Armed Forces: Future Defence Policy — Motion to Take Note

Part of the debate – in the House of Lords at 11:33 am on 6 November 2009.

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Photo of Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank Lord Guthrie of Craigiebank Crossbench 11:33, 6 November 2009

My Lords, I declare two interests. I am a non-executive director of a defence company and an adviser and colonel of two regiments currently serving in Afghanistan. I want to comment on what the Minister said. I had the privilege of being chief of defence staff when the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, was Secretary of State. I believe that in 1998 the Strategic Defence Review was very successful and well put together. Although the Cabinet signed up to it, almost from the moment that Cabinet meeting ended, the proposal started to be unpicked by the Treasury. It was very unsympathetic to defence and, although it was prepared when times were good to give a lot of money to other ministries, the Ministry of Defence continued to come off very badly in comparison.

Like other noble Lords, I am full of admiration for the bravery, resilience and outstanding qualities of our service men and women in Afghanistan, and what they have achieved, but I do not think that any of us can pretend that matters are going well in that country. Afghanistan illustrates all too clearly that the military can only do so much. Progress depends on political goals being achieved, diplomats, aid and the determination of the Afghan people and the Afghan Government themselves. To start with, expectations were too high and we now need new initiatives, both military and political. We should not pursue policies which have not worked, as the noble Lord, Lord King, said, and we need to seek regional agreement not just with Pakistan, but with India, Russia and Iran, all of whom have an interest in a satisfactory solution—in some ways, a much greater interest in a satisfactory solution than we do.

The Government could do several things which would greatly assist those in the front line and who find the Government's commitment to their needs less than it should be. First—and I make no apology for going on about this—is the vexed question of the clear need for more helicopters. Both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor said that the front line can have what it asks for. Commanders need helicopters in addition to logistics, transport and administration to save lives, to outwit and unsettle the enemy, and to disrupt its activities. We have been in Afghanistan for eight years and still the numbers are inadequate. It is unsatisfactory for the Ministry of Defence and Ministers always to say that things are better. They are always quoting percentage increases and the number of flying hours that have been increased. That all sounds very good until you realise what a low state it was in at the beginning. I have no doubt whatever that, with additional helicopters, some of the lives that have been lost would have been saved.

My second point concerns the 500 soldiers asked for by commanders on the ground. They are available and waiting but, because of what appears to be dithering in London, are becoming unsettled. These 500 men should not be linked to the 40,000 soldiers and a possible United States surge. These 500 men would give our commanders additional security for our service men and women, flexibility and balance which they desperately need and lack now. The three conditions laid down by the Prime Minister for their movement reveal a complete lack of understanding of what these men are for. I wonder who on earth has been briefing him about the need for helicopters.

The recent decision on the Territorial Army, which was thankfully reversed by the Prime Minister, sent the most terrible message to the TA, which has done so much in Iraq and Afghanistan. It was an extraordinary decision by the Ministry of Defence. We now hear that regular manpower is likely to be cut. I would like the Minister to say whether that is so. If it is cut, it will send a very damaging message to a heroic, hard-pressed and stretched Army—already too small. The Army, and many people in our country, will not understand how such a decision could be made at such a time. Military services and people in the front line are questioning whether the Government are really committed to making progress in Afghanistan and what is happening about the co-ordination between the Foreign Office, DfID and the Ministry of Defence. I am curious to know who is meant to be co-ordinating this. It does not seem very clear to me.