Baroness McIntosh of Pickering:

Moved by Baroness McIntosh of Pickering

59: Clause 3, page 2, line 23, leave out “the end of 2023” and insert “11:59 pm on 31 December 2028”Member’s explanatory statementThis is a consequential Amendment which provides clarity about the time the sunset provisions under clause 3 come into effect.

My Lords, this is obviously a long group of amendments. In moving Amendment 59, I will speak briefly to Amendment 76 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.

In Amendment 59, we have a chance to look at Clause 3, on the sunset of retained EU rights, powers and liabilities. Again, the particular purpose of this amendment is to take the Sunset clause in relation to the retained EU rights, powers and liabilities contained in the Bill and extend it to 31 December 2028; this reflects earlier debates that we have had.

The context of this group of amendments is to consider how EU law will be assimilated into UK law, and what the procedures and timescales for this will be. Amendments 60, 61, 64, 70 to 72, 74, 75 and 100 have a similar theme in this regard. I know my noble friend on the front bench thinks that he has heard these debates before, but take Amendment 60 as an example. The reason why this amendment is important is that it seeks to delete Clause 3(2), which declares that any retained EU law sunsetted by subsection (1)

“is not recognised or available in domestic law at or after that time (and, accordingly, is not to be enforced, allowed or followed).”

In the view of the Law Society of Scotland—I am grateful again to Michael Clancy for helping me prepare for today’s debate—this is

“an unnecessary provision and adds nothing to the interpretation of the clause. Accordingly it should be deleted.”

As noble Lords will realise, it is ultimately the role of lawyers to apply the law that we will, in time, pass in this Bill.

Amendment 61 provides the ability for the sunset of retained EU rights, powers and liabilities to be extended to a later time by a relevant national authority. As presently drafted, Clause 3 provides for a sunset of retained EU rights, powers and liabilities et cetera at the end of 2023. However, there is no provision to extend this sunset such as applies in relation to Clause 1. Amendment 61 makes provision for a relevant national authority to be able to make regulations to provide for such an extension.

Amendment 64 is a consequential amendment which provides clarity about the time when the sunset of the principle of the supremacy of EU law comes into effect. As we heard in debates, the principle of the supremacy of EU law was developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union and provides that, when there is a conflict between national and EU law, EU law will prevail. It is key to the EU legal order and ensures consistent application across the EU. In Retained EU Law: A Practical Guide, Duhs and Rao comment on the application of the principle. They note the comment by the House of Lords Constitution Committee that it is impossible to see in what sense the principle of supremacy of EU law could meaningfully apply in the UK once the UK has left the EU. They go on to explain that it is retained because one of the stated aims of the European Union withdrawal Act is to incorporate EU law into domestic law. To incorporate EU law into the domestic statute book while retaining the principle would imbalance the statute book. Therefore, it is logically consistent that, when retained EU law is being abolished, the principle should also be disapplied. However, the Law Society of Scotland, with which I agree, questions whether the abolition of this principle will not affect the interpretation of EU law when it becomes assimilated. Therefore, is this not a factor to be taken into account when considering how to assimilate that law? In earlier debates, the noble Lord, Lord Fox, pursued this with some eloquence in relation to earlier clauses. Amendment 64 relates to Clause 4. Providing a later sunset date of 31 December 2028, as I seek to do in Amendment 64, will allow for a thorough analysis of the consequences of the removal of the principle in relation to the interpretation of assimilated law.

I also support the proposal that Clause 5 stand part of this Bill. Unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and others, got there ahead of me, but I am delighted to lend my support. Clause 5 amends various sections of the EU withdrawal Act so that retained general principles of EU law are no longer part of UK law from the end of 2023. This clause will achieve the Government’s policy of removing retained principles of EU law. However, will not the abolition of these general principles affect the interpretation of EU law when it becomes assimilated? Should this not be taken into account when considering how to assimilate that law? The Government should therefore justify the necessity for Clause 5.

Amendment 70 looks again to extending to 31 December 2028 with regard to Clause 6. It is a consequential amendment providing clarity on precisely how and when retained EU law will be known as assimilated law. The reference to the end of 2023 in Clause 6(1) is vague, and therefore the greater precision set out in this amendment follows the precedent within the definition of IP completion day found in Section 39(1) of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. The additional time should be used for a more thoughtful approach to amending by renaming retained EU law. The choice of date should be made on the application of good legislative practice, including consideration and analysis of the legislation involved and to permit consultation with those who will be affected by the variation proposed by the regulations under Clause 19. This later date will allow for that process to be completed.

Amendment 71 is a consequential amendment, again extending the deadline for a different provision in Clause 6 to 31 December 2028, when it will become known as assimilated law. Equally, Amendment 72 has equal effect on a later provision in Clause 6. Amendment 75 again looks to extend a later part of Clause 6 to 31 December 2028. Amendment 100 is fairly self-explanatory. It is a consequential amendment to] the other amendments in this group to leave out Clause 8(4).

Before I move Amendment 59, I would like to speak to Amendment 76 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, who has unfortunately had to leave and can no longer be with us. Amendment 76, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff,

“gives the Scottish and Welsh Ministers a power, equivalent to the power of Ministers of the Crown in Clause 6(6), to amend legislation in consequence of the change in terminology from ‘retained EU law’ to ‘assimilated law’ made by Clause 6.”

That goes to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, in the previous group that it is important to have equality of governance across the UK between Ministers of the Crown and Ministers from devolved Governments.

With those few remarks, I hope that my noble friend will give a fair wind to the arguments that I have made to extend the sunset in those various clauses and looks favourably on the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, as well. I beg to move.

Your Lordships should know that, if Amendment 59 is agreed, I cannot call Amendments 61 or 67 for reasons of pre-emption.

My Lords, I have three amendments in this group, Amendments 61A, 61B and 61C. I first apologise to the Committee: at the rate things are going, I may not be here by the end of the group. No discourtesy is intended. I hope to be here, but it depends on the length of your Lordships’ speeches.

These three amendments seek to exempt from the sunset in Clause 3 various categories of retained European law. These categories and why they are so important were extensively debated earlier in Committee, but they also need to be excluded from this part of the Bill. These areas relate to employment, environment, food and transport safety, and I pick them out for two reasons. First, these are the areas on which noble Lords have received most representations from organisations, businesses and others anxious about whether key areas of retained law will fall on 31 December.

Secondly, and maybe this has more appeal to the Government, each of those three areas has profound implications for international relations. They are either traded issues, such as food, issues which are clearly covered, for example by the trade agreement with the EU that we will not lessen standards, or else areas which are very complicated in their origins. I take for example transport safety, and aviation and shipping safety in particular. They are partially British Laws, partially EU laws and partially international laws coming from the ICAO and various conventions. Unravelling that in any way which diminishes the effect of those laws will have very significant implications for international travel and transport, and organisations which operate in those fields.

I hope, therefore, that the Government will be prepared to put people’s minds at rest that they are not going to simply let regulations or laws in those areas fall as of 31 December. That will at least ensure more detailed consideration beyond that date, if necessary. I hope the Minister can take at least that aspect into account. I also say to him that regulations in those areas are, by and large, popular; they are popular with business as well as with the people whom they directly affect. The Government would be alienating everybody if they allowed them to fall at the end of this year.

My Lords, I would like to speak to Amendment 62, on which I welcome the support of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I will also mention Amendment 67, which is about Ministers being able to extend the sunset for the matters covered by Clauses 3 to 5, which at the moment is lacking. There are such powers for Clause 1, but there are not similar powers for the very important matters covered by Clauses 3 to 5. Amendment 137 is a consequential amendment and introduces our familiar theme of the affirmative procedure.

I want to concentrate on Amendment 62, because it is about removing

“the automatic deletion by the Sunset clause of the rights, powers, liabilities etc currently recognised and available in domestic law by virtue of section 4 of the”

European Union (Withdrawal) Act. The amendment calls for no abolition until these rights, powers and liabilities et cetera have been identified, and subjected to consultation and to a report laid before the relevant legislature—Parliament or the devolved ones—detailing the consequences of abolition. We do not have a huge amount of time, so I will not laboriously go through the text of the amendment, which is before noble Lords, but they will recognise the structure of it. On these Benches, there is a pattern to the amendments that we have tabled—Amendments 48, 42 and others which escape my memory at the moment—which are all about this considered way of making decisions.

The point about Amendment 62 is that it reflects one of our consistent objections. When I say “our”, I think I can say that right across the House, at Second Reading and in three days of Committee, there is a concern that it would be almost impossible to know what domestic law would actually look like after the end of this year. This offends key principles of the rule of law, including the requirement of legal certainty, human rights protection and other matters. The risk that this amendment is designed to address is that retained EU law will be revoked unknowingly; it is particularly prevalent for Clause 3 as the dashboard is far from comprehensive on this non-legislative form of law.

These rights encompassed by Clause 3 were originally recognised domestically by Section 2(1) of the European Communities Act and were retained by Section 4 of the EUWA. However, the potential effect of Clause 3 is arguably more serious than that of Clause 1. This is because identifying retained EU law to be deleted by Clause 3 is even more difficult than for Clause 1. We have been extensively through the difficulties of identifying retained legislation. Clause 3 is not a cataloguing of legal instruments. It requires legal research, often into case law of UK courts and the ECJ, to identify which EU treaty or directive articles have been found to contain directly enforceable EU rights and obligations. There may be further rights which are so obviously directly effective that they have never been litigated, and that provides a further challenge to identifying them before the deadline.

The Government have hardly started. Of the 3,800 pieces of REUL identified so far on the dashboard, only 28 rights, powers et cetera caught by the Clause 3 sunset have been identified, and there is no power to extend the Clause 3 deadline if Ministers run out of time. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, has amendments to that effect, as we do in Amendment 67. To delete all those which are not saved by Ministers by the end of this year is reckless and unnecessary, so I am sorry but I am going to take a little bit of time. Unfortunately this group comes at the end of the day, and we are all tired and we all want to get home, but these are really important matters.

I have two examples which have not yet been identified on the famous dashboard so have not been subject to any consultations with affected individuals, organisations or businesses and could have a very severe impact if they are deleted by Clause 3. The first example is Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the TFEU. This goes much further than the right to equal pay under the Equality Act 2010 because it is less restrictive with regard to comparators. For example, under Article 157, a woman teacher can compare herself to a man employed by a different education authority. They do not need to have the same employer. That type of comparison is not possible under the Equality Act. It requires comparison with a man employed by the same employer—it is usually a man; it could be the other way round but, let us face it, it is a normally a woman claiming equal pay with a man—so it has had a pretty revolutionary impact on the ability of women to get equal pay. However, Article 157 is not on the REUL dashboard as a directly effective right, so it would be repealed as a directly enforceable right by Clause 3 at the end of the year and women’s equal pay protections will be severely weakened as a result. Frankly, every woman in this country should be bombarding the Government with that fact. The Government have told us recently everything they say they are doing for women. I welcome anything that they are doing, but this drives a coach and horses through those claims.

The second example is Article 6 of the habitats directive. We have heard quite a bit about that directive, which is about the conservation of natural habitats and fauna and flora. One of the obligations in that directive has been found to be directly enforceable. It is the obligation of the competent authority, in our case the Environment Agency, in special areas of conservation and sites of international importance to habitats and species to

“take appropriate steps to avoid … the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species” et cetera.

This is a proactive and preventive obligation. It is not enough to react to deterioration once it has happened; it requires anticipatory protections to prevent deterioration and disturbance of habitats and species. That obligation has not been fully transposed into our domestic legislation. There remains in domestic law only a weaker duty on the Environment Agency to have regard to the habitats directive, which has been found not to impose a direction obligation, as article 6 of the EU directive does. So neither the habitats directive nor the case law on it appear on the REUL dashboard.

I hope that in his reply the Minister can address those two specific examples, which are not airy-fairy but very practical and significant. As things stand, this obligation will fall off the radar at the end of the year and the requirements on competent authorities to protect special areas of conservation proactively will be weakened. I must confess that I would like to have the noble Lord, Lord Benyon, here and to hear what he thinks of that.

Lastly, I recall that among the matters that Amendment 62 would require consideration of is the effect on our obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement and the protocol on Northern Ireland. That is a consistent point that we need to make from these Benches.

My Lords, I have signed Amendment 62 from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and I take this opportunity to say a few words about Clauses 3 to 5 more generally.

I spoke at Second Reading and, although I have not so far burdened your Lordships by speaking in Committee, I have watched much of the first two days’ proceedings with what I can describe only as horrified fascination. Reference has been made today to the recklessness of the Bill. I hope to explain as briefly as I can that this recklessness is not confined to Clauses 1 and 2 but reflected just as strongly in Clause 3, as the noble Baroness just said, and indeed in Clauses 4 and 5.

The Prime Minister does not strike me as a reckless man. We do not know his view of the Bill but perhaps we can take something from the fact that when he was Chancellor, he was careful to ensure that the rules for which he was responsible were excluded from its ambit.

A constant theme of the committee debates on EU-derived legislation was what I think of as the warning lights on the dashboard: a catalogue of retained EU law that is not comprehensive, a hole of uncertain size where devolved legislation should be and, however much Ministers may wish to reverse the presumption of revocation, its application by default to any provisions that have fallen down what has been referred to as the back of the national sofa.

Clause 3 has attracted only a small fraction of the public attention devoted to Clauses 1 and 2 but is, if anything, even more productive of uncertainty. So far as I can work out, that uncertainty comes in three varieties.

The first uncertainty derives from the fact that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said, no definitive list exists of the rights, powers and liabilities referred to in Clause 3 or, in all probability, is even capable of being prepared. The rights, powers and liabilities referred to include all those provisions of EU treaties that are sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional to confer rights directly on individuals, together with directly effective rights from EU agreements with third countries and directly effective rights in EU directives, subject to qualifications. All those rights had been preserved by Section 4 of the EU withdrawal Act in the interests of legal continuity. All are now to be removed in a single big bang moment at the end of the year, with no provision equivalent to Clause 2 for extending that sunset to a later date, as highlighted in the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh. These measures do not bear the brand “direct effect” on their foreheads; no one has ever made a full list of them. It is quite certain that the 28 directly effective rights listed in the dashboard, one of them repealed, can be only a tiny proportion of the total. No one has counted them, consulted on them or assessed the impact of their imminent removal.

The second uncertainty is about the legal consequences of Clause 3 and its relationship to other clauses in the Bill. The Explanatory Notes say that by repealing the directly effective rights, Clause 3 ensures

“that it is no longer possible for EU case law to override domestic legislation.”

How then to explain Clause 7, which gives the courts the option to depart from retained EU case law? That seems to suggest that courts can continue to give effect to EU case law if they wish. How to reconcile those statements?

I hope the Minister is listening because I am about to ask him a question. Perhaps they mean that the courts may choose under Clause 7 to rely on retained EU case law and its domestic equivalent only to the extent that the case law does not declare or proceed on the basis of the direct effect of EU law, which is Clause 3, that it does not declare or proceed on the basis of the supremacy of EU law, which is Clause 4, and that it does not rely for the purposes of interpretation or otherwise on the general principles of law referred to in Clause 5. The general principles are of course the judge-made rules of EU common law, ranging from proportionality and the protection of legitimate expectations to the precautionary principle and the protection of the fundamental rights set out in the EU charter. Not even in the EU, I think, is there any definitive list of what those principles are.

Perhaps the Minister could tell us—if I were in his position, I think I would want to do it in writing, but that is a matter for him—whether that is a correct analysis. I do not advance it with much confidence because Clause 7 appears to allow the courts the power to depart from, and so, conversely, not to depart from, any retained EU case law and any aspect of its own retained domestic case law. If you strip direct effect, supremacy and general principles out of EU case law, I am not sure how much is left for Clause 7 to bite on, or indeed how the judges would be able to use what is left. Certainly, that would be a far more difficult and intricate process than it is now.

The third uncertainty is about the practical consequences of Clause 3. It is one thing to design on paper a new legal hierarchy in which the principles of EU case law are demoted or removed. It is quite another to predict what the practical effect of that will be in the almost limitless range of areas in which our statute law and our common law have been influenced by directly effective EU law. It is not just a question of slaying the European dragon and expecting the common law to bounce back into its old place. Just as our law recognises contracts, torts and mortgages—their alien origins apparent in each case from their names—so over the past half century it has absorbed and assimilated many concepts with origins in the law of the EU, in which I should declare an interest; I spent more than 30 years practising it at the Bar. Fifty years of interpenetration make the consequences of separation complex and unpredictable. To save time, I can simply refer to the two examples given by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, although needless to say there are many more.

I hesitate to apply lipstick to this legislative porker, but there is a possible remedy in Amendment 62. It is a more constructive remedy than just clinging to the old familiarities of European law because anything else is too difficult. The remedy is simple, logical and modest but it requires sensible planning and a little more time. In that sense, it might be described as the equivalent for Clause 3 of Amendment 32 and its companions, which we discussed in the second grouping today. Amendment 62 would allow any right, power, liability, obligation, restriction, remedy or procedure of EU origin to be abolished, but in a controlled fashion. Candidates for abolition would have to be identified and consulted upon. A report on the consequences of abolition would have to be placed before Parliament. Regulations under Clause 3 would, by the accompanying Amendment 137, be subject to the affirmative procedure. It is as simple as that. There would be no cliff edge and not even an attempt at a parliamentary veto; just a requirement on the Government to seek advice and proceed, if at all, with the best attainable knowledge of the consequences.

Permission to demolish an old building requires the building to be identified and a demolition plan to be submitted so as to avoid harm to people and the environment. To a greater extent even than Clause 1, Clause 3 in its current form asks us to approve the launch of missiles at a large but unspecified number of buildings, some of which contain asbestos and some of which are likely to fall in unpredictable and damaging directions.

The description of the Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, on the first day of Committee as “lazy government” is an apt description of Clause 3. Laziness and recklessness are a dangerous combination. The noble Baroness offers the Government a practical, honourable and Brexit-friendly escape. I hope for all our sakes that, if the Bill proceeds, they will take it.

Finally, although I have not signed them, I commend to the Committee Amendments 68, 69 and 69A, which have the virtue of addressing Clauses 4 and 5, as well as Clause 3. As I hope is apparent from what I have said, very similar principles apply in relation to those clauses. These are strong amendments but if we are to get to grips with the grave uncertainties prompted by this part of the Bill, amendments of this kind are the very minimum we will require.

My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate so far. I want to speak to Clause 3 standing part and Amendment 142, which is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie. We are both of the firm view not only that the Bill should be withdrawn but, in particular, that it should be amended to remove Clause 3 or to retain Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal Act) 2018 to the extent that it preserves retained EU law which gives effect to human rights, equality and environmental protections in Northern Ireland, including all legislation that falls within the scope of protocol Article 2. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has already referred to that point.

Why is that the case? Undoubtedly, Clause 3 removes an additional layer of protection for human rights and equality provisions in domestic law. For example, in research undertaken for the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, rights under the EU trafficking directive, which the commission has identified as falling within the scope of protocol Article 2, were identified as being safeguarded in UK law by Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal Act) 2018. The repeal of Section 4 of that Act would have no bearing on enduring obligations under protocol Article 2 but it would create a risk of confusion in this regard. I do not think your Lordships can afford to tolerate that fact.

A complex, inaccessible and confusing statute book could lead to an inadvertent breach of these obligations, particularly for organisations that have statutory duties conferred on them by the UK Government to look into Article 2 provisions as they relate back to the Good Friday agreement. Moreover, where there are measures that protect equality and human rights which were retained EU law by virtue of Section 4 of the 2018 Act and which are outside the scope of protocol Article 2, these safeguards will fall unless otherwise preserved, resulting in a loss of rights.

In this regard, I have three questions for the Minister. I ask him for an assurance—perhaps in writing—that the provisions of the Bill are without prejudice to Section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal Act) 2018, in the absence of this clarification being included in the Bill; and that the UK Government or the devolved authority will, before the Bill takes effect, establish a comprehensive notification process for the law that is to be sunsetted, extended or preserved. In the case of Northern Ireland, we do not have institutions at the moment. What consideration was given by the Government to compliance with Article 2 of the protocol in the development of the Bill? It seems clear to me that one hand does not know what the other hand is doing according to legislation.

Amendment 142 seeks conformity with Section 7A of the EU withdrawal Act which gives domestic effect to the UK-EU withdrawal agreement. The Minister, when responding, needs to demonstrate to your Lordships’ Committee how the Bill will be in compliance with Article 2 of the protocol. Unfortunately, the Explanatory Memorandum does not show how this will happen.

The Minister also needs to demonstrate how the Government can seek consent from Northern Ireland with the lack of an Executive and Assembly. How will the process of reviewing, revoking, replacing or restating retained EU law by 2023—some nine and a half months down the road—be carried out in Northern Ireland? Those special considerations must be taken into account. Therefore, Clause 3 should not stand part of the Bill.

My Lords, I would like briefly to refer to this group of amendments, particularly to the aspects which seek to give the Government some flexibility as they go along this road. I am not wishing to address the cut-off dates, because that has been liberally described and debated already in earlier amendments, but the points that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, made.

I am sorry to see that the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is leaving the Chamber as I was about to address a question to him. I will address it to his colleague instead. I wanted to get on to the ground covered by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty. He talked about the possibility that some of the actions the Government wish to take will cut across our obligations under the trade and co-operation agreement or other international agreements and treaties, and will put the Government of the day in a very awkward and difficult position. Flexibility would give them a way of handling that.

I know that the author of this Bill wanted, like Ulysses, to stop his ears with wax and tie himself to the mast—the only difference being that he would not be on the boat when it hit the rocks. Other than that, that was what he was trying to do, and I do not think that is a sensible thing to do. Some flexibility, as suggested by some of these amendments, would be better. I say that because, until the events of Monday this week and the announcement of the Windsor Framework, one could imagine that the Government would have just said too bad, or words that are not repeatable in this Committee used by the former Prime Minister. However, I do not think that is the situation we are in now. We are in a situation where the Prime Minister and the Government have said that they wish to move in the direction of greater co-operation and flexibility, working with the EU. But here they are, stopping their ears with wax, tying themselves to the mast and making it very difficult to do that.

Here are my questions. It is no secret that the ambassadors of member states and of the Commission are deeply disturbed by this Bill. Anyone who has had any contact with them will know that. Could the Government say if they have received any representations about this Bill from any of the member states or the Commission? If so, what was the nature of those representations and what has their response been? I know the Minister does not much like being interrupted when he is winding up, so I hope he will answer that question because it will save me the trouble of interrupting him. His colleague, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, will no doubt tell him what the question was. I would be grateful to hear the answer.

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 76, as the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, cannot be in her place. I made all the arguments in relation to Amendment 58, and I do not intend to repeat them. I await with great interest the ingenious answer that will come out this time for treating the nations with inequality.

I will take one minute to support Amendment 62 most strongly. So far, we have been dealing with known knowns: we know that there is legislation. There is a bit of the known that needs due diligence, but that falls within the same category, and we should get there on legislation. But I will not be satisfied about that until I see how it has been searched for. However, in this area, we move into the known unknowns. The Bill shows a profound misunderstanding of the genius of the common law and the huge benefit of it and our way of doing things in this country. We are like magpies: we take good things from places and adapt them.

On what this Clause seeks to do, this amendment is so important because you do not know what you are doing—you do not know which bricks you are taking out. I implore the Government: the one industry that is extremely internationally successful in this country is our legal services industry. Please do not damage it by a failure to deal with these very general areas of law. A solution is provided for you; please take it. No ideological fanaticism should prevent a sensible approach to dealing with the genius of our common law.

My Lords, I will speak to the two amendments in my name. It is late, and I will try to keep this as short as possible, first addressing Amendment 67. Amendment 62, in the names of my noble friend Lady Ludford and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, focuses on much of the same ground as Amendment 67, and there has been a lot of wise discussion in that area. I support their points but do not need to echo them. However, I add that Clause 3 has the effect of sunsetting retained EU rights, powers, liabilities, et cetera. Unlike Clause 1, the Bill does not allow the Clause 3 deadline to be extended, which increases the likelihood of accidental deletions. Why is that extension not advanced for Clause 3?

I will focus on the proposal that Clause 5 should not stand part of the Bill. This is intended to probe the effect of abolishing the general principles of EU law—we briefly heard from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on that process, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, also alluded to this. I remind your Lordships that we have established that much EU law is, as the Minister described it, a “mishmash” of interwoven UK and EU-derived law. I think that that is what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, called, rather more alarmingly, the “interpenetration” of law. Until now, the general principles of EU law have been used by lawyers, court and tribunals in the UK to interpret the EU part of that mishmash. These general principles include legal certainty, equal treatment, proportionality, non-retroactivity, effectiveness, equivalence and respect for fundamental rights, among others—like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I was unable to find a definitive list.

A further example of a general principle of EU law is the Marleasing principle. Looking at experienced lawyers opposite, I feel I am probably entering terrible territory by even mentioning this. But my understanding is that the application of this principle means that, if no national law at all has been passed to comply with a directive, it was held that having national legislation passed specifically in the name of the directive was not necessary. In any case, the Bill does away with this, so there may be some lasting effect. So this amendment probes the practical effect of abolishing direct-effect supremacy, and the general principles of EU law, taken together.

As we know, the UK regulations set out the letter of a law, the bare bones. However, in spite of the excellent work done in this Chamber to achieve clarity in those Laws, there is often uncertainty—noble Lords will find that hard to believe—as to what the words actually mean.

Where the regulations give effect to a directive, such as the working time directive, the courts use the directive to help them understand the meaning of the regulations. Directives, unlike UK law, set out their purpose and their aims. Those aims help a court or tribunal to interpret the regulation. My understanding is that during the process of assimilation, new assimilated law loses contact with the EU directive and the EU-derived part of the law in that mishmash. It loses the basis for ongoing interpretation.

I can understand, post Brexit, why on the face of it the Government wish to sweep away all mention of EU law and EU directives—I get that. However, the meaning and understanding of the regulations, as we now have them—the Minister’s mishmash—has taken years and many different appeal cases, and much individual expense, to give the level of understanding of the law and the regulation that we now enjoy.

For example, litigation began in 2001 over whether workers were able to carry over their annual leave when they were too sick to take it. This was finally settled many cases later by Plumb in 2015—14 years later—with a carryover right. This is not unusual. Common law incrementally decides issues before a settled understanding emerges. The default of the Bill is to sweep away all this accrued understanding or at least put it in question and not provide any clear statement of what the law will be going forward.

If the Government do not want to change the settled meaning of UK law as it is interpreted today, my understanding is that they would need to audit all the conforming interpretations that have affected regulations from court decisions and translate those court decisions into the body of the new or replacement regulations. Is that what the Minister intends? If so, that intention should be inserted in the Bill. However, I suspect this is not the plan. In that case, even if all the regulations were preserved in assimilated law, the abolition of direct application, supremacy and general principles will result in the UK waking up on 1 January 2024 to a new year with large swathes of law that no lawyer will be able accurately to predict or advise on, causing great uncertainty—the sort of uncertainty that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, alluded to.

A colleague said to me as I was trying to explain this, “Surely no judge would want to throw out all that case law.” That is where we come to the interrelation of Clause 7. However, we will not know what the judges decide until a case has been brought. Let us not forget that there are thousands of laws here, which could mean thousands of potential tests. We will not know how the test will end until a judge rules on it—probably more than once, as experience shows.

Can the Minister explain why there is no plan to port the interpretation and case of the laws that we have within the mishmash into the assimilated law as we go forward? If there are plans, could he explain what they are?

It is quite clear from what the noble Lord said to the Committee that he is in favour of Amendment 62. It seems to me that, as a result of what he has said, he must be opposed to Clause 3 standing part of the Bill. I wonder whether he could confirm that.

Yes, absolutely. I made the point about Clause 3 missing out on the sunset Laws. That is clearly part of my dissatisfaction. I also said that I supported, but did not echo, the wise words on Amendment 62. In the interests of brevity, I was trying not to cover everything.

My Lords, also in the interests of brevity, I will just say that there is real fear and concern that we will end up with a massive mishmash of legal confusion in this area. That concern is very real in the world of work, in particular in areas such as equality—not least in equal pay for work of equal value and protection for insecure workers, where so many advances have depended on EU-derived legislation and case law. Previous judgments will no longer be binding, and issues will have to go through the judicial system again. As Michael Ford KC wrote in the Financial Times:

“Workers and employers will be back at square one. The whole lengthy and expensive process of appeals will have to be repeated. Even the most enthusiastic lawyer views such a … task with dismay.”

Having to argue those key points again will be costly and cause delays. Frankly, that usually benefits those with the biggest wallets.

The Bill hands huge powers to, and puts enormous pressure on, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, which have been instructed to depart from case law informed by EU law if they consider it right to do so. Of course, the chances are that there will be an avalanche of requests from lower courts or tribunals making references to higher courts about departing from retained EU case law. The result will be workers and employers spending more time in court—in a system that already has huge delays—in a desperate attempt to find out what the law now means.

I will make a short point about Amendment 61A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Whitty. In the amendment, he seeks to exclude from the effect of Clause 3 employment rights and health and safety at work. At the end of Tuesday, I sought to demonstrate that health and safety at work was a protected area which could not be repealed or amended under the Bill because of the protection given by the trade and co-operation agreement, which my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, mentioned this evening. I will explain why it covers some but not all employment rights.

There are two ways in which it operates. The first is via Article 387, which requires that a party, including the UK,

“shall not weaken or reduce, in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties, its labour and social levels of protection below the levels in place at the end of the transition period, including by failing to effectively enforce its law and standards.”

Indeed, Article 387.4 requires that:

“The Parties shall continue to strive to increase their respective labour and social levels of protection”.

On Tuesday, I pointed out that labour and social levels of protection are defined by Article 386, which includes not only

“occupational health and safety standards” but

“fundamental rights at work … fair working conditions and employment standards … information and consultation rights at company level; or … restructuring of undertakings.”

It is quite apparent that many of the EU Laws on employment are protected by that definition.

The other way in which some employment rights are protected is by Article 399.5:

“Each Party commits to implementing all the ILO Conventions that the United Kingdom and the Member States have respectively ratified and the different provisions of the European Social Charter that, as members of the Council of Europe, the Member States and the United Kingdom have respectively accepted.”

I will not reiterate the many ILO conventions which protect employment rights at work, but Members of the Committee may not be so familiar with the European Social Charter. I will not read the text of the relevant provisions, but I will just mention that Article 2 protects the right to just conditions of work; Article 3 protects the right to safe and healthy working conditions; Article 4 protects the right to a fair remuneration; Article 7 concerns the right of children and young persons to protection; and Article 8 concerns the right of employed women to protection. There are other provisions as well.

For these reasons, it appears to me that my noble friend Lord Whitty is right to seek protection for employment rights, or at least some employment rights, that are covered within those two ambits, as well as health and safety at work.

My Lords, I thought the Bill was bad, but this debate has been quite shocking. I really do not think the Government know what they are doing with these clauses. I do not think that, when the Bill was initially proposed while the Government were having their moment of madness last autumn, we thought that something like Clause 3 would be before Parliament in March the following year. Reckless does not quite cover it; it is as if the Government got completely drunk and now we have a hell of a hangover to deal with.

It is clear from the debate we had earlier in the week, and from the letter, that the Government have not appreciated what the impact of this clause will be. It would be very helpful if we could have a statement or a letter from the Government explaining exactly what they intend to happen as a consequence of this clause, because, listening to the debate, I think that things will emerge that Ministers have not fully taken into account. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, most sincerely for her Amendment 62; it is at least an attempt to put some safeguards around what could be about to happen. I am particularly concerned by the high-handed and nonchalant way in which Ministers are dealing with the issue of Northern Ireland. I have seen no evidence at all that the Government have appreciated the impact that what they are about to do could have on the agreement that they have only just entered into with the EU.

I have not read the full text of the agreement—I do not pretend to have done—but I have read the political declaration. It seems very clear that, underpinning the political declaration of the Windsor Framework, limited divergence will be permitted between the EU and the UK, to maintain the soft border arrangements on the island of Ireland. That is clearly what is intended by the political declaration; I expect that is why the noble Lord, Lord Frost, is so upset about it and does not seem to want to support it. That limited divergence is put at risk by the measures in the Bill.

The Minister earlier today did not want to engage with that. She said she was absolutely certain that I was wrong. I think that I am right and she is wrong. I would like a letter from the Minister for the Library explaining why the Government are so sure of themselves on that issue, because these are incredibly important questions; we cannot just be expected to skirt over them and take flippant assurances from the Benches opposite. Clearly, the consequences of Clause 3 and the following clauses may have dramatic impacts. They create great uncertainty. I just do not understand how Ministers can be so sure or even expect us to engage sensibly in this discussion, given what we have just heard.

My noble friend Lady Ritchie’s comments and her amendment are incredibly important. I hope the Government will reflect seriously on this debate. How can the Government think that the rights, liabilities and powers in Clause 3 will ever be reflected properly in the dashboard process? How is that supposed to work? Unless it works, how on earth are judges or citizens expected to make decisions, or employers expected to know what their responsibilities and duties are, if we go ahead with this clause?

Ministers will no doubt say that we are worrying unnecessarily and are taking too much time—that it is 7.05 pm. I do not care that it is 7.05 pm; these issues are just so important. I ask the Minister, please, not to treat this House in the high-handed way that Ministers do on occasion. It is not just him; I am sure others do too. These are critical questions that we are asking. If he cannot answer adequately today, please can he commit to going away and coming back with something more substantial? I can tell him now: this clause does not leave this House and go back to the other end given the debate that we have just heard. The mood of the Committee seems to be one of not wanting this to go forward. We are going to face this on Report.

I will be asked by my Chief Whip to prioritise votes and make sure that we do not have too many. I think that is going to be quite a challenge given what we have heard today, so the more the Government can themselves reflect and consider what has been said—particularly on the issues around Northern Ireland—the better. They must show us that they have done some proper thinking about that and appreciate the consequences of the Bill in relation to the agreement that was made only on Monday. That is the only way in which we can move forward.

I apologise for taking up a little more of the Minister’s time, but I am very patient, and I will sit here until he has given us the assurances we need. He can expect some interventions—irritating though he finds them—if he attempts not to answer the questions raised by noble Lords as part of this discussion.

I am very happy to stay as long and late as the House requires. I was very happy to stay later the other night as well, but I believe it is the noble Baroness’s party that said it wanted to go home early and that we therefore needed to finish.

Noble Lords:

Not early!

There is no need for these sorts of insults; we have agreed times.

Hang on a second—I made that point because the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, said that I was being dismissive of her points and that it was 7.05 pm and that I wanted to go. I have relayed that I am very happy to stay as long as the House requires, but I believe it was the Labour Party that said it wanted to finish early the other night, and at 7 pm tonight.

Noble Lords:

No!

Anyway, let us move on to the issues.

Let me first introduce government Amendments 65 and 66, which work together to remove a cross-reference in this Bill to Section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018. This new Section 183A is due to be inserted into the Data Protection Act by the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. Since the DPDI Bill is not anticipated to receive Royal Assent in this parliamentary Session, new Section 183A will not exist when this Bill receives Royal Assent. As such, noble Lords will understand that, for practical reasons, it is necessary to remove the cross-reference. Let me reassure the House that the Government are committed to maintaining high data protection standards and a functioning data protection regime. At this stage, we are minded to use the DPDI Bill to insert the reference to Section 183A of the Data Protection Act into Section 5(A3) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.

Amendments 73, 77, 78, 79 and 80 are to Clause 6 of and Schedule 1 to the Bill. These amendments are consequential to the Bill policy in Clause 6 which establishes “assimilated law” as a new body of law from the end of 2023. These changes are required to end the special status of retained EU law. Amendments 73 and 77 rename two further terms related to retained EU law, so that from the end of 2023 they will be renamed as terms related to “assimilated law”. The consequential Amendments 78, 79 and 80 make textual amendments to individual references in priority pieces of primary legislation which support the interpretation of retained EU law on the statute book, so that from the end of 2023 the identified references to retained EU law and related terms will be changed to references to “assimilated law” and related terms. These amendments are being tabled now purely for purposes of legal clarity and legal accessibility.

Turning to the non-government amendments, I start with Clause 3, which, as noble Lords have observed, repeals Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. Amendments to this clause seek to delay that repeal and thus a core part of the Government’s ambitious programme of retained EU law reform.

The matters saved by Section 4 consist largely of rights, obligations and remedies which overlap with rights already well established by domestic law. In our view, these overlaps can cause confusion, so we should no longer perpetuate this situation. Work is already well under way across departments to identify the implications of the repeal of Section 4 of the 2018 Act, and the Bill provides adequate powers to codify and safeguard relevant rights in domestic statute as needed.

Indeed, as Sir Stephen Laws, ex-First Parliamentary Counsel, said:

“The ideal for the law is that all law can be found from easily accessible sources and relied on to mean what it says without being qualified by complex, obscure or general glosses, or involving complex historical research to find out whether it is valid. The Bill, by removing everything that is subject to those disadvantages—because the ideal is not the situation at the moment for retained EU law—is an important step towards securing that the ideal is achieved, by forcing the decisions to be made about how this law can be properly integrated into UK law quickly. Things will only get worse if that does not happen.”

That will not mean the blanket removal of rights. Rather, combined with other measures in our Bill, it will result in the codification of rights in specific policy areas. This clarification will provide certainty for businesses and citizens in this country.

On Amendment 59 in the name of my noble friend Lady McIntosh, although I appreciate the concerns about the ambitious timetable we have set, I can assure her that the retained EU law reform programme is well under way and will ensure that the necessary legislation is in place by the sunset deadline.

Turning to Amendment 60, removing just Clause 3(2), as the amendment aims to do, would reduce legal certainty. We consider that this amendment is intended to operate in conjunction with Amendment 61, which seeks to delay the repeal of Section 4, so let me turn to that amendment.

We do not believe it is necessary to delay the repeal of Section 4. Where required, the Government will use the powers in the Bill to codify specific rights clearly and accessibly in domestic statute, and work is indeed under way to do so. These powers are also conferred on the devolved Governments, with whom we will of course continue to work closely to ensure that the most efficient and appropriate approach to exercising powers is taken in a way that provides certainty for all parts of our United Kingdom.

Amendments 61A, 61B and 61C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty—I know he is no longer in his place but he apologised for having to leave, so I will address his points—relate to policy-specific carve-outs from the measures in Clause 3 and from the sunset clauses more broadly. We have already discussed carve-outs extensively in previous groupings, and I do wish to rehash the same arguments. However, I reiterate that the Government do not see the need for carve-outs in individual departments, policy areas or sectors.

The intention of the proposed new clause under Amendment 62, put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is to leave matters saved by Section 4 of the 2018 Act on our statute book for longer—perhaps in some cases indefinitely. The noble Baroness mentioned in particular Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which is on equal work for equal pay. Equal pay already exists in UK statute. However, we recognise that here, the expression of the EU-based right can be slightly wider than its expression in UK legislation. That is why we have put powers in the Bill to codify the policy intent of these interpretive effects, such as Section 4 rights, where we need to. It would be for the Government Equalities Office and other government departments to decide whether to use the restatement powers in Clauses 12 and 13 to codify those principles.

The noble Baroness also mentioned Article 6—

I am grateful to the Minister. Of course, if you are going to use those codification powers, you have to know what you are codifying. I think he said a moment ago that work is under way to identify the rights, powers, liabilities, et cetera which are saved by Section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. Only 28 of those rights, powers and liabilities have so far found their way into the dashboard. How many have now been identified now, and when does the Minister anticipate that the work will be complete?

As I said, the work is under way at the moment across all the rights codified in those sections. As the noble Lord said in his speech, this is a complicated area of law. I do not want to get into a complicated legal argument, so it is perhaps best if I seek advice from the lawyers and write to him, as he suggested, on the legal technicalities of that area.

I think I must have failed to get across, when I addressed the Committee earlier, that we are not here dealing with legal technicalities but with massive uncertainties at the very heart of the Bill, uncertainties that relate not to legislation but belong to legal principle. I tried to help by saying how I thought Clauses 3 to 5 related to Clause 7. If I was right about that, the task of applying any European authority under Clause 7 becomes astonishingly difficult, because a court has to read every one and see whether it contains general principles, direct effects or supremacy before it can even decide whether it is going to apply it or not. I hope I did not leave the Minister with the impression that these are legal technicalities, and I hope that, if he writes to the Committee about this, we will have a full explanation of how Clauses 3 to 5 and Clause 7 are intended to relate to each other.

I will talk to the lawyers and attempt to get the noble Lord an answer to his concerns.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, mentioned the habitats directive. I am slightly loath to go back there, after the long discussion with my noble friend Lord Benyon on Tuesday, but let me restate again for the benefit of the record that the Government have been clear about the importance of environmental protection across the UK, not least through the Environment Act, which includes a legally binding target to halt the decline of nature by 2030. As I emphasised earlier in the debate, we are committed to meeting this target and we will of course not undermine our obligations to the environment.

I apologise to the Minister, but that is not the point I was asking about. I am no expert on the habitats directive, but a specific Clause has been interpreted in case law as imposing a preventive, proactive duty—in our case, on the Environment Agency. Will that be retained?

Case law is being retained. Case law is not being abolished, it will still exist, and courts will still be able to take account of it. Removing the complex and opaque legal gloss associated with Section 4 of the 2018 Act will improve the clarity of our domestic law. It would be, in our view, inappropriate, to leave these provisions on our statute book, and we wish to end them as soon as reasonably practicable. We consequently also oppose Amendment 137, which specifies that any regulation made under the power conferred by Amendment 62 would be subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

I think the Minister is departing from Clause 3. This sounds like small beer compared to some of the issues that colleagues have raised, but I asked a specific question about the difference in approach to the extension of sunsetting between Clauses 1 and 3, and I hoped the Minister would address that—if he was intending to.

I have some more remarks on Clause 3. Let me come to the end of them and, if the noble Lord does not feel that he has got an answer, we can talk about that further then.

I was going to move on to the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, who tabled notice of her intention to oppose Clause 3 stand part of the Bill. For the reasons set out, the repeal of Section 4 of the 2018 Act is, in our view, a crucial part of the Government’s agenda to take back control of our statute book and improve legal clarity. I completely agree with the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, about the Windsor Framework. We do not think this Bill has any effect on the agreements made. Of course, we will examine the text of that very closely, but it goes without saying that the Government are completely committed to the agreement and we would not wish to do anything in either this or future legislation to impinge on what I view as a fantastic agreement.

Moving on, Clause 4 abolishes the principle of the supremacy of EU law. I do not think that I have any notes to address the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, so let me say that we will include that in the general write-around about—well, I will not refer to them as legal technicalities because the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will tell me that they are extremely important legal principles. I will seek legal advice and get a proper answer for the Committee.

The Committee heard from a former Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that these principles go to the heart of how common law is applied in this country. I do not think that that is a legal technicality.

I acknowledge the noble Lord’s point but I will get him a proper answer from the lawyers.

When the Minister gets us that proper answer, I would be grateful if he could explain—I do not understand this, but I do not know whether others do; perhaps some noble and learned Lords understand it—the difference between the “interpretive effects” that were mentioned in the letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Bloomfield, and case law. What is the impact of that difference? The noble Baroness’s letter clearly states that the Bill will

“repeal retained EU interpretive effects.”

I am not clear what that means; I wonder whether the Minister could include that in his letter.

I would be happy to include it in the letter. I hesitate to give what I think is a legal definition in front of so many noble and learned Lords but I am told that interpretive effects are not case law. As I understand them, the interpretive effects are the general principles of EU law that have been used to apply to the interpretation of retained EU law because it was EU-originated. We wish to abolish interpretive effects, but that does not impinge on the case law, which of course remains.

Moving on, Clause 4 abolishes the principle of the supremacy of EU law for the end of 2023 in so far as it still applies to pre-2021 legislation. Amendment 64 would delay the abolition of the retained principle of EU supremacy until the end of 2028. There is cross-party support for the end of supremacy. In the House of Commons, Justin Madders MP—he is a spokesman for the Labour Party, I believe—said:

“Overall, we agree that there has to be an end to EU supremacy in UK law”.—[Official Report, Commons, Public Bill Committee, 24/11/22; col. 186.]

If left unreformed, supremacy would remain a constitutional anachronism on our statute book. We believe that it is simply incompatible with our status as an independent, sovereign nation, and we therefore wish to end it as soon as we can.

Can I just explain Justin’s comments? The Minister has provoked me. Clearly, the Shadow Minister was talking about a sane, considered process by which this matter is dealt with, not the lunacy that the Minister is trying to promote today.

I do not think he said that; he said that there has to be an end to EU supremacy in UK law. While we are all swapping letters, perhaps the Labour Party might want to write us a letter to clarify what he meant. I am not being serious, of course; it is not the Labour Party’s job to do that.

Amendment 142 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, seeks to clarify that this Bill does not disturb Section 7A of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. That section makes the rights and obligations in the withdrawal agreement available in domestic law. It also provides that domestic legislation must be read and given effect subject to those rights and obligations. I can reassure the noble Baroness that this Bill will not disturb Section 7A of the 2018 Act. I can also assure her that the Bill provides powers to restate rights and obligations required for Article 2 of the Northern Ireland protocol as needed. The Government will ensure that all necessary legislation is in place by the Bill’s sunset date to uphold all the commitments made under Article 2.

Amendment 100, tabled by my noble friend Lady McIntosh, would remove the sunset date for the compatibility power in Clause 8. It is not necessary to have a power to specify legislative hierarchies beyond 23 June 2026, by which time the Government will have exercised the power as needed.

I move on to Clause 5. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, has given notice of his intention to oppose the question that Clause 5 stand part of the Bill. General principles of EU law were developed in CJEU case law, with which EU institutions and member states must comply. I submit that it is clearly no longer suitable for our status as an independent nation outside the EU—however much the Liberal Democrats wish that not to be the case—for these specific principles to continue forming part of UK law. The powers in the Bill allow the Government to codify clearly any necessary effects to bring clarity to our domestic statute book.

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but that remark was gratuitous. The point is about legal certainty. It is not about whether we as a party, or anybody else, would have wanted to remain in the EU—it is clear that we would. It is about whether the law will be clear, and whether the judges will be able to operate it, and whether businesses, unions and whoever will know what they are supposed to be doing. That is the point that we have been trying to make over four days on this Bill. Brexit is irrelevant to this discussion, and I do not believe I have used the word once in these proceedings. What is important is whether the law will be able to be operated with certainty, clarity and predictability.

That is fair enough; it was a slightly gratuitous point. I actually agree with the noble Baroness—we want the law to be as clear and accessible as possible. That is why we do not believe that the general principles of EU law, which of course were developed by the CJEU for use primarily by EU institutions and member states, should be relevant to the UK now that we are an independent nation, whatever our differences of opinion might have been on that.

I think I failed to explain why I think that they are relevant. They are relevant because of the EU retained law part of the Minister’s mishmash, which gets assimilated into UK law. The interpretation of that EU part, which is now UK law, somehow loses the basis upon which the interpretation was made. I explained that I understood why the Government wanted to do this, but the fact that they become separated is an issue. I suggested a way for those interpretations to be ported across, specifically and explicitly for each one. If that is not the way it will be done and the Minister says that somehow this is going to happen, then at some point in this debate we need to understand. If it is not in the letter, then it needs to be later in this debate.

I made the point earlier that, when departments are reviewing their legislation and any modifications they might need to make to statutory instruments, they will of course want to take account of the fact that the general principles of EU law will no longer apply in the UK and make any modifications that would be required.

I move on to the somewhat related point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady. Let me be clear that retained case law—this comes back to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman—is not and cannot be directly sunsetted, as it consists of judges’ judgments, which are essentially statements of historical fact. Where general principles and other interpretive effects are removed by the Bill in Clauses 3 to 5, it would be expected that courts would continue to consider relevant case law where it is clear from the restatement that that is the intention.

Amendment 67 would introduce an extension power for the removal of general principles of EU law, as well as the abolition of supremacy and the repeal of Section 4 of the 2018 Act, as I have already set out. Removing these complex legal glosses will, in my view, satisfy the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and improve the clarity of our domestic law. It is imperative that we end them as soon as is reasonably practicable.

I turn to the amendments to Clause 6 and Schedule 1, which establish “assimilated law” as a body of law from the end of 2023. These proposed changes are part of the ending of the special status of retained EU law by the Bill. Amendments 70 to 72, 74 and 75 from the noble Baroness, Lady Mcintosh, intend to move the date from which retained EU law will be known as assimilated law to the end of 2028. As I have said to the noble Baroness, the Government propose an ambitious programme of retained EU law reform and will therefore be ending the special status of retained EU law at the end of 2023.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 76 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, who is unfortunately no longer in his place. Clause 6 provides that a UK Government Minister may use the consequential power conferred by Clause 19 to change references to “retained EU law” contained in other enactments to “assimilated law” and related terms. Engagement is already well established between the UK and devolved Governments on the process of renaming individual references to “retained EU law”. The UK Government making consequential provision for “assimilated law” will ensure that these technical amendments are made efficiently and follow a consistent approach.

The Government are engaged in a programme of reform to ensure that our statute book is fit for purpose. The measures taken by the Bill will allow us to be as responsive as possible to the issues facing our citizens and to implement fit-for-purpose solutions for the people of the UK.

Before the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, intervenes, I reassure him that we are not aware of any representations from the European Commission or other member states on the purposes of the Bill.

The Minister has made a number of commitments about providing letters and further information to the Committee, for which we are grateful. We are due to sit for an additional day on Monday. I do not think it is reasonable to ask the Committee to conclude its deliberations on the Bill without sight of the further information that the Minister has promised, so will he commit that we will receive it in good time before we start consideration on Monday—not two minutes before the Committee starts, but in adequate time for us to consider it before we begin? It would not be right for us to be asked to conclude Committee without it.

I am not going to give an absolute commitment, but I will talk to the lawyers. On the famous letter from my noble friend Lady Bloomfield, I actually pushed officials to try to assimilate the contents of the letter and get it out to the Committee as quickly as possible, because I thought noble Lords would want to see it before we considered the Bill on a further day. They worked very late into the evening to get the letter out, after going through all the necessary approvals that the Government need to go through. Given some of the criticisms, I wish I had not bothered. Nevertheless, I still think it was helpful to noble Lords and will do my best to get them the letter to which the noble Baroness referred.

My Lords, this has been an excellent debate. It reflects not least the concerns of the legal practitioners, who will be left to interpret the status of the Laws. But what concerns me is that the Minister and the department are perhaps in denial about the level of concern that has been expressed not just in the Committee this afternoon but in those examples from various sectors that we have heard today. This has been a beneficial session in probing where we can reach agreement before Report to help the Government get the Bill through. I know that my noble friend cares very deeply and passionately about that.

The Committee accepts that the supremacy of EU law will go but my noble friend needs to consider whether the abolition of this principle will affect the interpretation of EU law when it comes to being assimilated. Is that not a factor to take into account in how we assimilate that law? I leave my noble friend and the Committee with that thought.

However, I believe that we have established some ground rules during this debate, so that we can regroup before Report. I, among others, look forward to receiving the letter from my noble friend and, at this stage, beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.

Amendment 59 withdrawn.

Amendments 60 to 62A not moved.

Clause 3 agreed.

Amendment 63 not moved.

Clause 4: Abolition of supremacy of EU law

Amendment 64 not moved.