legislation that we would do nothing that would threaten the role and playing of our clubs in European competitions and the World Cup—and, if we include women’s football, in the Olympic Games too, but that is a matter for a latter amendment. I am concerned about the imposition of regulatory control, being the only country that does this, because, as was rightly pointed out by my noble friend, this does not in any way generate growth. On the contrary, it proposes a whole series of measures that will restrict the competitiveness of the clubs in the Premier League, which, in turn, will mean that the waterfall of financial support that comes through to all professional football in this country is lessened, not increased.

I speak from the position of somebody who has had the privilege of being involved in sport for 30 or 40 years. When I was interested in becoming a Member of Parliament, I wanted to go to Moscow as an athlete for the Olympic Games. Had we legislated that the athletes could not go, I would not have been permitted to go. As it was, I led a campaign for the athletes to go against the boycott that my then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, strongly supported. I felt that, under the autonomy and independence of sport and the vital principle that sportsmen and sportswomen should not be political pawns, it was right for the competitors, who wanted to go, to compete in Moscow, however much they may have opposed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as indeed I did. I recognised that to use sportsmen and sportswomen as the only way to demonstrate opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was wrong, when people could buy tickets for Aeroflot in Piccadilly and go to watch the Bolshoi in Leningrad, and while trade and diplomatic relations continued.

The moment you impose government control of sport in any way, you are in great jeopardy of losing the opportunity to continue to compete in international events. That is at the heart of the existence of the bodies that represent international sport. The most important issue for FIFA, UEFA and the International Olympic Committee is to oppose political interference and political control on the regulation of any sport—and, in the case of football, to oppose rigorously the unacceptable intrusion into the independent governance of sport, which is at the heart of those international competitions. So, it was with no surprise—I say this to my noble friend Lord Jackson—that UEFA threatened to expel us from Euro 2028 before we even started considering the Bill in this House. On what basis did it do that? Because of

“government interference in the running of football”.

That speaks volumes to the sensitivity that we should express on financial regulation in relation to all the detail that we are discussing today and the excellent points that my noble friend made.

Indeed, it was so important to keep the two apart —and the autonomy of sport whole—that, during the 2012 Olympic Games in London, we introduced legislation in this House at the request of the International Olympic Committee as a precondition of us hosting the Games. We had to recognise the autonomy of the International Olympic Committee, and we had to do things that I do not think politicians wanted to do—for example, closing the fast lanes on many of our roads to allow members of the IOC and some of the sportsmen and sportswomen to travel down them. There was not too much support in this House at the time for that—nor indeed among politicians on either side of the House of Commons—but we did it because we recognised that, if we were to host the Games, the autonomy of sport was vested in the International Olympic Committee. That was a condition precedent not only of hosting the Games but of our athletes supporting and playing in the Games.

My worry is that, if we do not resist politicisation and we do not protect autonomy, then we will very quickly find that decisions taken by the regulator about an individual club will immediately be the subject of questions to the footballers in that club about whether they believe that the regulator was right to intervene because there was concern about the behaviour of any of the owners or directors of the club. This is such a critically important issue. Unless we get this right, unless we pause to reflect seriously on ensuring that we respect the autonomy of those organisations that run sport—the Premier League and the EFL nationally and FIFA and UEFA internationally—we risk in the future jeopardising the ability of our sports men and women, in this case our footballers, to play in those international games.

I say to the Minister that, in looking at each and every clause of this Bill—and we are only on Clause 1—it is not as if one side is talking this out. Far from it; the majority of amendments tabled to the Bill come from the Government Back Benches. The reality is that there is a lot of concern. There would not be hundreds of amendments down on the Bill unless there was real concern about how it is drafted. This Bill is an enabling measure. It is no more than that. We are coming to that in Clause 2. It is an enabling measure, yet it is longer than the Great British Energy Bill. We must pause at some stage in these proceedings to reflect that, unless we get this light-touch regulation right, and unless we recognise the authority of UEFA and FIFA, we will jeopardise the financial success of football in this country and the right and opportunity of our footballers, both now and in the future, to play. That is not to say that it will not go through. This will go through, so, if it is going to go through, let us at least get it right.

My Lords, I am happy to support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Jackson and the eloquent case that he made for it. I wholeheartedly endorse the remarks of my noble friend Lord Moynihan.

As we go further into this Bill and debate it further, it becomes clearer that this was a Bill conceived in a fit of absence of mind; it has come about almost by accident. There were some concerns about Bury Football Club going into administration. There were concerns about the European Super League being proposed—an idea that was almost literally dead on arrival not because of a regulator or primarily because of political intervention but because of a fan revolt. The system as it was worked. It was the deep commitment of fans to the current arrangement, the current competitive leagues and all of that. Their anger and dismay at this were reflected in the British clubs which had committed to it, including my own. They abandoned it as if it was suddenly realised that this thing that they were holding was red hot and that the sooner they got rid of it the better. This was working. Yet there was a casual threat made by the then Prime Minister, reacting—as a populist will often do—to popular anger with a threat to introduce legislation. It is more and more evident as we go further that the Bill we are now considering at length, with its deficiencies and its threats, is the result of that.

I want to consider, for a moment, the case that my noble friend Lord Jackson made about overregulation. I have been involved, at various stages of my long and chequered career, in trying to counter overregulation. The first time was nearly 40 years ago when I was Margaret Thatcher’s Minister for Deregulation. Later, I chaired a deregulation task force at the request of my noble friend Lord Heseltine, the then Deputy Prime Minister. I then chaired periodically the coalition Government’s better regulation Cabinet Committee, or whatever we called it. I have been involved in this a lot and spent a lot of time looking at the effects of overregulation, who the beneficiaries are and which organisations suffer because of it.

One of the conclusions that I reached very early on was that it is not the big businesses that suffer most but the smaller ones. A bit of a theme in how we have been debating this Bill is the sense that “All of the resentment and all of the difficulty with this is coming from the Premier League”, and that somehow we are trying to defend it. I have to tell your Lordships that the clubs that will feel the least of the burden of overregulation, the compliance costs, are the big clubs, because they are big machines. They are serious businesses. They have the personnel and infrastructure and can draw on resources to deal with the unexpected effects of regulation. They will have a machine that will accommodate it. It will be uncomfortable and unnecessary and it will have costs, but they will not be threatened by it. The clubs that will really feel the burden are the small clubs. They do not have these big machines and are not equipped with armies of lawyers and accountants and the rest of the panoply of resource that is required to deal with this totally new form of regulation that is suddenly being thrust upon them.

This is something we need to think about very carefully indeed. One might not want there to be bad effects, but so many of the debates we have had on this Bill have been about the threat of unintended consequences.

I thank my noble friend for giving way. He has made an important point in relation to small companies, and is it not confirmed by an article in this morning’s Times, which says that the Financial Conduct Authority’s “over-regulation … harms small companies”? That is exactly the point he is making: it is small companies that are affected, rather than large ones.

I am grateful to my noble friend for drawing your Lordships’ attention to that. It is absolutely the case. When Governments consult with a sector, the people they consult with tend to be the big ones. I spent a lot of time thinking about this and trying to work out how to deal with it in previous contexts. If you run a small company, business or operation—a small football club—you are far more concerned with getting on with whatever the next thing is on your agenda. You have got relatively few people around to do the work. Big companies have a machine that is set up to deal with all this, so the point that my noble friend makes is entirely right.

The point behind this amendment is incredibly important, and my noble friend has done a great service in raising it in the vivid way that he has. We have to consider this, because once you create an independent regulator, you have created something that is supposedly independent, and it is much harder to come back. Later in these debates, we will come to my noble friend Lord Goodman’s proposed sunset clause. That would be some kind of constraint because the threat or certainty of there being a proper, serious review after a given length of time will focus the minds of the regulator. But without that, without the kind of amendment that my noble friend has tabled, I think we stand in great danger.

My Lords, absolutely nobody is going to support the idea of overregulation. I spent my whole career, however, in a highly regulated industry: broadcasting. The BBC was the result of a regulatory regime imposed over 100 years ago, and ITV was heavily regulated, with enormous benefits as a result. We have the best broadcasting system in the whole world, so good regulation makes things better. I agree that we do not want to see overregulation.

The strongest part of this Bill is that it tries to ensure that every club is well managed, and that is to be welcomed. Let us recognise that that has not been the general picture, and there is no club that I know of that has not been badly managed, including my own, at some point in its history. Somebody else gave the example that, for a few hours this weekend, Brighton were number two in the Premier League. That is absolutely 100% down to the fact that they have been exceptionally well-managed in recent years.

In my career, I encountered many boards of clubs at every level and, frankly, it was an extremely mixed picture. We name no names. Some of them I encountered were very well-managed, some were managed by rogues and many by people who had a bit of money—not enough money—and were attracted to football for the wrong reasons but completely and utterly lacked any ability to manage a club properly. The great strength of this Bill, in demanding proper boards and financial probity, will bring, I hope, a great improvement to the generality of English football down the leagues and have strong, competent boards wherever you look.

I cannot resist one short story. I know of a Prime Minister—I will not name who the Prime Minister was, but it is not the person you think that I am thinking of; it is somebody else—who was invited to a match and to have lunch beforehand. The Special Branch at Number 10 looked at all the other guests, and every single one of them had a criminal record. That is a true story. That is what we want to put an end to. We want good, strong boards and prudent financial management.

What is the justification for that intervention? It is all the things we have already mentioned. These clubs are not just normal commercial assets; they are deeply embedded in their communities; they have their own heritage; they have their own history; they are culturally important. That justifies appropriate and proportionate regulation and intervention.

Having said lots of nice things, I do have profound reservations about the mechanism for establishing fund flow down the pyramid, but that is a matter for later in our deliberations.

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 16, tabled by my noble friend Lord Jackson. The amendment would require the regulator to take into account the economic risks of overregulation and report against this risk. I am sure this is an approach that will interest all parts of the Committee, especially, as my noble friend Lord Jackson reminded us, as the Prime Minister himself recently made such a high priority of reducing the impact of regulatory burden on British investment and growth.

We should consider the Prime Minister’s words carefully. He spoke of breaking free from the trap of excessive regulation, of removing needless barriers to investment, and of ensuring that regulators take growth far more seriously. Yet, here we are again, at risk of creating a new regulator without proper safeguards against exactly these risks. Indeed, the Department for Business and Trade this year published a report on smarter regulation, which described the problem in stark terms:

“Good regulation allows our markets and societies to function. However, there is strong evidence that points to our regulatory culture acting as a drag on our ability to generate economic activity, innovation and to attract investment. The regulatory environment is often confusing and sometimes features of it appear to exist for the benefit of the regulators, rather than the industries who they regulate, consumers or Britain as a whole”.

We must take care to guard against our regulatory culture having a similarly damaging impact on British football.

As other noble Lords have pointed out, the Premier League represents one of Britain’s most successful exports, contributing £8.2 billion annually to our economy and more than £4 billion to the Exchequer, while supporting more than 90,000 jobs. Already, we are seeing concerning signs in the Bill: undefined ownership tests: parallel regulatory requirements; unproven intervention powers; and sweeping powers to redistribute Premier League revenue. Each adds complexity and risks that could deter the very investment that we need.

The Premier League competes globally for capital, for talent and for attention. Excessive regulation could quickly diminish its appeal to serious investors, with knock-on impacts for the pyramid which relies on the Premier League. As the chief executive of the Premier League has said in relation to this Bill, we must not wound the goose that lays English football’s golden egg. It is that egg that supports so much of the good work that we discussed earlier and the football pyramid as a whole.

The Prime Minister pledged to “march through the institutions”, ensuring regulators take growth seriously. Yet this Bill creates a regulator with no equal duty to consider success, economic impact or growth alongside the very vague notions of soundness and resilience, which, as I said earlier in this Committee, have no clear end state. We can have both effective regulation and economic dynamism, but only if we build in appropriate safeguards from the start. Without them, we risk creating exactly the kind of bureaucratic barriers to investment that the Prime Minister has correctly identified as holding Britain back.

My Lords, I rise to support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Jackson. I will concentrate particularly on both the impact assessment and what my noble friend Lord Maude was referring to: the impact on small businesses. Following on from the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Birt, when I made my comments at Second Reading, I emphasised that my concerns are not that there are no problems; the question is how we actually tackle the problems that exist in the industry while not damaging the success.

I have made a number of references to the impact assessment, and I quoted from it earlier today. On page 8, paragraph 17, it states:

“This Impact Assessment (IA) provides evidence and analysis to support the government’s case for intervention”.

I am concerned after reading the impact assessment that, as my noble friends Lord Jackson and Lord Maude identified, the impact is not on the big companies. Anybody who has sat on the side of an industry, as I did when changes were made to licensing law, for example, knows that it is not the big companies that are affected by such changes. They have the resources. It is the small companies that are confused, concerned and lost. They do not have a specialist to deal with the minutiae of a clause. I was the chief executive of the British Beer and Pub Association at the time, and it was an enormous task to guide smaller companies through the issues they faced. For me, the impact assessment dramatically underestimates the impact that small companies face in these circumstances.

I will come back to other elements later, but I am particularly concerned—and am referring to page 53 onwards—about the identified benefits that are supposed to accrue to the industry. The costs are dealt with, but I must admit that I am not convinced. On the indirect benefits, paragraph 225 comes up with a wonderful sentence:

“These indirect benefits are extremely difficult to quantify, given the range of variables that will affect the profitability of individual football clubs. Therefore, these are not quantified in the appraisal”.

Paragraph 227 says:

“These benefits are extremely difficult and speculative to quantify and therefore are not quantified in the appraisal”.

The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, will no doubt be relieved that I have not entered into any word counts on this occasion.

On accruing benefits for the community, paragraph 233, on page 54, states:

“The model states that the results of this contingent valuation survey of football users and non-users shows that people positively value the club they support/their local club and would be willing to pay an annual subscription to support it”.

I find myself at a loss to believe that my noble friend went round the streets of Wycombe or any other community and asked, “Would you be willing to pay X sum to support the club?” The suggestion that large parts of any population are

“willing to pay … to support” their local club is really stretching credibility far.

This comment was made as a result of some work undertaken by Ipsos, an organisation for which I have high regard and with which I deal on polling. But the next paragraph, 235, refers to the following:

“DCMS guidance states that a lower bound”—

I am not sure whether the authors intend “bound” or “band”—

“95% confidence interval of willingness to pay (WTP)”.

That is rather like talking about turnout at a general election by asking people whether they are going to vote. I checked with a pollster this morning, and the mean answer given is 80%. The turnout at the last election was 60%, so there was an error of a quarter or a third, depending on whether you go upwards or downwards. To suggest that you can quantify the willingness of a community and people in the street to pay to support their local club stretches the bounds of credibility.

But on page 56 we have a breakdown, in detail, of the willingness of each region of the country to pay a sum to support its local club. There has been infinite reference to the fact that the support for clubs crosses from one place to another. Therefore, if you are contributing in the north-east or in London you may not be willing to pay to support a specific club. It is not surprising that London is identified as the place where people are most willing to supply most money, but it does not say whether the sums involved include a season ticket. Many of the people who answered the question will have thought, “Well, I actually pay in the form of a season ticket already and therefore I am contributing”.

What is depressing about the impact assessment is that it goes into such detail in relation to the benefits that will be gained from this legislation, but there is no attempt to identify what the clubs will have to pay. I am not talking here about the Premier League clubs; I am talking about the small clubs. In her response to the points that I and others raised at Second Reading, the Minister said that the costs would be proportionate. But no figures are given. I find it barely credible that such detail can be provided to identify how much people from each different area of the country are willing to pay, but there is no calculation of the cost for a small club.

That is where the important issue—the questions raised by my noble friend Lord Jackson—arises. People can concentrate on Premier League clubs, but we are talking here about regulating over 100 clubs. People do not realise that the impact will be on the small clubs. The Government need to be honest before this legislation passes, and to identify the probable burden for each of the small clubs, because without that information it is not appropriate to pass into law a football regulation Bill.

I rise to support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Jackson and to speak further to the points raised by my noble friends Lord Maude and Lord Hayward about large clubs, small clubs and financial burdens.

We are presumably all agreed that large clubs are better able to bear the cost of regulation than smaller ones. My noble friend Lord Hayward referred a moment ago to 100 clubs, but if some noble Lords have their way, it will be more than 100 clubs. We have already heard today, as we will hear as the Bill develops, proposals to tack on to the Bill corporate social responsibility, net-zero obligations and so on. There are amendments tabled to tack on to the Bill specifically the National League North and National League South. I am sure that the Minister would resist any such amendments, in the same way that the Government will resist most of the amendments that come forward. But as my noble friend Lord Moynihan pointed out at Second Reading—if he did not, I am sure other noble Lords did—the Bill is shy about saying which leagues will be covered by the regulator.

The Government have made it very clear that it will be the pyramid—the top five leagues—but the point is that at any future date the Government might change or, heaven help us, the Minister might move on and be replaced by someone else. At that point, the Government could bring forward by regulation changes to the scope covered by the regulator in order to bring in the National Leagues North and South, or other leagues. Even more small clubs would then be covered by the regulator and have to bear the costs. My noble friend’s amendment is a wise, precautionary one, not only in dealing with the measures the Government are proposing to bring within the scope of the Bill, but as a hedge against other leagues being brought within the scope of the regulator in the future.

Can I just suggest to Members opposite who are making their point that they might look at Amendment 72, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Grey-Thompson? It is called “Support to clubs”, which very specifically gives advice on how smaller clubs might be helped.

I thank noble Lords and I think the point about Amendment 72 was well made. Why I believe this is so critical is that when we have been talking about big clubs the feeling almost is that they are going to look after themselves and somehow we do not need to worry about the Premier League. But, as we have all said, the clue is in the word “pyramid”. The fact that the Championship is the sixth-richest league in the world—richer than Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands—is because of the money passed down from the Premier League. Fundamental to the health of the whole game, all the network and all the clubs is the health of the Premier League.

As my noble friend Lord Maude was saying, I am afraid that the more that I look into this Bill and the more I understand it, the more worried I become. As we have said before, if the only objective of the regulator is the survival of clubs, as the shadow regulator mentioned, the only tool it has in its locker is to get them to deposit cash as a cushion. I do not think there is any other mechanism. Again, I would be delighted if anyone else can come up with another mechanism and I will sit down and hear it. I really would be delighted.

But the only measure is to say “Okay, we want to be sure that there is no chance at all of you getting into financial difficulties, so put this money aside”. There have been figures of £20 million a club—£400 million—but, as noble Lords have said, maybe the bigger clubs are better able to cope. I bet the top eight or so—the Liverpools, the Manchesters, the Tottenhams et cetera—will be better able to cope. It will be the smaller clubs, especially the ones that are just trying to break in—such as Brentford and Brighton, which have now broken in, but as they were trying to get there—are the ones which will be disproportionately affected.

It is not just the Premier League clubs because, of course, we would be talking about clubs right the way down the pyramid having to make deposits to make sure that there is less risk of them getting into financial difficulties. Of course, the further down the pyramid you go, the more of a hardship that becomes. Let us understand it more. The shadow regulator was talking about his concern about dependence on rich owners and what you can do about that.

We can give two examples recently from my club, Chelsea. I think everyone would say that Matthew Harding was a very reputable business guy, had very good intentions and was an absolutely stand-up person. He was tragically killed in a helicopter crash. No one could have expected that. The club was in financial difficulties and had to be sold. What would the regulator’s answer to that have been? Probably, “Oh, you were dependent on a rich owner. You have to deposit more money in case, God forbid, they die in a helicopter crash”. Our next owner, Roman Abramovich, was very well regarded for about 18 years and was absolutely fine. Then Russia invaded Ukraine and, all of a sudden, he was no longer a reputable owner. What could the financial regulator have done about that? Well, clearly, it has to look at all the owners and think “Ooh, what could happen in your circumstance? Could your country end up doing something bad on the world stage? Deposit more money”.

It goes beyond that. Lots of noble Lords have said, “What do we want? We want better management of our clubs”. Are we asking the financial regulator to assess managers and say “Oh, I don’t think you’re very good”, or “I don’t think your business plan is very good”. What can a financial regulator do if they do not like the management of the club? They cannot sack them. What can they do if they do not like the business plan very much? They can say, “Well, please try better, please make it a bit better”. The only thing they can absolutely do at the end of the day is say “I don’t like your management very much, I’m not very confident in them, and I don’t like your business plan very much, so I’m going to ask you to put more money on deposit”.

Then you get into a situation where I guess you follow that through to its logical conclusion and some clubs are going to have to put a lot more on deposit than others, because the regulator has decided, you know, “I don’t like the cut of your jib”, for want of a better word. What sort of situation are we going to get into there? We can see as we peel back the onion that this is fraught with more and more difficulties. You are asking the regulator to opine on each club, each business plan, each set of owners and each set of management and say, depending on all that, how much money a club should set aside—with only one criterion for success for that regulator: that that club financially stays in its place and never gets threatened with going bust. There is only one criterion, so every time we are going to have an ever-increasing ratchet to de-risk every club, and the only mechanism to do that is to get them to put more and more money on deposit.

Again, please, I would be delighted. I know the Minister cares about football and the welfare of the game, so I would be delighted if someone could come up with another tool on how the regulator can try to manage sustainability. He could not come up with one the other day, so maybe we should ask him.

Is it not far more likely that the regulator will simply insist on having a good-quality, conventional board—I know from the noble Lord’s experience that he will know what that looks like—with a mix of skills, a proper CFO and a real sense of financial accountability and risk management? That is the direction of travel a regulator is likely to take. I am sure the noble Lord would agree from his experience that that tends to lead to strong institutions—and that is not a description of many football clubs at any level.

Before my noble friend responds to that, he is on a very important point here about the remedies that are available to a regulator where they have concerns. The noble Lord suggests that you put in some great and good, experienced, splendid people, and they will make it all better. We have rightly heard a lot from the noble Lord opposite about Brighton & Hove Albion. If a visionary owner had a view of how you could, by investing in the right way, in the right kind of players and the right methodologies, have a different approach to managing and developing a football club, what would a great and good, wise and sage board have said? It would have said “Ooh, very difficult”. Board members would have pursed their lips and sucked their teeth and possibly stopped there being this great success story.

What would a regulator have done? They would have said, “This all looks very risky. How can you justify this great vision you’ve got?” Would they, as my noble friend suggested, say “Well, you’ve got to put more and more money on deposit as a hedge against possible failure”? What are you then going to say to fans when they say, “Well, why aren’t you investing in the players that we need to create the success?” This is why so much of this is of concern. It goes back to the point we made earlier about sustainability. It is all about downward pressure. It is putting a cap on aspiration, vision, excitement, ambition and the possibility of having these great romantic stories of huge success. Is that really what we want the future of English football to be?

I genuinely thank noble Lords for their interventions. We are trying to unpack and fix a tricky problem. I completely agree with the suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Birt, about better boards; of course that is a good idea, but how does the regulator make that happen? Will it be given the powers to force people off boards? I have not heard that; I have not seen that anywhere in the Bill. I fully support recommending a stronger board, but how do you make it happen? The only remedy I see for this in the Bill, and which I keep coming back to, is that clubs have to deposit more money as a sort of punishment.

On the visionary business plan at Brighton, which really was visionary, a regulator at the time could have thought, “That looks a bit risky”—and it probably was a bit risky—“so how do I guard against that?” They could have wondered, “How much does this chairman know about football? He is a poker champion; that is brilliant. He believes in the stats. But he is probably not your conventional person, who you would be going to and asking for more money as a deposit”.

This is what we all keep coming back to. If the only remedy is that the clubs put more money aside—

I thank my noble friend for allowing me to intervene. My understanding of the Bill is that the ultimate sanction the regulator can have is to withdraw the licence from the football club. If a football club loses its licence, it ceases to be able to play. It is put in a very difficult situation whatever the remedy: it either complies wholeheartedly with whatever remedy it is told by the regulator to put in place, or it loses its licence and cannot play in the league. Surely that cannot be right.

Again, I hope the Minister will answer this point. This is what the shadow regulator was explaining to us last week. What is the one thing you can do short of that? You can look to de-risk the situation, particularly if your only criterion is sustainability at that club; in other words, it survives by you saying, “You have to put money on deposit”. That is exactly the model they were taking from the financial regulator and the banks; that is what I see as the whole problem.

It is fundamental. As my noble friend Lord Jackson’s amendment suggests, we could make sure that it is aware of the burdens of regulation, or, as some of the earlier amendments proposed, it could be about broadening the definition and objectives of the regulator so that it has other criteria at stake. I truly believe that, unless we widen it out—it is only one-dimensional—we really are going to harm the great game.

My Lords, I appreciate that it is a little unconventional to speak to the amendment, but I would like to make a few comments to the mover of the amendment and the Minister. The case was made that this is all about small clubs. I have met very many clubs outside of the Premier League and discussed this issue with them. They have raised many issues and changes that they would like to see, some of which might be controversial in the football world or in government but not in relation to this regulation Bill. I have not yet come across any club outside of the Premier League that has said that it is worried or opposes this Bill—not one. Perhaps the Minister might like to reflect on that.

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough for moving his Amendment 16. It has been well worth having a debate on this on its own because his short and simple amendment, if inserted into the Bill, would represent a vital step towards ensuring that the regulation of English football was both fair and economically responsible. It would require the independent football regulator to consider the potential economic harms of overregulation.

As my noble friend so eloquently established, overregulation is an issue that can choke off investment and disrupt growth in many industries. It can also, as my noble friend Lord Maude of Horsham powerfully reminded us by invoking the example of Brighton and Hove Albion, prohibit the visionaries and the innovators who help to drive industries and sectors forward. None of us wants to see that harmful effect happening in the case of this new regulator and the example of football.

I am glad that my noble friend Lord Jackson drew the Committee’s attention to the recent report by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Investment Fraud and Fairer Financial Services scrutinising the work of the Financial Conduct Authority—another of the many regulators that Parliament has brought about over the decades. It was an excoriating report, as the snippets from it that my noble friend referred to point out. As he says, it is important that it is an all-party group that brought that report forward. My noble friend mentioned the membership of the group of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. I say to the Minister that the cross-party group of parliamentarians from both Houses that brought that report forward, dismayed at the work of the existing regulator, the FCA, includes her noble friends Lady Goudie, Lord Browne of Ladyton, Lord McNicol of West Kilbride, Lord Davies of Brixton, Lord Haskel and Lord Harris of Haringey, who was with us earlier but is no longer in his place. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Mann, was a member of the group, as were 15 Labour Members of Parliament in another place. It includes other Members from across your Lordships’ House, such as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and, from the Liberal Democrats, the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted and Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox.

If the Minister has not had a chance to look at that report yet, I hope she will and that she will bear in mind some of the points that my noble friend highlighted to us as we look at the bringing about of a new regulator. It is important that the Committee looks again at the real-life examples of regulators that Parliament has established over the years, to see how their scope increases. Their costs go up and they are tempted, both by contributions made in Parliament and by pressures put on them by vocal people who may not always represent the mean opinion of a sector, to take their work in further and new directions.

I was a member of that group and heavily involved in that work. Will the noble Lord reflect on the fact that all of its recommendations request that the regulator, the FCA, regulate more toughly and more appropriately, not less and more weakly, including the cases involving football that I am personally very involved in? That was a case for more and stronger regulation, not less.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention and for mentioning that. The point remains that it would be beneficial for us to look at that report on the way in which the FCA is doing its work to see whether it is doing what Parliament asked it to do when it was set up and to see whether we agree with the points that the all-party group, of which he is a member, made in its recent report.

As a number of noble Lords from across the House have said in our debate on this group, the amendment simply requires the regulator to have regard to the risks inherent when regulating a large industry such as football. I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Moynihan and Lord Maude of Horsham for the benefit of their considerable expertise and to my noble friend Lord Hayward for going so forensically through the impact assessment published by the Minister’s department.

My noble friend Lord Jackson’s Amendment 16 represents another guardrail for the regulator to use to focus its attention when exercising its functions. It would complement some of the other amendments that I have tabled and which we have been looking at. Such simple insertions of text into the Bill may be criticised as unnecessary, but they are important. The language that we use when establishing in law new public bodies and new regulators is of supreme importance. It creates a starting point from which that body will grow or change and be investigated by all-party groups and Select Committees. What that starting point looks like and how it is clearly defined has the potential to shape its future trajectory. We are looking at a regulator we hope will do its work very successfully for generations to come. Surely, we want that trajectory to enable future growth and innovation —future visionaries—and to remain free from mission creep and expansion into areas which we do not want to see it moving in.

The proposed model of regulation in the Bill will require the frequent submission of reports and financial plans. These will, as per the licensing conditions and as per our debate on this group, all have to be approved before a regulated club is granted a licence and are a condition for it maintaining that licence. The monitoring and collection of that information will naturally require a large number of staff to help comply with the new regulation. Added to the costs of the levy, this could have damaging effects on regulated clubs—damaging effects, as my noble friend Lord Maude of Horsham and others powerfully set out, that would be felt most keenly by those at the lower end of the pyramid.

That is also particularly evident in the provisions in the Bill that require clubs which are no longer regulated, by virtue of their relegation, to continue to comply with the duties set out. Part 5, for instance, states that some of these duties will be applicable for up to 10 years after the club has been regulated. This ratchet effect means that clubs could still be required to submit a whole host of information to the regulator, even when they have diminished resources because they have dropped below the lower limit of the regulatory ambit envisaged by the Bill. I hope that we can all see the potential for harms here and the risks of those harms growing.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, for drawing the Committee’s attention to her Amendment 72. We should all take a careful look at it in light of the debate that we have had. We will touch on it when we come to that group later on, but I appreciate that it is an attempt to make that sort of regulatory burden easier on clubs. When we come to it, I will ask her more on how her amendment envisages the regulator potentially paying some money to clubs. I will be interested to hear her set that out, but that is for another group.

Football is not only an extremely popular pastime but a vital part of our economy, and the financial health of clubs has to be protected, as my noble friend Lord Jackson’s Amendment 16 seeks to do. By mandating a thorough assessment of the financial implications of the new regulator’s regulatory actions, his amendment would guarantee that clubs’ sustainability would never be overlooked in the pursuit of regulation or reform.

The requirement for regular reports to be submitted to the Secretary of State and laid before Parliament would add to the Bill’s parliamentary oversight, which it currently lacks. It would enhance the transparency of the new regime that we will be bringing in through this law and allow for prompt corrective action, if needed. That is an approach which aligns perfectly with Conservative values, but one which I hope would garner support from every corner of your Lordships’ House. As my noble friend Lady Brady has reminded us, the Prime Minister has recently spoken, to my mind encouragingly, about the risks of overregulation and the need for growth. I hope that these points will resonate with the Benches opposite and with the Minister too.

My noble friend’s amendment seeks to safeguard the future of football while maintaining accountability to Parliament. I know that he would have tabled an amendment such as this if we were still in the last Parliament. If I had found myself at the Dispatch Box opposite, I would have been responding to it. I must say that I would have looked very favourably on it. I think it seeks to strike the right balance between regulation and the economic vitality and viability of football clubs. I hope the Minister will look favourably on it as well.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, for tabling this amendment. I also particularly welcomed the personal account of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. I thank all those who contributed, including the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, who has considerable expertise in regulation. The description from the noble Lord, Lord Birt, of the benefits of regulation, including a strong board and what advantage that might bring, was particularly helpful.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, we will cover the scope of specified competition in the next group, so your Lordships’ Committee will come to that shortly.

The amendment seeks to add an explicit requirement for the regulator to have “due regard” to the potential economic harms of overregulation and to report on this. It is an important point to be aired, and I welcome the opportunity to respond to the concerns the noble Lord has. I absolutely agree that overregulation is something to be avoided. It is why the regulator’s general duties and regulatory principles provide sufficient safeguards to prevent this.

The regulation ensures that the regime is proportionate. In particular, Clauses 7 and 8 emphasise the need for the regulator to act in a way that avoids, as far as reasonably possible, adverse effects on investment and competitiveness, and that it should act proportionately.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, asked about overregulation and was echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady. The regulator’s general duties require it to have regard to how regulation might affect, among other things, financial investment in English football. Its regulatory principles clearly state the importance of advocacy and the need for the regulator to engage with stakeholders. It must act, as I said, in a proportionate manner. All these measures provide a safeguard against overregulation.

The noble Lords, Lord Hayward and Lord Maude, asked about burdens or potential costs on small clubs and the risk of disproportionate burdens. In addition to the explicit regulatory principle guiding the regulator to be proportionate, the entire system has been designed with this proportionality in mind. For example, the licence conditions placed on clubs will vary depending on their unique circumstances. Where clubs are smaller or lower-risk, the regulator’s requirements will reflect this. This means that the regulator will not impose unnecessary burdens on smaller or already well-run clubs.

A comment was made about there being no concern for costs outside the Premier League. However, Mark Ives, the general manager of National League, said:

“We are concerned about the costs … The expectation of how much it is going to cost clubs at a National League level is a huge concern—it may be a small amount of money, but it is a lot to the clubs. We are worried about mission creep within the Bill and the additional bureaucracy. There is a lot of duplication of work, such as the licensing system—there’s an expectation for clubs to do two lots of licensing”.

Dagenham & Redbridge chief executive officer, Steve Thompson, said:

“We are worried that the Bill will be so onerous. Some National League clubs work on two or three people and some volunteers … It does really worry me that some of our small clubs will not survive with the regulation and the reporting that is required”.

There may be a proportionate cost, with clubs in the Premier League from the top down paying proportionately but, whatever the cost, there is concern throughout the leagues.

The noble Baroness raises a particular concern. I am not suggesting by any means that people will not need time to get used to and understand the burdens or costs on smaller clubs but, as I felt I had outlined, I hope that, with enough clarity, the licence conditions—that includes the costs placed on clubs— will vary depending on their unique circumstances. I am sure we will have further opportunities to discuss that as we go forward. Hopefully we can give your Lordships’ Committee and the clubs some reassurance on that point.

To follow up on the Minister’s comments and the observations made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, given the detail that is included in the impact assessment on every other category of cost and benefit, and even though I find some of the calculations dubious, to say the least, at the next sitting of this Committee can we have a clearer indication of the likely proportionate costs which will fall on clubs at different levels in the pyramid, rather than some broad, general observation that it will be proportionate?

The noble Lord will be aware that a lot of this detail is being worked out by the shadow regulator. I can ask for that detail. I cannot give the noble Lord explicit clarity on that tonight but I will endeavour to get a clearer answer for him before the next sitting. That may, however, not include the level of detail that he requests.

To return to the amendment in question, the duties in Clause 7 are fairly novel for a statutory regulator. These bespoke duties acknowledge the specific market features that are key to the continued success of English football, such as investment and competitiveness.

The Minister just referred to competitiveness. Some 14 clubs in the Premier League are multi-club ownership structures. Will the regulator be able to take into account the financial strength or otherwise of other clubs in the ownership structure of those 14 clubs? For example, with Jim Ratcliffe and INEOS at Manchester United, in providing a licence to Manchester United, will the regulator take into account the financial strength or otherwise of Nice and Lausanne—two other clubs which INEOS has an interest in—or is the regulator specifically and only to look at the English clubs? If it is the latter, is there not a risk of capital flight away from Manchester United in those circumstances if, for example, a significant bond was to be required by the regulator to be put up for Manchester United?

If I correctly understood the noble Lord’s point, I do not believe that clubs should be concerned about that particular instance. We will be discussing licences and licensing conditions in a later group so, with your Lordships’ indulgence, if we could wait until then, that would be appreciated.

The amendment would also require the regulator to submit a report on its effects on the financial position of regulated clubs. I reassure the noble Lord that the Bill already includes comprehensive reporting requirements on the regulator—for example, the “state of the game” report and the regulator’s annual report to the Secretary of State, which must be laid before Parliament. These reports would of course be expected to include an assessment of the regulator’s own impact on the market. In our view, the intent of this amendment is therefore already achieved in the Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, asked whether we are risking jeopardising English clubs’ involvement in international competitions. As I reiterated during the last debate, the Government are confident that the Bill and the regulator will not breach the statutes of UEFA and FIFA. This Bill will constitute the business regulation of football clubs in this country; it will not constitute interference in how the FA, or any international body, governs the game. For the reasons I have laid out, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

The Minister will be aware that I made quite a few points on how the only thing a regulator can really do—the only shot in its locker—is to put in more deposits, and on the impact that would have on clubs in terms of that safety net. I perfectly understand that she may not be able to answer that question now but I would welcome a follow-up in writing, and perhaps we can arrange a meeting on it.

I am happy to meet the noble Lord to discuss it further.

I thank the Minister for her answer and I thank my noble friends and others for an excellent debate on my amendment. I hesitate to single anyone out, but the contributions of my noble friends Lord Maude, Lord Moynihan and Lady Brady showed their great expertise in different aspects of football, sport and regulation over the years. I make particular reference to the granular and forensic demolition of the impact assessment by my noble friend Lord Hayward, and the issue of the impact on small clubs that was alluded to by my noble friend Lord Goodman of Wycombe.

To come back to the noble Lord, Lord Birt, I see this amendment as complementary to good governance, because it is a pretty light-touch amendment. It is really a permissive oversight power—we will come back to it, of course, on Report—with timely regulatory audit and a sense check. The Minister may need to think about whether accepting this amendment, perhaps on Report, would detract from the substance of the Bill.

Football is full of amazing stories. I want to finish with a story about my own local team, which goes to the heart of the debate on this amendment, which is the nature of entrepreneurial endeavour in football—risk and reward. Darragh MacAnthony, a property entrepreneur, bought Posh, Peterborough United, at the age of 30, the youngest owner in the league, in 2006. In August 2007, he put a note in the programme at a football match which said, “I will deliver back-to-back promotions from League Two to the Championship by 2009”. He did it, with the help of my friend Barry Fry, who, of course, noble Lords know. The point is that I have to ask, looking at the Bill and at all its onerous implications in terms of regulatory impact, would Darragh MacAnthony have put his business on the line to buy Posh, to keep Peterborough United afloat and make it flourish as it has done for the last 18 years, had the Bill been in place? I very much doubt that he would.

Does the noble Lord wish to withdraw his amendment?

Thank you; I appreciate being kept on my toes by the noble Baroness, Lady Morris. With that in mind, and notwithstanding anything I have said, we will ventilate these issues on Report. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 16 withdrawn.

Clause 1 agreed.

Clause 2: Key definitions

Amendments 17 and 17A not moved.