Part of the debate – in the House of Lords at 7:00 pm on 25 April 2012.
Lord Davies of Stamford
Labour
7:00,
25 April 2012
My Lords, I will come back to the Budget, if I may, and not take up the very challenging, provocative and frankly misconceived points that the noble Lord has been talking about in the European Union context. I do not want to come back to the macroeconomic stance represented by the Budget for more than two very brief remarks, because that matter has been thoroughly dealt with by my noble friend Lord Eatwell and the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky. I want to talk about two particular tax proposals in the Budget, the significance of which has unfortunately not been sufficiently understood so far.
Before I do it, I have those two brief comments on the macroeconomic debate. First, it is clear that the Government are committed to the Pigouvian idea, which was discredited in the 1930s and is clearly being discredited now, that if the Government cut borrowing and spending, then the reduction in aggregate demand following from that would be automatically compensated by an equal and opposite increase in borrowing by the private sector to finance consumption or investment spending. That is a very hoary doctrine that, as I said, has been proved to be wrong in the past. The Government seem to continue to be committed to it. It has become a sort of Panglossian piece of self-deception on their part.
The phrase that the noble Lord from the Treasury used this afternoon-I heard the Prime Minister use exactly the same phrase earlier today in Another place-that the solution to a borrowing crisis cannot be more borrowing reflects the preference of this Government to fall back into PR slogans rather than to think through matters carefully. It is a completely nonsensical statement. Clearly, if you have a deficit, you cannot get rid of it overnight. If you are going to continue with a deficit, you are going to continue to increase borrowing. We are merely talking about the rate at which you continue to increase borrowing. There is no doubt that the solution, whatever it is-whether it is the one we on this side of the House propose, or the one to which the Government opposite are committed-would involve more borrowing. We want more clarity, a bit more analysis and perhaps a little more straightforwardness with the public, and rather less of the generation of PR slogans to disguise reality from the public.
The two particular points emerging from the tax proposals in the Budget which I want to highlight this evening are not matters which will rouse great passion around the breakfast tables of millions of families in this country. They might even seem, at first glance at least, rather technical and esoteric but they are extremely important in terms of the vibrancy of the supply side of the economy, the ability of the economy to respond to opportunities, and the willingness of people to risk their money-to invest in new or expanding businesses, to generate wealth and employment in the future. I have already raised in the earlier Budget debate the first measure that I am concerned about. I was given a one-sentence response by the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, which made me feel that the Government either did not want to or could not be bothered to engage seriously with the issue. This concerns the introduction of a general anti-avoidance rule. I am in favour of the introduction of a general anti-avoidance rule, with the important condition-I always make this clear in any debate on the subject-that, to avoid doing considerable damage to the economy, it must be accompanied by a provision under which HMRC would provide pre-transaction rulings to taxpayers.
Briefly, what a general anti-avoidance rule-a GAAR-means is that every taxpayer is exposed to the risk that HMRC will suddenly challenge his or her tax return and say, "We are not accepting this particular structure or bottom line of taxable income because we think that you have engaged in some artificial practice for the purpose of tax avoidance. Therefore we are going to see through this structure and tax you on a completely different basis". Under a GAAR regime, you never quite know when you may be exposed to such a risk. I suppose that it is true to say that if you always make sure that you adopt structures which cost you the most tax of any structure that you could adopt to solve a particular problem or to arrange for a particular transaction, you would not be exposed to a revenue challenge of this kind. That, of course, would mean that there would be an enormous increase in the tax burden. That would be a very undesirable thing. It is not something that the Government have ever thought of, I am quite certain. If, in fact, you have a reasonably tax-efficient structure which you have adopted for totally respectable operational, strategic or other reasons, you are always exposed to the Revenue saying, "No, no; you only did this in order to avoid tax, so we are going to attack you with the GAAR". The only way around this is to have a system under which you can ask HMRC in advance whether or not it would accept a particular structure and, if it does, you know that you are safe. The IRS regularly provides pre-transaction rulings, and there is no reason whatever why HMRC should not do so. I will come on to that in one moment.
The first proposition that I put to the Minister is that the effect of introducing a GAAR without a pre-transaction ruling facility is greatly to increase tax uncertainty in this country, or to reduce tax certainty. I do not think that he will argue with that, but he will argue with my second proposition, which is that tax certainty is an important factor in the determination of willingness to exist and the location of investment decisions. That decision process which sometimes may be more intuitive and sometimes may be an explicit equation will always include certain key factors. Of course, these include political stability, the real output cost of labour, access to markets, availability of skills and monetary stability. All these things are important, but tax rates are important and tax certainty is extremely important. Therefore, if you change the variable of tax certainty, or produce a greater degree of tax uncertainty, you will change the outcome of that particular equation. You will have less investment. That is a very undesirable thing to do.
I had to ask myself, because the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, would not tell me, why the Government have decided not to introduce a rule that taxpayers can receive pre-transaction rulings from HMRC. I can hardly believe that the Chancellor did not raise this matter with HMRC. If he did not do so, he is even more incompetent than the media in this country are currently making him out to be. I assume that he did raise this issue, and that HMRC simply turned around and said, "No, we don't like it", and he weakly rolled over under this bureaucratic pushback and decided not to push forward with that idea. Of course, anybody could have predicted that HMRC would try to turn this down. There is nothing in it for HMRC. It obviously does not welcome the responsibility. It does not want to be criticised, like Mr Hartnett has been criticised over the Vodafone decision, for example. It does not want the extra work. There is a host of the normal bureaucratic reasons why they would not particularly want to take this on. However, it was quite wrong of the Chancellor simply to accept that bureaucratic pushback. He should have insisted. That is what a good Minister must be prepared to do. By not doing that he has done a very bad day's work. He has introduced, as I said, a significant deterioration-a degradation-of the climate for investment in this country.
My second point on the tax proposals in the Budget is not one that I raised in the previous debate on the subject, because none of us knew about it. It was not mentioned in the Budget speech at all. It only came out in the subsequent revenue announcements and press releases. Apparently the Government intend to try to introduce something which has been in the air for some time, of which I am once again very much in favour in principle. That is the concept of a minimum tax rate for high earners, so that it should not be possible that someone earning millions of pounds a year ends up with an effective tax rate of perhaps even less than 20 per cent, which is the minimum rate for people who are earning very modest sums of £10,000 or £15,000 and so forth. I have always thought that that was a good idea, but it should be based on a clear concept of the taxable income involved. The taxable income involved-the pre-tax disposable income, if you like-must be the money which is actually available to that taxpayer, with which he can pay the tax bill. It stands to reason that if he has given away part of that money to a charity it is not part of his income any more. He is not getting any benefit from it. He has given it away, and cannot get at it to pay any tax. Equally, it is quite clear that if, in the course of an individual's activities he or she has some profits from some activities and losses from others, he or she cannot get away with those losses. Losses are a fact of life. The income which should therefore be subject to taxation, in all common sense and fairness, is the net income. That has always been the rule in our tax system.
The Government have confused two things. They have confused the special tax shelters which are available and much used by those with higher incomes-SIPs, for example; EISs are a big one-on the one side, and actual losses, or gifts to charity which actually reduce income, on the other. Tax shelters do not reduce income. If you put money into a tax shelter, you retain beneficial ownership of that money. The money becomes subject to certain conditions in exchange for the tax shelter but, nevertheless, you gain from the particular profit from the investment that you are making in the EIS, SIP or whatever it happens to be. That matter is quite different, and I am totally in favour of saying that there should be not just a limit to SIPs or EISs, which there is, but an aggregate limit so that the total benefit that people get from tax shelters cannot ever drive their total taxable income down below a certain level.
The Government have got into a complete muddle. That is a very dangerous thing to do. Why? In fact, they are destroying, above the £50,000-a-year limit, the whole concept of tax consolidation. In other words, an individual who is looking to make an investment in an existing or different business has until now always been able to take the view that if there are losses-and there often are losses in investments, of course-they would be net losses. If you abolish tax consolidation, as the Government now propose to do, then for somebody investing in a new business the potential losses are no longer net. They are gross, and are going to be very much more substantial. It follows that the potential reward from these investments will be less, the risk will be much higher and, all other things being equal, people will require a higher threshold rate of return in order to engage in the same investment. If they require a higher threshold rate of return in order to make a particular investment because the risk of the investment has been enhanced by a government change in tax policy, they will not make as many investments, because fewer investments will achieve the prospective higher rate of return. Automatically, as a mathematical fact, you will be reducing the propensity of the economy to invest. That is a very unfortunate thing.
I put it to the Government that, while they were right initially in principle both in introducing the GAAR and in introducing something like a minimum tax rate for high earners, the way that they have done these things has introduced gratuitous damage to our supply side. I hope that they will look at these matters again, and in particular that the Chancellor will stand up a little better to HMRC. I am sure that he is quite sincere when he says that he wants to produce-as we do on this side of the House-a successful enterprise economy, and to encourage investment by British residents, by existing businesses and by overseas investors. However, he happens to have done two things which go in exactly the opposite direction.
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