My Lords, I was keen to participate in this debate today because I was the shadow Health Minister in your Lordships’ House during the pandemic and for many of the years leading up to it. I thank my noble friend Lady Merron for the opportunity for this debate and for her brilliant introduction to it. I would just like to point out this this is the first module of many—we are at the beginning of a process, not at the end of it.

I have been following the work of the commission of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hallett, since it started because I believe that this level and depth of inquiry is essential. As my noble friend said, not least we owe this to the tens of thousands who died, the thousands who suffer still the effects of long Covid and those who have yet to recover from the trauma that they experienced either while working in our emergency services in the NHS or in witnessing deaths and illness in their families or, indeed, their patients.

As Sir David Spiegelhalter said:

“The 2017 National Risk Register did include an ‘emerging infectious disease’ such as SARS and MERS, but the ‘reasonable worst case scenario’ was only ‘several thousand people experiencing symptoms, potentially leading to up to 100 fatalities’. This was the underestimate of the century – by the end of 2023, over 230,000 people in the UK had died with ‘Covid-19’ on their death certificate”.

I want to make two reflections today about this report, but I particularly welcome recommendation 10 in this module, which calls for:

“A UK-wide independent statutory body for whole-system civil emergency preparedness and resilience” to be set up within 12 months, which would consult with the

“voluntary, community and social enterprise sector”.

As patron of Social Enterprise UK and founder of its all-party group and having worked and supported the voluntary sector for most of my working life, I think this is very important. With particular reference to the questions raised by the RNIB in its very helpful briefing, I ask my noble friend the Minister to provide us with an update on the Government’s plans for setting up such a body and the ways in which disabled people and other groups could be represented. A letter would certainly suffice to answer that question.

The first issue I particularly want to mention and to perhaps explore is how to avoid groupthink, as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, said. If I might interject a moment of political dissent into this, I was waiting for him to say that they got it wrong with that at some point in his remarks. I will just leave it at that, because his Government were in charge of what happened next. The report says that:

“The provision of advice … could be improved. Advisers and advisory groups did not have sufficient freedom and autonomy to express dissenting views and suffered from a lack of significant external oversight and challenge. The advice was often undermined by ‘groupthink’”,

which, of course, added to the lack of preparedness. Vital “what if?” questions were not asked, either in the flawed pandemic preparations prior to the pandemic or during the engagement in dealing with the pandemic in those vital early days.

That means that questions of the preparedness did not take account of health inequalities, or of on-the-ground issues such as care homes and local preparedness. I saw this in action myself, because I was a member of a local clinical commissioning group in my borough that was about to be abolished at the beginning of 2020. At our last meeting that March, our local GPs assumed that they would have a vital role to play with the public health teams in our area in dealing with what was clearly shaping up to be a serious infectious disease. However, there was no information flowing from the centre about step-down facilities for those who needed to be moved out of hospitals—because everybody recognised that people needed to be moved out of them—and all those present knew that they should not be placed in care homes immediately. No questions were being asked, and our public health experts were not being listened to. There was no collecting of data locally and no flow of information, so a serious lack of leadership happened at that time.

The background to this was that the committee that might have led on these matters—the threats, hazards, resilience and contingencies sub-committee—had last met in February 2017. In July 2019, the sub-committee was formally taken out of the committee structure, with the suggestion that it could be “reconvened if needed” but an acceptance that in fact it was abolished. As a result, immediately prior to the pandemic, there was no cross-government ministerial oversight of the matters that were previously within that sub-committee’s remit. I say to my noble friend that the need to challenge groupthink means that there have to be external voices and expertise in our pandemic preparedness. Can I be assured that that will happen and that there will be a commitment to partnership working with scientists, researchers and vaccine manufacturers to ensure future pandemic resilience?

My second reflection is about parliamentary and constitutional readiness for national emergencies. In many ways, this is covered in the first recommendation of the report, which is a

“radical simplification of the civil emergency preparedness and resilience systems” and

“rationalising and streamlining the current bureaucracy and providing better and simpler Ministerial and official structures and leadership”.

Since the report was commissioned, there has in fact been an Independent Commission on UK Public Health Emergency Powers, chaired by the right honourable Sir Jack Beatson. The commission reviewed the UK’s public health legislative framework and institutional arrangements. Several Members of your Lordships’ House, including myself, gave evidence to that commission about what actually happened on the ground in terms of parliamentary accountability and governance. How do we build into our resilience structure our need for accountability, transparency and parliamentary control of executive action? That was what the independent commission was talking about; I am sure that its evidence has gone into the public commission, but it explored those issues.

When we build our new resilience framework, it has to take account of the role of Parliament and what happened. I think the then Minister and I were in agreement, along with lots of other noble Lords, that it was completely unacceptable that we were having to deal with decisions two or three weeks after they had been taken, or even longer. This Parliament found itself in a ridiculous situation, so we need to build into our new plans that that should not happen. One way might be that if we are faced with a national emergency, there should be a national political response that the Government have to lead and that takes account of all the different political voices that should be heard in that process.

I have been dismayed that some parts of the press and others have denigrated the inquiry as a waste of time and money, or as some form of petty personality dispute. We have lived through the worst disaster of our recent history, with upward of 230,000 deaths, as I have said, making us one of the most badly affected western nations. In terms of responsible governance, if we had lost that number of people in, say, a tsunami, we would have a huge inquiry to investigate all the nuts and bolts of future mitigation and best practice. Why would we not do the same in the event of the likelihood of another viral pandemic? Such events, stress-testing the machinery of our democracies to the maximum, seem to be part of this process.

I again congratulate my noble friend Lady Merron and look forward to many more discussions about future modules.