Lord Anderson of Ipswich:

Moved by Lord Anderson of Ipswich

14: After Schedule 1, insert the following new Schedule—“SCHEDULE 1A DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT NOTICE: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHTThis is the Schedule to be inserted after Schedule 4 to the British Nationality Act 1981—“SCHEDULE 4A Section 40(5E)DEPRIVATION OF CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT NOTICE: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHTDeprivation without notice: application to Special Immigration Appeals Commission1_(1) If the Secretary of State proposes to make a conducive grounds deprivation order without notice, the Secretary of State may apply to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission under this paragraph.(2) If the Secretary of State makes a conducive grounds deprivation order without notice, the Secretary of State must apply to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission under this paragraph within the period of seven days beginning with the day on which the order is made (unless an application has already been made under sub-paragraph (1)).(3) The function of the Commission on an application under this paragraph is to determine whether, in respect of each condition in section 40(5A) on which the Secretary of State relies, the Secretary of State’s view is obviously flawed. (4) In determining that question, the Commission must apply the principles that would be applicable on an application for judicial review.(5) If the Commission determines that the Secretary of State’s view is obviously flawed in respect of each condition in section 40(5A) on which the Secretary of State relies—(a) if the order in question has not been made, section 40(5) applies in relation to the order (notwithstanding section 40(5A));(b) if the order has been made, the Secretary of State must, within the period of 14 days beginning with the day on which the Commission made the determination—(i) give late notice in respect of the order,(ii) revoke the order, or(iii) make an application under sub-paragraph (6).(6) The Secretary of State may (at any time) make an application to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission for fresh consideration of a decision the Secretary of State has made under section 40(5A) where—(a) in the opinion of the Secretary of State, circumstances have changed materially since the determination mentioned in sub-paragraph (5), or(b) the Secretary of State wishes to provide further evidence to the Commission.Sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) apply to an application under this sub-paragraph.Deprivation of citizenship without notice: review2_(1) Sub-paragraphs (2) to (5) apply if—(a) the Secretary of State makes a conducive grounds deprivation order without notice, and(b) the Special Immigration Appeals Commission has not made the determination mentioned in paragraph 1(5) (Secretary of State’s decision obviously flawed).(2) The Secretary of State must, at least once in every review period, review the circumstances of the person in respect of whom the order was made (so far as known) and decide whether to give late notice in respect of the order.(3) On such a review, the Secretary of State must decide to give late notice to the person unless it appears to the Secretary of State that any of the conditions in section 40(5A) is met (reading any reference in those provisions to notice under section 40(5) as a reference to late notice).(4) If the Secretary of State decides at any point to give late notice in respect of the order—(a) the Secretary of State must give the notice as soon as reasonably practicable, and(b) once the notice is given, sub-paragraph (2) ceases to apply in relation to the person.(5) If on the expiry of the final review period the Secretary of State has not given, or has not decided to give, late notice in respect of the order, the Secretary of State must make an application to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission within the period of seven days beginning with the day after the final day of that review period.(6) Sub-paragraphs (3) to (6) of paragraph 1 (except sub-paragraph (5)(a)) apply for the purposes of an application under sub-paragraph (5) as they apply for the purposes of an application under that paragraph.(7) For the purposes of this paragraph, each of the following is a “review period”— (a) the period of four months beginning with the day after the day on which the Special Immigration Appeals Commission first determined an application in relation to the order under paragraph 1, and(b) each of the next five successive periods of four months.Interpretation3_(1) In this Schedule, references to making a conducive grounds deprivation order without notice are to making an order under section 40(2) without giving notice under subsection (5) of that section (in reliance on subsection (5A) of that section).(2) In this Schedule, “late notice”, in respect of an order under section 40(5), means written notice to the person in respect of whom the order was made specifying—(a) that the Secretary of State has made the order,(b) the reasons for the order, and(c) the person’s right of appeal under section 40A(1) or under section 2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997.””Member’s explanatory statementThis amendment inserts a new Schedule into the British Nationality Act 1981, to make provision for judicial oversight of decisions to deprive a person of their citizenship status without notice on grounds that the deprivation is conducive to the public good.

My Lords, the circumstances in which British citizenship may be removed were keenly debated in Committee. This group concerns a narrower issue: whether it should be possible to remove someone’s citizenship without giving them notice of it at the time and, if so, in what circumstances. Clause 9 struck me as so problematic that, in Committee, I tabled a stand part notice; that is echoed today by Amendment 20 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza. In Committee, I asked the Minister to take Clause 9 away and challenged her, if she could make the case for such an extraordinary power, to come back with a version of it that is far more limited in scope and subject to proper safeguards and accountability.

The Minister responded to that challenge as positively and wholeheartedly as I could have hoped. I pay tribute to her, to her fellow Minister, Tom Pursglove, to the Bill team and to those at the Home Office and in agencies with whom I have discussed these issues—and I pay no less tribute to the NGOs and individuals who have impressed on me the dangers of Clause 9. The result, after what I think I can fairly describe as very considerable movement on the part of the Government, is the first six amendments in this group, together with Amendment 85, which concerns commencement. They have been pulled into proper shape by the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel, and I hoped that they could be tabled last Monday as government amendments, with my support, but an extra day was needed to conclude our discussions, so they appear under my name. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, for adding their support.

These amendments achieve four important things. The first is a far more restricted range of circumstances in which notice can be withheld. The original Clause 9 would have allowed the Secretary of State to withhold notice whenever that appeared to her to be in the public interest. Amendments 15 and 16 remove the subjective element and provide that notice may be withheld only if the Secretary of State does not have an address for service, or if she reasonably considers it necessary on one of the four exceptional grounds specified in Amendment 16.

Let me illustrate my understanding of how those exceptional grounds could arise in practice. A terrorist may be living in a safe house here, or more likely abroad, without realising that his whereabouts are known to the authorities. To require a notice of citizenship deprivation to be served on him at that address would reveal to him that he is the object of covert surveillance, contrary to the interests of national security: proposed new sub-paragraph (i). The same may be true of a participant in “organised or serious crime”—the phrase being taken from Section 1 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which defines the remit of the National Crime Agency: proposed new sub-paragraph (ii). If intelligence as to location was supplied by a foreign liaison partner which does not wish its cover to be blown, notification at that address could jeopardise our intelligence relationship with that country: proposed new sub-paragraph (iv). The person in question might be, for example, with a dangerous armed group in a failed state. To require a courier to travel to such places to serve notice, at great personal risk, would be wrong: hence proposed new sub-paragraph (iii).

I do not believe that these grounds will be commonly advanced—it seems that, with a degree of ingenuity, workarounds have been found in the past—but neither, I suggest as a former independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, should they be dismissed as fanciful. It may be relevant that the laws of two of our closest allies are, if anything, more broadly drawn than this amendment. The New Zealand Citizenship Act 1977 allows for notice of deprivation to be dispensed with if it would be for any reason “not practicable” to serve it on the subject. The Australian Act of 2020 allows the Minister to determine that notice should not be given if it could prejudice the security, defence or international relations of Australia or Australian law enforcement operations.

The second feature of these amendments is to introduce powerful safeguards for conducive grounds deprivations that were entirely absent from the original Clause 9. In New Zealand, they have judicial scrutiny of these decisions. In Australia, they have regular ministerial review. Elements of both those safeguards are contained in the new Schedule 4A, which is set out in Amendment 14 and referred to in Amendments 17 and 19.

The judicial safeguard is in paragraph 1 of the schedule. If the Secretary of State wishes to withhold notice, she must apply to a superior court of record—the Special Immigration Appeals Commission—in advance or within seven days. SIAC will examine her reasons and decide, applying judicial review principles, whether her assessment is obviously flawed. That is the same test that is applied to the making of terrorism prevention and investigation orders under the TPIM Act 2011. SIAC will no doubt develop similar rules to deal with it, which might, in an appropriate case, provide for the appointment of a special advocate. If she does not succeed on her first attempt or on a subsequent application, which must be based on material change of circumstances or further evidence, the Secretary of State must either give notice in the normal way or revoke the deprivation order altogether.

The review safeguard is in paragraph 2 of the schedule. The Secretary of State must consider, three times a year for two years, whether the reasons for non-notification remain valid. If, after the sixth review, she still resists notification, she must make a further application to SIAC, which will, once again, give independent scrutiny to her decision.

The twin requirements of judicial approval and regular review will place a significant burden on the Secretary of State in any case where she wishes to exercise this power. I make no apology for that. Under the Immigration Rules, as they stood between 2018 and 2021, it was easy—far too easy—not to give notice but simply to record it on the file. That path was taken in no fewer than 29 of the 45 conducive grounds deprivations, mostly related to national security activity abroad, that were made in 2019, 2020 and 2021. These amendments not only require non-notification to be a last resort on paper; they make it hard work in practice. They should ensure that, in its own interests, the Home Office will take this exceptional course only when there really is no possible alternative.

The third feature of these amendments relates to appeals. Of course, a subject cannot appeal against a notice of deprivation until he has become aware of it. But Amendment 18 provides that time for appeal will begin to run only once notice has been given. It will not, therefore, be necessary to rely on the discretion of the court to extend time for appeal in cases where deprivation has not been notified at the time.

The fourth and final feature is in the proposed new subsections 5(c) and (d) inserted by Amendment 18. Any person whose citizenship was removed without notice must be informed of that fact, with reasons and information about appeal rights, as soon as they make themselves known to the Home Office, whether within the two-year review period or thereafter; for example, this might be by seeking consular assistance or a fresh passport.

Amendment 18 has another significant and, I would suggest, highly beneficial effect. The point has been well made by other noble Lords that upstanding citizens of this country, notably dual citizens, may be anxious about the removal of their citizenship without their knowledge. Amendment 18 provides such people with a means of reassurance. They have only to contact the Home Office to be told whether this has happened or whether, as will almost always be the case, it has not.

In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, challenged the House to

“find a way forward on Report that takes away the genuine fear from millions of people who believe—erroneously, but they believe it—that Clause 9 as drafted and the implementation of further measures will put them and their families at risk”.—[Official Report, 27/1/2022; col. 518.]

These amendments rise to that challenge. They should ensure that non-notification is confined to those rare cases where it is truly necessary, and they are subject to strong safeguards, including regular review, judicial scrutiny and a right to be informed on request.

I come finally to subsections (5) to (7) to Clause 9, which seek to limit the effect of the D4 case by providing that an unlawful failure to notify a pre-commencement deprivation order should not affect the validity of that order. I will listen carefully to my noble friend Lady D’Souza develop her manuscript amendment to remove those clauses, but in the meantime, to assist our deliberations, I ask the Minister to give two assurances relevant to that amendment. First, will she confirm that anyone subject to a pre-commencement deprivation order will be informed of that fact if they contact the Home Office, by analogy with proposed new subsections (5C) and (5D), as inserted by Amendment 17? They would then be in a position to proceed with any substantive appeal. Secondly, will she confirm, by analogy with Amendment 18, that the Home Office will not suggest that any of these people are out of time for appeal as a consequence of the interval between the decision to remove their citizenship and the giving of notice?

If my amendments are accepted, and those assurances given, I believe that we will have played our part as a revising Chamber and achieved a broadly acceptable balance. Opinions on citizenship removal will, of course, continue to differ, but the aggravating factor of removal without notice will be strictly confined and properly safeguarded for the future, as it was not in the Immigration Rules as they stood prior to the D4 judgment of last year, and as it was not under Clause 9 as it was passed by the Commons. I beg to move my amendment and, if necessary, I will test the opinion of the House.

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for her support in drafting these amendments, and I hope that she will give an assurance that the Government do, indeed, support these amendments. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for addressing many of the concerns that I raised in Committee, particularly those expressed to me by the Law Society of Scotland, which was extremely dissatisfied that, in the original Clause 9, the Government had not fully justified the removal of citizenship without notifying the affected person. It asked that this clause be reconsidered, and I am grateful to the noble Lord for doing so.

Equally, in Committee, I raised the concerns expressed to me by the European Network on Statelessness in its briefing. It was very concerned that Clause 9 as drafted would

“have severe impacts on the rule of law and on a person’s fundamental rights”, and that, as drafted, Clause 9

“disregards many of the UK’s international obligations, including the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of nationality, the obligation to avoid statelessness, and the right to a fair hearing.”

In its view, the UK Government

“has not provided any justification as to why such a restriction on fundamental rights is needed.”

I pay tribute to the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich; many of my concerns have been addressed. I support the amendments introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and support the reasons that he has given. The restrictive range of circumstances has been greatly reduced in which a citizen’s rights could be taken away. I support the powerful safeguards he set out as to why a citizen could be deprived of their citizenship, the rights of appeal, the provision that a citizen must be informed that their citizenship is going to be removed and the reassurance that he set out that could be given by condition C at that time. I support the amendments.

My Lords, powers to deprive British citizens of their citizenship have historically been very tightly drawn under UK immigration law for obvious reasons. However, I reminded the Committee that in 2003, 2006, 2014 and 2018, these powers were very considerably expanded, so that now they are exercisable against any British citizen who has dual nationality, where the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good. The breadth of this power is perhaps best understood by the Supreme Court’s conclusion in the Begum case, that this includes situations where the individual is unaware that they hold dual nationality and even where that individual has little or no connection with their country of second nationality.

I reminded the Committee of the words of the leading immigration law silk, Raza Husain QC, who said:

“This progressive extension over the last two decades has meant that it is no longer necessary to demonstrate that someone is a terrorist or a traitor before stripping them of British citizenship. Individuals may be deprived of citizenship on general public interest grounds of the sort usually invoked to justify deportation, rather than on the basis of their severing the bonds of allegiance that are the hallmark of nationality.”

The drastic nature of this power was well described by the United States chief justice Earl Warren, a Republican, put on the court by President Eisenhower, who said that the loss of nationality amounts to

“the total destruction of the individual’s status in organised society… the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.”

He was channelling Hannah Arendt there.

Deprivation of citizenship is such a drastic and far-reaching power that it must be accompanied by proper procedural safeguards. That much is obvious. This is a power that has been beloved of some of the worst regimes in history. If we are to permit this power to a Secretary of State, it must be accompanied by procedural safeguards. In its original form, Clause 9 went in precisely the opposite direction, removing the most basic safeguard of all—the safeguard of notification —really at the Secretary of State’s whim. That was not good enough and, like my noble friend Lord Anderson, I am grateful to the Government for having listened to the debate in Committee and for having changed course. Again, like him, I am satisfied that serious movement has been made and that some of our most serious concerns about the clause as originally drafted have been responded to appropriately. For that reason, I will be supporting this amendment and am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for moving it.

My Lords, the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, add hugely important safeguards to Clause 9, but subsections (5) to (7), which are set out on page 12 at lines 13 to 19, would remain in place and appear to make lawful what is clearly unlawful. The secret power to deprive citizenship without notice and/or appeal threatens our cherished British values of fair play and the rule of law. It would also risk unduly affecting ethnic minority communities. Subsections (5) to (7) seek to instruct the courts to treat past unlawful deprivations as if they were lawful, even where the courts have found that these actions failed to comply with statute at the time when they were made.

Parliament, it seems to me, is being asked to condone a disregard for the law by those Ministers who took away British national citizenship when it was illegal to do so. If these provisions remain in the Bill, a series of unlawful deprivation orders made against young women from minority ethnic communities will not be subject to any scrutiny whatever. This cannot be right.

It seems clear from what has been said so far on this clause that the most profound concerns still relate to Clause 9 as a whole and—although the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, alters the whole tenor of the Bill and grateful thanks are due to the Minister for enabling this—the concerns remain. These clauses would create a secret power. Clause 9 goes well beyond cases where the Government cannot provide notice. According to the Policy Exchange think tank, at no point in the last century has it been thought that national security called for depriving British citizens of their citizenship without notice. We cannot see the case for this now, at a time when our closest allies, such as the US, are warning that depriving individuals of citizenship is not an effective way to fight terrorism.

The main issue in this group of amendments is whether Clause 9 should remain part of the Bill. My suggestion is that it should be removed to create certainty and clarity. It seems to me that the optimal solution would be to remove this clause altogether, not only because, as it stands, it is contrary to British law and indeed to parts of the UN refugee convention, but because this clause—as well as new subsections (5) to (7) proposed by the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—seem to enable further restrictive orders, something that we as a scrutinising Chamber should avoid at all costs. Therefore, while I will of course support the noble Lord’s amendment, I will also seek to move my amendment, which would leave Clause 9 out.

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and I agree with what she said and that, although the amendments moved by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, have made Clause 9 less bad, it is still a bad clause that should disappear from the Bill. When introducing this group, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, said that these amendments were all about Clause 9. I would rather say that my Amendment 22, to which I will speak, was provoked by Clause 9. One thing revealed in public debate—and there has been an enormous amount of public debate around Clause 9—is the fact that so many people had not realised that what the Minister described earlier as the “warm embrace of citizenship” can be taken away, and that there is profound discrimination in the way that this can happen.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, talked in Committee talked about two-tier citizenship; I talk about it as two classes of citizenship. I regret that I was not able to take part in Committee; I thank my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb for very ably speaking for me. However, there are about 6 million Britons—I declare an interest as I am among them—who, because of another citizenship or their descent from people who came to Britain and chose to be Britons, have second-class citizenship. It can be taken away by the Government and, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, just outlined very clearly, we have seen a very rapid and considerable escalation of the ways in which that power can be, and has been, applied.

My Amendment 22 makes one exception. If someone attains citizenship by means of fraud or misrepresentation, obviously, the power should remain for that citizenship to be taken away, but if that citizenship has been acquired honestly, my amendment says that it cannot be taken away. I suggest to your Lordships’ House that this is the only way that we can ensure that every British citizen is the same class of citizen and treated in the same way. Given that people who have, or have access to, alternative citizenships come from migrant backgrounds, the discrimination in how this is applied is very obvious. I note from having read the Hansard report of Committee very carefully that the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, expressed support for this. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for also expressing support in principle for the idea that there should be only one class of citizenship and the Government should not be able to take it away.

I can imagine the response I might hear from the Minister: what about someone who is a security threat? If we have given millions of people British citizenship, we have benefited from the contributions, of all kinds, that they have made to the UK. Should we be able to say, “This person’s a problem so we’re going to get rid of them”, and make them someone else’s problem? If a person is a security threat to the UK, they might well be a security threat to the country that they hold citizenship for and that we send them to. Why should we be able to dump our problems on someone else?

I find myself torn. I aware of the desire in your Lordships’ House to take away some of the worst elements of the Bill, but I also find myself supported by many people in civil society who say that they want to ensure that there is one class of citizenship. I have said to all the relevant authorities that I will reserve the right to call a vote on this, because I find it a matter of principle on which it is very difficult simply to withdraw the amendment. I would really like to hear everyone’s position on this, particularly the Front-Bench speakers—I hope one of the Lords spiritual might contribute—and everyone’s explanation of whether they believe there should be two classes of British citizenship. Having heard that debate, I will make a decision about whether to push Amendment 22 to a vote.

My Lords—oh, sorry.

Thank you. My Lords, I am grateful for the suggestion that the House might like to hear from the Lords spiritual. I support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, which proposes that Clause 9 should not stand part of the Bill. We debated this at some length in Committee. It is somewhat disappointing that the Government have not taken the opportunity to reconsider more fully. I will not delay the House by repeating the arguments, but I will briefly speak about trust.

The Government seem genuinely confused by the level of opposition that the clause has triggered, but this should not have been surprising because I am afraid that it is symptomatic of a serious breakdown in trust between the Home Office and society groups, particularly minority ethnic groups, as we have heard. The response to the Windrush Lessons Learned Review promised a new culture in the Home Office—one that was more compassionate, that saw faces behind the cases and would rebuild and enhance

“public trust and confidence in the Home Office”.

The Bill as a whole does not do much to create the impression that this new culture has been embedded. Trust is hard to build and very easy to lose. On the issue of deprivation of citizenship and the treatment of minorities, trust is sufficiently low that any new changes to these powers must surely come with a compelling and overwhelming demonstration of a serious and widespread problem that needs to be solved.

I remain unconvinced that the Government have demonstrated that there is a sufficiently major problem that existing powers do not address. I am quite convinced that the impact this clause will have—indeed, already has had in continuing to undermine trust between the Home Office and civil society—is serious enough that the Bill would be greatly improved by Clause 9 being removed in its entirety. Having said that, I have heard the words of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. He provided a compelling and informed case for his saving amendments. I will listen with interest to the Minister’s response.

My Lords, I apologise to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford for my lack of control over my new varifocals, and to your Lordships for entering the debate at this late stage. I have been listening to the debate in the context of my concerns about the majority judgments in the D4 case, which has already been mentioned. I read my noble friend Lord Anderson’s amendments and listened with enormous care to his very clear—indeed, brilliant—opening. I support his amendments. My view is that they go further than is absolutely necessary in terms of proportionality between the duties and rights of citizens and the setting of safeguards to ensure that this equation is well balanced. Overbalancing in favour of protections is a good fault in the circumstances, hence my declared support for my noble friend’s amendments.

I will just say a word in relation to Amendment 22, which I am afraid I find rather befuddling. I am befuddled by the notion that somebody should be able to lose their citizenship for committing an offence of fraud but not for being a terrorist treacherous to and betraying their own country. That is absolutely what that amendment says. It may not have been intended as such, but that is how it reads. I suggest that, far from people with dual nationality being second-class citizens, they are advantaged citizens. We have been talking a good deal about oligarchs in recent days, and I can tell the noble Baroness who tabled Amendment 22 that expensive law firms have been expending large sums of oligarchs’ money on obtaining dual nationality so that those people can have the advantage of being able to hedge their bets in more than one country. I am not a dual national, but if I were a citizen of Ireland or the United States, for example, I would consider it a privilege and an advantage, not some kind of second-class citizenship.

I turn to the principle behind this. I listened with interest to my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, who is a distinguished former Director of Public Prosecutions. There seems to be some kind of presumption among some commentators, and possibly one or two Members of your Lordships’ House, that the Home Secretary will deprive everyone of their citizenship if they have gone to Syria and married a terrorist, simply because they have done that. But as my noble friend Lord Macdonald will know, there are many cases in which the Director of Public Prosecutions—he did this with great distinction—makes a decision on public interest grounds as to whether a case should be pursued. In this situation, particularly in the light of the amendments by my noble friend Lord Anderson, the Home Secretary would have exactly that kind of discretion and would not make a decision in every single case. Under the architecture that my noble friend Lord Anderson has set out, if a decision was made and was disproportionate, on judicial review principles it would be subject—as he said very clearly—to come before the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. So this is not simply lumping a large number of people into being deprived of citizenship. We can assume, at least in our country, that we do not operate like Mr Putin and that in fact rational decisions are taken and are tested in a rational way before the courts.

I have three examples of cases in which it is proportionate not to serve notice, even if there is some knowledge of whereabouts. I think I should state them briefly for the record. First, let us take a case relating to new subsection (5A)(c)(i) of Section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981, on national security grounds. If the Home Office holds sensitive intelligence that details an individual’s whereabouts so that they could cause notice to be served on that person, but the sensitive source of the intelligence means they cannot use it without revealing and risking the life of the sensitive source, and in so doing causing damage to national security, that is a clear example where non-service to file is entirely justified—particularly with my noble friend Lord Anderson’s architecture, as I have called it.

The second example relates to new subsection (5A)(c)(ii), inserted by Clause 9, relating to

“the interests of the relationship between the United Kingdom and another country”.

Let us suppose the Home Office holds sensitive intelligence obtained from a third country, as to an individual’s address or whereabouts such that the Home Office could—if it relied upon this intelligence—cause notice to be served on the person. Such intelligence sometimes comes from countries with which we do not have close intelligence relationships for particular reasons. So, using the address that has been given may not cause damage to our national security, but it might be damaging to the national security interests of the third country and even cause damage to the UK’s relationship with that country if the Home Office relied upon it. Without that intelligence, the Home Office would not know the individual’s whereabouts in order to effect service. Clearly, that is a situation in which it is reasonable not to serve.

My third example, which relates to new subsection (5A)(c)(iii)—not in the public interest—inserted by Clause 9, is an example where the Home Office holds an address for an individual that, if relied upon, could be used to cause notice to be served on the individual, but there is no functioning postal system where the individual is living. There is, however, the prospect of delivering the notice to the address via a courier. But doing so would expose the courier to risk—either due to prevailing circumstances in the region or due to the threat posed by the individual to be served if the courier encounters them. This is a very real example. I have seen this illustrated in a country—which I will not name in this debate—where civil servants doing other functions would be in a position to deliver such notices. Surely it would not be right for the Home Office to expose the courier to such risk and, indeed, to danger to their life.

So I come back to the balance between rights and duties. Most of the cohort we are discussing absolutely know the risk they take if they go and fight as terrorists, betray this country and put it in danger. Most of those people—not all, and I refer to what I said at the beginning about the Home Secretary’s discretion—will know if they are able to have the nationality of another country. If they do, those are the cases in which the Home Office should, in my view, be allowed to make such orders, and it would be foolish of us to stand in the way of that. Indeed, in making such orders, that is entirely proportionate to a judgment between the duties of the citizen not to betray their country and the rights of the citizen not, in certain circumstances, to have their citizenship removed.

Removing Clause 9 from the Bill leaves the unattractive proposition that, even where an alternative nationality is available, individuals should have a free run to betray this country and be terrorists against this country’s interests. I am against that, and I am absolutely certain that most reasonable people are against that.

The noble Lord has displayed a very touching faith in the Home Office, which I do not think reflected the view of your Lordships’ House in an earlier debate in terms of how we are approaching Ukrainian refugees. Is he aware of the case of the gentleman known as E3, who was deprived of his British citizenship for many years, was eventually able to appeal that, has never been arrested or charged, and has finally—on 11 February—returned to the UK and is now back with his family after many years of separation.

I am not aware of the details of that case, but I would say to the noble Baroness that the architecture that the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, set out would protect such a person in a much better way than was the case before.

My Lords, I start by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, on the detailed measures that he has brought forward. I really appreciate the time that he has given to the discussions and debates that he and I, and other Members of this House, have had over the last few weeks and months. I also pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Williams for her work and her calls, and for the way in which she has dealt with this issue, reaching out to try genuinely and sincerely to find a compromise. That is what this is—it is a compromise, and compromise is good, but fairness, justice and equality are better. Therefore, despite the fact that these amendments go some way to making what was really bad legislation slightly less bad, they are simply papering over the cracks.

Once again, we are being asked by the Government to keep incrementally changing this law from the early 1980s—each time it has been changed with one case law or one individual situation—so that more and more people in this country, from a wider and wider scope, with more and more different offences, are now included in a space where their citizenship can be stripped. Therefore, we have an opportunity in this House to, once again, incrementally, make a bad law slightly less bad—or we can take a position and say that the underlying law itself is so bad that we are no longer prepared to keep making these incremental changes.

This takes the bad law a little further. If we go back to what this law actually does, first, it strips citizenship from those who were born and raised here, know nowhere else and whose family have been here for generations, but who are deemed to have—they do not actually have—another citizenship through some tenuous link to a country that their grandfathers or great-grandparents may have come from. Secondly, under this law, in our courts in the United Kingdom we punish two people convicted of the same crime differently based upon their heritage—not on the crime committed, but on their heritage. That is what the underlying law does.

I take issue with the idea that these people are not second-class citizens; they are. Let me give an example. My grandfather came here in the 1950s; my father came in the 1960s. I was born here; I have no other citizenship. My children were born here; they have no other citizenship. My grandchildren have been born here; they have no other citizenship. However, if my grandchildren—we all bring our children up well, not to commit crime, but we can never predict how their lives will turn out—were to commit not just a terrorist offence but a criminal act such as a sexual offence or an offence involving fraud, they could, in court, be punished for the crime but also have their citizenship stripped. That is fact. That makes me a second-class citizen. It makes my children second-class citizens. It makes their children second-class citizens. How far back do we go before we say to people that they are as equal as anyone else in this country?

Today, by supporting the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, we can say, from this House, that despite all the assurances and the changes, we believe in equality for all in this country. My noble friend mentioned New Zealand and Australia, and I accept that changes have been put in place there; safeguards have been put in place where it is deemed not fit to serve notice. But we also have allies, such as the United States and Canada, who simply do not even have the law—they do not believe that we should be stripping our citizens of their citizenship.

The current law has been used throughout two decades of the war on terror, during the rise of ISIS, and while terrorist fighters from the United Kingdom have been going overseas. Over the years, we have managed to use the law, without this additional incremental change, to ensure that we have stripped people who we consider to be dangerous of their citizenship. We have managed under the current law; this further change is not required.

In conclusion, we may not have taken this moment to put right the wrongs of the past—many noble Lords, including many noble friends from my own Benches, stood up and asked for the original law to be considered. However, the least we can do is to stop a bad law becoming worse. If the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, tests the opinion of the House, I urge Members to vote for it because I will be voting for it, too.

My Lords, I shared the concerns expressed by my noble friend Lady D’Souza about Clause 9 as it was originally drafted. However, I am very satisfied with the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Anderson, particularly as the exercise of these powers is subject to the control of the independent Special Immigration Appeals Commission. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, that this is not to have trust and faith in the Home Office. Whether or not that is justified, I have trust and faith in the independent Special Immigration Appeals Commission. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, that this is not a compromise or papering over the cracks. Rather, this is a great tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and to the work done by the Minister: it is to achieve the protection of both the public interest and the rights of individuals. This is what this House should be aiming to do.

My Lords, I had the honour, with the then Leader of the House, to present to this House the 1981 Bill which became the Act. We certainly understood that it was a very drastic power which enabled citizenship to be taken away. Therefore, it was only right that notice should be required, and provided for, in Section 40(5) of that Act. It included the need to make clear to the person affected that the application was on. It used the last known address as a possibility. However, the more that difficulties arise, the more it is seen that something further is required. Therefore, it is right that Section 40(5) should be amended. I think that the amendments, as now proposed—and subject to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, if, as I hope, the Government will accept them—are an acceptable way of dealing with this very delicate matter.

I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, that the real and ultimate protection is in the independent judicial review by the special court for that purpose. It is essential that, as this nation is subject to many different ways of being attacked, we should be protected as much as possible. This is a very sensible way to do it, provided that the Government are prepared to accept the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.

My Lords, I spoke in Committee and, obviously, after two and a half hours then and 50 minutes now, one is in danger of ending up with—in that famous phrase of the football manager—a sense of déjà vu all over again. I will try to avoid that and just raise a couple of points.

I listened very carefully to what was said by the noble Baronesses, Lady D’Souza and Lady Bennett, and the right reverend Prelate—and I am not a lawyer. I also listened again to my noble friend Lady Warsi—having heard her passionate speech at the earlier stage—and the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik. I did not see the provisions of Clause 9 as an attack on people, and particularly not an attack on a particular part of our community. I saw the clause as a defence of the values that tie us all together and the glue that binds our society: the tolerance, freedom of speech and economic opportunity that has brought people to this country over the years, some more recently than others. That has been the essence of the attractions that have brought people here.

However, I was extremely concerned, and pointed out in Committee, that there was a gap in the arguments using the phrase

“conducive to the public good”.

I was worried about that, but I said—and still believe—that there is a need for the Government to protect the citizens of the country and that that is the overriding proposition we need to follow. Do I find the issues of Clause 9 easy? I do not. Do I wish we did not have to have Clause 9? I do so. But there are evil people about and wishing will not make it so. I thought in Committee, and still think now, that the underlying purpose of Clause 9 is right.

I pointed out in my speech then that, without the informed consent of the population of the country, the respect for and the importance of the rule of law become undermined. The travellers on the Clapham omnibus would regard some of the issues that have been raised this afternoon—such as having to send a courier into an extraordinarily dangerous country and put his or her life at risk—as a perverse outcome.

I recognise that there is a gap. I said that I hoped there would be some opportunity for smoothing some of the sharp edges in Clause 9 as originally drafted. As a non-lawyer, it seemed to me that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, answered the points that were made. Can it answer all the points? No, but it answers them effectively. It seems to provide a means to smooth the corners or close the gap—whichever metaphor you wish to use.

I would support the Government, whatever happened, as I think the underlying purpose of Clause 9 outweighs the disadvantages. However, I hope very much that my noble friend will be able to see the advantages of the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and will be able in that way to make the compromise that I think makes the argument unanswerable.

My Lords, I speak in support of the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, to leave Clause 9 out of the Bill. I find it difficult to comprehend that we are even debating something so out of step with our rules of justice and fairness. Depriving someone of their citizenship without even informing them, as would be the case if Clause 9 were to be enacted into law, is in effect an addition to the already punitive measures that have existed since 1918.

As the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, stated, Clause 9 effectively removes the right of appeal, which has evolved over the decades to become ever more powerful. If the Home Office deems it to be in the public interest or, as is worded,

“conducive to the public good”, then the long-standing position under the British Nationality Act 1981 that an individual must be notified if they are to be deprived of their nationality is being amended, so that they do not even have to be informed. Currently, citizenship deprivation letters can be delivered to the individual’s last known address, so why are we changing that? Essentially, over this past decade, the Government have failed to provide notice on many occasions, and it appears they are now seeking to declare all unlawful deprivation orders as lawful by making Clause 9 retroactive.

Clause 9(5) purports to make lawful deprivation orders which courts have found unlawful because of failure to give notice. That is making lawful a breach of requirements as laid down by Parliament, after the fact. This completely undermines the rule of law as we understand it. While I support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which would provide some safeguards on the use of Clause 9, the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, to remove the retroactive application of Clause 9 in its subsections (5)(6) and (7), should be considered seriously.

Former Prime Minister Sir John Major has warned that we should search our souls before taking this step. Others such as the Institute of Race Relations, the House of Lords Constitution Committee, the think tank Policy Exchange and the former Attorney-General Dominic Grieve, as well as five separate UN bodies, have stated that such deprivation orders made under Clause 9 are likely to be discriminatory and unlawful. I hope that we would give attention to such notable organisations and individuals.

I add that I support in principle the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, to omit subsections (2) and (4) of Section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981, but understand that it is probably outwith the scope of the Bill. However, we have to address this, because we are in danger of creating a two-tier system of citizenship.

The fact is that Clause 9 has a disproportionate impact on people from ethnic-minority backgrounds. As a person cannot be made stateless according to international conventions, by default it is more likely to affect those who have a connection to the Commonwealth or a country where they are entitled to dual nationality. But it is not even as obvious as that, for some Commonwealth countries allow dual nationality or will accept people if they have a connection through their parents or grandparents, while others do not. Take south Asia, for example: while Bangladesh and Pakistan offer dual nationality to British citizens who have a direct link, India does not, so citizenship deprivation would not impact British citizens of Indian heritage. As I said in Committee, if Clause 9 is enacted into law, we are heading towards a society made up of degrees of citizenship, where some are full citizens while others are half-citizens and others somewhere in between.

Growing up between two distinct cultures, one is acutely aware of certain idiosyncrasies and traits which define each. The core values are, of course, the same, but there are always certain endearing features: the British sense of humour, with its self- deprecation and the ability to laugh with others at one’s own expense is one. The other is this sense of fairness. How often do we hear the phrase “That’s not fair”? Then there are all the variations: “Let’s be fair”, “Fair enough” and “Fair is fair”. Do noble Lords think it fair to have a two-tier system of citizenship? Do we think it is fair to deny someone their citizenship without informing them?

I understand that our intention is to root out ruthless individuals and deny them entry to our country, which is absolutely right. Not one of us would disagree that we must do everything to protect our people, but it begs the question: will it protect our citizens to have ill-intentioned people free to continue to conspire against us elsewhere, rather than having them locked away safely, following the rigours of our excellent courts? It also begs the question: what if there is a mistake, as has already happened in the case pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, of the British Bangladeshi man referred to as E3? He spent five years in Bangladesh trying to get back, having had his citizenship revoked without him even being informed. He eventually got back, as there was no evidence that he had committed any crime or had any intention of doing so—a completely innocent man, wrongfully accused. Was that fair or unfair?

Britain has a proud tradition of justice, equality and fairness. Let us keep it that way.

I was not intending to intervene, but may I ask my noble friend the Minister whether there is any major change to the current law that forces the commentary that my noble friend has just made? I have seen on WhatsApp groups worried people and citizens of this country with a lot of misinformation, and I have gone through the Bill and fact sheets and tried to get my head around what this is about—apart from the fact that we want to make sure that people are aware when their citizenship may be taken away, when they cannot be reached, and that is not based on anything other than their performing a criminal or terrorist act.

May I have some clarification? Sitting here, I have listened very carefully to every contribution made today, and while there are lawyers among us who know the details very well, ordinary citizens out there—people in groups with WhatsApp messages going around—are very frightened. They feel very scared, and they need to know that this is not the case.

My Lords, I support the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. I think that the way this matter has been handled reflects extremely well on the flexibility and the detailed application of the minds of Members of your Lordships’ House in dealing with very great problems, especially when these problems are new and have recently arisen.

I was struck by the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, when he referred to the fact that when the 2011 Act was passed, he could not have imagined the need for these arrangements. Let us be aware that the thing that is new is the creation of a new political body, which has nothing do with religion, the Islamic State. It claims the ability to grant citizenship and demands loyalty but also—by definition, because it believes in theocracy rather than democracy, and the theocracy itself is an aberration with little to do with the noble aspects of Islam—believes in something that puts its members in permanent enmity with this country. They deny the right of other states to exist, which is why, of course, we should be taking steps to defend the realm against the possibility of such people using citizenship for the destruction of this country.

My Lords, although at first glance it would seem reasonable for the Home Office not to have to give notice to a terrorist overseas that they were being deprived of their British citizenship, it of course means that there is no effective right to appeal, as the subject would be unaware of the decision. We have also seen cases where the Home Office could have given notice, even to the last known address or by email, and chose not to. The increase in the use of this power needs to be reversed.

The amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, seek to introduce a range of judicial oversights, would remove the subjective element of the decision and tighten the grounds on which a deprivation of citizenship order may be made without notice to the person concerned. Others would strengthen the test for making such a decision; ensure, if the person concerned contacts the Home Office, that he is told what has happened and that he has a right of appeal; and allow the Special Immigration Appeals Tribunal to oversee such decisions. Any time limit on appeal would start when the subject is notified.

I understand that a government Minister would have signed these amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, had they not been out of time—the deadline for tabling government amendments being several days before that for other amendments. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for the time, effort and ingenuity he has brought to bear in bringing forward such a comprehensive suite of amendments that could arguably halt, if not throw into reverse, the current practice by the Home Office increasingly to use this power to deprive citizenship without notice. We wholeheartedly support these amendments.

However, were the House to divide on taking Clause 9 out of the Bill, we would, along with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford, support that Division. At the end of the day, the Government should be taking ownership of the actions of British citizens, including terrorists overseas, ensuring, wherever possible, that they are extradited to the UK to stand trial, rather than depriving them of British citizenship, preventing them returning to the UK, and making them some other country’s problem, whether with notice or not. However, while therefore agreeing with much of what the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, has said, we are unable to go so far as to support her amendment, as there could be exceptional cases where, as a last resort, citizenship should be removed.

I think I am right in saying that until the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, spoke, all those speakers who had spoken against Clause 9 were noble Baronesses. I am not sure what the significance of that is, and I do not say that in any wrong way; I think it is a great credit to them. Like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I hope they will forgive me for intruding on their space.

Although we appreciate that the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, are certainly an improvement on Clause 9—I, too, would like to express my thanks to the noble Lord for all the work I know he has put in—as it stands, we do not feel the case has been made by the Government for why Clause 9, and deprivation of nationality without prior notice to the individual concerned, are actually necessary. That is what we are talking about: not whether nationality should be removed but whether it should be possible for the Secretary of State to remove it without prior notice.

Currently, under the British Nationality Act 1981, an individual must be notified if they are to be deprived of their citizenship. So what is the problem when, for example, the present rules already allow for citizenship deprivation letters to be delivered to an individual’s last known address, or to a parent, or to a parent’s last known address? I say that against the background that the Government have already said there have been no cases where the requirement to give notice has stopped—prior to the recent High Court decision—a deprivation of citizenship order coming into being. It is also against a background where the number of people deprived of their citizenship has risen considerably over the last 12 years—an upward trend with a peak, I think, in 2017.

One thing we can be sure of is that if the Government have the powers under Clause 9, even with the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, we will see deprivation of citizenship orders being made without prior notice, because if it is not the Government’s intention to take advantage of the powers to deprive a person of their citizenship without prior notice, why are they seeking them? Against that scenario, we need to be satisfied that there is a real and overriding necessity for this additional power now, when it has not been deemed necessary before, beyond it being perhaps more convenient or helpful on occasions not to have to go through the procedure of giving prior notice to the individual concerned. The lack of a compelling and meaningful government response on that point, and there having been no cases where the requirement to give notice has stopped the deprivation of citizenship order coming into being, is significant.

If a proven national security need does arise for the power not to have to give prior notice of a deprivation of citizenship notice coming into being, the Government can get such necessary legislation through Parliament, as we know, with remarkable speed. In the absence of such a case being made for this power—and the lack of it clearly has not caused a serious difficulty until now—we should be wary of agreeing to Clause 9, even as amended, remaining in the Bill.

I suggest that the situation has not been helped by finding out from information in the Court of Appeal decision that in the D4 case the Home Secretary

“argued that notification had been given to D4 … by simply placing a note on her Home Office file, relying on regulations introduced without parliamentary approval.”

That ought to make us very wary about giving the Secretary of State and the Home Office the additional powers in Clause 9, now that we know how existing statutory powers and requirements on notification have been interpreted and implemented in the D4 case.

The consequences of the clause are likely to be felt most—but certainly not exclusively, as the noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, said—by those from ethnic minority backgrounds. It is no surprise that it is in this area that the Bill, particularly Clause 9, has caused most concern about how the new powers might be applied and interpreted and what the evidence is that they are needed now and have not been needed before.

It is unlawful to deprive someone of their citizenship and leave them stateless. Even so, the Home Office is still on record that British citizenship

“is a privilege, not a right”.

Yet without citizenship people do not have rights, and we are talking about significant rights. It has been estimated that nearly 6 million people in England and Wales could be affected, and that under this proposal two in five British citizens from an ethnic minority background are eligible to be deprived of their citizenship without being told, since they have, or may have, other citizenships available to them—I think that was the basis of the comment about two classes of citizenship—compared with one in 20 characterised as white. That is a sobering consideration for the Government, or should be, when looking at the merits or demerits of Clause 9, not least in the light of how the Secretary of State and the Home Office in the D4 case interpreted and implemented the requirement to give prior notice under the law as it exists at present. What would be tried if Clause 9, even as amended by the amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, gave the power not to have to give prior notice?

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford raised the issue of trust, or rather the lack of it, among society groups. The Government ought to reflect very carefully on that in considering whether Clause 9, even as amended, should remain in the Bill. I have to say that as far as we are concerned the case has not been made for Clause 9, even as amended, to remain in the Bill, and we shall certainly be looking for an opportunity to vote against it.

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, especially the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who has tabled these amendments; I am very grateful for his expertise in this matter. I also acknowledge Amendment 20, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and Amendment 22, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle.

The House will recall that we debated this matter at length in Committee. I say now, as I said then, that inaccurate and irresponsible media reporting continues to fuel fear and concern about how Clause 9 is to operate. I will repeat what I said then, starting with my noble friend Lady Verma: the deprivation power itself is not altered. Clause 9 does not alter the reasons why a person is to be deprived of British citizenship and we are not stripping millions of their citizenship.

To answer the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and others, Clause 9 does not target dual nationals, those from ethnic minorities or particular faiths, or indeed women and girls; there is no secret decision-making, and law-abiding people have nothing to fear from Clause 9. It is simply about the mechanics of how a deprivation decision are conveyed to the individual concerned.

To answer the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford, the deprivation power is compliant with the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the 2014 power has never been used. To answer the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, deprivation of citizenship on conducive grounds is rightly reserved for those who pose a threat to the UK or whose conduct involves very high harm. It is not for minor offences. Deprivation on fraud grounds is for those who obtain their citizenship fraudulently and therefore were never entitled to it in the first place. Decisions are made following careful consideration of advice from officials and, in respect of conducive deprivations, lawyers, and in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, as I said. To answer the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, two in five UK citizens are not high-harm individuals.

The noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, very helpfully gave some examples and I will add to them. In cases where we do not have a last known address—regarding my noble friend Lady Mobarik’s point—we may not have it, or to use it would be damaging to national security, which is a good reason for this provision. If you imagine someone who has been spying for another country against the UK and is now living at an unknown address in that country; or the head of an organised crime group whose current whereabouts is only known through a police informant and to use the address would put the life of the informant at risk; or an ISIL supporter who has committed terrorist attacks and is hiding in the mountains in Syria, these are very good examples of why we would need to use the no-notice power.

Such people pose a direct threat to the safety and security of the UK, and it simply cannot be right that our hands are tied because we cannot take away their British citizenship without giving them notice of that decision. Where we have already taken a decision to deprive someone of citizenship, it is essential that the decision remains valid and lawful to stop these dangerous and high-harm individuals from using their British passport to enter the UK. That is why Clause 9 is absolutely necessary. On my noble friend Lady Mobarik’s point of “Just lock them up”, they will get out eventually and therefore potentially do this country harm.

Amendment 22, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, seeks to repeal the power to deprive a person of citizenship on conducive grounds, but presumably not for fraud, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said; that is, use it for fraud but not for terrorists. I find that absolutely baffling. It would completely remove the Home Secretary’s ability to make a deprivation decision in relation to those high-harm individuals and so leave them free to travel in and out of the UK at will. As I have said before, it is the Government’s duty to keep the public safe and we make absolutely no apology for seeking to do so.

The noble Baroness also made the point about making a deprived citizen another country’s problem. They are not necessarily another country’s problem if they are deprived of their citizenship. The noble Baroness, along with my noble friend Lady Mobarik, also talked about just using the criminal justice system. But because the burden of proof for the criminal justice system is higher than that for immigration and nationality decisions, we might not be able to use intelligence for a prosecution as it would prejudice national security.

What the Government do accept is that Clause 9 as currently drafted does not make the case sufficiently clear for not giving notice of deprivation and I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for his Amendment 16, which does exactly that. It is not, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, says, a compromise; it provides for safeguards and oversight, and that can only be a good thing.

We also accept the concerns expressed by my noble friend Lord Hodgson that Clause 9 could be misused. He believes that the process of judicial oversight suggested by Amendments 19 and 14 would protect the provisions of Clause 9 from such misuse.

I turn to the right of redress. Much has been made in the media about Clause 9 removing a person’s appeal rights because they will not know that the Home Office has made a decision to deprive them of British citizenship. The Government have repeatedly been clear that the statutory right of appeal is not changed by Clause 9, but I understand that this is far too important to leave to chance. Amendment 17 therefore obliges the Secretary of State to give a person the notice of deprivation when they make contact with the Home Office, while Amendment 18 confirms that a person retains the statutory right of appeal against a decision to deprive them of British citizenship, even if they do not become aware of it until some time after the decision has been made. These seem very sensible safeguards.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, and my noble friend Lady Warsi talked about deprivation creating a two-tier society. Deprivation on conducive grounds is used extremely sparingly—in 19 cases per year on average—against those who pose a serious threat to the UK. It is right that the conducive power is limited so that it can be applied only to those who are dual citizens or where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person can become a national of another country. Parliament chose to enact that power on that basis to avoid the prospect of leaving individuals stateless, which would be contrary to the UK’s commitments under the 1961 statelessness convention.

My noble friend Lady Mobarik asked how somebody can challenge their deprivation if they do not know about it. We will always try to serve a deprivation notice at the point of decision, including information about the person’s statutory appeal rights. Where this is not possible and the person later makes contact with the Home Office, they will be issued with the decision notice and an explanation of their appeal rights so that they can seek to exercise their statutory right to appeal the decision.

The final points I will make, although I have made them throughout my speech, are in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who asked me to confirm two things. The first was whether anyone subject to a notice of deprivation could contact the Home Office to find out. The answer is yes. The second was that the Home Office will not suggest that people are out of time for an appeal. Again, the answer is yes.

In closing, I remind the House that depriving someone of their British citizenship is extremely serious. It is used sparingly and only against those whose conduct involves very high harm, those who pose a threat to the security of the UK or those who obtained their citizenship by fraudulent means. Preserving this power is vital to protect the integrity of the UK immigration system and the security of the UK from those who wish to do us harm.

I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, will not press Amendment 22, and that the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, will not press Amendment 20, but the Government are content to accept the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in this debate on a subject that I suspect none of us found particularly easy. I do not want to pre-empt anything, but it is possible, having heard the debate, that my amendments may not be very controversial. My noble friend Lord Carlile was alone in suggesting that these amendments go too far; he always was a little bit tougher than me. The real question for your Lordships might be whether they go far enough—whether, in short, we stick with my amendments or, as the opposition Front Benches maintain, twist by removing the whole clause.

The manuscript amendment shone a spotlight on subsections (5) to (7), which my amendments do not touch. With great respect to the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, it is not right that the effect of those subsections is that pre-commencement deprivation orders would, as she put it, not be subject to scrutiny. Their effect is rather that a pre-commencement deprivation would not be invalid purely because it was served to the file, in accordance with the Immigration Rules then in force.

Subsections (5) to (7) do not prevent a person who becomes aware of the deprivation—as the Minister just confirmed just now, they have only to ask—appealing it on any substantive ground. Indeed, the Minister also just confirmed, in providing the other undertaking that I sought, that the Home Office would not suggest that such appeals were out of time.

As to the suggestion that Clause 9 should be removed in its entirety, when I secured the agreement of the Government to my amendments, noble Lords will understand that it was not with a view to pocketing the gains and then asking for more. Therefore, I cannot in all conscience support that amendment myself, either as a tactical gambit or in the substance. I do, however, support my own amendments and I beg to move.

Amendment 14 agreed.

Clause 9: Notice of decision to deprive a person of citizenship