My Lords, Amendments 1, 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14 and 15, in my name, are in substance the amendments I introduced in Committee. Now as then, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for supporting them. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, who cannot be here today but has great experience in these matters and has written to express his support.
I will speak to the first two amendments, which are repeated, out of necessity, at relevant places in the Bill. The two stand together and make connected points. First, the Parole Board must consider the prisoner’s state of mind and whether for some reason, such as the presence of mental disorder, they cannot form the requisite intention to withhold the information. Secondly, the board must be satisfied that the prisoner has the mental capacity, within the meaning in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, to decide whether to disclose. In moving these amendments, I put on record yet again my support for the principle of this Bill and my admiration for Marie McCourt. I acknowledge the Bill’s importance to grieving families in achieving closure in the most terrible circumstances.
In Committee, the Minister expressed two objections to my amendments. I am very grateful to him for taking time to discuss them in advance of today. His first objection was that my amendments would prevent the Parole Board taking into account any previous occasions on which the offender had had the opportunity to co-operate with the authorities and reveal a victim’s whereabouts, but had refused to do so. He argued that if this offender later became unable to make a disclosure for reasons of deteriorating mental health, for example, my amendment would leave the board unable to consider any prior refusal to co-operate in assessing the risk the prisoner posed to the public in the event of release on licence. The amendments tabled today meet this objection by including the potential for historical consideration.
His second concern is more fundamental and goes to the heart of what I see as the underlying problem with the Bill. Throughout its progress, he has repeated the Government’s view that the board’s discretion to consider all possible reasons for non-disclosure must be unfettered. He contends that my amendments give undue prominence to one factor among the many the board will take into account when making a public protection decision.
But this in effect exactly what the Bill does. It turns consideration of non-disclosure—already a standard practice in parole panels—into a statutory duty. But it fails to create a parallel statutory duty of what must be a fundamental responsibility of the board in coming to its view: to consider whether the prisoner is able, for reasons of mental capacity or disorder, to disclose that information. The Bill therefore comes dangerously close to collapsing together the question of whether there is missing information with that of whether the prisoner should be held responsible for it.
Even if the Bill is not, in law, creating a new criminal offence of non-disclosure, the effect of deliberate non-disclosure is inexorably going to lead to the conclusion that the prisoner poses a risk and, as a result, requires to be kept in prison. Therefore, the Bill is in effect creating a statutory hurdle to release in those cases where deliberate non-disclosure is established. Given this, it should be explicit that that statutory hurdle can exist only where the prisoner can be held responsible for their own actions—that is to say that they are not suffering from a mental disorder or otherwise from impairment of mind or brain that should be seen as alleviating that responsibility.
The noble and learned Lord the Minister has been consistent in arguing that the Parole Board must be allowed to take into account a wide range of factors in making its decisions. But in relation to the Bill, which is so tightly focused on non-disclosure, there are really only three possible scenarios a board would face. The first concerns those cases where disclosure is not possible because the prisoner, for whatever reason, was not party to the disposal of remains and so genuinely does not know where the body is. Of course, there will also be cases where prisoners continue to protest their innocence. This is a problem for the board, but it is not what the Bill is about.
The second scenario concerns the non-disclosure cases where the verdict is not disputed and the facts of the case leave no room for it to be argued that the prisoner does not know where the victim’s body is located. In both those scenarios it is simple. There is either an inability to disclose or there is deliberate non-disclosure, which is culpable. The prisoner who persists in this wilful refusal, amplifying again the distress already visited on the family of the victim, must take the consequences, and in its efforts to address this particular issue, the Bill has my full support.
But it is the third scenario that my amendments address—a scenario on which the Bill is silent. It is the scenario in which the prisoner, for reasons of mental disorder, cannot form the requisite intention to withhold information, or lacks the mental capacity to take the decision to do so. By failing to mention any possibility of the contrary, the Bill assumes that the prisoner has the ability to disclose, thus making any non-disclosure culpable. Prolonged detention for non-disclosure in such cases would be unfair, unjust and a potential infringement of human rights.
By elevating non-disclosure to statutory status, the Bill already departs from the Government’s stated policy of leaving to the Parole Board decisions as to what weight, if any, it gives to the many factors it must consider. The Government have accepted, at the Dispatch Box here and in the other place, that the board should take state of mind and mental capacity into account. But the Bill provides the board with no guidance as to how its statutory duty is to be performed with regard to this. By extension, it fails to guide victims’ families as to what they should expect of the Parole Board in cases of this kind. My amendments would address this discrepancy by elevating in parallel the related imperative to take the ability to disclose into account.
If the Minister is not willing and able to accept these amendments, as I fear he is not, and this guidance is to be dealt with outside the statute, can he at least provide clarity as to what this guidance to the Parole Board is to be, where it is to be found and how its use will be monitored? I would be grateful if he could confirm definitively what training members of the Parole Board receive to support them specifically in making determinations under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. If the board’s responsibility to take mental disorder and mental capacity into account is not to be a statutory duty, it will be vital that its members are fully conversant with the Act and its use within the criminal justice system. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, for her introduction to this group of amendments, to which I have added my name. I entirely support her careful analysis of the problem they seek to address.
There is no doubt that the Bill has been drafted with the best of intentions, and, as I said when we discussed them in Committee, I completely understand the policy reasons that lie behind it. I have the deepest sympathy for those it seeks to help. We have tended to focus on cases where the failure to disclose has been in murder or manslaughter cases, where the question is where the victim’s remains were disposed of. But cases about the identity of children who are the subject of indecent images are just as distressing to the victims and their families. Our amendments, which are not intended in any way to undermine the Bill’s intentions, extend to both of them. That is because the Bill, as drafted, gives rise to the same problem in both cases. I recall the noble and learned Lord the Minister agreeing with us, in the virtual meeting to which he very kindly invited us, that what matters for the purposes of our discussion is the substance of the issue our amendments raise, not their precise wording. The same cannot be said of the Bill; its precise wording does indeed matter.
It is the wording of the new Sections 28A(1)(c) and 29(1)(c) that create the difficulty. I entirely understand the noble and leaned Lord’s point, which he made in Committee and repeated to us in our meeting, that subsections (2) and (3) of those sections do not limit the matters which the Parole Board must or may take into account, and that he does not want to limit the scope that this leaves to the board. The problem lies in the meaning that is to be given to the words “has information” and “has not disclosed” in subsection (1), which sets the context for the whole exercise. There is a gap here, which the Bill leaves open. Cases of deliberate refusal where the prisoner has the information, is able to disclose it and fails to do so are covered by these words. These are the obvious cases that are so distressing. They can be seen as cases where the prisoner is deliberately prolonging the agony being suffered by the victim’s families and, in the children’s case, by the victims too. Their predicament is horrifying, and it is right that everything should be done to address it. The word “non-disclosure” is absolutely right for use in these cases. It carries with it the notion of intention, as the noble Baroness made very clear. For very good reasons, it was these cases that were in mind when the Bill was being drafted to give statutory force to “Helen’s Law”.
But what about those whom the board believes have or had the information because of the way the crime was committed but, for the reasons given by the noble Baroness, are simply not able to disclose it to the Parole Board because they lack the intention? That is the gap that the Bill leaves open and our amendments seek to fill. It may be said that, as matters stand today, cases of that kind can be dealt with by the Parole Board perfectly well, with all the understanding that they deserve. The Bill assumes that what the board does now must be transformed into a requirement—a statutory duty—and all that this entails. It is designed to change something, not leave things as they are. One can see, by looking at Amendment 17, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, what this may lead to. The context for any judicial review will be set by the terms of the statute. The board needs clarity on this matter.
Are the cases described by the noble Baroness within the scope of these new clauses at all? Our Amendment 1 would make it clear at the outset that they are not, because they are not non-disclosure cases in the proper meaning of that word—they lack the intention. As an alternative, our Amendment 2 would make it clear that, without in any way limiting the scope of the matters that the board can take into account, the prisoner’s mental capacity to disclose the information is indeed one of them. It would provide the assurance that those prisoners need, and the Parole Board needs too, that a decision made on that ground would stand up to scrutiny.
I hope very much that, when he comes to reply, the noble and learned Lord will set out as clearly as he can what guidance has been given to the Parole Board about how it should deal with these cases under the statute, and will answer the various questions the noble Baroness has put to him. I hope, too, that his mind is not entirely closed to the possibility of addressing this difficult issue by an amendment at Third Reading if it seems, on further reflection, that this would be a better way to proceed.
My Lords, first, I wish to associate myself with the expressions of support and sympathy of the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, for those who have campaigned so strongly and so well for the Bill to be brought before the House. It is a very important Bill.
Secondly, I support these amendments because the ability of a prisoner to recall what has happened is, of course, paramount and of considerable importance when the Parole Board is considering its decision. I hope your Lordships will forgive me if I keep my further observations for the second group of amendments, which I will be speaking to in a moment.
My Lords, we have discussed the arguments behind these amendments in Committee and, to some extent, at Second Reading. I am not sure that much has changed since. For my part, while I entirely accept the motives and intentions of those behind the Bill itself, as well as the amendments in this first group, I remain sceptical about the utility of the Bill as an addition to the criminal law. That said, I have every sympathy—who would not?—for the living victims of the abhorrent criminals covered by the Bill, and know why they, and those who support the Bill so enthusiastically, want it enacted. I am sure it will be very soon.
Both the Minister and my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern were not favourably impressed with my suggestion of a discrete criminal offence. From memory, only the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, was prepared to agree with me about the value of the Bill in its current form. My suggestions have now sunk below the waves and can be forgotten. However, I urge the House, despite the experience and wisdom of those supporting these amendments relating to the offender’s state of mind—either through the greater emphasis demanded of the Parole Board in Amendment 1 of the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, or through a Newton hearing under Amendment 3 in the next group, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford—not to curtail the Parole Board’s independence and discretion.
As I indicated in our earlier debates, I would like the Parole Board’s work to be more accessible to the public. Despite the powerful analysis of the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I agree with the Minister’s argument in Committee—which he seems to have repeated in his meeting with the noble Lords—that the Bill in its unamended form enables the Parole Board to fully consider the offender’s state of mind and their reasons for not disclosing the requisite information.
As was pointed out in our earlier debates, when considering the public safety implications of permitting a long-sentenced offender to return to the community, the Parole Board is looking at information and coming to a decision many years after the offence and the trial. A finding made by the trial judge shortly after the verdict about the offender’s failure to disclose the site of the victim’s body or—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, properly reminded us—the identities of children in criminal images is valuable, and will surely be brought to the Parole Board’s attention, as will be the effect of that finding on the judge’s sentence. However, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, pointed out in Committee, we need to be careful not to confuse punishment for the original crime and the public safety implications of the prisoner’s much later release.
It must seem to many noble Lords that, not for the first time, I have got to the church by way of the moon. However, in short, let us leave the Bill as it is. It will be no more effective if amended.
My Lords, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier: the Bill is best left as it is. Although it is a limited purpose Bill and to be welcomed, there is plainly a need for a proper review of the Parole Board in due course. That is the occasion on which we should look at matters in the round.
In my experience, the Parole Board approaches the exercise of its discretion with the greatest possible care and, in cases where there are issues of mental capacity, takes infinite care to ensure that it has available all the necessary information, including reports from the prisoner. Occasionally, mistakes are made. However, there is always the remedy of judicial review, and it seems to me that it would be much better to leave the Bill as it is, allowing any errors on matters as obvious as mental capacity or findings of the trial judge to be taken into account. The Bill should be left alone; we should not amend it.
Earlier this week, we considered the state into which the law of sentencing has got by a piecemeal approach. It is not something we should do in criminal justice. Although I shall have something to say in detail about Amendment 3, I accept entirely the analysis of the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. However, my acceptance of their analysis of the proper approach does not persuade me that it is necessary to amend the Bill. The issues can be safely left to the discretion of the Parole Board, and there is a remedy if it fails to do that.
My Lords, I spoke in Committee and, subsequent to that, I had an exchange of correspondence with Marie McCourt. I would not like anything said today, and I do not think that any noble Lord would mean it, to take away from the need to right the hurt that she, and those dear to her, have felt.
I said on the last occasion that the Parole Board itself needed a thorough overhaul and the Minister, if I remember correctly, agreed with me. My concern here, as it is in many places, is that any law brought in to right a specific wrong can often be wrong itself—you need a much more generalist approach.
None the less, I welcome the Bill. My point is that, when you deal with mental capacity, you also have to remember human frailty. The fact of the matter is that people can just forget. There is at least an element of possibility that someone could just forget what they had done. It is also possible that they could just forget who photographs were of. I know that that may not be a popular thing to say but, going back many years to when I was in the Territorial Army, we used to have exercises where we dropped people and they then had to find their way to places. I was always amazed at how people could not recognise things. There is a genuine defence that someone has just forgotten.
Secondly, I hope that the Minister can assure us that we are not passing a law that will go to Strasbourg to be interpreted. When I look at this, I wonder whether it will pretty quickly end up in the European Court of Human Rights, where it will not be us doing the legislating but the judges in Strasbourg. I welcome the Minister’s assurance that he really does think that it is proof against even a reasonable prospect of a challenge in the court.
Finally, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that wording matters. It can matter quite strongly in the case of a Bill such as this one.
My Lords, I share the sympathy that has been expressed for the families of the victims who are behind the motivation for the Bill.
I looked carefully at the background to this issue to see what effect—[Inaudible]—stage had on the Bill to see if there is a necessity for the amendments that are proposed today. I examined paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Explanatory Notes, which say, among other things:
“The proposed change is to put Parole Board practice on a statutory footing … the Bill will not result in any change to current Parole Board practice and it is not anticipated that there will be any impact on the prison population”.
I also listened carefully to the Minister, who, in effect, repeated that analysis in relation to today’s proceedings.
I share the view of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Garnier and Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that we should not interfere with sound parole practice if Parole Board practice is—[Inaudible]—the Parole Board would be much more transparent—[Inaudible]—subject to closed hearings, national security and certain views of—[Inaudible]—confidentiality could be heard in public. What have the Government done to obtain the views, on both this Bill and the amendments that were passed earlier, of the current deputy chair of the Parole Board, His Honour Peter Rook QC—a very experienced and admired judge—and his predecessor, the former High Court judge, Sir John Saunders? I have a suspicion that, if consulted, they would say, “Well, first of all, we would prefer Parole Board procedure to be kept flexible and not to be circumscribed in any way by this Bill”, which—[Inaudible]—any changes to Parole Board practice.
Secondly, I would expect them to say that attitudes to cases change over the years, and that the Parole Board must be a living instrument, dealing with applications—[Inaudible]—released from prison, often many years after the event. I think that I once prosecuted a defendant who was sentenced to a whole-life tariff, remains in prison on that tariff and has taken his case to the European Court of Human Rights at least once. He happens to be the person who—[Inaudible]—which was just mischief-making. That is another example of the flexibility that the Parole Board needs in order to take account of the activities and attitudes of people who have committed dreadful offences such as these.
My main point is that the Parole Board should retain its flexibility to deal with all these issues as part of the larger picture in each case. On balance, I feel that the Bill in its original form does that more successfully than the Bill would do with the amendments added.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for the clear way in which they introduced the Bill and for signalling their intention not to push this amendment to a vote.
When we discussed this matter at an earlier stage of the proceedings, I explained that I am one of a number of Peers who has taken part every time we have discussed mental capacity legislation since its pre-legislative state in 2004. I remain concerned that mental capacity legislation is not widely understood or implemented in a variety of professions—even in the medical profession, where one might think that it would be. Given the incidence of mental illness in the prison population, one would think that such legislation is widely understood by practitioners. When we carried out the review of the Mental Capacity Act, that turned out not to be so.
I do not doubt that the Parole Board should be as free as possible to exercise judgment. It is not for those of us outside who do not have access to all the facts of a particular case to second-guess it. My questions during earlier stages of the Bill were about the training of professionals in the criminal justice system, particularly the Parole Board, and the reliance on Mental Capacity Act advisers, Mental Health Act advisers and so on. I have not had answers to those questions; therefore, like the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, I remain concerned that there is a gap in the legislation.
Like others who have spoken to Mrs McCourt, I really want this legislation to work and I do not wish to see gaps through which people who have the capacity and have information but are withholding it can slip. The noble Baroness, Lady Bull, made a valid point. I understand that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, will resist putting these words in the Bill, but can he tell us what regulations and guidance will arise as a result of our discussion?
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, very much for moving her amendment. In Committee, I supported the amendments. I also echo the support of the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, who contacted me personally to say that he very much wishes he could have been here to support the noble Baroness’s amendment.
It must be said that a number of extremely eminent lawyers have, in essence, spoken against the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Bull. My response to those eminent contributions was best articulated by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. My experience is that many different parts of the criminal justice system do not understand mental capacity legislation properly and that, even if they do, it is often not used to its full extent. That is because such a large proportion of the people we deal with in the criminal justice system as a whole have mental capacity issues.
I support in principle what the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, has said; I understand that she will not press her amendments to a vote. I hope that the Minister will say something more constructive about addressing the perceived gap in the legislation regarding further review by the Parole Board and the practicality of a possible remedy through judicial review. These are all active issues which have been explored in our debate. The Minister should acknowledge that the concerns raised are real and explain to the House why it would not be necessary to meet them in the Bill.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, and other noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. Perhaps I may reiterate the position of the Government, which is that we consider that the amendments would unnecessarily fetter the discretion of the Parole Board. I do not accept that there is a gap in the legislation, as suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.
I shall initially address Amendment 1 and related Amendments 5, 8, 11 and 14, which would ensure that the Bill’s provisions applied only to prisoners who are, or have previously been, “able” to disclose relevant information but have not chosen not to do so.
The Bill affords the Parole Board wide scope subjectively to consider the circumstances of a prisoner’s non-disclosure. The test is broadly drafted to give the Parole Board, which is after all an independent judicial body with experience in assessing risk and evidence, sufficient flexibility to take all relevant circumstances into account when making a release assessment.
The board must be satisfied that the offender no longer poses a risk to the public, and this high bar can be met only after it considers all elements of an offender’s case. This already includes an offender’s current and past “ability”, whether mental or physical, to disclose such information. The Parole Board may already consider all possible reasons, in its own view, for any non-disclosure, including historic refusals.
There is some uncertainty as to the meaning of the term “able” in these circumstances, and it would be unclear what criteria the board would use to make their determination. In many cases, there are varying degrees of ability, or varying degrees of information, that the prisoner can disclose, and the interpretations of ability in each case will differ—a point made by a number of noble Lords. The Parole Board in its current practice uses a flexible approach to take into account all elements of a non-disclosure. To use “able” in a determinative and inflexible way would cause unnecessary confusion and potential inconsistencies in its application. That has the potential unfairly to prevent the board when applying the Bill’s provisions from considering a non-disclosure by an offender in many circumstances; for example, the case of an offender who had rendered themselves “unable” to disclose due to illicit drug use in prison. There are clearly other examples of how that difficulty could arise.
By specifically avoiding reference to particulars in the Bill, we are deliberately not limiting the board’s ability to use its expertise in how it approaches such cases. I say in response to a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, that the Parole Board is possessed of considerable expertise in these areas, including that of mental health.
That leads me on to Amendments 2, 6, 9, 12 and 15, which would explicitly direct the Parole Board to take into account one possible reason for non-disclosure; namely, whether the prisoner has or had the mental capacity to disclose information. The Bill places a broad statutory duty on the Parole Board to take into account non-disclosure on the part of a prisoner and, in doing so, it must consider all the reasons for such non-disclosure. It is therefore for the board itself, as now, to take a subjective view of what those reasons might be, and then it is for the board to decide what bearing this information may have on its subsequent assessment of suitability for release. I remind noble Lords of what is provided for in Clause 1(2)(b), which states:
“When making the public protection decision about the life prisoner, the Parole Board must take into account … the reasons, in the Parole Board’s view, for the prisoner’s nondisclosure.”
That wide remit clearly would embrace all the issues that have been touched on in the debate.
The noble Baroness correctly identified that a prisoner’s mental state is likely to be a significant factor in assessing reasons for non-disclosure. However, we do not believe that there is any material benefit in referring to this as a possible reason for non-disclosure in the Bill, as the Parole Board will take all relevant factors into account when assessing a prisoner’s suitability for release. If one factor were to be explicitly stated, it could be asked why other reasons for non-disclosure are not also placed on a statutory footing, such as a geographical change that prevents the location of a victim’s remains being identified or circumstances where mental impairment does not amount to “mental capacity”. As one noble Lord observed, there may be cases where people have simply forgotten or decided to blank matters out of their mind over a period of many years. Clearly, the noble Baroness does not wish to preclude any other relevant factors, but any delineation of what the reasons for non-disclosure may be in order to preserve a flexible approach takes away from the subjective approach that we invite the Parole Board to take. This approach is expressed in Clause 1(3), which states:
“This section does not limit the matters which the Parole Board must or may take into account when making a public protection decision.”
It is for the board to take these matters into account when conducting its assessment.
There are significant practical difficulties in attempting to give examples on the face of the statute, which could lead to unnecessary confusion. That is why a decision as to mental capacity is one of many that would have to be considered. However, the board is bound by public law principles to act reasonably in respect of all decisions it makes. A decision where a relevant mental capacity issue was not taken into account would clearly be amenable to challenge by judicial review. That is why we believe that the more sensible approach is to leave these matters to the considerable expertise and experience of the Parole Board and not to attempt to take one or two factors out of context and place them in the Bill.
I say in response to one or two points raised in debate that the Parole Board already has expertise available to it in dealing with matters of mental capacity. We are not moving away from the current guidelines; we are essentially expressing in statutory form that which can be found there already. The noble Lord, Lord Balfe, asked whether the matter would go to Strasbourg. I simply draw his attention to the certificate given by the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice pursuant to Section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 that, in his view, the provisions of the Bill are compatible with convention rights.
I acknowledge the concern expressed about mental capacity. I reiterate our view that that is well embraced by the broad terms of the Bill. I therefore invite the noble Baroness not to press her amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the many noble and noble and learned Lords who have spoken in support of my amendments, and I am particularly grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for adding their names to them. All noble Lords who spoke supported the aims of this Bill, but several shared concerns that the wording creates difficulties. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, noted, the words “has information” and “has not disclosed” leave a gap in which the third scenario I outlined, where the prisoner is not able to disclose for reasons of mental disorder or mental capacity, is not covered. It does not provide the clarity that the board requires. I echo what I fear is the futile hope of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, that the Minister might be persuaded to reflect further following today’s debate and consider a government amendment at Third Reading.
The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, spoke with great experience and authority about the widespread lack of understanding of the Mental Capacity Act and its application within the criminal justice system. For reasons of time today, I did not repeat the observations I made in Committee about the extent to which issues of mental health might be a problem. The paucity of knowledge about the scale of the mental health challenge in our prison population, along with the potential for and the reasons behind mental health decline during incarceration, are there in Hansard. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, I consider that they remain real concerns in the light of this report of poverty of understanding of the Mental Capacity Act.
I am grateful to the Minister for his response and, as I said earlier, for taking the time to discuss between Committee and today’s debate, and I am only sorry that he has felt unable to take on the concerns that we have collectively expressed. However, I appreciate his confirmation that any decision that does not take mental capacity into account could be subject to judicial review. I wonder whether he could clarify his response to my earlier question, along with that put by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, as to where guidance on this could be found, how it would be applied and how it be monitored if it is not to be a statutory duty. Where is the guidance on application or consideration of mental capacity and mental impairment?
Finally, could the noble and learned Lord specifically address the question posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, in Committee and again today, and in writing on
We come now to the group beginning with Amendment 3. I remind noble Lords that Members other than the mover and the Minister may speak only once and that short questions of elucidation are discouraged. Anyone wishing to press this or any other amendment in this group to a Division should make that clear in debate.