Ukraine: Defence Relationships - Motion to Take Note

Part of the debate – in the House of Lords at 1:53 pm on 9 June 2022.

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Photo of Lord Purvis of Tweed Lord Purvis of Tweed Liberal Democrat Lords Spokesperson (International Trade), Liberal Democrat Lords Spokesperson (International Development), Liberal Democrat Lords Spokesperson (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) 1:53, 9 June 2022

My Lords,

“it has always been the case that our security at home is best advanced through global co-operation, working with institutions that support that, including the EU … This cannot be a time when any of us allow competition between partners, rigid institutional restrictions or deep-seated ideology to inhibit our co-operation and jeopardise the security of our citizens … where we can both be most effective by the UK deploying its significant capabilities and resources with and indeed through EU mechanisms—we should both be open to that. On defence, if the UK and EU’s interests can best be furthered by the UK continuing to contribute to an EU operation or mission as we do now, then we should both be open to that. And similarly, while the UK will decide how we spend the entirety of our foreign aid in the future, if a UK contribution to EU development programmes and instruments can best deliver our mutual interests, we should both be open to that … So we very much welcome the EU’s efforts to develop Europe’s capabilities in this field. We need to keep open all the options which will enable the UK and the EU to collaborate in the most effective way possible … We are keen for this to continue”.

Every single word that I have said so far is a direct quote from Prime Minister Theresa May to the Munich Security Conference on 17 February 2018. Those plans had a degree of prescience as they now seem obvious, but they were reversed by her successor—in the same party —just a year later. We have a good basis for reviewing the integrated review again by looking back at what Theresa May said in 2018, which we also debated in this House.

There are some clear examples of that move away, and I shall cite two. The first is the EU Military Mobility project, moving military equipment across internal EU borders, which is very bureaucratic and difficult although I am sure that noble and gallant Lords will say it is a fundamental aspect of mutual defence. The US and Canada are involved in the EU Military Mobility plan to simplify this, but not the UK. Why is that?

Third-party countries like Chile contribute personnel to EUFOR, or Operation Althea, the EU peacekeeping force in Bosnia, which is UN mandated. However, after Brexit, the UK withdrew all personnel from the Balkans, a critical and intense area that our Prime Minister has highlighted, and one of the collateral areas of the Russian invasion. I ask the Minister: will the Government consider this? We now have the European defence fund—€8 billion between 2021 and 2027. The UK would have been a leader in securing funding opportunities for research, development and increasing member states’ capabilities, but we are not participating in this. Can the Minister write to me about EU programmes or operations in which third countries can participate but we choose not to?

As the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said, there should be common ground. I agree with all noble Lords who commended him very strongly not only for bringing this debate to the Chamber but for the extremely comprehensive way that he introduced it—he covered this thematically and progressively, and it set the frame for the debate. He also said very clearly that security, development and prosperity here at home are so intertwined with that our nearest neighbours and indeed those further afield that are like-minded, through NATO in particular.

In his comprehensive remarks, the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, referred to Ernest Bevin; from these Benches, we would say that there is no difference between us in commending that foresight. In studying the early days of NATO, I was struck that, for Ernest Bevin, it was in many respects the successor organisation to the Brussels Pact between the UK, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. This European mutual defence agreement was put in place in 1948 to encourage the Truman Administration to go wider and support NATO. So we should never see this debate as purely about one rather than the other; the concept and the delivery are integrated.

The noble Lord also referenced his very frequent visits to and involvement with Ukraine, as have many others in this debate—I have visited Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada on a number of occasions. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, touched on the civilian element of this: over 4,000 civilians, including 300 children, have sacrificed their lives for the cause of self-determination and their wish to live in a democratic country. This is on top of all those brave individuals who have signed up or been called up to the forces. However, it is a depressing fact that we are likely to see scores more people—hundreds of thousands—dying of hunger, as the collateral damage of Putin’s aggression. This is on top of the world facing increased dangers through the climate emergency and the growth in fragile states. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, indicated the very imbalanced way that Covid has been managed across the world. We see the warnings that 8 million to 13 million people will suffer acute hunger in the Horn of Africa and central Africa as a result of this conflict.

However, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, also indicated, we cannot take for granted that all countries see our thinking and perspective, especially those that are developing or are in fragile, sensitive and complex areas, such as the Middle East. In the week of the Russian invasion, I was in Baghdad and then Beirut. Subsequently, I went to central Africa, where I will be next week, before I go to the civic forums of the CHOGM in Kigali. I heard, and no doubt will hear, differing perspectives on not only the conflict but the consequences of it. This is why the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, is absolutely right: the UK’s reputation and trustworthiness is critical in this debate if we are to lever further support for UK interests, given that it has been indicated that this will be a long-term situation.

It is wrong that the UK has cut support from 0.7% to 0.5%—of course it is—and, while it is positive that the UK has committed 0.18% of GNI to Ukraine support, which we support and endorse, it is still not clear whether that is offsetting cuts to programmes in other countries. It is in addition to the 0.5% cap? Or will it be squeezing out other support that is critically important, especially when we see growing poverty, increased instability, the lack of action on climate change in many areas, the growth of mercenary groups in Wagner and also, depressingly, the growth and the recruitment of terrorist groups such as Daesh.

If we are introducing legislation that breaks the rule of law here at home, we cannot be the strongest in calling for the rule of law abroad. That is really important, as the noble Viscount, Lord Waverley, indicated, when we see India, China and others taking a different course from us. We need to lead by example not only militarily and economically but morally and on trust.

As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, indicated, we are engaged in hybrid warfare, where our sanctions and economic measures are markedly different from those in the past. They are now designed not only to deter actions but to change strategic and military campaign decisions. We need to debate this soberly and clearly, with regard to the exit that needs to be in place. That exit will be at a time of increased fragility, with the climate emergency and other pressures. So, we do need to revisit the integrated review in practical ways, and measures suggested by my noble friend Lady Ludford. As I said earlier, when we review this—perhaps not to the extent of the German Zeitenwende: the watershed moment they have indicated—we should start by going back to 2018 and that speech of Theresa May.