Baroness Chapman of Darlington:

Moved by Baroness Chapman of Darlington

7: Clause 1, page 1, leave out lines 20 to 22Member’s explanatory statementThis amendment is to seek clarity on when an individual is considered to be the decision maker for the purposes of this bill.

My Lords, it might be helpful to explain that most, if not all, the amendments we have tabled reflect the fact that we find this quite a difficult Bill to amend in a way that would make it work because, as many noble Lords have already said, it is very wide-ranging and quite vague in many of its terms. Our amendments are mostly intended to elicit not a response from the Minister to the amendments as such, but an explanation of the Bill’s intention, so that we are clear, or as clear as we can be, about exactly how the Bill is intended to be interpreted. This group of amendments is more about who the Government wish to catch with the measures in the Bill, and how it will work. Through these amendments, we want to tease out how the Government will decide who will be subject to enforcement action.

Amendment 7 would remove lines 20 to 22 in Clause 1:

“and those references to the decision-maker include, in a case where the decision-maker is not an individual”—

I assume that that means a local authority, a university or some other public body—

“the individuals who in fact make the decision for the decision-maker”.

I am not sure whether the Government want, in Clause 1, to include members of a governing body or councillors serving on a particular committee—we will come on later to definitions of public bodies. Often, people serve in these capacities as volunteers or as inexpert lay members. Are the Government really trying to say that they want those individuals to be held to account in a way that, in other parts of the Bill, they seem to be suggesting the body itself is to be affected? We need to be clear in our own minds which it is.

We would like to understand in what circumstances individuals will be given notices and then fines. I know we will come on to this later, but we do not know the extent of these fines. Will the fines be applied differently to individuals, compared to a council or a university? Pragmatically, we would expect them to be, but how will they be treated differently if they are to be subject to enforcement action? How will the enforcement agency decide? Is there to be discretion as to whether it is holding an individual responsible as the decision-maker, or is the organisation the decision-maker? How will it assess that? Will it look at the individual behaviour of particularly influential senior managers, members of staff or elected representatives? Would the chancellor of a university, for example, be held to account, or the wider organisation; and how will that judgment be made? The Explanatory Notes do not help us with this question in relation to Clause 1. That is why we have also tabled Amendment 55, which asks the Secretary of State to publish guidance on the circumstances in which an individual is the decision-maker under the Bill, and the circumstances in which they are not.

I am not a lawyer, so perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, would like to help us out here. When does this corporate liability, if I can put it that way, become an individual liability? The LGA has helpfully given examples of this question arising. I do not know whether noble Lords have had a chance to look at the pre-legislative scrutiny that took place in the Commons. The LGA was very clear about lots of things in its oral evidence, including that some councillors who serve on pensions committees are not particularly expert in managing these funds, but they are very well supported and advised by their officers, and they take their duties very seriously. Even where, say, a newly elected councillor arrives with some grand intention or attempts to argue for some kind of divestment decision, actually, their fiduciary duties, it is pointed out to them, override such concerns, and that does tend to become the view of the committee.

The LGA, because of its experience of how these things work in practice, said in its evidence that any enforcement action should be directed towards the administering authority and not the individual councillors. Can the Minister explain how an enforcement authority will decide whether individual or corporate responsibility applies for a particular decision? The LGA talks about this in relation to judicial review as well, which we will come on to later. The LGA feels that the subject of the judicial review should not be the decision-making authority but rather the enforcement authority, so that it is its decision that is challenged. If it decides not to issue a notice, that can be challenged, but the risk does not reside with the individual councillors.

It is interesting that in relation to Clause 4, which I know we are all very worried about as it concerns the prohibition of statements in support of boycotts, the Explanatory Notes are quite clear, although we will want to tease this out; it helps reinforce the lack of clarity in Clause 1. The Explanatory Notes say on Clause 4:

“It only affects individuals when they are a public authority (for example a Minister of the Crown) or when they make statements or take action on behalf of public authorities. Even when an individual is speaking on behalf of a public authority, the ban only applies to the public authority itself and there is no personal liability for the individual”.

That is helpful and clear, but we do not get that in relation to Clause 1. I do not understand why that is and it would be helpful if the Minister could clarify it for us.

We are not really looking, in the Minister’s response, for a word-by-word critique of what we have tabled. We are using the process that we have, and the only way to get this started is by tabling something. Our aim is to really understand who is going to be subject to the Bill, and how that enforcement process will work in terms of individuals, as opposed to organisations. I beg to move.

My Lords, I am an academic and, in the course of my career, I have been an associated member of three colleges in Oxford and Cambridge. One has a governing body in the mid-30s; the second has one of around 50; and the third has one of nearly 100—much too large, I quite agree. The chilling effect of this clause on those three colleges would be considerable, precisely because it is not entirely clear what it means by the individuals who make the decision for the decision-maker. That requires a great deal more clarification; at the very least, it ought to be in the Explanatory Notes. This is another attempt to ask the Government to come back with something which is a great deal clearer.

In my career, I have also been a historian and an analyst of foreign policy. It is an area in which we spend an awful lot of time defining, discussing and describing decision-making. We very often disagree sharply with each other because it is very difficult to define, for example, exactly who took the crucial decision that started the First World War. Baroness Henig, sadly no longer with us, wrote several books on the subject. The noble Lord, Lord Roberts of Belgravia, has written several books entirely disagreeing with what other historians have said about various crucial decisions.

That is, again, part of our problem: when a complicated decision is taken, who takes it? How many people are complicit? If you are a member of the council committee which takes the decision and you abstain on the vote—or vote against it—are you also part of the decision-making or not? There is, to say the least, a cloud of uncertainty around this phrase. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, understands it; I must say that I do not.

My Lords, I would also like to probe a little more on the meaning of “decision-maker” in a higher education context, following on from the excellent speech by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace.

Universities are often very decentralised in their structures, and power can be distributed quite far and wide. It is not always concentrated in the vice-chancellor’s office; nor is the governance of universities often as clear- cut as it might be. I would appreciate some clarity as the Bill proceeds on who exactly is going to be identified as the decision-maker in particular situations. Do we mean specifically decisions taken by the executive management team of an institution, principally the vice-chancellor? Do we mean, for example, student unions?

I noted that in my noble friend the Minister’s response to the noble Lord, Lord Mann, that student unions were—if I heard her correctly—out of scope, because they are private bodies. This confuses me a little, because I thought the whole purpose of the Bill, from a political point of view, was to address precisely this issue: student unions getting on their soapboxes and making statements about BDS, and all the rest of it. If they are out of scope of the Bill, I really wonder why universities as a whole are still in scope. It is not the vice-chancellors, academics or heads of department who are making these kinds of noises; it is the student unions. If I understood my noble friend the Minister correctly, they are not even covered. I really question why universities are still in scope at all, but that is a question we will come to later in Committee.

The final point on which I would like some clarity from my noble friend the Minister is whether a decision-maker will also be deemed to be an individual academic, who may manage a research budget. Will the use of that research budget by the individual academic be part of the decision-making process captured by the Bill? If so, how will that be squared with the legal duties on the OfS, among others, to promote academic freedom and freedom of speech in our higher education institutions?

My Lords, it seems to me that there is a bit of confusion going on. Amendment 7, which takes out the words in Clause 1(7), relates only to who is carrying out the disapproval. It is just amplifying those people whose disapproval is taken into account, to see whether or not the clause is engaged. It is not trying to add different categories of decision-maker, because the reference to decision-maker is clear in Clause 2, which we will come on to in another group. It is that definition that then drives enforcement, et cetera.

I was interested in Amendment 55 of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman—although I think it is actually the wrong amendment asking for regulations—because it highlights that decision-makers might be individuals under the Bill, which they can be. As I understand it, the definition of “decision-maker” in Clause 2 encompasses some individuals being the decision-maker from whom all these consequences might flow. That was a complete surprise to me because the Bill is titled the Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill—a manifesto commitment related to public bodies. I was completely amazed to find that individuals might be public authorities within the terms of Clause 2, and therefore decision-makers.

I was interested in the noble Baroness’s probing amendment, because I hoped that she would be using that to ask the Minister what kinds of individuals could be decision-makers under the definition that we are using—the Human Rights Act definition. The limited research I have done produced the example of a doctor. When a doctor is carrying out his NHS work, he could be a public authority for that purpose, but when carrying out his private work, he could not be. I did not find much more than that, and I am rather hoping that the Minister will be able to explain to us in rather more detail precisely which individuals are decision-makers within Clause 2.

My Lords, I, too, will speak to this amendment and do so, like the noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Johnson, in relation to universities and higher education. I had some experience of that: I was on two university councils—those of Birmingham and Kent—and I chaired the Birmingham council for five or six years in the early part of this century.

I have to say to the Minister that, as a result of a lot of extremely desirable reforms, the decision-making at universities was concentrated quite heavily on the council. The council did not micromanage every decision, but it was responsible for every decision taken at the university. That responsibility was clearly focused on a much-reduced size of council, down from the 30s or 40s to the 20s, and it meant that a quite a lot of responsibility came on to its members, who were a combination of academics and lay persons—with a majority, on the whole, of lay persons. The lay persons on the council were volunteers and were not paid a penny. Now, if the vagueness in this bit of the legislation is retained, I would not like to be out there trying to recruit new members to university councils, if they thought they were going to be liable for any of the sorts of problems that could arise under this legislation.

I suspect that this is just one of many pieces of this legislation that reinforce the case for simply taking higher education and universities completely out of it. I think that is what we will come to when we get to Report. This is just the first illustration that it will have a remarkably chilling effect on the conduct of councils and the way in which people are prepared to serve—for nothing and as volunteers—on university councils, giving up many hundreds of hours of their lives to making sure that the university is properly administered and decisions properly taken.

My Lords, I preface my remarks by declaring an interest as chancellor of Cardiff University. I apologise that my duties at Cardiff University prevented me attending the whole of Second Reading—so I could not speak, although I attended a significant part of it.

Before I was chancellor of Cardiff University, I was a member of the council of Cardiff Metropolitan University, so I have a background in both executive and non-executive roles at universities. What I have to say very much follows neatly from the noble Lord. My experience is that university councils—and other bodies doing the same job but sometimes with different names—are very highly regulated already. They involve a great deal of training and responsibility and absolutely no financial reward—but there is great satisfaction for those who participate.

In both universities I have mentioned, our problem is always trying to get the suitable range of highly skilled, highly experienced people to participate. If you add another unnecessary layer of responsibility on to those people, you will deter very worthwhile recruits and you will make life more difficult again for our higher education sector. So can the Minister give us examples of universities—and individuals within universities—that have made these inappropriate decisions, so that we can see why universities are included? Otherwise, if there are no examples at the Minister’s fingertips, could the Government give further thought to whether they should be included at all?

My Lords, I want to return, very briefly, to something the noble Lord, Lord Mann, raised earlier. I can understand in the broader sense why universities have been included, because very often it has been universities that have been at the cutting edge of popularising boycotts. They have taken a wide range of forms—and not just in terms of what is sold or invested in. As the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, pointed out, it could be denying people research, not letting Israeli academics come over to speak or whatever. There are all sorts of ways that this happens. So, I understand why the university sector is in scope. My problem is that it is not clear to me how a Bill like this can do anything other than attack academic freedom, which I am interested in defending. I think we have to deal with what is happening on university campuses in a different way.

Regardless of that, the reason it is frustrating—and why I am referring to what the noble Lord, Lord Mann, said—is that, if you have a conversation with anyone outside this Chamber, if they are like me, they are worried about BDS and anti-Semitic campaigns against Israeli academics. Something has just happened at King’s College London in fact, where an event has been called off, and there is a University of Leeds chaplain in hiding —all these things are going on. Ironically, if anything, this Bill is too narrow to deal with what is really happening. The point that the noble Lord, Lord Mann, made was that the way wording happens, there are ways around it that this Bill will not deal with. He and I might differ about how we would deal with that—I think we probably would. None the less, given what a public authority is, it is understandable why universities are in here—but, as people have said, which bit of the university?

For the Minister to say “Oh, no, it wouldn’t count, student unions”, would be utterly ludicrous. From the Government’s point of view, even if I go with you, why would it not be student unions? That would be mad. They are part of what the public authority of the university is about, along with research councils and everyone else. I am not trying to encourage the Government to wipe up every part of a university to bring them in scope, but to keep saying that they are not in scope makes no sense from the point of view of the public justification for this Bill by Michael Gove when he has argued for it, and anyone else who supports it. So we do need some clarity here.

My Lords, this debate has referred consistently to universities, but I do not want the point to get lost that there is an equivalent problem with local government pension schemes, where a succession of bodies take part in the decisions that are reached. Every fund has advisers, in particular advisers on ESG. The trustees are responsible for the decision, but they are under a legal obligation to give due regard to their advisers’ views. Now, because of the encouragement by the Government, the individual funds are not actually investing the money; the money is passed on to a pooled fund that equally has its advisers and its decision-makers. Somewhere in that thread of control, someone is a decision-maker, but I defy the Minister to tell us precisely, in the terms of this Bill, who it is.

My Lords, I have just a few points and questions, following the discussion we have just had. The first point is to seek clarity on whether my understanding of the last three lines of Clause 1(7) is correct. I understand those three lines simply to be saying that, where the decision-maker is a collegiate body, the duty to have regard applies to the individuals within that collegiate body who are taking the decision. That is how I read those three lines, but I may be missing something.

The second point arises from the comment that the noble Lord, Lord Johnson of Marylebone, made about universities. I suppose it is a point that comes up both under these amendments but also under the next amendments and in particular Amendment 8. Paragraph 20 of the Explanatory Notes, which speaks to Clause 1, states:

“The ban in Clause 1 is not intended to prohibit a higher education institution from deciding to terminate a collaboration with a foreign university on the grounds of academic freedom”.

I read that as implying that, other than on those grounds, the ban would apply to a decision to terminate a collaboration with a foreign academic institution. I would like some clarity on this, because I was a bit surprised to see that, as my reading of the definition of “procurement decision” would not necessarily have included a collaboration with a foreign academic institution as a procurement decision. It certainly is not an investment decision, but is a collaboration with a foreign academic institution in scope of the ban potentially? That is what I would like to understand. If so, it raises the question that the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, raised, of whether the individual grant holder who has, for example, a research collaboration with a foreign institution, is within scope of Clause 1. That is not clear to me.

My Lords, I have had advice from a professor of law at Cambridge University that it is not within scope where the research funding is not public. It is then a private act, not a public act.

My Lords, very many points have been made about how the decision-maker is established. From the point of view of local government, in local councils there are very many ways of taking decisions that can be individual or corporate. The tiers of responsibility and the trails that decisions make throughout a large organisation would need to be explored if enforcement action was to be taken.

In addition, councillors, committees or even pension committees, as we heard earlier, are advised by experts and independent advisers, so it is not clear where the line of accountability is and who is responsible, who is to be identified for enforcement action. The public authority, as has been identified earlier, is the body that is talked about in relation to Clause 4, but it is not in the Bill and does not relate to any other part of decision-making. I add my plea for further clarification as to how the decision-maker is to be identified and how enforcement is to be pursued in light of that.

As far as pension funds are concerned, as a former member I know that expert advisers do take account of political situations in their evaluation of risk. Again, that may be intimidating for councillors or advisers and inhibit the quality of advice that is given.

My Lords, Amendment 7, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury, and Amendment 55, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, seek clarity on whether an individual is considered a decision-maker for the purposes of this Bill. It was helpful to hear the introduction from the noble Baroness and her wish for general elucidation. As she implied, it is an important part of the Bill’s provisions. I will try to confine my points mainly to decision-makers, which are the purpose of this group.

A public authority will generally delegate responsibility for decision-making on procurement and investment decisions to individuals within the public authority. The individuals who make the decision on behalf of the public authority will do so in accordance with the public authority’s internal policies and structures. To address the noble Baroness’s question on enforcement, even when an individual is making decisions or speaking on behalf of a public authority, the ban applies only to the public authority itself. There is no personal liability for the individual. Individuals will therefore not personally be responsible for any fines that may be imposed on public authorities for a breach of the ban in Clauses 1 or 4.

On the noble Baroness’s question on pensions—this is something I know about because I have served as a pension trustee, admittedly in the private sector—this is something we can come back to in more detail when we discuss Clause 12, but I will also look at the Local Government Association material that she referenced, which I am sure will be helpful and interesting.

My noble friend Lady Noakes made the point that there are some limited cases where individuals are the public authority in their own right. She asked for examples, so I suppose that examples would be UK Government Ministers, Ministers from devolved Administrations and police and crime commissioners. They could also be individuals such as mayors if they exercise public functions in their own right. Any individual who is a public authority in their own right is already subject to far-reaching and fundamental duties under the Human Rights Act 1998. They could be subject to court action if they restrict others’ human rights, and the duties in the Human Rights Act are much more wide-ranging than the prohibitions in this Bill. It would not be appropriate for these individuals to be pursuing policies that are not in line with the official foreign policy, which is, of course, set by the UK Government. To be clear, local authority councillors and university leaders are not public authorities in their own right.

Amendment 55 would require the Secretary of State to publish guidance to clarify in what circumstances an individual is a decision-maker before the Bill commences. We do not believe that it would be appropriate to publish guidance on this matter, as every public authority is structured differently and has different policies on how its internal decision-making process operates. As it happens, as the noble Baroness, Lady Janke, said, structures vary a lot, and that is the case.

To give the House an example, in the case of local authorities, they will have a scheme of delegations in place, with, for example, a commissioning board, which will indicate who takes procurement decisions. While the decision is made by the individuals on the board, they have been empowered to take those decisions via the scheme of delegations, and it is therefore the local authority that is the legal decision-maker in the context of the ban. This is made clear in Clause 2(1) of the Bill. Even when an individual is making decisions or speaking on behalf of a public authority, the ban applies only to the public authority itself and there is no personal liability for the individual. Therefore, individuals will not personally be responsible for any fines that may be imposed on public authorities for a breach of the ban. The concerns on this issue—

What the Minister is saying is genuinely quite helpful, but I am just trying to apply this to my experience of the real world. If a councillor, say, were to make a statement or cause something to happen at a conference or something like that, the council would be held responsible as a public authority for the actions of that individual. The trouble with that, in a way, is that that would then influence the advice, guidance and training that is given to elected individuals, and then you would get the chilling effect that we are all so concerned about. Just to make sure, have I actually understood that correctly? Is that what the Minister was explaining to us?

I think that sounds right but, if I may, I will clarify if I got that wrong. To some extent, it is important in Committee that we actually understand what is happening. That is what, in the spirit of the noble Baroness’s question, I am trying to do. Even if a decision were delegated to individuals in a public authority, such as a commissioning board in a local authority, I think it is clear that the fine would be imposed on the public authority, not the individual.

I should briefly address why universities need to be in the scope of the legislation in response to my noble friend Lord Johnson, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. We will come back to this on later amendments. It is an area of particular interest to a lot of noble Lords, not least because of the huge contributions people in this House make to the university sector.

However, the fact is that universities are a frequent target of the BDS movement, and some student unions —to come back to that point—have passed motions pressurising their universities to divest from Israeli companies. The Bill will ensure that universities cannot implement such policies in response to pressure from their student unions, as that would be divisive and could potentially contribute to rising anti-Semitism on university campuses, which is a concern.

The Minister raised it—can she give us one example of where a university has ever succumbed to such pressure from its student union?

We will come back to this amendment; as the noble Baroness knows, this is an area of investigation for me, and I am trying to make sure that we have all the answers that we need and can provide the sorts of examples that she and I are used to exchanging in trying to move forward legislation in a constructive way.

On student unions, I will add a point that perhaps I should have made earlier. Student unions are usually charities and can undertake political activity only if it can be shown to support their charitable purposes, in line with Charity Commission guidance. Any questions as to whether political activity was appropriate would be considered in line with the Charity Commission’s normal processes. However, I confirm what I said earlier, that the Bill is narrow, applying to public bodies and, obviously, to investment and procurement. I hope that that addresses the concerns of noble Lords.

The Minister used the word “pressurised”. Did she do so advisedly—“pressurised” as opposed to “called on” or “suggested”? Is “pressurised” defined in the Bill?

I think I used the word “pressure”. Certainly, I was reading “pressure”, but perhaps I blurred the wording and said “pressurised”. I could equally have used “influenced” or some other word. I was trying to explain what we were getting at on the education side of things.

I have a couple of examples of student union pressure, which I mentioned earlier. Warwick student union held an all-student vote in 2020 to pressure the University of Warwick to fully divest from all unethical industries and release all investments. That included divesting from companies in support of a boycott of Israel, and divesting from international companies that are complicit in violations of Palestinian rights. There was also the example of Sussex University, which I mentioned a little earlier.

The thing is, though, as we are teasing out, is it not right that the Bill would not stop Warwick University student union from passing a motion in that regard? It would stop the university from acting on it, but no university has ever acted on these things. That is why we are all scratching our heads a little about what we are going to get from the Bill. It was a manifesto commitment—we understand that—but it is not our fault if the Government cannot turn their manifesto commitment into a usable piece of legislation.

On the Warwick University point, for clarification, the other important thing that happened there was that Warwick University academics refused to sit on a panel discussing the issue of Israel, and so on. That was led by academics. It would not be affected by the Bill. The Minister can say, “Oh, that’s okay, it won’t be affected by this Bill” but that has had a much more damaging impact on the debate around Israel in Warwick University than anything that a few people at the student union did and that the university authorities did not act upon. What the university did not do was support those Jewish students and the organisation that organised that debate, and it let the academics carry on. The question of what the Bill will and will not do, and who will be held responsible, is what we are trying to clarify in this Committee.

My Lords, I did not come prepared with examples about universities—my memory is not that good. However, there have been very many occasions where violence used by anti-Israel students has forced the university to cancel speakers or to charge Israeli and Jewish societies for their own security when an Israeli or a pro-Israeli speaker comes. There are manifold examples of this, and I have dealt with it over the years. If noble Lords do not know about this, they really should.

The comments that have been made by the noble Lords, Lord Mann and Lord Wallace, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, take us to the heart of the Bill and why the drafting is so difficult. What the Bill really means to do is clamp down on anti-Semitism in local authorities and universities, but it cannot say so in direct terms; therefore, it goes much more broadly than it needs to, because it is academically dancing around the subject. If I could rip it up and start again, I would have a couple of clauses saying that anti-Israel activity—anti-Zionist activity, if you want to call it that, or anti-Semitic activity—is prohibited in universities and public authorities, because there are no examples of universities and public authorities acting against Australia, to give a fanciful example. Is anyone banning Australian wine because of what happened to the Aborigines? Is anyone banning New Zealand lamb because of the way the Māoris were treated? Is anyone, anywhere, ceasing to use Chinese products? I need hardly go on.

My Lords, I will add to this element of the debate, if I may, because I think it is relevant. The noble Lord, Lord Willetts, mentioned at Second Reading that he was on the council of Southampton University. I too am an alumnus of Southampton University.

In March 2015, the university procured the services of a speaker to host a debate questioning the right of Israel to exist. I do not know whether that would be caught by the Bill. I would hope that it is, but I suspect that it is not. I wrote to the vice-chancellor at the time—I had been a very modest donor to the university—and asked, going to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, whether there had been any conference at Southampton University questioning the right to exist of any other country. He wrote back and said there had not. Eventually, the conference was cancelled—it received reprobation from the Communities Secretary at the time, now my noble friend Lord Pickles —only because the university claimed it could not go ahead on health and safety grounds. But that was a very thin excuse, and for a university to host a conference dedicated to questioning the right of the State of Israel to exist, and to procure the services of people to run it, is, I hope noble Lords would agree, what we should be addressing.

My Lords, my noble friend the Minister was asking whether I was reassured. I appreciate that that was largely a rhetorical question, but I have to say I am not yet totally reassured. But I would be if she were able to furnish us with examples of higher education institutions succumbing to pressure from student unions to undertake BDS-style actions in relation to their investment and procurement decisions. That is really important for us as we make progress with the Bill.

I thank all noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for their interventions. I observe that, obviously, the Bill will make this boycotting activity by student unions almost pointless. But I say to the speakers that this is a group about decision-makers, and we are ranging widely into the debate about the exact involvement of universities, although that has been helpful in informing the next stage of this Committee.

Returning to decision-makers, perhaps I could just say in conclusion that I trust that this addresses some of the concerns of noble Lords and the noble Baroness. My officials will provide further clarification in the Bill’s Explanatory Notes, as requested by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. I hope, in the light of the explanations I have given, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, that was probably a bit more helpful than I had anticipated, in that it fleshed out some of our really quite fundamental concerns. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, made a very powerful case for why action is needed to prevent some of the antagonism and fear, and those activities that have happened on campuses and elsewhere that we all want to prevent. But this Bill does not do it: it deals only with boycott and divestment decisions. It probably brings into scope people and decision-makers that the Government did not have in mind.

The idea that people who want to campaign on these issues will suddenly stop doing so as a consequence of the legislation is fanciful because, as the noble Lord, Lord Mann, said in his Second Reading speech, they will just change the target from public authorities to others. It will not deal with some of the unpleasantness and the atmosphere on campus. That will not be assisted in any way, and the way the Bill is drafted might actually make things worse. It will not deal with campaigns to prevent certain events or not to have certain speakers. Those things are completely outside the scope of the Bill. We are focusing on universities to make this point, but similar things could be said about local government.

I am very happy to withdraw my amendment, but I think we are going to end up with this discussion on most of the groups, because the Bill is so unsatisfactory and does not actually fulfil the aims that the Government say they wish to achieve. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.