My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]

Clause 28 [National Statistician: advisory functions]:

moved Amendment No. 147:

Clause 28, page 12, line 35, at end insert—

"( ) The National Statistician shall be the government's principal advisor on statistics and provide professional leadership to all persons engaged in statistical production and publication."

The amendment takes us back to earlier Committee debates. At one level, it states the blindingly obvious, that:

"The National Statistician shall be the government's principal advisor on statistics and provide professional leadership to all persons engaged in statistical production and publication".

I do not think that anybody would doubt either of those statements. It is pretty obvious that the National Statistician will be the Government's principal adviser on statistics. However, we tabled this amendment because we want to establish clearly and get on the record that the role of the National Statistician will not be limited to statistics that the board and the National Statistician provide and will include statistics provided across government.

Given the debate we had on the distinction in the Bill between official statistics and national statistics—I am sure we will return to that issue on Report—the view of these Benches is that the National Statistician should have an overview of all statistics produced by government and that the code should apply to them all. In a sense, this is a companion amendment to those that we debated earlier about the difference between the two sorts of statistics. The value of such an amendment is that it makes clear that whoever is producing statistics in government must look to the National Statistician for advice and leadership. Given the situation in respect of official statistics not covered by the code, the Bill requires an amendment of this nature. I beg to move.

We support the amendment and are happy to echo the noble Lord's reasons for it. This Committee has already heard my noble friend Lady Noakes explain the necessity for a clear and strong role for the National Statistician and his or her office. Where departments not under the remit of the Statistics Board produce statistics, if trust is to be maintained it should be clear that the ultimate government authority is independent and impartial. The amendment ensures that the Prime Minister is advised by the person most qualified to give advice and makes clear that the National Statistician is the person to give it.

I put my name down in support of this amendment for the obvious reason that others mentioned: it is crucial that the National Statistician is publicly and officially regarded as the ultimate authority for all official statistics. Clauses 28 and 29 cover that ground. Clause 28 covers the advisory role of the National Statistician and Clause 29 covers the executive role. The amendment is important because it must be clear beyond any shadow of doubt that, when there is a problem anywhere in the statistical system, the Government look to the National Statistician as the final arbiter, adviser and authority.

In my experience it was always beyond doubt that, although I was director of the CSO, I was also head of the Government Statistical Service, so if there was a problem with, let us say, health or education statistics, although those departments were expected to deal with it, if it remained in any way or form the Prime Minister would look to me as the ultimate authority. That is why it is very important that the Bill provides that the ultimate authority and responsibility for all statistics, national or non-national—if that remains a distinction, which I am very much against—in every department should remain the National Statistician.

There is another subtle point. One tends to think of the National Statistician and his or her colleagues as simply responsible for standards, methodology and quality in general, but the responsibility is much bigger. He or she is also responsible for planning, by looking ahead, the entire statistical system. That is an advisory role. He or she may decide that in the years or months to come it might become very important to improve migration statistics—we all know that it is—or some other field of statistics. It is a planning operation. The National Statistician may decide that that requires the co-operation of all the departments because it is a co-ordinating job. In that way also he or she is the ultimate authority. For those reasons, the amendment is important.

The noble Lord, Lord Newby, very kindly opened by saying that he was stating the blindingly obvious. It is also obvious to the Government. We accept the noble Lord's argument, as the same concept underlies our position on the Bill.

The National Statistician's role as chief adviser is already established in the Bill, although it is not explicitly stated in the amendment. I shall indicate why I cannot accept the amendment in a moment. The National Statistician is the board's chief professional adviser. It must take account of his or her advice on all statistical matters, and the board has to publish a report for Parliament if on any occasion it overrules the National Statistician on professional or technical matters, including the reasons why.

Under the duties and powers established in the Bill, the board, in turn, has the responsibility to advise government departments on statistical issues, including technical issues such as methodologies, definitions and classifications, as well as on standards for official statistics. Therefore, it will be seen that the Government understand, and have legislated in the Bill for, the National Statistician to be the Government's chief adviser on statistical matters. We intend the National Statistician to be the head of the Government's statistical service, providing professional leadership to those working on statistics in government, in the way the noble Lord, Lord Moser, indicated the role has been performed in the past.

However, it will be recognised why I have difficulty with the amendment. We have chosen to retain the decentralised statistical system. That decision has been widely supported. I do not think that it has been challenged in our debate. The Treasury Select Committee endorsed the concept. A decentralised system inevitably means that statisticians remain working within government departments. It is not appropriate to legislate within the Civil Service structure for lines of accountability between staff working in departments and the National Statistician working in another department. That would be to bring into legislation that which, in a decentralised system, should be kept out of legislation, but it in no way, shape or form undermines the arguments about the responsibilities of the National Statistician and his relationship to statisticians in departments.

We are not changing that basic relationship. What is being changed—this is the theme of the Bill—is the creation of a board on which the National Statistician is chief executive, with the powers vested in that board rather than where they lie at present. There is nothing between us on where we want the National Statistician to be. I cannot accept the amendment because it would mean that we would be legislating about the structure of the Civil Service, which seems not to make any sense.

I am fascinated by the Minister's response. I am very pleased that he agrees with the substance of the amendment but I do not follow his logic as to why, if he agrees with it, he cannot just accept it. This is not a formal, structural amendment; it makes a general point about the role of the National Statistician as providing professional leadership. If we were saying that each head of statistics in each department should report to the National Statistician in various ways or that they should have different grades or anything, I would have some sympathy with the Minister, but the amendment points out a general, important principle.

I do not intend to press the amendment tonight, but I will definitely give further thought to what the Minister has said and may come back to it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 148 and 149 not moved.]

Clause 28 agreed to.

Clause 29 [National Statistician: executive functions]:

[Amendment No. 150 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 151:

Clause 29, page 12, line 38, leave out subsection (2)

I shall speak also to the other amendments in the group that stand in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising. These probing amendments concern the executive functions of the National Statistician set out in Clause 29, the functions of the board and who actually controls the exercise or delegation of those functions. The board is set up with a number of functions, as set out throughout the Bill, particularly in Clauses 8 to 19. These are explicitly drafted in the Bill for the board. We have debated whether some or all of these functions should be assigned to the National Statistician and we will be returning to that subject at later stages of the Bill.

When we get to Clause 29 and the National Statistician's functions, we find in subsection (2) that:

"The National Statistician may ... exercise any of the functions of the Board", and, further, in subsection (7) that he "may delegate" the functions,

"to any other member of the executive office".

I am not sure that is the right scheme of powers. If the board is given functions under the Bill, it is the board which should decide on how they should be exercised. That is separate from the National Statistician being given defined powers under the Bill.

The Minister was keen on citing the corporate practice and the combined code when we debated the structure of the board right at the beginning of Committee. What the Bill does is very far from commercial practice. If this was a listed company, the board would have the power to do everything and would formally set down those things it reserved to itself.

The premise behind these amendments is that it cannot be right that the National Statistician has the power to exercise any of the functions of the board without reference to the board. I have tabled two alternative ways to deal with this. The first is, in Amendments Nos. 151 and 160, to delete Clause 29(2), (7) and (8), which would make the Bill silent on who is to exercise the functions. I believe that it would remain open to the board to empower the National Statistician to carry out all or any of its functions and to delegate to other members of the executive office.

I do not believe that removing the subsections would prohibit the board and the National Statistician from working on a perfectly satisfactory basis, but the board would be in the driving seat. However, if there is to be some explicit mention of the National Statistician's powers to carry out the functions of the board and to delegate them as necessary, they should be subject to the consent of the board, which is what Amendments Nos. 153 and 161 achieve. A further option, which I have not drafted, would be to let the board decide what functions it reserved to itself. That would line up with practice in the commercial world. My two sets of amendments achieve the same result. I ask the Minister to tell us what role the board will have under the Bill as it stands. It seems that the National Statistician has total freedom to choose what he or she does. I beg to move.

I point out that if the amendment is agreed, I shall not be able to call Amendment No. 152, by reason of pre-emption.

This may be a convenient moment to speak to my amendment, which is in the group, although the subject is somewhat different.

In speaking to the amendment to leave out Clause 29(4), I draw attention to the increasingly confused and, as I see it, misunderstood governance proposals. On Second Reading, we started with a red herring—the assertion that the chosen governance model would meet the approval of the Financial Services Authority. If the Minister still thinks that that model will gain approval, he can ask the FSA whether it agrees. It would no doubt answer that since it does not regulate any body remotely like the proposed Statistics Board, it has no comment to make. Will the Minister test that proposition?

However, since introducing red herrings is the classic way of diverting attention from what is really going on, we will do well to concentrate on whether the Government's proposals will work, regardless of where they come from. It is clear both from Committee proceedings to date and from information on the search for the chair that the Treasury considers that being the Statistics Board's adviser will be the National Statistician's real role. The promised position of chief executive is an add-on.

The chair, although described as non-executive in the Bill, is to be executive, I believe. The advertised salary of £150,000, presumably pensionable, must give rise to a remuneration package for three days a week way beyond any existing package for non-executive chairs. If it does not, may we be given the relevant precedents? The chair's rate of pay is considerably higher than that enjoyed by the National Statistician—always a good test of who is in charge. The Minister circulated a letter on the subject, but may we also have copies of the search consultants' information pack?

It is clear that the chair is to be top dog—a concept described by the Minister as crude, as indeed it is, given the drafting of the Bill. Given those developments, Clause 29(4) becomes even more unacceptable because it hammers home the reduction in the National Statistician's position to that of any executive who accepts that she must do or not do whatever the chair tells her, in the way in which he tells her to do it. Yet she is head of her profession.

What about the impact on independence and the building of trust—the twin objectives of the Bill? I wonder how those arrangements are to be built into the contracts of employment for the chair and the National Statistician. We need to understand those arrangements because if, on the one hand, the chair is to be deeply involved in operations and, on the other, the National Statistician is to have no public profile, I for one have been misled. The clause should be dropped.

I am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken to their amendments. I shall discuss the amendments separately because the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, raises some fundamental points that I need to address separately, although I recognise that they are contiguous with the arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. As she said, we discussed at length in our first Committee sitting the question of the governance model set out in the Bill. The Government are committed to that model. We believe that we have adopted the right approach for the National Statistician's relationship with the board and to the role of the executive office that the National Statistician is to establish.

As I said in my response to the previous amendment, our approach recognises the professional pre-eminence of the National Statistician. I listened to the arguments of the Opposition, but I shall not yield to them on their argument that we have any objective other than recognising the professional pre-eminence of the National Statistician. We establish that in Clause 29(2), where the National Statistician is assumed to be able to exercise the functions of the board directly, without the intervening express authority of the board, except in respect of specific functions. One is assessment, which we all recognise to be a separate concept; another is the final sign-off of the code of practice. The National Statistician will not exercise all those functions herself or himself, so the Bill enables the National Statistician to delegate functions to the staff of the executive office for which he or she is responsible.

The necessary quid pro quo of allowing the National Statistician directly to exercise those functions is that, to maintain accountability, the board must be able, as necessary, to condition how the executive staff are to function and reserve the right to exercise certain functions itself—the two functions that I identified earlier.

We see no case for changing that approach. I hear what the noble Baroness says, but I hope that she will recognise that there is coherence to the Government's position, which is based on a model that certainly preserves the role of the National Statistician but also guarantees that the board can meet its obligations in being accountable to Parliament.

The noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, is defining a different kind of board, one in which there is an executive chairman. That is why he raises the issue of the salary. Why should the salary issue affect the relationship between the chair and the National Statistician if not the chair but the National Statistician is exercising executive authority?

Although the National Statistician can exercise any of the board's functions, except for the final code sign-off and assessment decisions, which we recognise to be separate, the reason why those functions need to be reserved is that the board will be charged under the Bill as ultimately accountable for those functions. It is therefore bound to have some power to direct the National Statistician on the discharge of those functions. The board could not be accountable if it had no control at all over the manner in which the functions are exercised. I shall consider the question asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, about the search consultants' reference pack. I cannot give a categorical answer at this stage. I will do my best to provide that information, but I am slightly hesitant about doing so. It will be recognised that this relates to a public appointment, and I am not quite sure just how much we are free to disclose. I will certainly write to him with as much information as I can.

The noble Viscount's amendment relates to a different kind of board from the one in the Bill—which we hope to convince the Chamber has merits. The board is accountable to Parliament and has the National Statistician as its chief executive. It has two functions in particular. We all recognise the one that relates to assessment and that is separate from the National Statistician, which is why it has its powers. It is also accountable to Parliament for the overall position, but the National Statistician is the executive officer. He will set up the executive operation of statistics from the board, and will set the standards for all statisticians who produce government statistics.

There has been a considerable overlap of issues in both the debates that we have had so far. I hope that I have established for the Committee the fact that the Government are clear in the Bill about the nature of the board, and that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment. She said that it was probing. I hope that I have at least given her food for thought.

The trouble with this topic is that the amendments touch on what we came to call the muddle of the whole structure of the relationship between the National Statistician and the board, which the Minister will come back to at a later stage. It is therefore difficult to discuss them totally separately. On the whole, I support the amendments, but I want to talk about a particular problem, which may be the product of my suspicious mind. From the very beginning, when we first set out on this route after the Chancellor had made his proposal, I had the feeling that the Treasury, where this all came from, was rather in favour of a somewhat executive board. Gradually, that was watered down and became more non-executive, which we have discussed at some length.

My worries have returned because of the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, and the announcement last week of the appointment of a non-executive chairman. It was not so much the salary that worried me; I cannot comment on that because everyone gets such high salaries these days that I can only congratulate whoever gets this job. I am much more worried about the three days a week. In my time as National Statistician and in that of National Statisticians after me, it was very nice to have Ministers in charge. They may occasionally have gone slightly too far into the political arena, but they basically left one alone. They certainly did not spend three days a week in charge of us. I worry about the concept of a non-executive chairman spending three days a week "managing" the National Statistician, as one document put it.

I thank both noble Lords for taking part in this short debate. There is an incredible fog in this Bill about the board and the National Statistician. At times, the Minister wishes to build up the National Statistician at the Dispatch Box; at others, he resists any amendments to the Bill to enhance that. There is a complete lack of clarity. The noble Lord, Lord Moser, put his finger on the question teased out by the amendment of my noble friend Lord Eccles: what will this chairman do for three days a week? We understand that there can be different kinds of boards and different kinds of separation of roles between executives and non-executives, but we find it increasingly difficult to align what the Minister is saying about what the National Statistician will do and what the board will do by itself, with what the Government are saying are the role of the chairman and the terms of his appointment in advertisements in the national newspapers. The Minister rightly noted that I said that my amendments were probing; I always stand by my word on such things. He will know that we need to return to this in much more detail on Report. I would not like him to think in any way that his arguments have left the Committee satisfied. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 152 to 157 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 158:

Clause 29, page 13, line 8, at end insert—

"( ) The executive office established under subsection (5) shall be known as the Office for National Statistics."

Amendment No. 158 states that the name of the executive office created by Clause 29(5) shall be the Office for National Statistics. In Clause 52, both the Office for National Statistics and the Statistics Commission are officially killed off. In Clause 53, however, the property, rights and liabilities of the ONS are transferred to the Statistics Board. Under Clause 29(5), the National Statistician must establish an executive office. Although the Bill and the Explanatory Notes are silent on this, I understand, not least from the meeting that the Minister organised with Mr John Healey before Second Reading, that in effect the ONS will live on in the new executive office.

I am sure that the parliamentary draftsman had a good reason for killing off the ONS in one part of the Bill and resurrecting it under no name in another part of the Bill, but it would be clearer if the Bill made it plain that the new executive office is indeed the successor to the ONS and that it proudly bears its name. The noble Lord, Lord Moser, reminded us at Second Reading that:

"The ONS is widely and rightly regarded as one of the best statistical offices in the world",—[Hansard, 26/3/07; col. 1455.]

and that the problems addressed by the Bill lie elsewhere and not in the ONS itself. The Minister did not dissent from that proposition in his winding-up speech that day, and I hope that he will confirm that the Government indeed recognise and value the strength of the ONS.

Given that there is brand value in the ONS, it seems perverse that its name and brand are being consigned to history. It would be far better to preserve the name in the Bill and to make clear its continuity in the world of statistics, both nationally and internationally. I beg to move.

Amendment No. 158 stipulates that the executive office of the board should be known as the Office for National Statistics. Our view is that including in the legislation the prescription of what the executive office is to be called—namely, the Office for National Statistics—is unnecessarily inflexible. The executive office may well be called the Office for National Statistics, although those involved, such as the chairman, the board and the National Statistician, may decide that a different name would be more appropriate. It is difficult for us to see what interest is to be served by prescribing this in the Bill.

When the staff of the Office for National Statistics read Hansard, they will note that the Minister did not respond to my invitation to recognise the value and strength of the ONS, and they will regret that. I can see that if the Government do not want to put the name in the Bill, they are entitled not to, but the signal that the Government send is a pity. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 159 to 161 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 162:

Clause 29, page 13, line 17, at end insert—

"( ) The National Statistician shall produce a business plan covering functions relating to all official statistics at least once every three years."

We return here to the planning of statistics, which I suggest should be a function of the National Statistician. Members of the Committee will remember that at Second Reading I drew attention to the fact that the present framework requires the National Statistician, or the chief statistician, to produce a high-level business plan for statistics in relation not just to the ONS—I am afraid that I shall continue to refer to the ONS, which is a very good brand name—but to all national statistics. That was in the framework, but there is nothing in the Bill. At Second Reading I asked why not.

In addition, the current framework for statistics places an obligation on the Chancellor of the Exchequer to maintain and develop the co-ordination structure for national statistics. Again, that responsibility has not been assigned to the board or to the National Statistician and is, therefore, apparently lost. At Second Reading, I asked why that should be. I received no satisfactory answers to these questions, so I am having another go. There is nothing in the Bill which gives either the board or the National Statistician explicit authority for co-ordinating statistical planning across more than 20 Whitehall producers of official statistics or the devolved Administrations. All that the Bill enables the board to do is to monitor and report on the statistical plans of the various largely autonomous bodies under Clause 8.

Planning to meet the statistical needs of the country is a highly demanding task, which I am advised, in the view of many, is not well done now. We have had the recent row over the migration statistics. A few years ago there was a row over the pension statistics. There have been arguments over the regional economic statistics, which were the subject of the 2004 Allsopp report commissioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. That report pointed to the inadequacy of those statistics.

At Second Reading I mentioned several examples of where often policies are embarked on with no statistical base at all. I cited the example of the New Deal and a number of others. In all these areas, the provision of statistics has lagged some way behind the requirement of the Government, let alone the requirements of the country more generally. It is my view, and I hope that the Committee might agree, that good planning is essential to make sure that needs are recognised early and properly addressed.

Let me give a further more recent example of this. Last week, the Institute for Social & Economic Research at Essex University, a body for which I have high regard, announced a new household panel survey of 40,000 households, which is a substantial enlargement of the existing British household panel study. It is being financed by the Economic and Social Research Council. Like the British household panel study, it will be a longitudinal survey—again, I attach the highest importance to that—and will follow the survey sample over many years. The proposers recognise, and argue, that to trace the social development of different categories of citizen in this way provides much more effective information on which policies can be based. But if neither the National Statistician nor the Statistics Board has any authority to plan or co-ordinate this new statistical survey, will it just go the way of the others that I have mentioned?

Simply gathering together the routine statistical plans of individual organisations does little to raise the game of the statistical service. This is already done now and the resulting product gives little overall sense of co-ordination or purpose, which is not surprising as the chief statistician does not have the authority to impose co-ordination or co-operation on any of these parties. The absence of any authority to co-ordinate statistical planning is a major weakness. My amendment suggests that at least once every three years, the National Statistician must produce a plan for statistics across the board. This role belongs firmly to the National Statistician as the Government's chief adviser, as we have discussed earlier. The board's role is to make sure that it is done well and to report to Parliament on its assessment in that regard.

That is the purpose of my amendment. I did not get good answers at Second Reading, but I hope that I may get some decent answers now. I beg to move.

I support this amendment. It seems such an obvious duty for the National Statistician, supported by the board. There is no other statistical office in the world that I know of—and I used to be in charge of United Nations statistics—that does not have this kind of responsibility, if only to make sure that forward planning of not only statistics but of resources needed by the statistical service are in good shape. This seems to be an obvious duty to incorporate in the Bill.

As the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, said, we have had quite a discussion about this matter. I hope that there will be clarity in what I say which will satisfy the noble Lord. The board's objective is to promote and safeguard the quality and comprehensiveness of official statistics that meet the public good. The board has a range of duties and powers to help deliver on that. We want to let the independent board statistician and chairman determine the appropriate planning mechanism and not at this stage be over-prescriptive. Ultimately, the board is the legal entity responsible for exercising the functions in the Bill. Therefore, we do not believe that there should be a legal requirement on the National Statistician to produce a business plan.

Already the board, under its obligation to produce an annual report under Clause 25, is to report on,

"what it intends to do during the next financial year", and to lay this report before the UK Parliament and the devolved legislatures. The board's powers under the clause also allow it to publish at any time additional reports relating to any of its functions. How frequently such reports are published, and what specific issues will be covered, will ultimately, and in our view quite rightly, be for the board, with the National Statistician as the executive figure, to determine.

We would also expect that in addition to the information included in the board's annual report, it will produce periodic, more strategic, business planning documents. Our assumption is that a competent board, with the National Statistician in the chief executive's role and a non-executive chairman, will do everything that the noble Lord requires. That is the way things happen with an efficient, well run board and a super chief executive. There is a worry in the noble Lord's mind, but it is difficult to see why he is concerned.

I hope that I may intervene. Both roles were spelt out in 2000 in the framework and were assigned to the National Statistician and to the commission. However, they do not appear in this Bill—they have gone. The Minister's argument is that it will all happen as though they were in the Bill. I find that very difficult to accept.

That is not my argument. Here we are setting up a board which has objectives. Of course it is in everyone's interests that an effective National Statistician and executive chair are in place. We will expect the board to do everything the noble Lord says. However, the fact that the requirement does not appear in the Bill is not relevant because, obviously, the board will want to be highly effective.

I find that reply deeply unsatisfactory and I will want to study what the Minister has said. He does not appear in any way to have addressed the argument put to the Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Moser, who said that this requirement is made by every other statistical office. I feel that the Government are leaving too much to the discretion of the board and the National Statistician. Surely, planning must be a central function and I cannot understand why it should not be specified in the Bill.

However, the Minister has said that the Government will not give way on this tonight. We shall need to return to the matter at some stage but, in the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 163:

Clause 29, page 13, line 22, leave out paragraph (a)

I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 164, 166 and 167. They are probing amendments and concern the extent to which the assessment function will be fully separated within the Statistics Board.

The structure of the Statistics Board in the Bill rests on being able to separate the function of assessment from the other functions. As assessment of statistics applies to those statistics produced by the ONS, or its successor, as well as those produced elsewhere in government, the function of assessment and separation of that function is critical.

The Bill provides that the head of assessment is not to be a member of the executive office which is headed by the National Statistician. That is quite right, but no mention is made of the staff who will carry out the assessment processes. My Amendment No. 163 removes paragraph (a) of Clause 29(10), which refers to the head of assessment only. Amendment No. 164 replaces this with a new paragraph which will ensure that not only the head of assessment but also his staff will not be in the executive office.

Clause 31(3) does try to deal with the issue of keeping staff separate, though it implies that the staff could in fact be members of the executive office. But the board, under Clause 31(3), secures this separation only "so far as practicable". We do not think that this is anything like strong enough. It must be evident that the staff must not work on the production of statistics. The function of assessment is akin to an audit function and one of the primary characteristics of audit—whether external or internal—is independence. Auditors have to avoid various threats, such as familiarity, self-review, intimidation and self-interest, all of which could arise if the assessment function used members of the executive office to carry out its work.

Amendment No. 166 deletes the words "so far as practicable" from Clause 31(3). Amendment No. 167 reinforces that by extending the requirement for the head of assessment not to take part in the production of statistics to the staff of the head of assessment.

Perhaps I may return briefly to the role of the National Statistician as the chief executive of the board. That implies that the head of assessment is inferior to the National Statistician because he has to be an employee of the board even if not actually a member of the board. I understand the desire to create a board with two streams of activity which are independent of each other, but I do not believe that the Bill achieves that with clarity.

I tried in Amendment No. 150, which we debated on our first Committee day, to argue that the National Statistician should be the chief executive not of the board but of the executive office. That was because I could not see how the National Statistician could be the chief executive of the board because one important stream of activity—that of assessment—had to be kept entirely separate. I continue to be concerned on this score.

I said earlier that these were probing amendments and I hope that the Minister can explain how, under the Bill, the head of assessment and his staff are properly separate from and independent of the National Statistician and the executive office. I beg to move.

The Committee will be pleased to hear that I agree with every sentiment expressed by the noble Baroness about the objective of keeping assessment separate from the production of statistics. That is our intent, too, and I emphasise that we do not think the amendments are necessary to achieve our shared goal—a goal shared by all those concerned with the effective operation of the board. Clauses 29 and 31 make clear that the head of assessment is not to be part of the National Statistician's executive office, as the noble Baroness recognised, nor is the head of assessment to take part in statistical production.

As the staff working on assessment will report to the head of assessment, it follows that these staff are not part of the executive office, nor will they work on statistical production. We do not need to state this again in the Bill because it is clear that we have identified the need to separate the head of assessment from the production of statistics. However, I ask the Committee to consider whether there is a real difficulty with the fact that they are on the same board.

Let me take an area in which inspection plays its part in a product that we all hold very dear to our hearts; education. It is possible for the inspectorate to be part of the board and represented on it. The inspectorate has an entirely different job and a different responsibility—it is the inspectorate of what the board is responsible for producing. There is no suggestion that because the chief executive is concerned with the promotion of educational standards, the inspectorate is somehow compromised because the inspector serves on the same board. However, it must be clear that their functions are defined as separate and that the board is there to guarantee that separation. That is exactly what is being proposed in this model.

In Amendment No. 166 the noble Baroness has alighted upon the phrase, "so far as practicable". I recognise why she should: because there is a danger that this provision is a get-out from the position that those concerned with the production of statistics should not be involved in assessment. In the normal course of events, we expect that the board will ensure that staff do not engage in the production and simultaneously the assessment of statistics. We have kept this phrase simply because it is possible that a member of staff might move from a post in the production of statistics to one on the assessment side and a small overlap in their work might result. That is not in any way, shape or form to compromise the principle on which the board will operate—to keep assessment separate from production—but working situations of that kind might arise. We simply did not want a position where a low-level overlap for a short period would cause a member of staff and the board employing him or her to fall foul of the legislation. That would render movement between the two functions very difficult indeed. But in career terms, a member of staff may well be involved at one stage in the production of national statistics and then pursue a career move on the assessment side.

The provision is included for that purpose only, and the safeguard is that the board is charged with these two separate functions. That is set out clearly in the Bill and the board's working practices will embody them. I have illustrated the point with an example from the field of education. The noble Baroness has indicated that her amendments are probing in nature, and I certainly hope that on this occasion I have satisfied her that the Government have thought this issue through.

I will have to disappoint the Minister again by saying that I am not wholly satisfied with his response. He gave an example in education where an inspector sat on a board. In fact, the Bill does not have the head of assessment sitting on the board. Some may think that he should be on the board, but that is not what this legislation seeks to achieve. My amendment does not address that issue because I can see quite easily how two people might function at a senior level within the organisation. My point concerned the staff.

Can the Minister explain why the Bill sets up an arrangement for the National Statistician to head an executive office with a full staff but is completely silent on any issues relating to staff for the head of assessment? Nothing in the Bill refers to the resources that would need to go to the head of assessment. The Minister says that the Government have thought this through clearly, but I cannot see that in the Bill.

We do not put staff numbers and remuneration in legislation; we are merely making it absolutely clear that the staff working for the head of assessment have nothing to do with the production of statistics, nor do they work in the executive office under the National Statistician. It could not be clearer than that.

The Minister is clear on it, but the Bill is not. It does not state that staff working on the assessment side should not be in the executive office. Indeed, a casual reading implies quite the reverse. I fear that the Minister has also not explained how the National Statistician can be the chief executive of the board when there are supposed to be two sets of staff and the National Statistician is the chief executive of only one set. This takes us back to an aspect of the confusion lying at the heart of the Bill.

I said when I introduced these amendments that they are probing in nature, and therefore I shall take them no further today. I do not believe that the Minister has adequately explained how these two streams of activity are to exist within the new Statistics Board, and I hope that he will choose to reflect on that before we come to the Report stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 164 not moved.]

Clause 29 agreed to.

Clause 30 [Head of Assessment]:

On Question, Whether Clause 30 shall stand part of the Bill?

I do not want to go over the ground that has already been covered by my noble friend Lady Noakes, so I will be brief. However, I should like to suggest to the Minister at least one reason why the arrangements in Clause 30 are unsatisfactory. It is not the habit of chief executives to be told that they may not have anything to do with part of the organisation for which they are executively responsible. Chief executives reckon that the buck stops on their desk. If, for example, when I was chairman of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, I had told the incoming director that there was a large chunk of the gardens' operations for which he would have no responsibility, I would have had trouble concluding a contract with him.

While I can see that if the three-day chairman is to be the public face of the Statistics Board—to guard the code, to be responsible for the board's detailed relationships with the Government and the person who deals with the media—he or she will need advice. However, the presence of a second executive member with the title of "Head of Assessment" alongside the National Statistician, who is to be the chief executive and yet is to have no working relationship with the head of assessment, is a recipe for trouble. Any highly qualified chair would be able to deal with these matters without the intervention of such a prescriptive clause, put in the Bill no doubt in pursuit of continued Treasury control. I suspect, from the discussion so far, that if the clause were not there and an amendment was put forward to include it, we would be told that it was too prescriptive and not needed.

I thank the noble Viscount for presenting his opposition to the clause in such a constructive way, although obviously we regard this provision as important. I am afraid that I am obliged to reiterate the role of the head of assessment in the way I did when responding to the previous amendment. The head of assessment is not a competing voice to the board's chief adviser—the chief executive in the form of the National Statistician. While the National Statistician will advise the board on its wide range of statistical functions, the role of the head of assessment will be strongly focused on supporting the board in one, and only one, of its key functions, that of assessment.

I recognise from the response of the noble Baroness to my explanation on the previous amendments that I have not as yet won the argument and achieved total conviction. We have further stages where these issues may be pursued. I shall study what has been said this evening in criticism of the government model in Hansard carefully, and I hope that the replies from this Box will also be studied with care. We believe that the Bill gives a clear prescription of the role of the National Statistician and the enhancement of that position as the chief executive of the board and head of national statistics, and of the assessment function with which the board is properly charged which is separate from that. I hope that if we return to this subject on another occasion, noble Lords will have looked at these arguments as carefully as I intend to.

I shall certainly look with great care at what the Minister said, as is only right and proper. I do not think that there is any disagreement about the dual role of production and quality control—as I prefer to call it as opposed to assessment. The point of disagreement is why it is not right and proper to leave this matter to the Statistics Board and its chief executive, the National Statistician, who would be uniquely well placed to carry out the function of quality control.

Clause 30 agreed to.

Clause 31 [Separation of Functions]:

[Amendment No. 165 to 168 not moved.]

Clause 31 agreed to.

Clause 32 [Committees]:

[Amendment No. 169 not moved.]

Clause 32 agreed to.

Clauses 33 to 35 agreed to.

Clause 36 [Confidentiality of personal information]:

[Amendment No. 170 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 171:

Clause 36, page 15, line 16, after "disclosed" insert "nor used except in relation to the exercise of any of the Board's and National Statistician's functions,"

We have tabled this probing amendment because we believe it is very important that there should be clarity about the circumstances in which information submitted to the board, particularly by an individual, can be used. The amendment seeks to ensure that information not only cannot be disclosed; it cannot be used,

"except in relation to the exercise of any of the Board's and National Statistician's functions".

This seems a very strange amendment because, presumably, a member or employee of the board, or of a committee of the board, will be exercising only the functions of the board. Therefore the amendment does not apply to paragraphs (a) and (b).

The amendment relates to paragraph (c), which states that information must not be disclosed by,

"any other person who has received it directly or indirectly from the Board".

The key issue, on which I seek reassurance from the Minister, is what types of person will receive the information directly or indirectly if it is information that board members and their employees cannot disclose? What does the Bill mean by "disclosed" as opposed to information which is received?. Does paragraph (c) mean that anyone who receives information for some reason, not necessarily as a result of a deliberate disclosure by the board, is bound by the disclosure rules; or is it intended to refer, for example, to a subcontractor to the board who is not a member or employee of the board or of any of its committees? What category of person does the Minister envisage will be receiving information? Can we be certain that, in the Bill as it stands, anyone who is not employed by the board will be limited in the use they can make of any information they receive simply to the exercise of the functions of the board? I beg to move.

My Amendment No. 180 in this group is different from the Liberal Democrat amendment but addresses some of the same issues. Amendment No. 171 would restrict the board in the use of personal information to the board's or National Statistician's functions. Amendment No. 180 seeks to delete Clause 36(4)(c) and would not allow the disclosure of information which is,

"necessary for the purpose of enabling or assisting the Board to exercise any of its functions".

My purpose in tabling Amendment No. 180 is to probe why the board should ever need to disclose information for the purposes of its functions.

I can see why the board might need to use personal information and I can see how it might feel that it could disclose in some of the circumstances set out in subsection (4), but I cannot understand the circumstances in which the board would need to disclose information for the purposes of its functions as set out in the Bill, such as reporting official statistics, defining official statistics, producing statistics, compiling the retail prices index and providing statistical services. It also has a function in research, but that is specifically covered in subsection (4)(i), and paragraph (c) is clearly not about that.

So we are left with one area, the census, which is the only area given in the Explanatory Notes as the reason for the board needing to disclose information for the purposes of its functions. If that is the only reason, we believe that a much more targeted reference to the disclosure of information for that purpose should be included in the Bill, rather than the extremely broad permission given in subsection (4)(c) to disclose anything in relation to the board's functions. I look forward to the Minister's explanation.

Perhaps I may deal first with Amendment No. 180 as it is a specific amendment and then deal with the rather more general issues that the noble Lord, Lord Newby, introduced with his amendment.

There may be limited occasions when the board may need to disclose in pursuit of its functions, one of which is given, for example, in Section 5 of the Census Act 1920. That function is transferred to the board from the Registrar General under Schedule 1 to the Bill and allows the board to develop statistics on the population for periods between one census and another, and otherwise to supply and further provide for the better co-ordination of such information. In performing this function the board may need to disclose information; for example, to allow statisticians in the Department for Work and Pensions to use that information, with administrative data, to aid in the development of better-quality population statistics. The prevention of such sharing, which would be for the purpose of a function of the board, could cause a real deterioration in the standard of government statistics.

I want to reassure the noble Baroness and the Committee that, as all the board's functions are considered to be statistical, there could be no possibility of this exception allowing disclosure for non-statistical purposes. Nothing in the exception overrides existing restrictions on disclosure in, for example, other legislation. The board will be able to make a disclosure only where it is lawful to do so. The confidentiality protection in Clause 36 will still apply even if the board has passed the data on to others under this exception. It will mean that if anyone who received the data under this exception disclosed it unlawfully, they would be subject to criminal sanction. Nothing in Clause 36 overrides the protections given in the Data Protection Act and the Human Rights Act. I hope that the noble Baroness recognises why there needs to be an exception.

Is there an example other than the census? That is the question which I posed in my opening remarks.

I gave the clearest illustration that I could. I will write to the noble Baroness if there are other illustrations, but this is the key one in respect of the necessity for having exception.

On the more general issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, we believe that there are adequate and proper safeguards in place for personal information. They are vital, as the noble Lord emphasised. That is why the Bill ensures the strongest possible protections for confidentiality of personal information consistent with the public interest in allowing the existing flows of data to and from the board to continue and allowing the possibility of increasing the sharing of data for, I emphasise, statistical purposes only.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded that the Bill did not raise sufficiently significant human rights issues for the committee to examine it further. A committee that, as we know, examines Bills with the greatest care thought that this Bill had a clean bill of health as it stands. As I said on Second Reading, overall the Information Commissioner welcomes the fact that the Bill recognises the importance of ensuring personal information is used only where necessary and confidentiality is respected. The Information Commissioner welcomed the creation of a criminal offence for the illegal disclosure of personal information in Clause 36, which he believes should act as a significant deterrent to those working for the board and to anyone else in receipt of the information who needs to act on it for statistical purposes only.

The Government's approach to the data-sharing and confidentiality clauses is clear. We intend to ensure that the existing flows of data to and from the ONS are replicated in the new system. We do not want to damage the flows of information on which the ONS has been dependent in the past. We want to allow for the possibility of increased sharing of data to and from the board and other public authorities where that sharing is for the purpose of statistical production and analysis and anywhere that it is judged to be in the public interest and approved by Parliament through secondary legislation. We have introduced strong confidentiality safeguards to ensure that people have confidence that their data will be held securely. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, gave voice to obvious anxieties on that score, which need to be allayed.

These are the principles on which we are working. We are building on the long history of the ONS, which, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, or the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, said, was an excellent brand name. I see that the noble Baroness takes responsibility for that phrase, and I congratulate her. We do not want in any way, shape or form to do anything other than enhance that. The ONS has had a long history of properly protecting data. We are taking this opportunity to increase the confidentiality safeguards on personal information, introducing into the Bill a criminal sanction for wrongful disclosure.

I emphasise that we fully appreciate the noble Lord's concerns. Others have looked at the Bill carefully and have given a favourable response to the issues of confidentiality. I hope that he will therefore feel able to withdraw the amendment.

I am most grateful to the Minister for that explanation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 172 to 175 not moved.]

If Amendment No. 176 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 177 because of pre-emption.

moved Amendment No. 176:

Clause 36, page 15, line 32, leave out paragraph (a)

I shall speak to Amendment No. 177 as well. Amendment No. 176 would delete paragraph (a) of Clause 36(4). This paragraph allows the board to disclose personal information that is required or permitted by any enactment. The amendment would remove that as a basis for permitted disclosure by the board or anyone else who had received it from the board.

Paragraph (a) is very wide. I can see that for Acts passed after this Act is brought into effect it will be open to Parliament to authorise disclosure. I have a bigger problem with this Act permitting a completely unspecified number of disclosures or opportunities for disclosure on legislative grounds. Clearly the existing statutes do not refer to the Statistics Board, so I am struggling with what kind of Acts we are talking about. Are they referring to disclosure to the ONS? If so, why do we not see a schedule of technical amendments for that purpose? The Explanatory Notes give one solitary example. Are there any others? Can the Minister provide a comprehensive list of the statutes concerned as at today's date? If he cannot do so today, will he undertake to do so before Report?

Amendment No. 177 generously assumes that the Minister can make a case for disclosure on the basis of paragraph (a). If that paragraph remains in the Bill, we believe that it should be made plain that the information may be disclosed only if it is for statistical purposes. We have discussed the principles of this before. We believe it important that the board should not disclose personal information for non-statistical purposes, except in the most clearly defined and substantiated cases. Paragraph (a) is not clearly defined and must therefore be constrained by statistical purposes. I beg to move.

Amendment No. 176 would remove the exception to the confidentiality obligation in Clause 36(4)(a) that allows the board to share personal information when another enactment requires or permits this sharing. Clause 36(4)(a) is there to take into account existing information gateways agreed by Parliament. We would not want to remove this exception or limit it to allowing disclosure only for statistical purposes. This may prevent existing data-sharing practices occurring in those specific cases that Parliament has previously debated and decided are in the public interest. Schedule 2 gives the examples of other Acts, such as the Finance Act 1969.

Another example of where sharing between the ONS and other departments is allowed by existing legislation is the Inter Departmental Business Register. The IDBR is a list of UK businesses maintained by the ONS, collected under legislation such as the Statistics of Trade Act 1947. These data are used by various government departments, such as the Department for Education and Skills and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, or by the devolved Administrations, for selecting samples for surveys of businesses to produce, for example, analyses of business activity. It is vital for statistics around government to ensure that these existing flows of data from the IDBR are allowed to continue. Amendment No. 176 would stop this by preventing the board from sharing data when other enactments allowed it. The noble Baroness asked for a comprehensive list. We hope to provide that to her before the next stage of the Bill. I hope that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment in the light of what I have said.

I thank the Minister for offering to provide that list. I was merely seeking clarity, rather than leaving an undefined ability in the Bill. When the Minister produces the list, perhaps he will explain the relationship between it and Schedule 2, to which he referred me and which provides for continuity with a number of specific Acts. Is Schedule 2 a comprehensive statement? I am happy for the Minister to write to me on that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 177 and 178 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 179:

Clause 36, page 15, line 33, at end insert "and only where the information is being made available for statistical purposes"

I was confused earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, not moving Amendment No. 174, with which Amendment No. 179 was grouped. Since we have now reached Amendment No. 179 on the Marshalled List, I shall exercise my right to move it.

Noble Lords will know that we on these Benches have a fair degree of suspicion about the designs of the European Community on matters within our national competence. We can just about see that there might be statistical obligations within the Community that require disclosure of personal information. We are not convinced that that is the case, but we are prepared to give the benefit of the doubt. However, we are wholly resistant to the notion that the Statistics Board, which is the guardian of personal information for statistical purposes within the UK, should have any right or obligation to pass on personal information under Community laws that are not statistical in origin. That is a step too far and it should be resisted. I beg to move.

I have been puzzled by some of the observations that have been made and have been trying to restrain myself. I do not know what the worry is. What information of a personal nature does the noble Baroness think could be revealed by the Statistics Board? Where a sole corporation is concerned, the name of the corporation may be revealed. I do not know what sort of person the noble Baroness is worried about.

I find that question a little difficult to answer. I am worried about any form of personal information that the Statistics Board might hold for its statistical purposes. I have no problem with the Statistics Board receiving personal information to produce statistics—that is entirely sensible and rational—but I am probing the circumstances in which the Statistics Board may pass on that personal information. It will acquire quite a lot of personal information; for example, it will be able to acquire information from NHS registration practices. I am sure that the Minister can assure the noble Lord, Lord Desai, that it will be quite normal for the Statistics Board—or the ONS at the moment—to have access to personal information in the production of its statistics. I am probing the removal of that information beyond the Statistics Board, not its use within it.

EU regulations and directives impose duties on member states as regards the collection of statistics and regulate the way in which they are collected. Community obligations are an important part of the UK Government's responsibilities within the European Union. We currently provide significant amounts of information in response to our Community obligations; for example, member states are required to submit to Eurostat data on balance of payments, international trade in services and foreign direct investment for the production of Community statistics.

I emphasise that we are not currently aware of any Community obligations that require disclosure of statistical information for a non-statistical purpose. However, the Government believe it necessary to ensure that this clause does not create a barrier to disclosure, in the event that a Community obligation should require this in the future. This is particularly necessary given the criminal sanctions in Clause 36. We certainly would not want somebody inadvertently to be criminalised because they had met a future Community obligation.

Our obligations and responsibilities within the European Union are important. It would not be right to restrict disclosure where the Community required it. EC regulations are binding in their entirety and are directly applicable in member states. As a matter of law, any national provision that is inconsistent would need to be repealed in any case. The exception in Clause 36(4)(b) is required to ensure that there is sufficient flexibility for the future should a Community obligation require disclosure, whether or not that disclosure is for a statistical purpose. No legislation from the Community requires this at this stage, and nothing is imminent, but if we did not have any flexibility in this legislation, someone could be subject to criminal sanctions for obeying a European requirement to which we had properly assented. That is the reason for this element of flexibility, but I indicate again that there has been no instance of this disclosure being required by the European Community in the several decades for which it has existed.

The truly shocking aspect of the Minister's response was his saying that the Government might agree to releasing personal information for non-statistical purposes into the EU. He referred to the UK properly assenting to such a requirement. In my view, the UK could never properly assent to any such notion, but clearly the Government's views and ours on what we will do with our citizens' data within the EU do not coincide, as is the case with many of our views on our relationship with the EU. However, that is too large a subject to pursue further this evening. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 180 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 181:

Clause 36, page 15, line 37, leave out paragraph (e)

I apologise to the noble Baroness for not having moved Amendment No. 174, but my principal reason for not moving it was that I was rather reassured, somewhat against the grain of this Bill, by the Minister's response to Amendment No. 171, when he said—or I thought that he had said—that disclosure would take place only for statistical purposes. Perhaps I was lulled into a false sense of security.

In moving Amendment No. 181, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 183. They are not grouped together, but they are both probing amendments. The two paragraphs to which they refer appear to deal with information which would be disclosed for non-statistical purposes. I cannot imagine a court ordering the board to disclose information for statistical purposes, nor can I imagine the intelligence services doing the same. This clause looks very similar to a clause that I remember debating in a Bill merging the Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise; it is a general clause. Could I have some explanation from the Minister as to circumstances in which personal information might be required by the court and, if he could, circumstances in which the intelligence services might be given that information? I beg to move.

I shall speak to Amendments Nos. 181 and 183.

Amendment No. 181 would remove the exception allowing the board lawfully to share information in pursuit of a court order. This exception is necessary to avoid the board being put under competing legal obligations—from the court order and the confidentiality obligation at Clause 36. If the board were made the subject of a court order requiring it to disclose this information, the board's employees would face conflicting legal demands. On the one hand, they would be subject to the limit on disclosure of information in the confidentiality obligation and, on the other hand, they would be required to disclose information as a result of an order of the court.

Of course, if a court requested information from the board, the board could present arguments to the courts as to why they should not be required to release the information, as the ONS has done in the past. However, we do not want the board or its employees to face conflicting legal demands if, after considering those arguments, the court order requires the information to be passed to them.

Amendment No. 183 would remove the provision which allows the board lawfully to share information with the intelligence services, in the interests of national security. This provision effectively replicates the current position, whereby we believe that, if the intelligence services were able to make out a principled case for access to information, restrictions on disclosure of information could be over-ridden in the public interest. The provision ensures that the Statistics Board is not restricted from making a disclosure of this nature in the future, should it be regarded as necessary.

As with all the exceptions to the confidentiality obligation, this exception allows, but does not compel, disclosure by the board. This is a discretionary gateway under which the board would be able to disclose if it was satisfied that the disclosure fell within the terms of the Bill. Should the board receive a request for information from the intelligence services, it would have to consider that request on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, before making a disclosure, the board would need to be satisfied that the disclosure did not breach the Human Rights Act 1998, particularly Article 8—the right to privacy—and was consistent with the Data Protection Act 1998.

There are other existing legislative safeguards against abuse—in particular, the legislation establishing the intelligence services places statutory duties on the heads of the intelligence services to ensure that there are arrangements for securing that information is not obtained except in so far as necessary for the proposed discharge of their functions.

I hope that my comments on these two amendments have reassured the noble Lord, Lord Newby, and that he will be able to withdraw his amendment.

In respect of both instances that are the subject of the noble Lord's amendment, the board will end up being the secondary source of information. The information will have been derived from primary sources, whatever those sources may be. In that event, why on Earth is it necessary for the law statutorily to demand the right of access to the board's information when as a matter of course that information primarily is available elsewhere?

It may not be available elsewhere. It may have been collected from a variety of sources. The point of my explanation on the amendments is that there is nothing new here. This is how the board operates at the moment and we are simply explaining that that is how it will operate in future. If the noble Earl believes that there is a basic inefficiency in how the ONS has done its duty in the past, we will be very happy to look at that. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, shakes her head. If I was proposing that the board did things in a different way, there might be a reason for some discussion, but I am describing what happens now.

I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation, which technically I understand. However, because he has not given us any examples of either of these powers being used in the past—although I accept that that might be difficult to do because of national security—it is very difficult to have a discussion about whether they have been used reasonably. It is highly likely that such orders of the court are rarely used. I could not think of a case in which a court would be ordering the ONS to disclose personal information. However, if there is a strand here, it would be useful to have some evidence of what it is and why the provision is so valuable. The Minister may be able to give me some satisfaction on that.

This is an answer to the question asked by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk. It is likely that courts would go to primary sources, but there may be circumstances when they consider it necessary to approach the board.

I am sure that the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, is extremely grateful for that explanation. Perhaps the Minister would feel it helpful to drop me and other noble Lords participating in this debate a short note about circumstances in which the court has applied for information. I think that we would all find that extremely helpful.

I shall be very happy to do that.

I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 182 to 186 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 187:

Clause 36, page 16, line 8, at end insert ", and

(c) appropriate safeguards to guarantee adequate data protection for the relevant personal information."

The amendment's clear purpose is to ensure that approved researchers are bound by adequate data protection safeguards, not least so that such individuals are fully cognisant of the legal requirement to maintain confidentiality in respect of raw data. I have absolutely no difficulty with such individuals being granted access to personal information by the board. Indeed, such a provision can be interpreted as both necessary and beneficial in generating an effective and useful statistical product. That said, given the nature and scope of the raw data that will potentially be disclosed to them, it seems entirely appropriate that a strong and robust analysis of the data protection safeguards with which approved researchers would need to comply should be an element of the criteria that the board considers.

As I suggested at Second Reading, I can be reasonably certain that the Minister will pray in aid the defence that the Data Protection Act applies in any event. However, as I argued elsewhere, the protections afforded by the DPA are not necessarily as robust as they may seem, not least because the technological landscape has changed so dramatically since it was enacted some 10 years ago. Quite apart from that, the massive scope of personal information now encompassed by administrative data requires that regimes protecting it should be as robust as possible, even more so than those in the private sector.

Accordingly, I believe the belt-and-braces approach that is intrinsic in the amendment to be both necessary and sensible. I beg to move.

I added my name to the amendment and completely support it. The Bill wisely drafts in the requirement to sign a confidentiality declaration and that the board consider various issues. However, the board is not required to consider the additional safeguards for handling information; therefore, my noble friend's amendment is an essential addition.

As we have heard, the amendment relates to the appointment of approved researchers by the board. As we discussed earlier, the Government are giving the board a function of promoting statistical research, allowing it to give academics and statistical researchers access, with tight controls, to some of the wealth of government data it holds, benefiting the wider public through the provision of better research and statistics.

The amendment would insert the requirement that the board, when appointing an approved researcher, must consider whether there are appropriate safeguards to guarantee data protection. I reassure the Committee that, as my noble friend Lord Davies explained, the Government consider it essential that there be strong confidentiality safeguards to give people confidence that their personal data will be held securely by the board. Furthermore, I reiterate that the Bill is not intended to make the Statistics Board a repository or conduit for the widespread sharing of information throughout government, beyond, of course, replicating the existing situation.

A great number of safeguards are in place to ensure adequate data protection when the board promotes statistical research. However, the key point is that we do not consider it necessary to specify in legislation that the board must expressly consider that there are appropriate safeguards to guarantee data protection when appointing an approved researcher.

The Bill specifies that the board must periodically publish the criteria on which it will appoint approved researchers. We would expect these criteria to include a consideration of the safeguards in place to guarantee data protection. However, given that a number of specific and general legal safeguards are already in place, we do not think that it is necessary to specify this in the legislation.

I hope that the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, is satisfied with the information I have given and that he will withdraw the amendment.

I am grateful to the noble Lord. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 188 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 189:

Clause 36, page 16, line 11, at end insert—

"( ) A disclosure of information by virtue of subsection (4) must be authorised by the Board.

( ) Section 33(1) does not apply to the Board's power to authorise a disclosure under subsection (4)."

This probing amendment would insert two new subsections into Clause 36.

We have talked about various disclosures of personal information which may be permitted under Clause 36(4). We have varying degrees of enthusiasm for some of those categories. Amendment No. 189 addresses a related concern; namely, the level at which disclosure may be authorised. The first new subsection says that only the board may authorise disclosure, and the second says that the ability to delegate set out in Clause 33(1) does not apply to disclosure under Clause 36(4).

We are concerned with the liberal delegation powers allowed by Clauses 33 and 29, through which the authorisation of disclosure may slip down the organisation and what should be exceptional and subject to a high level of scrutiny may become routine and unsupervised. I mean no suggestion of dishonesty or negligence if the board staff were handling disclosure, but when disclosure becomes routine and out of the close oversight of the top of the organisation, it is easy to forget that crucial issues of data confidentiality are at stake. That is why it is important that disclosure of personal information never becomes routine.

I hope that the Minister will explain what controls the Government would expect the board to exercise over disclosure. Given that the Government are not supposed to interfere with the board, how will they be sure about what actually happens, if it is not laid down in statute? I beg to move.

It may be convenient to the Committee if I speak to my clause-stand-part Question at this time. In common with Clause 24, the scope of the clause, in so far as it is not confined to the statistical functions of the board, is extremely wide. The board would be empowered to,

"disclose any information obtained by it"— that is to say, to include any and all administrative data within its purview—to,

"any person providing services to the Board".

Accordingly, as I understand the drafting, any public authority, in so far as it provides the "service" of disseminating raw data to the board, could qualify under the terms of the clause and have disclosed to it information held by the board. To that extent, my impression is that the clause could facilitate a "revolving door" policy in respect of data-sharing; that is to say, notwithstanding earlier comments from the Minister, data could be disseminated to the board by one authority effectively for onward transmission to any other.

Of course, I acknowledge that much depends upon the meaning, in its context, of the phrase "service providers". It would be helpful, therefore, if the Minister could clarify the Government's thinking, perhaps even providing practical examples of the sort of companies, institutions or even to whom the provision is intended to apply.

The amendmentwould require that anyone disclosing personal information through the exceptions to the confidentiality clause should seek consent from the board before doing so. The amendment would constrain the exceptions that allow disclosure of personal information. There are cases where requiring the consent of the board would be unnecessary. For example, where the information had already been lawfully made public, or where the consent of the individual had already been given, someone disclosing information through the exceptions to the confidentiality clause should not need to gain the explicit consent of the board.

Requiring that people gain additional further consent from the board in those cases would only add a significant and unnecessary bureaucratic hurdle. For example, it would require statisticians in other departments to go back to the board to gain consent to publish information that they had received from the board, even when the board had already lawfully put the personal information in the public domain in one of its publications. Where the board did consider it necessary to give consent to information being published through one of the exceptions to the confidentiality clause, it could effect that through a formal agreement with the person to whom it gives the information in the first place. That would allow the board to insist on consent on those occasions when it was really required, rather than for all disclosures.

There may also be instances where such a requirement as given in the amendment might place individuals under contradictory legal obligations; for example, it may be that a court order compels others who have received information from the board to release it. In that case, if the board did not give its consent to the data being disclosed under the court order, the person could be under conflicting legal requirements. Similarly, if an enactment required that information be disclosed, but the board refused consent, that person would again be under conflicting legal requirements. Noble Lords will surely understand that we do not wish to risk placing someone in such a position.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked what the operational controls were. The ONS has a wide range of security protocols and mechanisms, including declarations on confidentiality. Everyone working there signs a declaration on maintaining the confidentiality of statistical records. On physical security, all staff working in the organisation must have a pass and there is no public access to any part of the organisation where statistical data may be held. There is technical security and the ONS maintains a government-secure intranet; all transmission of personal data is conducted within the GSI network, on encrypted e-mail or password-protected CDs. On organisational security, the ONS uses a combination of survey project managers and data management teams to protect and maintain data. On disclosure of security, the ONS uses a combination of data manipulation and/or statistical disclosure techniques to meet its confidentiality guarantee, which prevents individuals being identified from aggregate data.

These techniques are reviewed every five years to test their adequacy. We fully expect the board to have similar operational controls in place. The ONS has contracts for advice on statistical methodologies from the academic sector. The University of Southampton won such a contract, tendered in 1999, which provides valuable expertise, including advice on sample design and estimation methodology, as well as providing quality assurance for the ONS's work. In the past six years, the contract has proved beneficial to both parties and the ONS has gained assistance in the development of new methods, underpinning a wide range of outputs, including those relating to quality assessments of its products and the protection of confidentiality. I hope that my description of that framework will enable the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, to withdraw his amendment.

Actually, it is my amendment. I should not really speak for my noble friend, but I very much doubt that the Minister's response will have satisfied him, because I am not sure that he addressed his points.

I accept what the Minister has said on information for which consent has already been given or which has already been made public. He then concentrated on disclosure outside the board. My amendment was designed to probe the procedures within the board to ensure that disclosure was made only in proper circumstances. I asked what controls would be exercised over disclosure. The Minister gave a long explanation, which I shall read carefully in Hansard, none of which dealt with controls over disclosure of information, although it dealt with security of information, passwords and so on. I was concentrating on conscious, not accidental, acts of disclosure and on how decisions were made to disclose information. The Minister's response did not deal with that, and if he were prepared to say that he would look carefully at my questions and write to me before Report, I would find it relatively easy to withdraw my amendment.

I am very happy to undertake to write to the noble Baroness and to give her the information that she asked for. She will appreciate that there may be a confidentiality aspect in declaring precisely how these decisions are made, but we will overcome that and I am sure that I will be able to satisfy her.

I thank the noble Lord and I am sure that, if his officials read my opening remarks carefully, they will understand the issues that I seek to address and the issue that my noble friend Lord Northesk raised regarding whether one of the later clauses should stand part of the Bill. For today, I am happy to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 190:

Clause 36, page 16, line 18, leave out subsection (10)

Amendment No. 190 would delete subsection (10) from Clause 36. Again, I put this forward on a probing basis.

The scheme of Clause 36 is that under subsection (1) personal information must not be disclosed but then various exclusions are set out in subsection (4). So one might think that if it could be proved that, say, a Statistics Board employee disclosed personal information and he or she could not claim one of the protections in subsection (4), it would be clear that an offence had been committed and the penalties outlined in subsection (9) could be invoked on a conviction.

If you were the person whose information had been disclosed, you would regard that as perfectly fair, because the release of personal information is a very serious issue. The incorrect disclosure of such information cannot be reversed and damage can be done to an individual in an instant, especially in today's world of electronic communication.

However, subsection (10) contains a defence for the employee if he or she "reasonably believes" that the individual cannot be identified. I paraphrase but that is the general intent. If I understand correctly how the law works, the employee would be required to establish this defence of reasonable belief only on a balance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt, which is the standard used for the basic offence. That structure creates a bias in favour of those who disclose personal information and thus acts against the interests of the person to whom the information relates. The law seems to create a clear offence in relation to disclosure but then waters it down significantly.

I ask the noble Lord to agree that the law should be structured so that the person whose information is disclosed is protected above those who disclose it. As I said, my amendment is probing but it is designed to rebalance the law in favour of the individual and not the discloser. I beg to move.

Perhaps I may intervene briefly. I think that the reasonable belief clause is important, and I shall give a short account of something that I once did. I had a sample of 39,000 observations and, by cross-classifying in various ways—race, sex and so on—I found that in some cells there was only one observation. A clever person could more or less have identified a certain person, although I would not have known it when I analysed the data. I discovered it only by accident using some statistical tools on the outline observations.

You have to allow some defence for a researcher who reasonably believes that what he has done is as statistically competent as possible and accept that someone may be able to get more meaning out of the sample. That may not be satisfactory to the noble Baroness but I ask her to accept that, on that occasion, I would have been prosecuted by whoever that person was. He had had a certain education and was of a certain ethnic background and happened to be the only one in the cell. His salary also happened to be about 20 times the average, so one could easily have found out who he was. It was reasonably possible that I would not have known that when I read the data. When I found out, I stopped my analysis. However, it is possible that statisticians will not suspect that other people may be able to extract more meaning from statistics, so I think it is possible to have a reasonable belief defence for a statistician.

As we have heard, Amendment No. 190 would remove the grounds for defence against criminal prosecution if personal information was unlawfully disclosed. That means that, for example, the criminal sanction would apply even where the individual making the disclosure reasonably believed that the information did not reveal identities. Removing the reasonable belief defence would, in our view, make the criminal sanction excessively harsh. I am grateful for the intervention of my noble friend Lord Desai. The Government want to ensure that there are strong confidentiality safeguards, but we do not want to criminalise conduct where an individual makes a disclosure in the reasonable belief that the information does not identify an individual.

In addition, that amendment could have the detrimental effect of inhibiting the sharing of aggregate information—something which goes on currently and which is important to the statistical system. Currently, the ONS rightly shares large amounts of aggregate information—that is, information which does not reveal individual identities because data are aggregated—after making a careful and thorough assessment of disclosure risk, leading to a reasonable belief that the information does not identify individuals. Introducing a criminal sanction without a reasonable belief defence might discourage the board from such sharing, because no matter how thorough those disclosure checks are, it is not possible to be absolutely certain that disclosure of the information does not reveal the identity of a person, particularly when considering the information disclosed together with other published information. As such, removing that defence might discourage the board from sharing when it is necessary and in the public interest; for example, to help to develop statistics elsewhere in our decentralised system.

There are other examples of offences of unlawful disclosure being accompanied by a reasonable belief defence of a similar nature to the one included in Clause 36. For example, a defence exists to the offence of wrongful disclosure in the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005, where a person charged with the offence can prove that he reasonably believed that the disclosure was lawful or that the information had already been made lawfully available to the public. I hope that my explanation reassures the noble Baroness. I, therefore, ask her to withdraw the amendment.

I thank the Minister for that reply and for explaining the difficulties that may be encountered around aggregate information. The noble Lord, Lord Desai, made a special pleading for statisticians and researchers generally. I was trying to put the little man in the balance against that, as it is the little man's information that is disclosed. Through the amendment, I was merely seeking to show the imbalance.

Let me assure the noble Baroness that the researcher is also a very little man.

I have never regarded the noble Lord, Lord Desai, as a little man.

With this amendment I was seeking to highlight the balance of the legislation which is towards the person who discloses. That will satisfy people from the research community and statisticians generally but will not give heart to those whose personal information goes through the portals of the Statistics Board. We have had a good debate and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 36 agreed to.

Clause 37 [Freedom of information]:

On Question, Whether Clause 37 shall stand part of the Bill?

I have given notice that I wish to oppose the Question that Clause 37 stand part of the Bill, and I do so on a probing basis. As we go through the information clauses in the Bill we shall explore a concern that personal information that comes to the board should be used for statistical purposes only and that the board should not become a conduit for personal information to become more widely available through the Government and beyond.

Clause 37 provides that Section 44 of the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to information received directly or indirectly from the board. Hence the exemption from Freedom of Information Act disclosure, which would otherwise apply to information whose disclosure is prevented by Clause 36, is ruled out. Put simply, if a government department or other public authority obtains personal information from the board, it might well be required to disclose it under the Freedom of Information Act. That seems to us to be a rather dangerous possibility. We have already seen that Clause 36 allows the disclosure of personal information in quite a large number of circumstances, which are set out in Clause 36(4). Once it arrives in the hands of another authority, Clause 37 might allow it to be disclosed further. I am aware that the other reasons for non-disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act will continue to apply, but the concern is that the public authority that receives the personal information from the board will be less assiduous than the board in seeking to justify exemptions from disclosure.

The only example given in the Explanatory Notes and in another place for requiring this curious clause is the National Archives. The clause would allow it to publish census data after the usual time periods. If that is the only exception for which Clause 36 is designed, it could be given statutory effect on a more direct and targeted basis. When the Minister replies, will he say whether there is any other reason for the existence of Clause 37? If it is aimed at the National Archives only, it would be safer if this provision, which modifies the impact of the Freedom of Information Act, were restricted to that particular instance. The unlimited scope of Clause 37 gives us cause for concern. We believe that the presumption in the Bill should be against facilitating the disclosure of personal information, but Clause 37 seems to start from the opposite position.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her comments on Clause 37. It is obvious that I want to see Clause 37 survive in the Bill, this evening, at least, but I heard her question about further illustrations. We think that this is an important provision and that the National Archives should have access to the information and be able to release it to researchers. However, the noble Baroness said that she thinks that it could be specifically targeted, and I will look at that suggestion.

It alone is a justification for recognising that the constraints that would otherwise obtain should be removed. That is why the clause is expressed in the way that it is. We think that there will be other examples apart from the National Archives, although it is the most graphic and clearest one. The noble Baroness will recognise the value of that information being released. She is not contending that, but she is maintaining that it could be done in a rather more specific way. I will look at that matter, but in drafting this clause, we had that one clear illustration in mind. The noble Baroness will recognise that something had to be done in order to preserve that opportunity for the National Archives, and Clause 37 represents that. I recognise the constructive way in which she has approached this issue, and I shall look at it further and come back on Report.

Clause 37 agreed to.

Clause 38 [Disclosure of information to service providers]:

moved Amendment No. 191:

Clause 38, page 17, line 13, at end insert—

"( ) Information may only be disclosed under subsection (1) if—

(a) the Board consider that the person providing services is a fit and proper person; and(b) the person has signed a declaration, in such form as the Board may determine, that he understands the requirements of section 36."

I speak to Amendment No. 191 and to the Question that Clause 38 stand part of the Bill.

Amendment No. 191 draws from subsections (7) and (8) of Clause 36 to insert the same safeguards around disclosing information to contracted service providers as already exist when disclosing information to approved researchers. The amendment would specifically place an obligation on the board to consider whether the service provider was capable of protecting the information, and on the service provider to consider the necessity of keeping this information secure. People make mistakes and do not always give data protection the appropriate priority. Protection against such mistakes should be statutory to emphasise its importance to those handling the information and that proper care must be taken, and so that they are fully aware of their obligations. I beg to move.

I must apologise most sincerely to the Committee: I lost track of the groupings and the remarks that I made to my noble friend's Amendment No. 189 should more properly be made at this point. I do not propose to repeat them, nor do I anticipate that the Minister can necessarily remember what I may have said way back then. If the Minister would prefer to write to me on the issues I raised, I would be perfectly content with that.

I will certainly take up the option of writing to the noble Earl, but I hope that I have sufficient recollection of what transpired earlier to be able to reassure him on his anxieties, and to meet the points indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Rising. We referred in earlier amendments to why we think Clause 8 is a necessary part of the Bill and gave illustrations of how the ONS has used contractors as part of its work. These examples demonstrate how allowing the board to pass information to third parties which are providing a service to the board can improve the way in which the board works. We are merely building on past practice in those terms. My noble friend gave the illustration of the University of Southampton and the work that it has done. That is also true of certain IT providers.

The Committee will want to be assured that a range of safeguards exist to protect any personal information shared with the service providers. I want not only to emphasise what has already been stated but to express it as clearly as I can. First, as clearly set out in the clause, the board would be able to pass personal information to a service provider only if it was considered necessary or appropriate to do so for the provision of the services which it required.

Secondly, it is intended that those receiving the data under this clause will not be able to use them for any purpose other than for the provision of the service which the board requires from them. Additionally, we would expect that the use of personal information by service providers will be explicitly covered in a contract between the board and any service provider, because the board will be fully cognisant of its obligations in those terms.

Thirdly, any service provider would automatically be constrained by the confidentiality obligation in Clause 36, which contains a criminal sanction, as we heard in our earlier discussions. Finally, the board and the service provider will also need to have regard to putting in place appropriate data protection safeguards to ensure that any processing that occurs is consistent with the requirements of the Data Protection Act, particularly the eight data protection principles set out in the Act.

These are strong safeguards, and rightly so. They mean that the board can share information with service providers to improve the quality and efficiency of the board's work and the statistics produced while ensuring that personal information is protected by the requirements that I identified earlier. I hope that the noble Lord will be satisfied with that response.

I thank the Minister for his remarks. The amendment is not really about passing information or about the information being passed on; the point is that the board must ensure that the person to whom it is giving the information is capable of carrying out the essential confidentiality agreements. It is not about the information being confidential but about the probity of the people to whom the board is passing the information.

I certainly understand that point, but as I said, we expect the board, in striking the contract with the provider, to have due regard to its responsibilities in those terms. Of course the board will be all too well aware of such responsibilities. That will be built into the contract.

I thank the noble Lord and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 38 agreed to.

Clause 39 agreed to.

Clause 40 [Information relating to NHS registration]:

moved Amendment No. 192:

Clause 40, page 18, line 14, after second "information" insert "—

"(a)"

I shall also address Amendments Nos. 194, 196 and 198. As the Committee will be aware, Clauses 40 and 41 sanction the disclosure of patient registration information to the board—such disclosure duly constrained by subsections (3), (4) and (5). So far so good. Obviously, such data will be invaluable in preparing population statistics. Neither do I doubt that the terms of Clause 36(3) leach into those two clauses. To the extent that they do, that is both welcome and useful. However, given the extreme sensitivity of personal medical information, the same level of protection as exists under Clause 36 should apply to those two clauses and should be expected in the drafting, hence the amendment. I beg to move.

I have added my name to the amendment and I have little to add to what my noble friend says because he makes his usual powerful case. I am confident that the Minister will accept the amendment because it is largely modelled on Clause 36(10), which the Minister defended so stoutly when I sought to delete it a few moments ago.

I am likely to disappoint the noble Baroness by not accepting the amendments. After all, they would prevent the Secretary of State for Health, other public authorities or Welsh Ministers disclosing to the board any information from which the health condition, care or treatment provided to any person could be deduced, either on its own or when taken together with any other published information.

The amendments could prevent the Secretary of State disclosing the information listed in the clause. That might occur if, for example, he was aware of other relevant information obtained by the board from other sources which might allow the health or condition of a person, or the care or treatment provided to that person, to be deduced. If the Secretary of State considered that he was prohibited from disclosing patient registration information altogether, the board would not be able to continue to produce population statistics.

Although I understand why the noble Baroness and the noble Lord are concerned about the matter, given the impact that the amendments would have on outputs currently produced by the Office for National Statistics, we feel that the emphasis should instead be on having appropriate safeguards in handling the data, as we discussed on previous amendments.

We maintain that the Bill contains safeguards in Clause 36 which include a confidentiality obligation for personal information held by the board or anyone else who has received such information directly or indirectly from the board. The board's handling and disclosure of the personal information received under the clauses will also be governed by the protections afforded by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 1998.

Clauses 40 and 41 contain additional safeguards in that disclosure by the board of any information received under these clauses, either for the purpose of enabling or assisting the board to exercise any of its functions or to an approved researcher, can be made only with the express consent of the Secretary of State for Health. In addition, it is likely that the data sharing envisaged by Clauses 40 and 41 will be underpinned by a memorandum of understanding or a service level agreement between the board and the Secretary of State for Health. The memorandum of understanding or service-level agreement would certainly cover issues such as confidentiality and disclosure. Any changes to the memorandum of understanding or service-level agreement would, by its very nature, need the agreement of the Secretary of State for Health, as does the initial disclosure envisaged by Clauses 40 and 41.

We maintain that we have a lock on this position, and that we have appropriate safeguards in this very important area. I fully respect the anxieties that have been expressed about issues of confidentiality, because they are very important. Equally, however, it is obvious that certain information is absolutely essential for gathering, deciphering and presenting statistics. There must be safeguards to protect the individual, but, as I said, we believe that we have the necessary safeguards. I hope that the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, will accept that.

I am grateful for the Minister's response. I am not sure that it entirely satisfies me. Nevertheless, I will read carefully what he said in Hansard and reflect on the matter. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 193:

Clause 40, page 18, line 15, after first "the" insert "name,"

Amendment No. 193 would amend Clause 40(4) by providing that NHS information disclosed to the board should not include a patient's name. Amendment No. 197 would make a similar amendment to Clause 41.

Amendment No. 193 makes a relatively narrow point about whether a person's name—the most personal piece of information—can be disclosed. Various items of information are listed as capable of being disclosed, but name is not mentioned, and we want it to be absolutely clear that it would be inappropriate for a person's name to be disclosed under Clause 40. I hope that the Government will agree that there should be no circumstances in which a person's name would be disclosed with the other information that is transmitted to the board, and that they will agree to put that beyond doubt. I beg to move.

The amendments would prevent the Secretary of State for Health, other public authorities or Welsh Ministers from disclosing a patient's name to the board. As the Office for National Statistics does currently, the board will need access to identifiable information, including, on occasion, names, if it is to continue to produce useful and meaningful population statistics derived from patient registration information. Although the ONS never discloses names in any statistical outputs—nor would the board—names can be used to assist in the production of population statistics such as birth and mortality rates, where other identifying factors are inadequate. For example, in order to produce birth and mortality rates, it is necessary for the ONS to link patient registration information with birth and death records held by the Registrar-General, who is also the National Statistician. In many cases, the ONS can link the records by using the NHS number or other identifiers. However, this is sometimes unsuccessful because an incorrect NHS number has been identified at death or no NHS number has been given. In these circumstances, it is necessary for the board to use other identifiers, such as name, to make the necessary linkages.

It is therefore important for there to be flexibility over the information that the board receives from the Secretary of State for Health, other public authorities or Welsh Ministers. This will help to ensure that the board can continue to produce population statistics based on reliable and accurate data. Identifiable information would not be released by the board in the processing or publication of population statistics, which will all continue to be released in aggregate form.

As Members of the Committee are aware, the board's use of this information will be governed by Clause 36, which contains safeguards, including a confidentiality obligation for personal information held by the board or anyone else who has received such information directly or indirectly from the board. The board's handling and disclosure of the personal information received under these clauses will also be governed, as I explained on the previous amendment, by the protections afforded by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 1998.

As I said in relation to the previous amendments, Clauses 40 and 41 contain additional safeguards in that disclosure by the board of any information received under these clauses, either for the purpose of enabling or assisting the board to exercise any of its functions or to an approved researcher, can be made only with the express consent of the Secretary of State for Health. In addition, and again as I have already said, it is likely that the data sharing envisaged by Clauses 40 and 41 will be underpinned by a Memorandum of Understanding or service level agreement between the board and the Secretary of State for Health. The Memorandum of Understanding or service level agreement would encompass issues such as confidentiality and disclosure. Any changes to the Memorandum of Understanding or service level agreement, by their very nature, would need the agreement of the Secretary of State for Health, as would the initial disclosure envisaged by Clauses 40 and 41.

In view of these safeguards, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

I confess to some initial disappointment at that response, but I am prepared to take the trouble to read carefully what the Minister has said in Hansard. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 194 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 195:

Clause 40, page 18, line 21, leave out from first "section" to end of line 22 and insert "subsection (4) of that section shall not have effect"

I shall speak also to the other amendments in this group. Amendment No. 195 deals with Clause 40 and probes the rationale for allowing the board to permit any onward disclosure of NHS registration information that it has received. Clause 40 allows the Secretary of State for Health or other public authority to disclose English and Welsh NHS registration information to the board. Under subsection (5), the board may use the information only for the purposes of population statistics. So far so good.

It seems to us to be reasonable for there to be no further ability for anyone in the board to disclose that information any further, but Clause 36 is to apply with only a very limited modification in subsection (6). We would contend that Clause 36, which prohibits the disclosure of personal information held by the board, should apply without any of the let-outs or excuses set up in subsection (4). Clause 40(6) takes a different line, allowing disclosure in almost all subsection (4) situations, other than under paragraphs (c) and (i). In those cases, the consent of the Secretary of State is required.

Since the board is not the original recipient of the data—that will be the NHS in one of its various forms—we believe that the board should not have the permission to disclose the information further. That should be properly a matter for the primary custodian of the data; namely, the NHS or the Secretary of State for Health. The board should and needs to have no further part to play in further disclosure, because the information has been given to the board only for the purposes of population statistics and not for any other purpose.

Of the other amendments in this group, Amendment No. 199 is a mirror of Amendment No. 195 in relation to Welsh NHS registration information. Amendments Nos. 201 and 202 would achieve the same effect in relation to the provisions of Clause 44, which allows the Treasury to make regulations to authorise a limitless number of public authorities to disclose information to the board. Specifically, Amendment No. 201 would eliminate the let-outs in subsection (4) of Clause 36. Amendment No. 202 would leave out paragraph (b) of Clause 44(7), which would allow the Treasury to lay down rules for onward disclosure. Amendments Nos. 211, 212, 215 and 216 are similar and deal with the Scottish and Northern Irish provisions in Clauses 45 and 46.

It is common ground that access to personal information needs to be strictly confined. The key question is who should allow access. We believe that control over access should rest with the body most able to determine whether disclosure should be made. That will be the body which first obtains the information. A secondary or tertiary holder of information is not the most natural person to decide whether any other person may have access to the data.

As I have said, we have no problem with the Statistics Board having access to and using the data obtained from other public authorities for its statistical purposes, but we believe that the board should be subject to the strictest of rules in relation to further disclosure. Indeed, it is noticeable that Clause 42(4) of the Bill prohibits the further disclosure of information obtained from HMRC without the consent of the commissioners. If any onward disclosure is necessary, we believe that that should be the right model for this Bill throughout the information disclosure provisions. Will the Minister explain why one approach has been taken for HMRC information and another taken for other information disclosed to the board? This is all the more important because under Clause 42 little personal information is likely in any event to flow from HMRC to the board.

At this stage, I have not tabled equivalent amendments to Clauses 48 to 50, which give the Treasury power to authorise disclosure by the board. Those clauses may also require further consideration in the light of the Minister's reply. I beg to move.

I thought that the noble Baroness had presented sufficient amendments for this issue to be aired without having the dire threat that more are to come on subsequent clauses. We will look forward to that entertainment when it arrives. She has raised some important points on a significant part of the Bill relating to data sharing and I will make a few general points before seeking to deal in detail with her questions.

There is broad support from a key range of interest groups on the important aspect of the Bill concerned with data sharing. Data sharing is crucially linked in the Bill with the confidentiality provisions that we discussed on the previous amendment. Those provisions will cover personal information passed under these clauses, as they would any other personal information held by the board or anyone who has received personal information from it.

Let me set out the principles of data sharing that appear in the Bill. There are benefits from data sharing and they command widespread agreement. There are also proper concerns to ensure that appropriate safeguards are in place. We have not the slightest doubt that data sharing can lead to improvements in the quality of statistical data and analysis, which can therefore improve our ability to make and to judge the impact of policy. Data sharing can also reduce the burden on those required to complete the surveys on which so many of our official statistics depend and has therefore been recommended by both the Better Regulation Task Force and the Confederation of British Industry—two important contributors to this debate—which are all too well aware of the fact that excessive demands for data are extremely irksome for interest groups. What is more, the sharing of data for statistical purposes can help to address the problems of declining survey response rates, which are also a sad feature of our times.

We have set up a mechanism that will enable data sharing for statistical purposes to and from the board with safeguards to make sure that the data are used in a limited and appropriate way. Increased data sharing could occur between the board and other public authorities, and vice versa, where regulations permitting such sharing are made under Clauses 44 to 50. The regulations will be subject to further scrutiny and approval by Parliament and will be made only where the Treasury with its residual responsibilities to the board—the noble Baroness mentioned the Treasury, so she will not mind me expressing the hope that it remains in that position—and another Minister agree that the sharing of information is for the statistical purposes of the board or the public authority to which the disclosure is made and is in the public interest. Ministers will need to agree this for each data set specified in the regulations, and the use of regulations will allow the system to adapt to further statistical resources and needs, thus allowing new indicators to be developed to provide a more up-to-date, accurate, comprehensive and meaningful description of the country. The Bill also heightens safeguards for confidentiality and includes a criminal sanction for unlawful disclosure.

I wish to make one further point before I address the amendments of the noble Baroness. The noble Earl, Lord Northesk, asked earlier whether the Government envisage that the Statistics Board could or should perform the function of a repository or conduit for the widespread sharing of information throughout government. It is not our intention that these data-sharing clauses should allow the board to become a general repository for raw data or to introduce the widespread sharing of confidential information throughout government. A number of safeguards will prevent this power from being used to allow the widespread sharing of information. Any information passed under the clauses must be used for the statistical purposes of the receiving authority or the board, and before the regulations are made the relevant Ministers, as I mentioned a moment ago, must be satisfied that the disclosure is in the public interest. I hope that I have met the anxieties expressed by the noble Earl.

The amendments before us would prevent the board from disclosing personal information that it has received relating to patient registration information or from the data-sharing enabling powers in all circumstances. As we have discussed, we are taking the opportunity to increase the confidentiality safeguards on personal information by introducing a criminal sanction on the unlawful disclosure of information, whether held by board members and employees or by anyone to whom the board has passed the data. The confidentiality obligations have been designed with a number of exceptions, ensuring that the board is permitted to disclose personal information in certain limited circumstances and for specific purposes where we consider it to be necessary and in the public interest.

Given that we want as far as possible to limit the circumstances in which personal information might be passed on only to those for whom it is absolutely necessary, in Clauses 44 to 50 we have restricted still further the exceptions. Consequently, for the clauses permitting extended data sharing with the board, we have removed the power of the board to share this information in pursuit of its functions. Beyond these restrictions on the existing exceptions, the Government believe that the remaining exceptions are entirely appropriate. I do not quite understand why we would want to restrict the disclosure of information for the limited exceptions that remain, such as where consent for that disclosure has been given by the person to whom the information relates or where the information is already lawfully in the public domain. It is right that the board should be able to respond positively to a request for disclosure in such cases where it would be unreasonable for the board to be obstructive.

Amendments Nos. 202, 212 and 216 seek to remove the power in Clauses 44 to 46 respectively to include consequential provision allowing for further disclosure of the information received in regulations under these clauses. The presumption under the clauses is that onward disclosure should normally be restricted only to limited exceptions. Including consequential provision to allow for further disclosure may in certain cases—but only in certain cases—be appropriate. Just as there may be statistical and policy benefits from the board using data that have come in through regulations made under these clauses, there may be similar statistical and policy benefits from another public authority—for example, statisticians elsewhere in the Government Statistical Service—using the information that the board has received. So although it is not expected that data received by the board under these regulations will in general be allowed to be disclosed to, for example, approved researchers, there may be cases where this could be appropriate.

In both cases—researchers or other government statisticians—it is right that any such sharing should be explicitly set down in regulations to be approved by Parliament, and the Bill provides for that. Furthermore, in making the regulations, the Treasury would be subject to Section 6 of the Human Rights Act. As such, it would be unlawful for the Treasury to make regulations that were incompatible with the convention rights.

Another Minister of the Crown must consent to the exercise of the power to make regulations. The exercise of the power will be subject to the scrutiny of Parliament under the affirmative procedure and the regulations may not amend the Human Rights Act. The Government have thought through these issues and have put data sharing under very clear restrictions. But, within that framework, the Bill offers proper protections while, at the same time, permitting data sharing in areas where that clearly advances the public interest. That is the basis of the Government's position and I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Before I decide what to do with my amendments, I ask the Minister to explain why Clause 42(4) states:

"Information disclosed under subsection (1)"— that is, information obtained from HMRC—

"may not be disclosed by the Board to any person except with the consent of the Commissioners".

If I follow the logic of what the Minister has explained about the eighth wonder of the modern world known as data sharing, it rather sits at odds with Clause 42. Can he explain the different approaches in different parts of the Bill?

I do not have a specific note on HMRC but the noble Baroness will recognise the nature of some of that information being identifiable to individuals and the importance of that. I shall certainly write to her on that point. The amendments are addressed to these clauses, which provide for data sharing under the clearest specifications, in which Parliament has its role to play and for which Ministers have proper responsibility. On that basis I hope she will feel that the Bill stands the test of examination and that she will withdraw the amendment.

At the end of his response the Minister cited the need to comply with the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act. Whenever I hear Ministers say that, I can hear the sound of a barrel being scraped. These arguments are wheeled out when all others fail.

The point I was trying to make with the amendments is that it should not be for the board to settle on the disclosure. These are not anti-data sharing amendments; they are about who should control the disclosure of personal information. Should it be the person who first had it? In the case of NHS data, the NHS was the right body to decide whether personal information in the NHS should be shared further, not the board, because the information happens to pass through the board.

Of course I accept what the Minister said about my amendments not being appropriate for information for which consent has already been given. To that extent, their drafting may well be defective. But the key issue is that most data are disclosed on a non-consent basis; consent to disclosure is very rarely sought, and that is part of the problem, given the extensive data-sharing provisions that the Government are introducing in as many Bills as they can get their hands on, as far as one can tell. As well as lack of consent, there is excessive reliance on things such as sanctions, cited again by the Minister, in Clause 36. However, the clause has many let-outs and has a very wide defence available for disclosure.

The Minister will be aware that I am not over the moon about his response, but this evening is not the time to take the issue further. I will think carefully about what he has said and hope that he and his officials will reflect further as well. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 40 agreed to.

Clause 41 [Information relating to NHS registration: Wales ]:

[Amendments Nos. 196 to 199 not moved.]

Clause 41 agreed to.

Clauses 42 and 43 agreed to.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Clause 44 [Power to authorise disclosure to the Board]:

moved Amendment No. 200:

Clause 44, page 19, line 33, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendments Nos. 201 and 202 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 203:

Clause 44, page 20, line 21, at end insert—

"(c) governing further disclosure by the Board of information in circumstances where the disclosure would otherwise be permitted by a rule of law, this Act or an Act passed before this Act."

I shall speak also to the other amendments in the group. To a greater or lesser extent, this part of the Bill liberalises the data-sharing regime, albeit it is constrained by Clause 51, which seeks to guarantee that the Data Protection Act and Human Rights Act cannot be disapplied or over-ridden under any circumstances. However, notwithstanding the Minister's fulsome reassurances earlier, statutory provision already exists—notably Section 9 of the Identity Cards Act—whereby the safeguards afforded by these two Acts have been breached. Thus, the purpose of the amendments, as with Amendment No. 176, is to attempt to ascertain what extant statutory powers there may already be where the Data Protection Act and the Human Rights Act can be over-ruled and to find out how the Government intend to deal with such scenarios in the context of the board. Indeed, I could be tempted to suppose that the proposed regulations, irrespective of whether the intention behind the drafting is that the board take on some sort of role as an information clearing house, should be subject to the additional scrutiny safeguard proposed in the amendment, if only to introduce additional accountability and transparency. I beg to move.

These amendments deal with the powers to make supplementary and consequential provision in the regulations to permit data sharing. The clauses set out two examples of possible types of supplementary and consequential revision, in particular to restrict or permit disclosure of the information disclosed under these regulations. Such provision could be used to allow approved researchers access to information disclosed to the board. Naturally, such provision would need to be approved by Parliament through the affirmative procedure, along with the rest of the regulation.

The amendments add in another example of what consequential or supplementary provision the regulations made under this power could contain—to govern onward disclosure when this is allowed by existing legislation. The amendments suggest that the regulations might need to make provision for disclosure that is already permitted. However, the clause already makes it clear that consequential provision could be made to restrict further disclosure. It is not therefore clear to us what the amendment would add.

The noble Lord may have another type of provision in mind. Perhaps he wishes to see the possibility for consequential provision to be made to restrict use of the information by the board when it receives it. However, if that is the case, the amendment is still not needed. The enabling clauses explicitly specify—for example, Clause 44(2)—that the regulations may authorise disclosure only to enable the board to carry out one or more of its functions. They also make clear—for example, Clause 44(3)—that the board may use the information received under the regulations only for the purpose for which disclosure is authorised.

Noble Lords might find it helpful to bear in mind that the consequential and supplementary provisions listed in the clause are not exhaustive. Included in the enabling clauses, at Clause 44(7), Clause 45(7) and Clause 46(7), are two examples of possible consequential and supplementary provision. It would still be possible and, I am sure, desirable in some cases, for the regulations to make additional provision as to use, further to these examples.

The noble Earl, Lord Northesk, asked what other powers might be overriden. There is nothing in the Bill that can override the Data Protection Act or the Human Rights Act. I hope that the noble Earl will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

I am grateful for the Minister's response and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendments Nos. 204 to 206:

Clause 44, page 20, line 22, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 44, page 20, line 28, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 44, page 20, line 29, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 207:

Clause 44, page 20, line 31, at end insert "statistical"

I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 214, 218 and 223. The purpose of the amendments is straightforward; namely, to confine the disclosure and information-sharing provisions in Clauses 44 to 47 to the board's statistical functions. This is wholly consistent with the reassurances given earlier by the Minister. I beg to move.

I want to reassure the noble Earl and all Members of the Committee that while we cannot accept the amendment, we agree with the spirit behind it. I do not have a good record in the Chamber of conveying my enthusiasm for the spirit and intention behind amendments. The Government may well be in favour of them, but we resist them because we think we have already achieved the position.

The purposes of the board are statistical, which the Bill makes absolutely clear. The Government fully intend for the board to use all information received only for statistical purposes and only in connection with its functions, other than its statistical service function set out in Clause 20. The Bill achieves this. All the board's functions as set out in the Bill are considered to be statistical. Regulations made under the clauses in question may authorise disclosure only for the board's statistical functions even without this amendment, simply because the board has only statistical functions. That is its raison d'être; that is why it has been created; and that is why the amendment is unnecessary. However, I am pleased to welcome the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, on board with the Government's intention that that should be so.

I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. I knew it would not be that easy, but never mind. There is a modicum of agreement here. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendments Nos. 208 to 210:

Clause 44, page 20, line 36, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 44, page 20, line 38, leave out subsection (11)

Clause 44, page 21, line 1, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 44, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 45 [Power to authorise disclosure to the Board: Scotland]:

[Amendments Nos. 211 to 214 not moved.]

Clause 45 agreed to.

Clause 46 [Power to authorise disclosure to the Board: Northern Ireland]:

[Amendments Nos. 215 to 218 not moved.]

Clause 46 agreed to.

Clause 47 [Power to authorise use of information by the Board]:

moved Amendments Nos. 219 to 222:

Clause 47, page 22, line 35, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 47, page 23, line 1, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 47, page 23, line 3, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 47, page 23, line 4, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

[Amendment No. 223 not moved.]

moved Amendments Nos. 224 to 225:

Clause 47, page 23, line 9, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 47, page 23, line 12, leave out subsection (7)

Clause 47, page 23, line 13, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 47, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 48 [Power to authorise disclosure by the Board]:

moved Amendment No. 226:

Clause 48, page 23, line 18, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 227 not moved.]

moved Amendments Nos. 228 to 230:

Clause 48, page 24, line 4, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 48, page 24, line 11, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 48, page 24, line 13, leave out subsection (11)

Clause 48, page 24, line 14, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 48, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 49 [Power to authorise disclosure by the Board: Scotland]:

[Amendment No. 231 not moved.]

moved Amendments Nos. 232 and 233:

Clause 49, page 24, line 44, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 49, page 25, line 2, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 49, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 50 [Power to authorise disclosure by the Board: Northern Ireland]:

[Amendment No. 234 not moved.]

moved Amendments Nos. 235 and 236:

Clause 50, page 25, line 35, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 50, page 25, line 37, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 50, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 51 agreed to.

Clause 52 [Cessation of Office for National Statistics etc]:

moved Amendment No. 236A:

Clause 52, page 26, line 6, leave out paragraph (b)

The Statistics Commission is to disappear, as have other of this Government's short-lived creations; yet the commission has established itself well and developed its practice in an exemplary way. The given reason for its departure is the wish to avoid,

"competing independent centres of statistical expertise".

The commission will have been well pleased with "independent" and "expertise" but mystified by "competing". How could a commission spending £1.5 million a year advising and monitoring ever be in competition with the Office for National Statistics, with its £200 million a year? We need a more convincing explanation. Could the commission have become too independent and too expert and thus out of day-to-day control? I beg to move.

I agree entirely with the approval and praise expressed by the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, for the work of the Statistics Commission over the seven years of its existence. We thank the past and present members who have contributed to that excellent record. However, the issue is not quite as benign as he suggested. The new board will have a statutory objective to promote and safeguard the production and publication of official statistics that serve the public good and to promote the quality, comprehensiveness and good practice of official statistics. In order to deliver on this, as the Statistics Commission does now, the board will operate openly and transparently and will report publicly, including to this House, on all aspects of its operation and its findings in relation to official statistics.

The two bodies cannot co-exist, as the noble Viscount proposed, as it would be inefficient and potentially damaging to have two bodies serving exactly the same function with potentially competing voices and blurred responsibilities and accountability lines. The Government expect Parliament to play a central role in holding the statistical system, including the board, to account, in the same way as Parliament provides independent oversight of other independent institutions such as the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority and the competition regulators.

We subscribe to the same view as the noble Viscount in his admiration for the Statistics Commission, but we have built upon that experience in order to produce the model for the development of statistics in this country in the form of the new board and its responsibilities. I hope that the noble Viscount will accept that in good faith and will withdraw his amendment.

I thank the Minister for that reply.

Before my noble friend withdraws the amendment I should like to say a few words about this matter. I have been holding my peace. I am sorry that we have gone past 10 o'clock but I have not tried to lengthen the debate.

I reinforce what has been said about the value of the work of the Statistics Commission. I have been the beneficiary of a great deal of advice from it. Many of the amendments tabled from this side of the Committee or from the Liberal Democrat Benches were suggested, or certainly approved, by the Statistics Commission. On many occasions it declared its fears about what the noble Lord, Lord Moser, referred to earlier as the muddle between the role of the board and that of the National Statistician. The Statistics Commission put its finger on that again and again. It is deeply disquieted by the structure that the Government have set up under this Bill.

I hope that I shall not embarrass the commission by saying this but it has been very generous with its time and advice. We should not allow this clause to pass without not only praising the commission for what it has done but acknowledging that it shares, and in many cases has been the origin of, the opposition to many of the Bill's clauses. I am enormously grateful to it. I hope that even now Ministers, either here or in another place, will pay greater attention to the criticisms that the commission has advanced in its experience and wisdom. I do not think that we should let the Bill pass without expressing that forcefully. There are many stages still to come. We shall have Report and amendments will go back to another place. I suspect that some of them may well come back here later. In all that, we will be reflecting in many cases the views of the Statistics Commission, and it knows what it is talking about.

I have previously in the Committee paid tribute to the work done by the Statistics Commission, but I have not paid tribute to the work that it did to help noble Lords prepare for their scrutiny of the Bill. I associate myself with everything that my noble friend Lord Jenkin said.

I apologise for pre-empting my noble friend Lord Jenkin of Roding. I have only one thing to add. Competing bodies, if their competition is in ideas, provided that the terms of reference are tightly drawn and the cost is reasonable, might be very good for the democratic process rather than being bad for it. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 52 agreed to.

Clauses 53 to 57 agreed to.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

Clause 58 [Money]:

[Amendments Nos. 237 and 238 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 239:

Clause 58, page 29 line 13, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 58, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 59 to 61 agreed to.

Clause 62 [Orders and regulations]:

moved Amendments Nos. 240 and 241:

Clause 62, page 30, line 20, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

Clause 62, page 30, line 29, leave out "Treasury" and insert "Cabinet Office"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

moved Amendments Nos. 242 to 246:

Clause 62, page 30, line 30, leave out paragraph (a)

Clause 62, page 30, line 32, leave out "order or"

Clause 62, page 30, line 35, leave out "or 11"

Clause 62, page 30, line 39, leave out "or 11"

Clause 62, page 31, line 2, leave out paragraph (b)

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 62, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 63 to 70 agreed to.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clauses 71 to 73 agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported with amendments.

House adjourned at 10.08 pm.