Baroness Massey of Darwen:

Moved by Baroness Massey of Darwen

4: Clause 3, page 2, line 23, leave out paragraph (a)Member’s explanatory statementThis Amendment and the other amendments to Clause 3 in the name of Baroness Massey would delete the requirement to give “particular weight” in any prosecution decision after 5 years to a person having an impaired ability to exercise self-control or to exercise sound judgement whilst being deployed on operations overseas.

My Lords, again I am speaking as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the amendments are again based on the views of expert witnesses who contributed to its report. I shall speak to Amendments 4, 7 and 8. They relate to Clause 3 and would delete the requirement to give “particular weight” in any prosecution decision after five years to a person having an impaired ability to exercise self-control or to exercise sound judgment while being deployed on operations overseas. The amendments would omit Clause 3(2)(a), (3) and (4). Their concern is similar to concerns in Clause 11 in relation to limitations on bringing proceedings under the Human Rights Act.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights report on the Bill explains in chapter 3 that:

“In domestic law the prosecution would take into account a person’s mental health as part of the decision as to whether a prosecution is in the public interest—and this is a factor that would currently already apply to prosecutions of members of the Armed Forces. Moreover, a person who is not fit to plead at the time of trial would not be assessed for the … mental element … of an offence. A defendant could raise a plea of insanity as a defence if at the time of the offence their mental condition was so impaired that they were unable to understand the act they were doing or that it was wrong.”

Paragraph 77 of the report states:

“The MoD should not be sending Armed Forces personnel on deployment who are unable to make ‘sound judgements’, who cannot ‘exercise self-control’ or whose mental health is so severely affected that the MoD does not consider that they should be responsible for their criminal actions. Moreover, if a member of the Armed Forces becomes unable to make ‘sound judgements’, can no longer ‘exercise self-control’ or where there are significant concerns about their mental health, then there should be adequate systems in place to relieve that person of their operational duties, remove them from the conflict situation (where appropriate) and give them the support that they need.”

The Joint Committee on Human Rights expressed concern at paragraph 76 that,

“the Bill does not provide any incentives for the military hierarchy to ensure that members of the Armed Forces who are mentally unfit to be deployed get removed from operational duties and given the support that they need. Instead it includes an impediment to prosecuting a person whose judgement may be impaired, who lacks adequate self-control or whose mental health may have been affected”.

Service personnel are trained to deal with complex situations, and there are undoubtedly high-stress situations in combat. Due account must be taken of these complexities as part of any decision on whether to bring a prosecution. However, it should not be part of a statutory barrier to bringing prosecutions when they are in the public interest.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights does not consider that there is any solid basis for including additional requirements that could risk granting de facto impunity to those who have committed crimes on the grounds that the perpetrator lacked sound judgment or could not exercise self-control beyond the threshold already established in criminal law. For that reason, the committee recommends deleting Clause 3(2)(a), (3) and (4). I beg to move.

My Lords, the question is when this condition intervenes. It would be one thing to send a person over to a foreign assignment with that condition at that time, but there must be a risk that the impetus of foreign work in certain conditions would bring about these conditions in the person in question. There is therefore a real question as to whether or not the matter of the investigation discloses that the person in question became subject to that condition as a result of his being in the operation abroad. It does not necessarily mean that a person is sent into the work with that kind of condition. I would have thought that that distinction was quite important since the idea of the Clause seems to be that they look to see whether or not the conditions under which the military man or woman has been working have produced these results, so far as their mental health is concerned.

My Lords, in principle I am quite concerned about overprescribing matters to be taken into account, because I would want all prosecutors in relation to all suspects to have a very broad discretion to take into account all sorts of adverse factors in fairness to a potential accused. None the less the Minister, who is the most gifted and reasonable advocate, says that part of the purpose of the Bill is reassurance—presumably even if that is a psychological comfort rather than an actual legal one, because I am sure that all relevant factors are currently available.

The Minister also talks about balance and equilibrium. In that spirit I am concerned, given that it is said that prosecution after five years is now going to be wholly exceptional, that no factors are listed in the Bill that militate towards that exceptional prosecution. Why not? Surely that would be the balanced thing to do in the spirit of equilibrium. Why is there no mention here of issues such as covert operations, witnesses and indeed victims of war crimes potentially having been incarcerated, or the crime being particularly undetectable because of collusion by people within an operational cohort or even at a higher level? It seems strange as a matter of good law to have put in the factors that militate against prosecution, which we are told is to be exceptional, as two parts of the triple lock, but to have given no guidance at all as to the exceptional circumstances. With that in mind, I can only agree with the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is such an important committee for both Houses in performing their role in relation to human rights, and with the remarks of my noble friend Lady Massey.

I am pleased to follow the noble Baroness. I am grateful to her for, dare I say, reaching out during the last group of amendments and attempting to reach some common ground. I think we are seeking to achieve similar things, albeit coming from very different perspectives, since I was a practitioner, as it were, in the past. I looked very carefully at the Amendment and, for fear of being damned with faint praise by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, there are aspects that I absolutely understand.

As ever, though, the problem has just been hit on the head by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay, and that is the application. It is one thing to say that people who are suffering should not be put into a war zone, and that is absolutely right. However, the application matters when you are already in a war zone—a distant FOB—and within a small group with no ability to blow a whistle and stop the war in order to be withdrawn from the situation, along with the gradual deterioration of the condition over a period of time. This will not necessarily be seen by those around you because they are suffering similar things. It is not quite as easy to put into practical application during operations, which is why we need to be careful.

When I was training to become a bomb disposal officer, I knew absolutely what I was letting myself in for. Having served on operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, most recently in Afghanistan while I was a Member of Parliament, it is not always possible to see these deteriorations. It is important to realise that a medical or psychiatric condition may or may not be recognised at the time. Prosecutors are already required to have regard to any significant mental or physical ill-health or disability as in some circumstances this may mean that it is less likely that a prosecution is required. Clause 3 simply seeks to ensure that such considerations are put on to a statutory footing within the unique context of an overseas operation.

I recognise that I come at this from a different angle and I can see the precise way in which noble and noble and learned Lords are looking at the Bill, but I will go back to the comments I made earlier. This is also about sending a message. By putting this on to a statutory footing in the Bill, it will send a clear message to members of our Armed Forces that the Government and Parliament understand that we are asking them to do extraordinary things in extraordinary circumstances. This would be a recognition of that.

My Lords, I also speak as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights which produced the report on this Bill, and it is what is in that report which will influence the brief comments that I shall make. I support what my noble friend Lady Massey has said.

I accept fully that it is most unlikely that the Armed Forces would send someone abroad who was not capable of making sound judgments. The issue, as evidenced by the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, just now and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, is whether people in a war zone, in very difficult and dangerous circumstances, might develop a condition where their judgment was not as sound as when they were sent there. However, my understanding is that soundness of judgment is something that underlies all prosecutorial decisions in the criminal law of this country anyway, so I am not clear as to why we should treat soldiers differently from the way that the law normally works.

I can do no better than to quote from paragraph 79 of the JCHR report:

“The mental health of a defendant is already borne in mind as part of the prosecutorial decision as to whether it is in the public interest to bring a prosecution. We do not consider that there is any solid basis for including an additional requirement that could risk granting de facto impunity to those who have committed crimes on the grounds that the perpetrator lacked sound judgement, or could not exercise self-control, beyond the threshold already established in criminal law. For this reason, we would recommend deleting Clause 3(2)(a), 3(3) and 3(4).”

The key words in this are

“beyond the threshold already established in criminal law.”

If we believe that the threshold in our criminal law is adequate, we do not need this extra provision. That is the basis on which I will support what my noble friend Lady Massey said at the beginning of this debate.

The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, has withdrawn, so I call the next Speaker.

My Lords, we stand foursquare behind our troops and we want to work with the Government to build the broadest consensus possible on the Bill—tailored to supporting our Armed Forces members and safeguarding human rights. The amendments in this group aim to probe an understanding of what particular weight a prosecutor must give when considering a prosecutorial decision related to alleged conduct during overseas operations. As we have heard, Amendment 4 would remove the requirement on a prosecutor to consider the adverse effect on the person of the conditions they were exposed to. Amendment 7 would remove the requirement on the prosecutor to consider any exceptional demands and stresses, while Amendment 8 would remove the definition of any adverse effects, including making sound judgments or considering mental health.

The amendments are based on concerns raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights which stated:

“We do not consider that there is any solid basis for including additional requirements that could risk granting de facto impunity.”

If mental health is already considered by prosecutors, as indicated by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, why do the Government believe it necessary to include it in this Bill? As the Minister will see, these requirements have not been considered by prosecutors before. Also, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer asked in the previous group, why have the Government not included a requirement for prosecutors to give weight to the quality and duration of relevant investigations? The Armed Forces Judge Advocate, General Jeff Blackett, has said:

“Clause 3 is engaged after five years. It seems bizarre to me that in deciding whether to prosecute, you have a post-five-year test, but not a pre-five-year test.”

Why have the Government drafted Clause 3 in this way? What independent legal advice was given in relation to the drafting of the clause? Vexatious claims are a serious problem, but we fear that the focus on a presumption against prosecution misses the point: it is the current cycle of investigations. We can see that from how the Government have failed to give particular weight to the quality and duration of the investigations in this clause.

My Lords, once again, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, and all other contributors to the debate for a fertile discussion. At the risk of sounding repetitive, I shall probably repeat some of the themes to which I have already referred.

In relation to these amendments, I would comment that we ask a huge amount of our service personnel. We send them to undertake high-threat, high-risk operations in defence of our country and its people. They do their duty in the clear knowledge that they may be injured, maimed or even killed. That is the unique nature of their job and is what sets them apart from the rest of us. The Government believe therefore that it is absolutely right and reasonable to require that in return we ensure that a prosecutor, when coming to a decision to prosecute, must give particular weight to the unique circumstances of overseas operations and the adverse impact that these may have on a service person’s capacity to make sound judgments and on their mental health at the time of an alleged offence. This will be in addition to considering the existing evidential sufficiency and public interest test.

Let me make it clear that this is intended not to excuse bad behaviour by service personnel but to ensure that prosecutors give full recognition to the significant difference in the circumstances surrounding an alleged offence committed on operations overseas as compared, for example, with situations where the alleged criminal conduct occurs in a domestic, civilian setting.

Although differing views to the attitude of the Government have perhaps been expressed in the debate, as far as I could ascertain, contributors acknowledged that the conditions referred to in the Bill could indeed be personal impairments that might attach to Armed Forces personnel in the course of their operations overseas. That is why the prosecutor must consider the presumption against prosecution in Clause 2 and determine whether the case meets the exceptional threshold. The prosecutor must also, as required by Clause 3, give particular weight to matters that may effectively tip the balance in favour of not prosecuting.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, asked: what is exceptional? First, we have to look at the environment of overseas operations, which creates a unique background for our Armed Forces. That is the raison d’être for the Bill and the exceptionality is then to be determined by the prosecutor. That is why I suggested earlier that Clauses 1 to 7 are interwoven in the Bill. If you remove one of them, you weaken the rest. I suggest that Clause 3 reflects the filters that are to be applied—the final filter being the consent of the Attorney-General.

There has been a lot of discussion during the passage of the Bill about concerns over the impact on our personnel of repeated scrutiny and the mental burden placed on them by the threat of criminal prosecution occurring long after the events in question, in particular where there is no compelling new evidence to be considered. Significantly, as we saw in the responses to our public consultation in 2019, many service personnel were concerned about the ability of prosecutors and others in the justice system to understand the operational context in which an alleged offence occurred, and to adequately reflect that in determining the public interest. My noble friend Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton described poignantly the sort of environment in which we expect our Armed Forces personnel to operate.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, that we fully accept that prosecutors may already take these matters into account, including mental health considerations. However, making them a statutory requirement by putting them into the Bill provides greater certainty and reassurance for our service personnel that the unique context of overseas operations will be given particular and appropriate weight in the prosecutor’s deliberations.

I have also noted the suggestion by some that Clause 3 will grant de facto impunity to individuals who have been accused of committing criminal offences. I wish to repeat that the application of Clause 3, alongside all the other considerations, still leaves the prosecutor with discretion to determine that a case should be prosecuted, even when there is no compelling new evidence. My concern is that these amendments would effectively remove one of the matters to be given particular weight and undermine that reassurance to our service personnel that the operational context and the adverse effect that it can have on them will be taken into account by the prosecutor. That would be an unfortunate message for this Committee to send and, in those circumstances, I urge the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, to withdraw her Amendment.

I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the mover, the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen.

My Lords, again I thank the Minister for her concern and detailed response. Many wise comments and questions have been made. I appreciate what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, is saying about lack of sound judgment developing under stress in adverse conditions in conflict situations. The point that I wanted to make was that I agreed that that would happen, but part of what I was saying was that people needed support to come to terms with that, which could take a very long time.

My noble friends Lord Dubs and Lord Tunnicliffe gave a response. The question that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti asked on why Clause 3 has been drafted in this way is important. In response to the Minister’s final comments, I should like to read what she said. It is difficult to be persuaded that prosecutors would find it difficult to understand the condition and environment in which service personnel are working. It is fairly obvious to most people that those circumstances are difficult. However, I should like to read what she said, and read the full debate, and discuss with colleagues what action we want to take next. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment 4 withdrawn.

Amendments 5 to 8 not moved.

Clause 3 agreed.

Clause 4 agreed.

Clause 5: Requirement of consent to prosecute

Amendment 9 not moved.

We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 10. Anyone wishing to press this or anything else in this group to a Division must make that clear in debate.