Moved by Lord Sharkey
1: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out subsection (1) and insert—“(1) A Minister of the Crown may by regulation revoke or replace any legislation referred to in Schedule 1 provided that—(a) a document containing a proposal for those regulations has been laid before each House of Parliament,(b) the document has been referred to a Joint Committee of both Houses, and(c) a period of at least 40 days has elapsed after that referral, not including any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or either House is adjourned for more than four days.(2) If the Joint Committee, after considering any regulations laid under this paragraph, finds that—(a) the regulations represent a substantial change to the preceding retained EU law, or(b) the Government have not carried out sufficient public consultation lasting at least six weeks before laying the draft before Parliament, a Minister of the Crown must arrange for the instrument to be debated on the floor of each House and voted on before the period in sub-paragraph (1)(c) elapses.(3) If any amendments to the regulations, whether or not proposed by the Joint Committee, are agreed by both Houses of Parliament the regulations must be made in the form so amended.(4) If one House agrees amendments to the regulations under sub-paragraph (3) the Minister may not make the relevant statutory instrument until the other House has debated and voted on a motion to agree or disagree with those amendments.”
My Lords, I shall speak first to Amendment 1 and then to Amendments 116 and 117. The Bill gives the Ministers and regulators power to shape our financial services regimes, but it does not allow for any meaningful parliamentary scrutiny of the changes that Ministers and regulators may introduce into law. This is another very clear example of what the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Blencathra, and their committees, warned about—the significant and continuing shift of power from Parliament to the Executive. The DPRRC report says in its introduction:
“We have concluded that it is now a matter of urgency that Parliament should take stock and consider how the balance of power can be re-set”.
It goes on to highlight the problem of what it calls
“Legislative sub-delegation of power: where ministers can confer powers on themselves or other bodies”,
which is precisely what this Bill is about. The report, called Democracy Denied?, goes on to say:
“we conclude that conferring legislative sub-delegation of power is potentially a more egregious erosion of democratic accountability than a simple delegation to a minister”.
The Minister is aware of these concerns. In our previous discussions, she has noted, by way of compensation no doubt, that there will be opportunities for Parliament to be consulted and for post-hoc accountability reviews. Neither of those things, desirable though they may well be, is a substitute for meaningful legislative scrutiny. This scrutiny is what Amendment 1 proposes to introduce, and I am very grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts and Lord Lisvane, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for adding their names to the amendment.
The amendment is based on the Amendment 76 of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, to the REUL Bill, which your Lordships agreed to on
The objection against taking up too much parliamentary time seems pretty odd, as scrutiny is obviously the essence of our role. In any case, that objection may, if one is charitable, have some force in the case of the monster that is the REUL Bill, but surely has none in the case of this much shorter and more coherent Bill.
As for the Government’s not accepting the principle that Parliament should be able to amend statutory instruments, that surely needs qualification. We have heard that qualification discussed in the preceding business. There are two examples of Acts of Parliament containing provisions for the statutory instruments that they generate to be amended—the Census Act 1920 and the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. Both those Acts allow for SIs to be amendable in the way that our Amendment 1 proposes, only by agreement of both Houses. There are no free-standing or wide-ranging powers.
The Government seem to be sticking to this rather confected set of objections to parliamentary scrutiny. Noble Lords who were here for the preceding ping-pong on the REUL amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will have heard the repeated resistance to parliamentary scrutiny. That is despite the SLSC’s calling for the REUL Bill to contain
“an enhanced scrutiny mechanism that enables Parliament to decide that an instrument makes changes of such policy significance that the usual ‘take it or leave it’ procedures—even if affirmative—relating to statutory instruments should not apply but that a further option should be available, namely a procedure by which the Houses can either amend, or recommend amendments to, the instrument”.
The Bill before us is essentially a financial services carve-out from the REUL Bill and it suffers from the same lack of effective scrutiny provisions. What was necessary for parliamentary scrutiny of the REUL Bill is also necessary for this. Our Amendment 1 responds to the SLSC’s call. It brings in a sifting process. It allows a Joint Committee discretion over what constitutes substantial change to preceding retained EU law. It requires a debate on the Floor of each House if the Joint Committee makes a finding of substantial change or that there has been insufficient public consultation. It also allows SIs generated by the Bill to be amended if, and only if, both Houses agree. This is not a prescription for frequent and casual intervention but a narrowly drawn means of altering SIs on those rare occasions when both Houses find the case compelling.
The amendment returns a measure of meaningful parliamentary scrutiny to the Bill. It allows careful parliamentary scrutiny of proposed changes to our critically important financial services regime. Without it, there would be none; Ministers and regulators would decide, and Parliament would be bypassed yet again.
I turn to Amendments 116 and 117. These amendments, taken together, would allow either House to insist on an enhanced form of scrutiny for SIs it deemed likely to benefit from more detailed examination and debate, as well as from recommendations for revision. The usual SI procedures, as we all know, do not allow this and do not constitute parliamentary scrutiny in any meaningful sense: we cannot amend and we do not reject. The super-affirmative procedure set out in Amendment 117 would allow a measure of real, detailed scrutiny, a means of hearing evidence and a means of making recommendations to Ministers. It would not allow the amendment of SIs: that power remains exclusively with the Minister.
Identical amendments were debated in Committee. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who is not in her place, added her name to the amendments and spoke in support; so did the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, also not in his place, commented:
“If a piece of legislation is proposed and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, you have to think that it is pretty wide-ranging—in fact, close to impossible”.—[Official Report, 23/3/23; col. GC 329.]
I think he meant that as a compliment, but it is not entirely clear.
The super-affirmative procedure is appropriate here because, for example, Clause 3 allows for very significant policy changes to be made that could be significant in the context of the restatement of EU law, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, noted in the debate. The Minister thinks that the super-affirmative procedure is unnecessary and promises instead that
“the Government will seek to undertake a combination of formal consultation and informal engagement appropriate to the changes being made”.—[
That is not even a real commitment, with the phrase “will seek to undertake”, and it is certainly nothing close to meaningful parliamentary scrutiny. We need the super-affirmative procedure, and I commend these amendments to the House. I beg to move Amendment 1.
My Lords, I declare my interests as a director of two investment companies as stated in the register. I listened with interest to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, in bringing forward his Amendment 1 and other amendments. I feel strongly, as he has suggested, that what has been agreed for the REUL Bill should also be acceptable for this Bill. Indeed, one of my later amendments makes the same point. As he said, the Bill is in some sense a carve-out from the REUL Bill dealing exclusively with financial services. As for his other amendments, I will not repeat the arguments I made in Committee, but I look forward to hearing whether the Minister can give any greater assurance to the House today than she did at that time.
My Lords, I support Amendment 1. My noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts does not seem to be with us, but I have collaborated with him over the retained EU law Bill, and I know his views are that Parliament has been collectively losing control of its agenda and that parliamentary sovereignty has been undermined. He has been chairman of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, and he notices that more and more business goes through both Houses under statutory instruments. That is not really what we should be going along with in either House, and it is disappointing that the other House does not seem to worry too much about the fact that it is losing its sovereignty and its power to control legislation. That seems to be a fact we have to deal with.
I have repeated this very often, but unlike most people in your Lordships’ House, I campaigned to leave the EU. I often wonder what would have happened if the people who were really concerned about the fact that we were getting all this legislation from the EU—inevitably, I accept—which we could neither amend nor reject knew that we would substitute it with stuff in respect of which the Executive are given all the power that had previously lain in Brussels. If we had campaigned in the country and told people that that was what was going to happen, I am not at all certain that the referendum would have been won by the leave campaign.
It strikes me as very odd that when we talk about taking back control, it seems to exclude Parliament. It does not seem to have a desire—particularly the other place—to actually take back control of legislation, which is what I think we should be doing. It is time we brought this to a halt. I do not have any great optimism that that is going to happen, but I would be more than happy to support the noble Lord’s amendment if he presses it to a Division.
My Lords, I am a signatory to this amendment, although some quirk of technology has meant that my name does not appear on the Marshalled List today. I am delighted to join other noble Lords whose names are on the amendment. This is déjà vu all over again, as they say, because this amendment is very similar to one proposed to the retained EU law Bill by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, which was approved by this House, sent to the Commons, sent back to us and returned in a slightly different form in the Motion moved by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and agreed today.
Perhaps I may very briefly recall what I said on that Motion, because it applies equally to this amendment. This would not set up an entirely new category of amendable SIs which form a new legislative family, as it were. To suggest that it does as a reason for opposing the amendment is to be frighted with false fire, to borrow Hamlet’s phrase. There are two statutes, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, that have the power to amend SIs where the amendments are immediately effective. In my view, this is much more like the super-affirmative procedure, which is set out in some detail in the proposal contained in Amendment 117. The difference is that Ministers would not have the discretion to refuse the amendment which is suggested. It does not seem to me outrageous that Ministers should be subject to the will of Parliament, especially if a proposal might seriously disadvantage businesses or individuals. I commend the amendment to your Lordships.
My Lords, I would just like to refer back to the fact that from 1992 to 1997, I had the privilege in the other place of being Chairman of Ways and Means and Deputy Speaker. At that time, I received considerable briefing from the Officers of the House and other senior parliamentarians, and the procedure we have in Amendments 116 and 117 is, in my judgment, entirely appropriate in instances where a Bill of what I might refer to as super-national importance is going through. I cannot think of any Bill at this stage in a Parliament that is more important than this one. We have the whole of the City of London in favour of the principle of the Bill. That is absolutely fundamental to the success and growth of our nation, and to have the financial sector behind it, alongside His Majesty’s Government, seems to me entirely appropriate. Here, we have a situation that may occur—I hope it does not. However, if it is felt strongly by parliamentarians that something that His Majesty’s Government and Ministers are bringing forward should go through the super-affirmative procedure, that is to be welcomed and recognised. If it does—and I assume it would go through—all that does is strengthen the Government of the day, which is why I very much support this amendment.
My Lords, I had the privilege of adding my name to this amendment because it seems to me, as has just been said, that this is such an important Bill for our nations. It also has this distinguishing feature. Regulation of financial services and matters of this kind is extremely complicated; it is very easy to get them wrong. Why do the Government not feel that they need the expertise of this House, which was so evident during the Grand Committee hearing on aspects of financial services? That completely defeats my understanding of the way in which we should have good government.
My Lords, I add my support to the amendment so excellently moved by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and I thank my noble friends Lord Hamilton and Lord Naseby, who have spoken about the dangers that are entailed if we do not introduce measures such as this amendment into the Bill. There is a risk of executive power-grab. I am not at all saying that that is the intention, but the possibility of that would be opened and surely, as we have just argued in the previous legislative discussion, it is so important that we ensure that Parliament has control, not a few Ministers. That is what I hoped we were going to do when we were revising the laws that had been adopted from the EU.
My Lords, I can add very little to the extraordinary speeches we just heard, many of them quite brief but absolutely targeted and to the point. I simply want to add just two more issues that perhaps have been mentioned but not stressed.
The first is that a carve-out of financial services from the REUL Bill is not the carve-out of some minor area of insignificant interest. Financial services are in effect our largest and most significant industry at this point in time in the UK and will be for many years in the future, and indeed the products that come from financial services are the lifeblood of our economy, both for businesses and for ordinary people. Therefore, scrutiny of decisions that are made within this arena surely has to be a central and significant responsibility of Parliament.
I say to the Minister, who always prays in aid consultation, both formal and informal, in the process of making change, when did consultation replace scrutiny in the mind of this Government? Parliament is not a consultee but the body that is democratically elected to make the key legislative decisions about the future of our country. Its relegation to the role of a consultee, which in effect happens and which this legislation would in some ways counter, is, I believe, completely unacceptable to most people when they have the opportunity to face up to it and think through this issue. Therefore, we on these Benches are very much in support of these amendments, and if necessary we will go through the Lobbies if the Minister is unable to accept at least a significant one of them.
My Lords, before I address the amendments, I want to acknowledge the work of my noble friend Lord Tunnicliffe, who had been leading for these Benches on this Bill until very recently, and thank him for his hard work and generosity in the way he has handed over custody of the Bill to me and my noble friend Lord Livermore. We are very grateful to my noble friend for everything he did, and he continues to advise and support—as noble Lords who know him can well imagine.
However, we are on Report, and this is the stage where we cut to the chase and pick our battles. I have been leading on the retained EU law Bill and am very familiar with the arguments raised in this debate, but we are treating this Bill slightly differently to the retained EU law Bill because our concerns on that Bill revolved around the lack of certainty created by the Government’s approach. There was no definitive list of the terms of retained EU law that would be revoked at the end of the year, and the absence of that list meant limited scope for meaningful engagement, scrutiny or consultation. That was our fundamental objection to that Bill.
The process set out in this Bill is different, with most of the retained law listed in the legislation and to be repealed and revoked only once replaced by regulations that are UK-specific. Fundamentally, we think that changing the process outlined in the Bill at this stage in a manner that the sector has not asked for—it is very different to the engagement that we had on the retained EU law Bill, where there was strong demand from various sectors for change—would introduce uncertainty.
The Lords were right to ask the Government to think again on the retained EU law Bill, but amendments to one Bill do not automatically work for another and, in any event— as I know from having worked on the retained EU law Bill—the version of the amendment we are considering today has already been convincingly overturned by the elected House and we have had to come back with another. As we need to pick our battles and to prioritise at this stage in our proceedings, we on these Benches will not be participating should the issue be put to a Division today.
My Lords, before turning to the amendments at hand, I add my thanks to those of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, for the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, to this Bill and the Labour Front Bench on Treasury matters. The noble Baroness referred to the noble Lord’s generosity; I have definitely found that to be the case. He has always had a very constructive approach and approached his work with kindness and wisdom, which is a great combination to bring to this House.
The amendments before us from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, Amendments 1, 116 and 117, would introduce new parliamentary procedures when exercising the powers in the Bill. As noble Lords have noted, very similar amendments were proposed to the retained EU law Bill, passed and then reversed by the Commons. We have just had a debate this afternoon on a modified version of those amendments, to which I listened very carefully, although I am not as expert in the passage of that Bill as some other noble Lords in the Chamber.
Many of the arguments covered in that debate also apply here, so I do not intend to repeat them at length. I want to focus on some specific considerations in relation to this Bill, which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, noted, takes a different approach to repealing retained EU law for financial services. That is because it enables the Government to deliver fundamental structural reform to the way in which the financial services sector is regulated.
The Government are not asking for a blank cheque to rewrite EU law. This Bill repeals EU law and creates the necessary powers for it to be replaced in line with the UK’s existing Financial Services and Markets Act 2000—FSMA—model of regulation, which we are also enhancing through this Bill to ensure strong accountability and transparency. A list of retained EU law to be repealed in Schedule 1 was included in the Bill from its introduction in July 2022 to enable scrutiny of this proposal.
Going forward, our independent regulators will generally set the detailed provisions in their rulebooks instead of firms being required to follow EU law. The Bill includes a number of provisions to enable Parliament to scrutinise the regulators; the Government have brought forward amendments to go further on this, as we will discuss later on Report.
Amendments 1, 116 and 117 would introduce rare parliamentary procedures, including the super-affirmative procedure, and create a process to enable Parliament to amend SIs. As I said in Committee, those procedures are not justified by the limited role that secondary legislation will have in enabling the regulators to take up their new responsibilities. The Government have worked hard to ensure that every power in the Bill is appropriately scoped and justified. As I noted in Committee, the DPRRC praised the Treasury for a
“thorough and helpful delegated powers memorandum”.
It did not recommend any changes to the procedures governing the repeal of EU law or any other power in this Bill.
The powers over retained EU law are governed by a set of purposes that draw on the regulators’ statutory objectives. They are limited in scope and can be used only to modify or restate retained EU law relating to financial services or markets, as captured by Schedule 1. However, of course, the Government understand noble Lords’ interest in how they intend to use the powers in this Bill and are committed to being as open and collaborative as possible when delivering these reforms.
The Government have consulted extensively on their approach to retained EU law relating to financial services and there is a broad consensus in the sector behind the Government’s plans. As part of the Edinburgh reforms, the Government published a document, Building a Smarter Financial Services Framework for the UK, which describes the Government’s approach, including how they expect to exercise some of the powers in this Bill. It also sets out the key areas of retained EU law that are priorities for reform. Alongside this publication, the Government published three illustrative statutory instruments using the powers in this Bill to facilitate scrutiny.
When replacing retained EU law, the Government expect that there will be a combination of formal consultation, including on draft statutory instruments, and informal engagement in cases where there is a material impact or policy change, such as where activities that are currently taking place in the UK would no longer be subject to a broadly equivalent level of regulation. The Government will continue to be proportionate and consultative during this process, just as we have been up to this point.
Through the retained EU law Bill, the Government have also committed to providing regular updates to Parliament on progress in repealing and reforming retained EU law. I am happy to confirm that these reports will also cover the financial services retained EU law listed in Schedule 1 to this Bill.
I hope that I have satisfied noble Lords that the Government are committed to an open, transparent and consultative approach to implementing the reforms enabled by this Bill. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, to withdraw his Amendment 1.
I thank all those who have spoken in this brief debate—some more warmly than others, perhaps. In my initial speech, I forgot to be especially nice about Denis, the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe; I regret that. I am of course disappointed by both his absence and the response of his successors. I repeat: when it comes to the need for real parliamentary scrutiny, the contents of this Bill are quite as important as the contents of the REUL Bill. That seems to me to be the essence of the matter. All the other arguments about the need to focus and get on with it on Report seem mechanistic; indeed, they are close to being excuses, in some ways.
The essential problem is that Parliament will be unable to scrutinise revocation and replacement, as it is set out in this Bill. I accept that it is not likely that we will revolutionise the way we treat these things as a result of this intervention, but perseverance is the only way of making any progress towards making certain that Parliament recovers its ability to scrutinise properly and does not continue to lose that ability. Although on some occasions—this is one of them—the outcome may be unsatisfactory in the short term, I am convinced that, over time and with enough persistence, we can find a way to do what the DPRRC recommended, which is restoring the balance between Parliament and the Executive. Having said all that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment 1 withdrawn.
Schedule 2: Transitional amendments