My Lords, I declare my interests as trustee of DB and master trusts. I will speak to Amendment 93. Government Amendment 4 is welcome because it recognises the necessary direction of travel on disclosure requirements on sustainability, but the problem is that it is not sufficient. It gives the Treasury the power to issue a policy statement on SDRs and to require the regulators to report against this, but the FCA does not have the powers to actually implement SDRs. As Amendment 93 proposes, there is a need to give the FCA the power to publish guidance on how asset managers must consider the long-term consequences of any decision; consider the impact of climate, nature and society on their investments; consider the impact of their investments on climate and nature; and publicly report on their considerations.
It is interesting that the explanatory statement accompanying the published government amendment states that it supports
“the regulation of disclosure requirements relating to sustainability” by requiring the FCA not only to have regard to Treasury policy but to inform a policy statement by the Treasury. It is difficult to see how the FCA could optimally inform Treasury policy if it does not set guidance on expected content and open reporting by asset managers on the impact of their investment decision-making.
Confusion among fiduciaries about the extent of their duty to consider such impacts is not limited to occupational pension schemes; it runs across the length of the investment chain. The FCA has broad powers to issue guidance under Section 139A of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, but there is still an ambiguity. Amendment 93 gives the FCA the explicit power to issue guidance on the disclosure of considerations of sustainability impacts as a core part of the investment managers’ duties. This is not inconsistent with the existing duty on trustees, in Regulation 2 of the occupational pensions investment regulations, to report on how they have complied with the Section 35 duties of the Pensions Act 1995.
The proposed FCA guidance is not legally binding: regulated firms would be free to diverge from it, but there is an expectation that they would need to explain why they have done so. There is a need to apply the guidance to contract-based personal pension schemes as well, to avoid the risk of regulatory arbitrage between a weaker FCA regime and a more robust TPR disclosure regime.
The concept of fiduciary duty borne by those responsible for the best interests of pension scheme members is evolving, and, as we heard, the Government’s updated green finance strategy of 2023 includes a commitment to review pension trustees’ fiduciary duties and stewardship activities. That trustees must act in the best interests of scheme members must not be a principle in doubt or, indeed, overridden. The key issue is what “acting in savers’ best interests” means in law for fiduciaries, and the extent to which it includes stewardship and ESG engagement. If fiduciaries ignore the impacts of investment strategies on society, climate and nature, or vice versa, those major externalities will eventually impact them at a later date.
In seeking more productive investment by the finance sector, the Government should acknowledge that pension funds are not the only decision-maker or the beginning and end of the problem; asset managers have an equally key role to play in managing impacts and considering the long-term consequences. Amending FCA regulation powers to guide open reporting on these matters will encourage investment away from environmentally and socially damaging activities, and towards supporting efficient transition to net zero, nature protection and healthy societies, in a way that is in the savers’ best interests and that supports the successful transition of the wider economy.
Guidance from regulators is required along the length of the investment chains as risks become more acute. Pension schemes contract with fund managers to manage assets. If schemes are expected to consider the sustainability of their investments, they need fund managers to support them by undertaking that activity too. Trustees’ ability to discharge their ESG and stewardship responsibilities to greatest effect has a dependency on how regulators expect asset managers to discharge their duties. Expectations placed on pension funds and asset managers are a complement to, not a substitute for, government policies on efficient transition to a sustainable economic future. Government regulations that perversely drive greenwashing or green asset bubble risk are equally unsustainable.
The Government want to see more productive investment by the financial sector, but mandating how citizens’ private assets are invested would displace trustee fiduciary duty with state control of private assets, inviting litigation and risking impacting public attitudes to private saving. But, in giving the FCA power to guide the content and require open reporting on sustainability, Amendment 93 can assist confidence in aligning members’ best interests with increasing productive investment. I commend it to the House.