Lord Coaker:

Moved by Lord Coaker

158: Clause 61, page 64, line 4, at end insert—“(aa) the person was aged 18 or over at the time of the circumstances which gave rise to the first RG decision;”Member’s explanatory statementThis amendment seeks to preclude those exploited as children from being denied additional recovery periods if they are re-trafficked.

My Lords, before I start my remarks on this group of amendments, I want to say in answer to the question asked earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that the problem the Minister has—and he has it all the way through this part of the Bill—is that what the Government do not like saying is that the reason they are doing this is not really to do with modern slavery. They are trying to sort out what they see as an immigration mess and the problem they have with everybody moaning about immigration, asylum and so on, and this has ended up in a Bill it should not be in. That is the problem. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, asked why we were doing this. The answer is, “because we think the modern slavery system is being abused and lots of people who shouldn’t be applying to it are applying to it, and they’re immigration offenders and not victims of modern slavery”.

What this Committee is saying is that it should not be in this Bill. Victims of modern slavery are being conflated with immigration offenders, and it will lead to the undermining of the Modern Slavery Act and the principles on which it is based, and to potential victims not receiving the support and help they need. That is the motivation for the Government in doing this. I do not think that it is the motivation for this Minister, which is why it is sometimes particularly difficult for him to answer the specific questions asked by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, as a one-nation Conservative—I think that is a compliment to him. The noble Lord has been trying to say to him that it was that brand of conservatism which drove the Modern Slavery Act. Perhaps the current Government—I can say this not as a lifelong Conservative—could learn from that. But that is a matter for internal grief and beyond the scope of this Bill.

I want to draw the Committee’s attention to the titles of these clauses. I will say something on Clause 61, “No entitlement to additional recovery period etc”, but there is a particular difficulty with Clause 62, “Identified potential victims etc: disqualification from protection”, which goes to the heart of the problem. Essentially, it is another way for the Government to say that potential victims of slavery are abusing the system to get round it because they are really immigration offenders. The Government are saying, “The system is being abused and we are going to stop it, and this is the way we’re going to do it”. The problem is that they are going to undermine the Modern Slavery Act and the modern slavery system that they have put in place, of which they should be proud, and indeed of which people—including all of us—are proud. It is that contradiction that goes to the heart of Part 5 in every single utterance, whether it is made from the Government Front Bench, the Opposition Front Bench or others in this Chamber.

I point out that Clause 62 does not even say “potential victims”; it talks about “identified potential victims”. No wonder there is such disquiet, upset and anger about this clause, which I will come on to in a minute. There are very real problems with Clause 61, but particularly with Clause 62, hence the amendments that I and other noble Lords have tabled, and the clause stand part notice.

Again, I come back to this question on Clause 61: what problem are the Government actually trying to fix that requires primary legislation? Again and again that has been asked by noble Lords across the Chamber without the Government really being able to answer—apart the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, intimating the explanation I gave in his remarks on an earlier group.

The Explanatory Notes state that Clause 61 is there:

“In order to prevent the recovery period being misused by those wishing to extend their stay in the UK and to remove unnecessary support and barriers to removal”.

Again, that goes to the heart of it. The Government are seeking to change an immigration offence using a modern slavery context. It is a contradiction. It is not supposed to be like that. The whole point of the Modern Slavery Act was to take this out of the immigration context of the Home Office. That perennial battle between immigration and modern slavery is unresolved and requires parts of the Government to stand up and say, “You’re wrong and we’re not going to do that”.

What evidence is there of recovery periods being abused? That is of interest, I think, as evidence for the proposed change before us. What evidence is there of us providing “unnecessary support” to a person using the NRM? Re-trafficking has increasingly become part of the traffickers’ operating model, including where people return to their enslavers for fear of repercussions for their families, which we touched on earlier. How does Clause 61 respond to or break that model? Does not the refusal of a further recovery period simply strengthen the perpetrators? I think that is a real risk.

As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has asked on a number of occasions, will children be subject to the restrictions under Clause 61? Every single part of this Bill makes no distinction at all between adults and children. The Minister has experience of the legislative system, which, as a basis, divides children and adults on the grounds of good justice. Why is that not the case here? This is what Amendment 158 seeks to probe. Does the Minister have any figures for the number of children who go missing and are re-trafficked? Does he agree—again, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, also asked this—that a missing child at risk of exploitation is a safeguarding issue, not an immigration or enforcement issue?

On Clause 62, the key question is what action, if any, the Secretary of State intends to take on the comments made by the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, who has written a scathing article in the Times today—note the word “independent” in the commissioner’s title. The headline says:

“Fears about bill that would take support away from some modern slavery victims”.

She has concerns about the way Clause 62 will operate and the wide way in which certain phrases in it could be drawn. Is it the Government’s intention to ignore the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, including where she says that Clause 62 will empower and embolden people traffickers and criminal gangs? Why is something that the anti-slavery commissioner says is harmful included in the Bill? Can the Minister also give further detail on how Clause 62 will operate in relation to children who are victims of criminal exploitation?

The lead signatory of Amendment 169 is the noble Lord, Lord Randall, but he cannot be with us today and has sent his apologies. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, have also signed it. Amendment 169 suggests to the Government that, if they are going to have Clause 62, which many would say should not be part of the Bill, this is a way they could redraft it to try to address some concerns. I personally would not keep Clause 62 but, instead of just a vague reference to a “threat to public order”, whatever that means, the amendment’s proposed new subsection (2)(a) inserts the words

“is prevented from doing so as a result of an immediate, genuine, present and serious threat to public order”,

rather than a wider definition.

Similarly, under

“Identified potential victims etc: disqualification from protection”,

we have put the words:

“in exceptional circumstances … following an assessment of all the circumstances of the case.”

Then there is the importance of international co-operation and the fact that we have also not included children. These specific points seek to address some of the concerns that have been raised by many groups and other noble Lords.

My Amendment 164A is to probe a specific question: where a person is covered by Clause 62, is it the Government’s intention that that person will still be entitled to and receive a conclusive grounds decision, as they do at present, or do the Government consider that the duty to investigate trafficking and exploitation no longer applies?

The criticism of Clause 61 and particularly Clause 62 is that, in the Government’s efforts to deal with what they perceive is an immigration problem, they are undermining the protection that the Modern Slavery Act gives victims. That view is held by many noble Lords in this Committee, many Members in the other place and the various NGOs that seek to inform our debates. I beg to move.

My Lords, I must inform the Committee that, if Amendment 160A is agreed to, I will not be able to call Amendments 161 to 163, by reason of pre-emption.

My Lords, I want to speak to the JCHR amendments in this group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. Those were very strong words from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and I found them extremely persuasive, including his remarks on one-nation conservatism. I see the noble Lords, Lord Fowler and Lord Deben, in their place, and I commend the speech of Sir John Major today, which I have followed a little on Twitter.

Amendment 159 was inspired by the JCHR and seeks to remove the discretion around whether a person who has a positive reasonable grounds decision and a conclusive grounds decision pending could avoid removal. Instead of saying that the competent authority “may determine” that removal should not take place, if that is appropriate in the circumstances of the case, we suggest it “must”.

Clause 59 has already changed the Modern Slavery Act so that we are talking about people who “are” victims of slavery or human trafficking, not those who “may be”. Therefore, it is surely right that such victims, who have been given an additional positive reasonable grounds decision for new or more recent slavery or trafficking allegations, must not be removed.

Indeed, in paragraph 76 of their ECHR memorandum, the Government say

“where … the Secretary of State will be required to make a new conclusive grounds decision on the new referral … the person will be protected from removal in the meantime, ensuring compliance with Article 10(2)” of ECAT. However, Clause 61 does not accord with that, because it retains as a discretionary power the denial of protection from removal. That discretion should be removed from the Bill, in accordance with Amendment 179.

Amendment 162 amends Clause 62, which would deny protection assistance and support to and allow the removal of a victim who is a “threat to public order”. This could impede the UK’s ability to investigate and prosecute human trafficking and slavery perpetrators. The anti-slavery commissioner has expressed grave concerns at the wide net of that provision, the potential denial of the recovery and reflection period to a considerable number of victims and the consequence that prosecution witnesses may be unable to build rapport with law enforcement and provide evidence.

In her letter to the Home Secretary of last September, which my noble friend Lord Paddick quoted earlier, the anti-slavery commissioner quoted data from Hope for Justice, which said that

“of their current live caseload, 29% of individuals have committed offences that would meet the criteria for exemption under public order grounds. A further 13% have committed wider offences that may/may not meet the criteria for a public order exemption and 3% have a conviction but the details of this are unknown.”

Up to 45% of this organisation’s case load have or appear to have convictions. Excluding all those people is really being kind to criminal trafficking gangs. She gave a case study:

“In 2018 a Romanian trafficker was convicted … under the Modern Slavery Act … having trafficked at least 15 people from Romania … He received a seven year sentence and … a Slavery and Trafficking Prevention Order … Of the 15 potential victims identified, two provided statements to support the police investigation. One of these witnesses, whose evidence was significant in securing the conviction, had three previous convictions in Romania all of which attracted sentences in excess of 12 months”.

If the Government want to exclude from protection these victims, who might have criminal offences on their record, that means we will get fewer prosecutions and convictions of the perpetrators of trafficking and slavery.

The JCHR proposes that Clause 62 should be amended so that only a serious and ongoing threat to public order takes a victim out of protection. In fact, due to failings in the criminal justice system, victims are often forced to commit offences, such as on cannabis farms. In a recent Strasbourg court case, the UK was found to have failed in its duty to protect such victims. To be in line with its protective obligations under the ECHR and ECAT, the Government should accept at least amendment of Clause 62. Hence Amendment 168 provides that a person should not be considered a threat to public order if they were compelled to commit an offence, and Amendments 165 to 167 tighten up the provision in the Bill in other ways. The bottom line, as proposed by my noble friend Lord Paddick and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is that Clauses 61 and 62 are pernicious and should be removed.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to the article by the anti-slavery commissioner, Dame Sara Thornton, in the Times today. She mentions the Joint Committee on Human Rights and she concludes:

“Ministers have assured that decisions to remove support from victims will be made on a case-by-case basis suggesting infrequent use. But why frame legislation that appears to remove protection from such a wide cohort of individuals if that is not indeed the desire? There might be exceptional circumstances in which it is right to withhold support when there is a genuine, current and serious threat to public order, but the present bill goes far beyond this.”

She gives us a hint:

“Parliamentarians have the opportunity to address this—I hope that they take it.”

I hope we will take it in our vote on Report. That is a very powerful warning, I think, from the anti-slavery commissioner and I hope the Minister will tell me how seriously he takes it.

My Lords, I support all these amendments but I will speak to Amendment 169, to which I have put my name. I will deal with two other people apart from the anti-slavery commissioner who said that her gravest concern lies with Clause 62 above all the other clauses in this part of the Bill.

The United Nations rapporteur said:

“We are concerned that Clause 62(3) would be in violation of the State’s obligation to ensure non-punishment of victims of … forms of slavery for any unlawful acts … that are a direct consequence of trafficking.”

That, of course, is exactly what the Modern Slavery Act says in relation to people who commit offences if they are done in the course of being a trafficked person. So far as children are concerned, if they are under 18, they cannot be responsible for acts that they have done under the coercion of being a trafficking victim.

Perhaps of more significance to the Government is the issue of prosecution. Caroline Haughey QC, who advises the Government and regularly prosecutes traffickers—with great success I am glad to say—has described this Bill as catastrophic. She is a very successful QC. She is very measured and “catastrophic”, to my mind, is the most unusual word for a sensible prosecuting QC to use. She goes on to warn of the risks of losing witnesses for prosecutions because they have been guilty of offences themselves. We do not have enough prosecutions. It is an extremely serious matter that we do not have enough, and this clause is certain, if it is left in its original state, to reduce the number of prosecutions that Caroline Haughey and other QCs are trying to do in the criminal justice system.

I think again the Government ought to bear in mind why so many people who are victims have criminal records. It is perfectly obvious—they are much easier to identify and traffic, children as well as adults. They are the sort of people the traffickers go for because they know they are much less likely to come voluntarily to the public eye. They need protection against having been trafficked just as much as anybody who has a clear record. I implore the Government to think very carefully about this effect on prosecutions and the fact that criminals are very likely to be trafficked people.

I am delighted to follow the noble and learned Baroness. The Committee has benefited greatly from her insightful comments on the background. This is a particularly murky world about which we are talking. People are in an extremely vulnerable and unfortunate position, and they may well be preyed on and further exploited by the very people I applaud the Government for trying to target.

I will speak briefly to Amendments 160 and 163 in my name. Amendment 160 is the key amendment; again, it is a concern raised by the Law Society of Scotland, which is keen to ensure that these provisions be brought to account only in exceptional circumstances. The reasoning for this—which follows very well from the discussion we have heard in this debate—is that Clause 62 excludes from the national referral mechanism persons who have committed criminal offences as well as other offences relating to terrorism. It excludes those who have claimed to be victims of terrorism in bad faith. However, it appears to divide victims into the worthy and the unworthy. Surely the Government must explain their reasoning behind this. In my view, and that of the Law Society of Scotland, no one should be disqualified from being a victim of one crime because they have been a perpetrator of another—precisely for the reasons that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, gave us. Victims of trafficking could be criminalised for conduct relating to their trafficking. This is in breach of Article 26 of the Council of Europe trafficking convention. I cannot believe for a minute that this is the intention of the Minister or the Government in this regard.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred to a recent court case; I do not know if it is the same one to which I will refer. A violation of Article 4 of the ECHR was recently found against the United Kingdom, in this regard, by the European Court of Human Rights in VCL and AN v the United Kingdom. For those who would like to research this further, the reference is application numbers 77587/12 and 74603/12.

I conclude with a question to the Minister. Does he not share my concern that the clause, as it stands and without reference to exceptional circumstances, introduces a high risk of a double punishment for those victims who have received convictions? Moreover, disqualifying certain victims from protection increases the prospect that they will be further exploited by organised criminal groups as they will be unable to access protection from the state.

My Lords, I have added my name to those of noble Lords who oppose Clause 62 standing part of the Bill. I echo remarks made by noble colleagues.

As the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, just said, Clause 62 goes to an essential point of principle in the entire operation of how modern slavery protections ought to work. The proposal is that Clause 62 makes victimhood a conditional state. In fact, it sets up a division between worthy and unworthy victims, as the noble Baroness commented. This would be such a retrograde step. If we are serious about destroying the business model of modern slavery and identifying and prosecuting as many slavers as we can, we must find ways of incentivising and supporting all victims to come forwards. By excluding from support those who have acted in bad faith—a term for which I greatly welcome more clarity from the Minister on what it would mean—or those deemed a threat to public order, we are creating two categories of victim.

Over the road in the General Synod of the Church of England debate yesterday, there was a plea not to be naive. As was said, traffickers and modern slavers are not stupid. They know how to use criminal exploitation to trap people into criminal activity, to scare them into not approaching the police. We know this from work on the ground. When speaking to support charities and victims in my role as lead bishop on modern slavery, I have heard often that one of the most effective ways to keep victims in fear is to force them to commit crimes so that they will be criminalised if they come forward to the authorities.

Life for legislators—indeed, for everyone—would be much easier if there were nice, clear binaries: blameless victims and evil enslavers. The reality, as anyone who has worked on the ground with those trafficked through county lines and many other forms of criminal exploitation can attest, is that things are not that easy. People who have done bad things can and often do become victims of slavery. People who have become victims of slavery find themselves compelled to do bad things.

In opposing Clause 62, I am not suggesting that people should not be held responsible for their actions. They should, but as a society we have responsibilities too and one of those is to break the way in which modern slavers operate. Creating a two-tier system of victimhood will, I fear, strengthen it.

My Lords, my name is on Amendment 160A, which is from these Benches. I fear that we are rather in lipstick on pigs territory—a phrase used a good deal earlier in our deliberations on the Bill. Clause 62 refers a “threat to public order”, which is then explained as various terrorism offences. It says that the list is not exhaustive, and I recognise what the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, said about how non-exhaustive lists are dealt with in the courts and that the longer lists are, the more rigorously they are dealt with. Our amendment refers instead to a threat to national security.

My noble friend Lord Paddick also has his name on the Clause 62 stand part notice and mine is on Amendment 169. I do not want to take the time of the Committee by repeating what has been said, very clearly, about activity “attributable” to being a victim of slavery or trafficking.

In the previous group of amendments, the Minister referred to an ability to recollect. I think, from other things he has said, in a sympathetic manner, he would agree that very often there is also, among victims, an inability to express—it is not just the inability to recollect. It might be worth saying—I am not sure it has been said before—that there is even more difficulty than in disclosing that one has been a victim of forced labour in disclosing that one has been a victim of sexual exploitation.

I agree with others about words such as “worthy” and “unworthy”. I noted “deserving” and “undeserving” —here we are again—like “deserving” and “undeserving” refugees and asylum seekers; that distinction is replicated here.

My Lords, again, as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I shall speak very briefly. I should say how much I appreciate the contributions made by my noble friend Lord Coaker, by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, who is on the Joint Committee with me, and by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in her very powerful remarks.

Many years ago—if I may tell a little anecdote—I heard of a certain conversation that took place in the Home Office when an official was told by her boss to justify a certain position. The official said, “But that is indefensible”. Her boss said, “Yes, of course—defending the defensible is easy. You’re paid to defend the indefensible”. I say that as a word of comfort to the Minister, who is defending the indefensible. He knows it, we know it and the officials know it—and I suppose he has to do it, unless he does what the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, did and decides to distance himself from it.

I will say this very briefly. I find it hard to remember, and keep needing to remind myself, that we are talking about Part 5 of a Bill about modern slavery. Some of these issues are so remote from the rest of the Bill, as has already been said. The amendments to which I have put my name are concerned about a number of things. One is public safety and security. The amendments seek to get the right balance between public safety and security, which of course is important, and the rights of individuals who seek safety in this country. I contend that the Government, particularly in Clause 62, have got the balance quite wrong.

As the right reverend Prelate has already said, some of the people who are victims of traffickers or slavery are under threat; they are fearful, and the fact is that some of them at least will have been compelled to take up the position that they have taken up. We should respect that. These are frightened and anxious people, who are not secure and who do not know this country at all well. They may have been in this country for some time, or they may not have been, but they do not feel all that secure. We have to be sensitive to their situation, and I contend that what the Government are doing in this section, particularly in Clause 62, is to show insensitivity to some very vulnerable people—which is why I hope they will get rid of this provision, which does not make any sense at all.

My Lords, in opening from the Front Bench, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, made a number of points in relation to the position of the Government in relation to the one-nation Conservative tradition, if I may put it like that. I will preface my remarks to the Committee by saying that, just as with our then coalition partners the Conservatives were in the forefront of dealing with the issue of modern slavery, so we were, hundreds of years ago, in dealing with the issue of slavery, as it then stood. Where slavery exists, Conservatives will always be found in the forefront of any attempts to confront it.

In relation to Clause 61, there is currently no policy on whether, or in what circumstances, individuals should or should not receive additional recovery periods under the national referral mechanism. Clause 61 addresses this gap by introducing a power to withhold additional recovery periods where an individual has already benefited from a recovery period and the further reported exploitation happened prior to the previous referral into the national referral mechanism, unless appropriate circumstances are set forth. This is not an attempt to create two tiers, however it may be read; rather, it is an attempt to put into legislation appropriate controls against misuse, where that misuse takes place.

Amendment 158 seeks to remove this power if any of the incidents of exploitation occurred when the individual was under 18 years of age. I seek first to reassure the Committee that the provision may be applied only when the further positive reasonable grounds decision arises from things done wholly before the previous reasonable grounds decision was made. Therefore, this power does not apply in cases of re-trafficking.

From the Front Bench, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, like other noble Lords at an earlier stage, raised the question of why these provisions appear on the face of an immigration Bill. It is because there are overlaps between immigration and modern slavery, which the Bill recognises and seeks to address, but it also goes further in providing clarification on people’s entitlement.

As I said in relation to the previous grouping, and as I am sure we will all have occasion to say again, the complex nature of exploitation, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, identified in his opening speech and at other times in this debate, and the potential resulting safeguarding needs, particularly for children, are recognised by the Government. This clause is designed to allow for discretion in how decision-makers apply the disqualification, ensuring that the welfare of children will be taken into account. This discretion is an important part of our needs-based approach to the provision of support, and in the circumstances there is no need for the carve-out that the amendment proposes.

Moving on to Amendment 159, while we understand the intention behind this amendment, the existing discretionary element strikes the right balance between allowing decision-makers flexibility to grant additional recovery periods and preventing the misuse of the NRM protections to which I referred. Decision-makers will be able to consider the vulnerabilities and circumstances of the individual.

Turning to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in relation to Clause 62, as noble Lords have outlined, ECAT envisages that recovery periods should be withheld on grounds of public order and improper claims. However, ECAT does not include a definition of “public order” and, to date, that omission has hindered our ability to disqualify suitable individuals in practice. The question was posed of whether the provision as it stands might impede operational decisions in relation to prosecution, but I submit that these decisions would be taken at all times in relation to that developing understanding of the pressures and difficulties. I fully appreciate that I am understating those things by using those expressions. Those pressures and difficulties are upon persons who are victims of modern slavery or human trafficking.

I am grateful to the Minister. In Clause 62, the phrase “bad faith” seems extraordinarily ambiguous. Can he clarify that? What jurisprudence does this phrase come from and on what basis will it be interpreted in the courts?

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that intervention. I was proposing to deal later with the expression “bad faith” and its source, but, to help him at this stage, it is not drawn from any comparable legislation, nor from the authority of the courts. We do not hark back to that. Rather, the nature of the problems that must be confronted in relation to this is sufficiently protean and diverse that a need was identified to arrive at a broad expression in the Bill, and “bad faith” was the language selected after consideration among Ministers and officials to represent that.

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but I now realise that he has now moved on from Clause 61 and is talking about Clause 62. I was wondering whether he was going to answer my point about incompatibility with the ECHR memorandum. That says that

“where the person’s previous conclusive grounds decision was negative, the Secretary of State will be required to make a new conclusive grounds decision on the new referral, and the person will be protected from removal in the meantime, ensuring compliance with Article 10(2) of ECAT.”

However, you are not protecting them from removal in the meantime under Article 61, as far as I can see, so how is the Bill compatible with the ECHR memorandum?

If the noble Baroness will bear with me, I will seek to get an answer to that question that I can deliver in the course of the debate—doubtless the Committee will remind me if I have not reverted to the noble Baroness by the time I sit down.

Amendments 160 and 162 do not define “exceptional circumstances” or “serious and ongoing” threat in relation to withholding protection from removal. As such, our view is that they would risk undermining the clarity which this clause seeks to provide and would make the power very difficult to use, meaning that potentially dangerous individuals would continue to receive the generous protections afforded by the NRM.

On Amendment 160A, Clause 62 specifies that disqualification applies when in the interests of national security, but it is right that the Government should also be able to withhold protections from individuals who pose a threat to public order more broadly, including where they have been convicted of serious criminal offences or have made a claim in bad faith, to use the expression that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, referred me to. I say that “bad faith” is appropriate in these circumstances because it is so broad and because it comprises so many aspects.

I want to intervene briefly on the “good faith” and “bad faith” point, in case it is of assistance to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and others. Concepts such as “good faith” and bad faith” are commonly used in civil and commercial matters; we understand that. In contracting matters, it is incumbent on parties to act in good faith, subject to the deal they have done with each other. Why I think the Committee is so concerned about what the Minister called the protean nature of the phrase here is that this is human rights protection, and we cannot afford to be protean or vague in the same way that we can when we are talking about how we enter into a contract. This is life and death.

The point I was seeking to make by that expression is, I think, the same one that my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar made earlier, when he spoke about this—it is as familiar to the noble Baroness as a practising barrister as it is to me, and I think it was referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. If we have a list that sets out heads A to E, and then counsel attempts to rely on point F which is not otherwise comprehended, or not specifically enumerated but which may be comprehended within the expression “or any other circumstance”, that always—as my noble friend Lord Wolfson said—places counsel at a disadvantage.

On the threats, or potential threats, and the potential scope for abuse which lie within the power of a person seeking to exploit and make a false application under these circumstances, what we are seeking to do is to identify a phrase or term which is sufficiently wide to encompass all those potential points. Noble Lords in the Committee have identified, under reference to the traffickers and criminals whom it is the intention of the entire Committee to thwart, their cunning, resilience and resourcefulness in finding ways to slip between the cracks of aspects of legislation.

Amendment 169 does not provide a definition of “public order”. I reassure the Committee that we adhere to relevant provisions in our international obligations but it is unnecessary to specify that in legislation, and we are satisfied that the current definition of public order complies with ECAT.

My noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering proposes that we replace the “bad faith” provision with one of “improper claims”. That proposal can be addressed in conjunction with Amendment 163, which seeks to remove the bad faith provision entirely. Another reason for the expression “bad faith”, and its breadth, is to avoid inadvertently excluding administrative mistakes made when submitting claims, which may be interpreted as falling under “improper claims”. We believe that “bad faith” is the appropriate language.

In answer to submissions made by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, under Amendments 169, 161 and 164, which seek to exclude children from this clause, ECAT does not specify an age limit. We deem it important that the United Kingdom maintains the full scope while ensuring that all decisions to withhold the protections of the NRM are balanced against our priority to safeguard children. The proposal set out in these amendments would create, in effect, a two-tiered system that could encourage those looking to misuse the NRM protections to provide falsified information regarding their age. We all sat late enough the other night in relation to the age amendment provisions elsewhere in the Bill for me not to wish to go into that area again, but we are concerned lest the proposals in the amendment provide an opportunity for persons to provide falsified information.

In relation to Amendment 168, the Government are aware that potential and confirmed victims of modern slavery may already have been convicted of serious offences or be involved in terrorism-related activity. I make it clear that neither the additional recovery period nor the public order disqualifications can be taken as being a blanket disqualification. Any decisions relating to disqualifications will be taken on an individual basis, taking into account the individual’s circumstances and vulnerabilities. This includes consideration as to the nature of any criminal exploitation that may have been made of them and the need to safeguard individuals. We think it is right that further details of how to apply this discretionary element should be set out in guidance for decision-makers rather than being placed in the Bill. That will give the Government the flexibility to meet the needs of victims and respond to changing patterns of criminal activity that may seek opportunities to misuse the NRM.

We do not consider that Clause 62 will present a barrier to people who have had convictions and prevent them coming forward, because of that discretionary approach and because there will not be a blanket disqualification on the basis of public order. All of us—the whole Committee, I am sure—want victims of modern slavery to continue to come forward for identification and support, irrespective of their personal circumstances or the circumstances in which they came to be exploited. However, we maintain that it is right that the Government can remove individuals who pose a threat to public order from the protections and support that the NRM affords.

Together with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, was concerned lest such victims did not come forward if they had criminal convictions. First responders should still always refer victims into the national referral mechanism, in line with modern slavery statutory guidance, even where the individual has had a previous recovery period or has a criminal conviction. Decision-makers trained in the field will then carefully consider each individual case and take into account specific vulnerabilities and the needs of each individual, again on a case-by-case basis.

The recovery period may be withheld following a reasonable grounds decision, and the rights that flow from a conclusive grounds decision may also be withheld at that stage if relevant disqualifications apply. I emphasise that we will carefully consider each individual case to ensure that people who genuinely need protection and support will receive it. I reiterate that it is right that we should be able to withhold rights from individuals where appropriate—for example, from those who pose a national security risk to the United Kingdom.

I return to the matter raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, in relation to compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. The protections of the NRM will be withheld in accordance with Clause 61 only when so to do would be compliant with our international obligations—

I am glad to hear that the Government want to comply with our international obligations—some of us feel that that is not entirely evident from the Bill—but I was asking about compatibility with the European convention against trafficking. Clause 61 allows “a competent authority” to remove someone even when a conclusive grounds decision is pending. I am sorry to repeat myself, but the European Convention on Human Rights memorandum, produced presumably by the Home Office for the Bill, says at paragraph 76.d:

“the Secretary of State will be required to make a new conclusive grounds decision on the new referral, and the person will be protected from removal in the meantime, ensuring compliance with Article 10(2)”.

That is not what Clause 61 does; it allows the Government to remove the person. They are not “protected from removal” pending a new conclusive grounds decision, so the ECHR memorandum and the Bill are in direct contradiction. Can the Minister take further advice and answer that point? If he cannot do so today, I am sure that he will be able to write to me. I am pretty sure that this was identified by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is why we wanted to change “must” determine the person’s removal to “may”, so that there is wiggle room that might be in compliance with ECAT. On the face of it, I cannot see that this provision is compliant, notwithstanding the assertion in the memorandum that it is.

The noble Baroness graciously affords me the possibility of replying perhaps in more detail and later. Unless I have further information to provide to her, I propose to take that course. I am obliged to her for her consideration.

In relation to how to assess whether a person is involved in terrorism-related activity or is otherwise a national security concern, the Government have extensive experience of assessing these things, together with our operational partners, and using these assessments to inform executive decision-making.

Whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity is a crucial part of consideration for public order disqualification. Amendment 165 would weaken the United Kingdom’s ability to withhold protections from people of terrorism concern, and we therefore consider that it would increase the risk to the national security of the UK.

Regarding Amendment 166, NRM referrals for foreign national offenders and foreign nationals held on remand are rising, with an average of 85 per month for the first five months of 2021, compared to 19 per month in 2018. It is right that foreign nationals who have been convicted of the serious offences referred to in Section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007 should be included within scope for consideration of the public order disqualification. This ensures that we will have a clear definition provided for in legislation to support decisions.

Finally, referring to Amendment 164A, I reassure the Committee that the Government are committed to identifying possible victims promptly and providing needs-based support that we hope will aid their recovery. This clause is in line with ECAT, and as such we consider that the requirement to make a conclusive grounds decision can fall away in the event of disqualification on grounds of public order or improper claims.

We will set out the detail of matters in guidance, but again I assure the Committee that trained decision-makers will consider carefully the full circumstances of each individual case, consulting with relevant stakeholders and considering all the relevant information, including weighing national security considerations against whether any potential interference with protected rights is proportionate.

I omitted to recognise the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol’s contribution to the matter of “bad faith”. I hope that she will forgive that omission.

I hope, for the reasons outlined, that noble Lords will be content not to press their amendments at this stage.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his typically courteous and thoughtful reply, and the way in which he attempted to answer every question put to him by noble Lords across the Chamber. We are very grateful and that was well received by everyone. I believe, however, that there is a very real problem at the heart of the Bill, with respect to Clause 61 and particularly Clause 62, notwithstanding his reassuring words.

It remains on the face of the Bill that an identified potential victim can be disqualified from the section if they are a threat to public order, or they have given information in bad faith. As noble Lords have said, there is no real clarification, notwithstanding the Minister’s response, on what a threat to public order means. We can see from what has been said, by many of the organisations that made representations, including lawyers and the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner, that a threat to public order can include very minor offences. The Minister says, “Don’t worry, the decision-makers understand that Clause 62 does not apply if they are minor offences”, but that really is not good enough. It should be on the face of the Bill; it should be clearer, in primary legislation, what a “threat to public order” means—and indeed “acting in bad faith”. What on earth does “acting in bad faith” mean? That is usually something people use when they cannot think of anything else—“That’ll do, that will be something we can say because it encompasses everything.” It is not good enough, in primary legislation, to legislate in that way.

The purpose of the amendments that have been tabled, and the debate that has been had in Committee, will cause the Government to have to think again and, at the very least, be clearer in what they actually mean with respect to where they are going to disqualify somebody from protection when they are an unidentified potential victim.

The last point I will very quickly make is that there is real issue with respect to children. Both this Minister and the Minister who responded to the earlier groups say again, “Don’t worry, there is nothing to worry about. We understand the particular needs of children”. I say again that in virtually every area of government a distinction is made between adults and children, for obvious reasons. It beggars belief that it is not done anywhere in this Bill. We will come back to this at Report, but I thank the Minister for his reply and, with the leave of the Committee, withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 158 withdrawn.

Amendment 159 not moved.

Clause 61 agreed.

Clause 62: Identified potential victims etc: disqualification from protection

Amendments 160 to 169 not moved.

Clause 62 agreed.

Clause 63: Identified potential victims etc in England and Wales: assistance and support