Lord Carlile of Berriew:

Moved by Lord Carlile of Berriew

2: Clause 27, leave out Clause 27 and insert the following new Clause—“Continued imprisonment of terrorist prisoners during the extension period of an extended sentence of imprisonment(1) The Criminal Justice Act 2003 is amended as follows.(2) In section 247A(7) (restricted eligibility for release on licence of terrorist prisoners), at the beginning insert “Subject to section 247B,”.(3) After section 247A insert—247B Continued imprisonment of terrorist prisoners during extension period of an extended sentence of imprisonment(1) This section applies to a terrorist prisoner within the meaning of section 247A, where— (a) an extended sentence of imprisonment was imposed on the prisoner under section 226A or 226B, or under section 254, 266, 268A, 279 or 282A of the Sentencing Code, and(b) the prisoner is in custody, in accordance with section 247A, immediately before the expiry of the appropriate custodial term.(2) The prisoner must only be released under section 247A(7) in accordance with the provisions of this section.(3) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to refer the case of the prisoner to the Board—(a) as soon as the prisoner has served the appropriate custodial term, and(b) if the prisoner is still in custody, every year, before the anniversary of the conclusion of the appropriate custodial term.(4) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to release the prisoner on licence as soon as the Board has directed the release of the prisoner under this section.(5) The Board must not give a direction under subsection (4) unless—(a) the Secretary of State has referred the prisoner’s case to the Board, and(b) the Board is satisfied that—(i) the prisoner does not represent a grave risk to the public, and(ii) it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined.(6) Where the Secretary of State has not released the prisoner in accordance with subsection (4) by the conclusion of the extension period, it is the duty of the Secretary of State to release the prisoner immediately upon the conclusion of the extension period.(7) For the purposes of this section—“appropriate custodial term” has the same meaning as in section 247A,“extension period”, in relation to a sentence imposed under section 226A or 226B, or under section 254, 266, 268A, 279 or 282A of the Sentencing Code, means the period determined as such by the court under that provision.(8) Nothing in this section affects the duty of the Secretary of State to release a person whose release has been directed by the Board before this section comes into force.””

My Lords, I should like at the outset to acknowledge the assistance that I have received from the Bingham Centre in preparing the Amendment and the courtesy of Ministers in this House and their staff in discussing it. I will briefly give my reasons for the amendment.

First, I am clear in my belief, which is shared by many others, that some men and women imprisoned for terrorist offences—I repeat, some—represent a threat to public safety and national security beyond the length of their sentences, and that the consequences of that risk may be the death of innocent citizens. Some examples of such people can easily be identified and are well known, but it is clear that others who present such a risk are much more difficult to identify.

It is to be noted that the recidivism rate for terrorist offences is extremely low compared with that for most other offences—under 3%, on the most recent figure that I have seen—and that a fraction of the recidivism rate therefore applies to terrorist offences. Their recidivism rate is a fraction of that for other offences, including serious offences such as armed robbery. So far, at least, projects in prisons to achieve deradicalisation or even recognition of the wrongness of the acts taken as radicals have been difficult to assess. It is extremely difficult to know whether prisoners are deradicalised and such efforts to assess prisoners have suffered significant failures. The room for erroneous judgments is high. I shall give only one of several examples, that of Usman Khan, the Fishmongers’ Hall terrorist.

As part of the effort to identify whether prisoners remain a serious risk to the public, I support the use of polygraphs but only as one instrument of assessment—one component only in such determinations. It has been proved in other areas—for example, in relation to sexual offences and in the context of some immigration matters—that polygraphs can provide useful corroboration, though one should be careful not to use them as primary evidence.

A great deal of work has been done to enable terrorist prisoners to be assessed because it is known that, to date, the evidential analysis of such prisoners has proved fragile. It has been extremely difficult to assess the threat that they may present on release. Where has most of the work been done in relation to making judgments about such prisoners? I emphasise that we are talking about judgments. It has been done by the Parole Board and it is about its potential role that I am mainly speaking.

The Parole Board in its ordinary duties deals at present with people who have been sentenced for terrorist offences and, indeed, with prisoners who have become radicalised in prison, though not sentenced for terrorist offences. To deal with that, the Parole Board embarked on an extensive and detailed training programme so that its members—chairs and lay members—could fulfil empirically their existing role with that cohort of prisoners. The board is recognised as offering a fair procedure that is legal and justiciable in a way that is familiar to prisoners and their legal advisers, and is understandable to commentators and us parliamentarians.

I have met the argument that it would be a mistake to extend the role of the Parole Board beyond its present functions. However, given what I have said about the training that it has given to its members in relation to terrorism offences, and looking at what the board does in a more rounded way, I suggest that it is entirely fitted to have its range of responsibilities broadened to deal with wider issues. They could properly include a possible extension of sentences within appropriate statutory limits. Those decisions may not be made by the Parole Board if the Government or others do not find that acceptable, although, in my view, the board is well suited to making such decisions about the possible extension of sentences. For example, it could refer certain cases to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division or the Senior Presiding Judge for England and Wales, so that if a sentence was to be extended beyond its temporal determination, that could be done by a senior judge or judges.

Given the very serious risk posed by a small percentage of terrorist prisoners, there is a danger that the Majority who have been reformed may become the victims of the 3% or so who are unreformed. That should be avoided if at all possible, for I am sure that we would agree that what may seem like a failure to recognise that a prisoner truly is reformed and remorseful may create the very opposite effect and leave them to become reradicalised.

The aim of my amendment is to attempt to persuade Her Majesty’s Government to change the architecture of the process of extended sentences in relation to terrorism offences. I accept that the amendment does not complete the task, which is why I will not press it to a Division. However, I hope that it will be possible to discuss this matter further with Ministers before we reach the end of the procedures of the Bill.

I suggest that the changed architecture, as I have called it, should allow, first, the sentencing judge to inform and warn a defendant at the time of sentence—no ifs, no buts—that at the time when otherwise they may or should be released, they will be subject to assessment by the Parole Board and that that assessment will be based on whether they represent a serious and continuing risk to the public. It should be clearly said by the judge at the time of sentencing in accordance with the discretion of judges, who as has been said earlier, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, are used to dealing with sentencing scenarios.

Further, I suggest that the changed architecture should allow the following: if a prisoner presents a serious and continuing risk to the public, the ensuing procedure, founded on comprehensive evidence from both sides, as happens at Parole Board hearings, could result in the sentence being extended further, and possibly on more than one occasion. In my view, such an architecture would provide for a fair process that is clearly understood by a prisoner at the time he or she is sentenced. I suggest, therefore, that such a procedure would be fairer and certainly more capable of review before the courts, and safer for the small cohort of very dangerous prisoners envisaged by this Bill.

I also invite the Minister to confirm in his reply that the Parole Board has been consulted about any additional roles it might take, either along the lines that I have described or in the general context of this Bill. I would, as I have said, welcome further discussions with Ministers.

My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, particularly given his deep and long experience in counterterrorism and the legislation in this area, along with his wide experience of the workings of the Parole Board.

Clause 27 was the subject of considerable controversy in Committee because as it stands, it would remove the role of the Parole Board from the determination of whether, and at what stage, a terrorist offender should be released from custody. Without wishing to repeat the arguments that were canvassed in the debate on the clause at that stage, many of us felt then and continue to feel strongly that the Parole Board has had, and should continue to have, an important part to play in determining whether and at what stage even dangerous terrorist offenders should be released on licence.

The Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, refers to prisoners who are serving extended sentences and applies after they have completed their custodial term, thus changing the architecture of extended sentences, as he has put it. Such prisoners’ release would be contemplated only after the custodial term, at which stage their cases would be referred to the Parole Board for consideration, as they then would on every further anniversary of the completion of that custodial term.

As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has explained, before the board could direct release, it would have to be satisfied that two important conditions had been met: first, the prisoner did not represent a grave risk to the public, and secondly, it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined. We would have preferred that the amendment went further and applied more widely for the reasons that we expressed in Committee, but we regard the work of the Parole Board, whose members are specialists in the field, as extremely valuable. We are firmly of the view that a full hearing before the Parole Board is the best way to determine whether a prisoner should be released after a suitable minimum custodial term, having regard to the elimination of the threat that the prisoner posed to public safety and to such progress as might have been made in the prisoner’s deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reform.

I should emphasise that throughout our approach to this Bill, we have maintained the position that hope of rehabilitation should always be part of the process of punishment, even in severe terrorist cases, and that sentences which offer no hope are counterproductive. We recognise that all prisoners are likely to be released one day and that rehabilitation is more achievable in the context of a release on licence than it is in the context of continued incarceration. That is a position that was rightly taken and recognised by the experts who briefed a number of Peers at the Joint Extremism Unit drop-in session that was arranged for us by the Ministry of Justice. Those who attended found it to be interesting and informative, and we are all very grateful. For my part, however, I confess to remaining perplexed that the Government have decided to cut the role of the Parole Board in the way set out in Clause 27. This amendment would reduce the impact of that particular cutting axe, and I therefore support it.

My Lords, Amendment 2 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, sets out an alternative possible architecture for assessing terrorists and the possibility of extending sentences. In speaking to the amendment, the noble Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, expressed their faith in the Parole Board and the view that it should play a much fuller role in assessing terrorist prisoners who are coming towards the end of their sentences. I too joined in the very useful expert panel held last week with presentations from Home Office experts as well as senior psychologists who have an overview of this work.

The probation service itself employs around 350 psychologists, some of whom are specialists in this work. The message I got from that meeting last week is that it is very complicated work and there is no guarantee of success. However, that does not mean that there should not be efforts—indeed, very strenuous efforts—made to try to rehabilitate these offenders.

The point I made in Committee was from the briefing I received from the National Association of Probation Officers and the Prison Officers’ Association. Both made the same point: it is much easier to manage a prison, and much safer for their members, if there is hope for the prisoners themselves. They are a better group to manage—if I may phrase it like that. Those two trade unions are of course concerned about the well-being of their members and, as we all know, there has been a huge increase in attacks on prison officers in recent years.

I am therefore sympathetic to this amendment, though I heard the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, say that he would not press it to a vote. However, the part of the argument that I have not heard from the Minister is why the alternative provisions would do a better job than the Parole Board, which is well understood by the wider judicial community as well as prisoners themselves. The outcomes of those existing processes would be justiciable and perceived as fairer, but I will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say.

My Lords, I understand that the intent of this Amendment, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, is to do two things: first, to introduce a role for the Parole Board where, otherwise, the changes in the Bill would make its role superfluous; and, secondly and at the same time, not to reintroduce eligibility for early discretionary release for this cohort.

I will begin by outlining briefly the effect of the amendment in a little more detail. It would replace Clause 27, which restricts early release for offenders convicted of a serious terrorism offence—that is, those listed in Schedule 2 to the Bill—who receive an extended determinate sentence, or EDS, or a new serious terrorism sentence so that they instead serve the full custodial term of their sentence. In its place, the amendment would insert a provision that would change the release provision for all terrorist offenders sentenced to an EDS. Further, and while I understand that this may not be the noble Lord’s intent, this amendment would also apply to those currently serving an EDS for a terrorist offence.

The replacement release provision in the noble Lord’s amendment would continue to restrict early release, but there is an important difference. At the end of the custodial term, the scheme set out in the amendment would instead refer the offender to the Parole Board. The Parole Board would then determine whether the offender represents a grave risk to the public and whether it is necessary for the protection of the public that the offender continues to be imprisoned. Under the scheme in the amendment, this consideration would continue annually until release was granted, or to the end of the extended licence period, when the offender would then be released, unconditionally, into the community. The effect would therefore be that, if release were not granted until the end of the extended licence period, there would be a cliff edge and the offender would at that point be released unconditionally into the community. There would be no period of supervision and reintegration. For the reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, that is a matter of concern.

I have carefully considered the proposed changes, especially as they arise from an amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I hope I may be permitted to say that contributions from him on this subject always merit the most careful consideration, and I can assure both him and the House that I have done so in this case. None the less, having undertaken that careful consideration, I must set out the Government’s view that the changes to the release provisions for the EDS, as set out in the amendment, would be contrary to safeguards set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and its case law governing sentencing and release. That case law is usefully summarised in a recent decision of the Supreme Court of this country in Brown v Parole Board for Scotland—we seem to be referring to Scottish cases everywhere today. It is reported at [2017] UKSC 69, in particular the discussions between paragraphs 49 and 55. While every decision of the Supreme Court is obviously a decision of a strong court, that court, for which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, spoke, contained three former and current Presidents of the Supreme Court.

The reason the proposal would be contrary to the case law is that the EDS comprises two distinct parts. The first is a punitive component—namely, the custodial term—imposed for the length a judge considers commensurate with the seriousness of the offending. The second is a separate preventive element—namely, the extended licence—imposed to protect the public from the danger posed by other, future, yet to be determined serious offending. To that extent, we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who was right to draw attention to the question of serious risk to the public. That is what the second part of the EDS does.

If the Government were to detain EDS prisoners into their extended licence period for reasons related to their initial offending, that detention would be contrary to the nature and intended purpose of the community supervision component of the sentence, and contrary to the court’s order imposing the EDS. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Reed, for the Supreme Court, put it in the Brown case,

“the purpose of detention during the extension period is materially different from that of a determinate sentence.”

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, acknowledged that this amendment would require further development, either in the form of a new sentence or by further alteration to the existing EDS regime. I am grateful for that acceptance. However, I must state that the Government would not support such a proposal, because there is no need for such a new sentence. The EDS and the new serious terrorism sentence are deliberately structured to do two things: to provide punishment and, separately, to aid public protection and reintegration through the licence period. We have no desire to change this overall approach or, to use the metaphor of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to change the architecture.

For those who are not dangerous, the sentence for offenders of particular concern sufficiently caters for release with a role for the Parole Board and yet without the risk of an unsupervised cliff edge, which the amendment would introduce. I understand, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, noted, that the amendment is born of a desire to introduce a role for the Parole Board. But there is no role for the Parole Board here because it is not necessary. There is no early release and no parole so, accordingly, there is no role for the Parole Board. That is, therefore, my answer to the question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, who asked why there is no role for the Parole Board. It is for the reasons I have just given. While I suspect that my answer may not leave him persuaded, I hope it means that he is no longer perplexed.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me whether we are saying that the alternative can do a better job than the Parole Board. I accept that, as the premise behind that question would admit, some Peers consider the Parole Board the only qualified body to deal with the specialised nature of setting licence conditions for terrorist offenders. But in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I must respectfully reject that approach. The reason the Parole Board is responsible for setting licence conditions when it directs the prisoner’s release is that that is part and parcel of the Parole Board’s decision that the offender can be safely released and managed in the community. The Parole Board decides that the offender can be released and, as part of that, decides the licence conditions that will govern such release.

However, with an EDS for a serious terrorism offence and the serious terrorism sentence, there is no provision for early release before the end of the custodial period. The corollary of that proposition is that release at the end of the custodial period is automatic. Where release is automatic, there is no reason why the Parole Board specifically should consider licence conditions.

Furthermore, offenders will be subject to management under MAPPA—Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements—through which the police and the probation and prison services work with other agencies to manage the risks posed by offenders living in the community in order to protect the public. In cases under the Terrorism Act 2000—TACT—and TACT-connected cases, that involves the probation service, the releasing prison, counterterrorism police, security services, the Joint Extremism Unit of HMPPS, and social services.

With the creation of the national security Division of the National Probation Service, we will see even greater specialism in making such recommendations. That ensures that professionals with a detailed knowledge of the offender are involved in identifying the licence conditions which are necessary and appropriate. The key point is that that happens regardless of whether the final decision-maker on setting the licence is the Parole Board or HMPPS—the governor. While ultimately the board or the governor makes the decision, that decision is always directly informed by those with intelligence of and expertise in managing the offender. I therefore assure the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the process is no less rigorous and the outcomes are no different.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, asked a specific question about our discussions with the Parole Board. We have shared the Bill with the Parole Board and discussed its implications with it, but there has not been a formal consultation, if that is what the noble Lord was driving at in his question.

For those reasons, which I hope I have explained clearly and fairly, I remain of the view that there is no role for the Parole Board where there is no consideration of early release. That point, combined with the issues I have explained around the legality of this amendment from an ECHR standpoint, leads me to consider this amendment unnecessary. I therefore respectfully urge the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, to withdraw it. Of course, I am happy to continue our conversations with him about this matter, as I am sure we will continue to benefit from an exchange of views about other matters in the Bill also.

My Lords, I am grateful to all who have spoken in this debate, to the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Ponsonby, for their broad support for what I have suggested, and to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, for his detailed response.

When I was at school, I had a teacher who taught us about different forms of argument, one of which is entitled “argumentum ad maiorem”—argument using a greater authority. In those days, I suppose it was something like “Because Sir Winston Churchill said something, it must be right.” The Minister’s argumentum ad maiorem was about the case of Brown v the Parole Board for Scotland, which, it will not surprise your Lordships to know, I have read.

I do not propose to embark on and bore your Lordships with a legal moot about that case. I say simply that I respectfully do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, despite his eminence as a lawyer, about the effect of that case on my proposal. I believe that my proposal, because of the change of the architecture that I suggested, including the fact that the sentencing judge would clearly refer to the potential extension provisions at the time of sentence, would come within the judgment of Brown v the Parole Board for Scotland.

I listened to the reassurance that the Minister sought to give us about the processes in place. The noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Ponsonby, referred to the opportunity that we were generously given to participate in an expert panel in a meeting a few days ago. I was present at that meeting. I may be in a minority, but I emerged from that meeting feeling deeply unreassured about the processes that were being used by those who described them to us. It seemed to me that what is required with prisoners who have served sentences for such serious offences and who may present a grave danger to the public is an evidence-based, preferably adversarial, justiciable, appealable procedure, and the place for that procedure, plainly, is the Parole Board.

I do not accept the argument that a cliff-edge would be created either. Maybe it would if my Amendment, the imperfections of which I have admitted, were amended a little further. I believe that licence conditions could be applied in a similar way to those applied at present at the end of a sentence after the procedure that I have suggested.

Finally, I am disappointed that there has been no formal consultation with the Parole Board, particularly with the chair and deputy chair. If there was such formal consultation, I have a shrewd suspicion that they would have something very constructive to say. I respectfully suggest to the Minister that a consultation of a formal kind with the Parole Board’s senior officers is necessary as well as desirable to see what they feel they could do to improve this situation. With those remarks, I do not propose to test the opinion of the House on my amendment, but I hope that we can continue to discuss it to improve the provisions in the Bill.

Amendment 2 withdrawn.

We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 3. Anyone wishing to press this or any other amendment in this group to a Division must make that clear in the debate.

Clause 29: Further provision about release of terrorist prisoners: Scotland