Once again, I thank my noble friend Lady Noakes for her thoughtful and constructive contributions throughout the progress of the Bill so far. However, she will be disappointed to know, I am sure, that on the substance of her Amendment 20, I am not convinced that adding a legislative requirement for the Secretary of State to approve how these supplementary powers are exercised would be beneficial to ARIA’s effective function or enhance its accountability measures that are already in place.

On ARIA’s ability to borrow money, I recognise that this has been consistently raised throughout the passage of the Bill by my noble friend. I thank her for her previous probing amendments on this matter, which prompted an important conversation on the balance between ARIA’s activities and the appropriate government oversight. As I outlined in correspondence with my noble friend, any borrowing would be contingent on ARIA complying with the rules of Managing Public Money and subject to approval by Her Majesty’s Treasury.

ARIA’s allocation and delegation letters, which the CEO of ARIA will be duty-bound to adhere to, will confirm that ARIA will be subject to, and comply with, all Managing Public Money rules that relate to borrowing. Managing Public Money sets robust conditions on borrowing, and states:

“Public sector organisations may borrow from private sector sources only if the transaction delivers better value for money for the Exchequer as a whole.”

Ensuring that ARIA’s expenditure is made in accordance with Managing Public Money guidance, except for in certain agreed circumstances, will be a condition of the budget ARIA receives from BEIS in its allocation and delegation letters from the BEIS permanent Secretary to ARIA’s CEO.

There is an expectation of a level of faith between the Government and their arm’s-length bodies. This understanding of trust, and all of ARIA’s freedoms and powers, will be balanced with a number of core accountability principles. The CEO will be ARIA’s delegated accounting officer and will be personally accountable to Parliament for the stewardship of ARIA’s resources, decision-making and financial management. This includes the Public Accounts Select Committee, which will, I am sure, take an interest in such matters. The BEIS Permanent Secretary, as principal accounting officer, will retain an important oversight role, and has the power to make arrangements to ensure they are satisfied that ARIA’s systems are adequate and its finances soundly managed. The Permanent Secretary may intervene if ARIA is significantly off track, and in the unlikely scenario that serious concerns are raised, or there is financial mismanagement, the CEO’s delegated accounting officer authority can be revoked. I hope my noble friend is reassured that the mechanisms here are well established and robust and that they will be enforced.

Moving on to ARIA’s ability to form partnerships, I believe that adding a Secretary of State approval to ARIA’s activities in this area would significantly hinder its effective operations. In designing ARIA, we have put emphasis on the agency operating with significant autonomy from government, and with freedom from standard bureaucracy. Forming partnerships, such as providing grant funding to a project with a university or a business, will be an essential part of ARIA’s daily operations. We expect the agency to contract with, commission and collaborate with a range of different actors for each of its research projects—indeed, that will be one of its core functions.

We have designed this agency to be led and run by experts with technological vision. It is vital that these individuals are free from arduous processes so that they can act quickly, decisively, with autonomy and with clear authority. We should trust ARIA to have discretion over how it forms those partnerships, and I believe that requiring it to engage in a central government approval process for each partnership sits squarely contrary to its aims and purpose.

Moving to ARIA’s ability to form companies and to form and participate in joint ventures, my department is currently in negotiations with Her Majesty’s Treasury about the exact clearance processes ARIA will undertake for each of these transactions. The detail will be set out in ARIA’s allocation and delegation letters, the conditions of which the CEO, as accounting officer, will be duty-bound to comply with. However, I assure my noble friend that all iterations of this delegation letter will include sufficient assurances that ARIA’s internal assessment processes and capability are sufficiently robust. Given that these arrangements may need to evolve in the future, it would not be appropriate for this to be mandated at this stage in the Bill.

On ARIA’s ability to accept gifts, there are already stringent conditions on this in Her Majesty’s Treasury’s Managing Public Money that ARIA would need to comply with. ARIA would consult BEIS about gifts, and HMT’s approval is explicitly required for any gift over £300,000. Gifts made would be recorded in ARIA’s accounts and gifts received would be recorded in a register. These rules will also be confirmed in ARIA’s allocations and delegations letter from the BEIS Permanent Secretary.

ARIA’s power to acquire and sell land would be exercised only in compliance with the Managing Public Money guidance, which sets controls on the below-market sale of land, will compel ARIA to take professional advice when disposing of land and property assets, and will mandate ARIA to include land in its asset register.

Furthermore, introducing a blanket statutory requirement for Secretary of State approval would leave ARIA with less freedom than comparable arm’s-length bodies such as UKRI, which is able to exercise supplementary powers related to accepting gifts and the buying and selling of land without a legislated approval from the Secretary of State.

I appreciate that my noble friend has significant expertise and interest in the areas of financial management and propriety, and we welcome that. However, adding a statutory requirement here would not add value or challenge beyond what is already well established and enforced through Managing Public Money. Furthermore, as I have set out, adding the requirement to the forming of partnerships would, I believe, be genuinely detrimental to ARIA’s agile, autonomous operations, which I know my noble friend is keen not to prejudice.

Before I conclude on this final group of amendments, I once again thank all noble Lords who have taken an interest in this Bill for their excellent and constructive contributions throughout our scrutiny. ARIA provides us with enormous opportunities. I have been delighted to take the Bill through this House and engage with colleagues on all sides, who have focused on the task of providing appropriate scrutiny with enthusiasm, ability and great skill.