My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Scotland of Asthal, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]

Clause 1 [Drinking banning orders]:

moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 1, line 8, leave out "described" and insert "specified"

In moving Amendment No. 1, I shall speak to Amendment No. 3, which is grouped with it.

Naturally, we support measures that would reduce violent crime, but we shall certainly need to examine all the proposals in the Bill rigorously to ensure that they are both justified and effective. We are surely justified in our scepticism of the Home Office's ability to deliver its policies effectively given the shambles revealed this week whereby more than 1,000 foreign national criminals, who should have been considered for deportation or removal, completed their prison sentences and were released without the appropriate consideration of either deportation or removal action. That is shocking. I make it clear that I do not expect the Minister to have to respond on that issue today; I have already made that clear to him outside the Chamber. I believe it is not his direct area of responsibility, and I think it would be inappropriate to hold him to account for that today. However, I give notice now that I have drafted an amendment on this matter, within the scope of the Bill, for later debate. I have sought the advice of the Public Bill Office on whether it is within the scope of the Long Title. As a result of the late development of these matters today, it has not been possible for the Public Bill Office to consider it in time for me to make it clear now whether it will be tabled. If I receive the advice of the Public Bill Office that it is within the scope of the Long Title, the amendment will be published before the end of the week.

We support measures to give the courts more effective powers to ban individuals from licensed premises if that will materially improve public order. We need to look carefully at whether the Government's plans for drinking banning orders are worth the bureaucratic new structure that they propose to build. Drinking banning orders are an odd beast. The Government present them as a civil order, but they wear the mantle of criminal design. Debates in another place did not dispel the confusion that lies at the heart of the creation of this new order. In our debates on the amendments in this part of the Bill, we shall try to persuade the Government to do rather better.

The amendments in this first group are probing. They seek to determine the scope of the potential prohibitions that could be included in a drinking banning order. This is a particularly important issue to be debated, given recent developments in the courts concerning anti-social behaviour orders. Of course, I appreciate that drinking banning orders are not the same as ASBOs, but they share certain characteristics, as was made clear by the right honourable Hazel Blears in another place.

It is worth noting that earlier this month the High Court ruled that a prohibition included in an anti-social behaviour order imposed by a court was too wide. The particular prohibition banned the individual who was the subject of the order from behaving in an anti-social way for two years. That was deemed to be far too vague in its scope to be lawful. With that knowledge in mind of how wary the courts are when it comes to allowing orders and prohibitions of this kind, it is important that the Minister should clarify today exactly what the Government have in mind in Clause 1(1) and (2). Naturally, in this House we always seek to ensure that legislation is fit for purpose. If anything is left in the Bill that risks causing unnecessary difficulty in the courts at a later stage, I believe we need to address that matter now.

Subsection (1) explains that a drinking banning order would prohibit the individual subject to the order from doing the things described in the order. I was somewhat surprised to see the use of the word "described" instead of "specified", which one would usually expect to see in this context. The word "described" conveys a rather more general and less explicit approach to setting out the terms of a drinking banning order. Is that what the Government intend? In any event, is that wise, given the ruling earlier this month by Lord Justice Richards and Mr Justice David Clarke?

Amendment No. 1 simply replaces "described" with "specified". Would not that make it crystal clear that the drinking banning order must be as explicit as possible in setting out precisely what a person is banned from doing?

Subsection (2) states that a drinking banning order,

"may impose any prohibition on the subject".

It qualifies that with the proviso that any such prohibition has to be,

"necessary for the purpose of protecting other persons from criminal or disorderly conduct by the subject while he is under the influence of alcohol".

Subsection (3) specifies what must be included in the prohibition and subsection (4) specifies what must not be included.

That begs the question: what, therefore, may be included? Paragraph 3 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill state that there is,

"the possibility of other relevant prohibitions also being included in the order".

How does the Minister foresee this test of relevance being met? Amendment No. 3 suggests a couple of examples that might possibly be included. Can the Minister give the Committee further examples of what might be contained in such an order?

Although the heading of the clause indicates that these orders are drinking banning orders, it seems that, given the width of Clause 1(2), they are not really confined at all to banning someone from drinking. Calling them "drinking banning orders" is, therefore, something of a misnomer within the current drafting of the Bill. I have tried to show that in Amendment No. 3.

At this stage I certainly do not seek to bring into the debate questions about the approved courses that are the subject of government amendments later on. We shall return to that point. I am simply asking the Minister to give examples of the prohibitions on behaviour that may form the basis of the order. Those are the prohibitions that would stand apart from any requirement that may be imposed by attendance at an approved course. I consider those to be separate.

Clause 22 gives the police powers to give directions to individuals who represent a risk of disorder, requiring them to leave a locality for up to 48 hours. Is it the Government's intention to provide in Clause 1 for powers that go beyond those powers in Clause 22? That would be tantamount to exclusion orders. It seems that these prohibitions could end up being extremely similar to bail conditions that the court can already impose, with the crucial difference that no criminal charge has been made against the individual concerned. I beg to move.

The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, has done the Committee a singular service in pointing out two problems that arise. First, what does Clause 1 cover? Secondly, how do we avoid its breadth being tested in the courts? The structure of Clause 1 indicates that a drinking banning order is one that prohibits the individual against whom it is made from doing the things described or specified in the order. There is obviously no limitation involved in Clause 1(1). Clause 1(2) gives a broad discretion to impose any prohibition which is,

"necessary for the purpose of protecting other persons from criminal or disorderly conduct by the subject while he is under the influence of alcohol".

What does the phrase "while he is under the influence of alcohol" mean? In the criminal law we are familiar with the concept of a person being "drunk and disorderly". Whether a person is drunk does not take a great deal of describing. However, "under the influence of alcohol" is a much vaguer term and does not involve the question of whether a person has been disinhibited by the effects of alcohol. So it is a very vague expression. What is the difference between being drunk—a concept already punished by the criminal law—and being under the influence of alcohol?

The next issue that arises is whether the prohibition order can contain a prohibition on a person's conduct when he is sober. The order is necessary for the purposes of protecting other persons from criminal conduct by the subject "while he is under the influence of alcohol". Supposing he is sober? Does he breach the order if he goes into a public house when he is sober if he is prohibited from doing so under Clause 1(3) when he is under the influence of alcohol? It is clearly a very important question. If a man goes into a pub sober, and then becomes drunk inside, has he breached a prohibition which prevents him "entering" licensed premises—"entering" is the word used in Clause 1(3)—when he is under the influence of drink? Divisional court, here we come: more money for lawyers for sorting out precisely what is the purport of that subsection.

The purpose of the Conservative amendments, as the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, said, is to flush out what sort of prohibition the Government have in mind. My Amendment No. 4 has the same purpose: to insert the word "appropriate" before "necessary" in Clause 1(3) to make sure at least that the prohibitions contained in a drinking banning order have something to do with drinking. We are all familiar now with the way in which ASBOs have been used. They have covered a variety of conduct which must go far beyond that in the minds of those who originally framed the legislation. They have been used to ban people from wearing caps, from keeping pigs or geese, from playing records of classical music and from sunbathing in a thong. All sorts of peculiar things have been banned by ASBOs, and we are at least entitled to know what is to be the extent of a drinking banning order as set out in Clause 1. I await the Minister's reply with interest.

I am sure I am not alone in being disappointed that the Statement made by the Home Secretary in another place has not been repeated here. It is appropriate to say just a few words about the appalling scandal revealed in the papers today, if only because we are now invited to discuss in Committee a Bill the title of which suggests that the Government are acting to reduce violent crime. It is quite ridiculous to suggest that the appalling scandal revealed in the papers is merely a failure on the part of officials to identify and consider for removal foreign criminals reaching the end of their sentences. Murderers, rapists, paedophiles, drug importers and other dangerous and violent offenders are on our streets because of the virtual abandonment of immigration control by this Government. That has resulted in hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants entering Britain, which in turn has resulted in a staggering increase in the number of foreign nationals in our gaols. If this is not a resignation matter, will the Minister please tell us in what circumstances the Home Secretary would think it right to resign?

Before I turn to the content of the amendments, I want to record my thanks to the noble Baroness for speaking to me earlier about her intention to raise the issue of the Home Secretary's Statement. I am grateful for her comments and like everyone else I await with interest the content of the amendments, which I am sure the noble Baroness will endeavour to ensure are within the scope of the Bill. They will be the subject for debate on another day. It is not appropriate for me to comment on the Statement; that is not what is in front of us, although obviously I respect the views of the noble Lord on the matter. I would have expected him to express them very forcefully. He is entitled to do so. However, this afternoon we are here to discuss this Bill, one that is a product of our policy: our determination to do all we can to ensure that there is a proper legal framework to counter violent crime on our streets. That is exactly what this series of practical measures is designed to do.

I am also grateful to the noble Baroness and to noble Lords on the Liberal Democrat Benches for the practical expression of their support for the Bill and its intentions when it received its Second Reading in this House. I hope that our debates can be framed in what I have detected as a positive and pragmatic approach to a piece of legislation which has great merit in terms of the policy lying behind it. It is the kind of Bill with which noble Lords in this House will probably deal in a practical and hardnosed way, as they do quite properly when considering practical measures brought before the House which have a fair degree of support in the House.

I turn to the amendment moved by the noble Baroness and spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. Amendment No. 1 is probing in nature and seeks to redefine a drinking banning order as being one that prohibits the individual against whom it is made from doing the things specified rather than described in the order.

In our view, the proposed amendment, although probative, is unnecessary and fails to add anything to the content of the wording of the Bill. For those reasons, I hope the noble Baroness will not press the amendment.

As I am sure all noble Lords understand, Clause 1 introduces a new civil order—a drinking banning order—which will be available to protect persons and property from criminal or disorderly conduct by an individual while he is under the influence of alcohol. A drinking banning order could impose any prohibition on an individual that a court considers necessary to protect others against such conduct. This includes prohibitions with regard to an individual entering premises that sell alcohol and club premises that can supply alcohol to members and guests.

Amendment No. 3 would allow a drinking banning order to include prohibitions preventing an individual from coming within 10 metres of premises licensed to sell alcohol which have been specified by the court, or from associating with certain individuals. It is an interesting example, but the Bill already allows the courts to impose such prohibitions as it considers necessary. The example given by the noble Baroness is of a type that the court could quite properly consider but, in our view, there is no need to specify the type of prohibitions that the amendment proposes.

We would expect the court to look at the circumstances of the offence to which the drinking banning order relates, and at the individual on whom the court is considering imposing a drinking banning order, to see what the prohibition could usefully cover. Seeking to constrain this in any way on the face of the Bill would not be practical and workable.

Amendments Nos. 4 and 5 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, seek, in spirit, to tighten the circumstances in which prohibitions can be imposed by a drinking banning order. I understand why that is the case. The amendments seek to add a test of appropriateness before a prohibition can be included in an order. In our view, this is unnecessary because, if a prohibition is inappropriate, it could not be necessary. The amendments would also alter parliamentary counsel's drafting but would not add anything by doing so.

If the intention is to ensure that the prohibitions included in an order take into account the circumstances of an individual and the impact that the order will have on him in going about his lawful, everyday business and so on, I can assure the Committee that we would expect the court to consider, in any event, the appropriateness of an order and any proposed prohibition in each and every case. The guidance will be all important in this regard. This, of course, will be published to accompany the measure and will make clear the circumstances in which prohibitions are inappropriate—for example, where they would prevent a person from accessing his place of work or an educational establishment. I know that there are other amendments that seek to address those issues, to which we shall come later.

I am grateful for the amendments, which have been valuable. Having heard what I have said, however, I hope that the noble Baroness and the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw or not move their amendments today.

The noble Baroness referred to some anti-social behaviour order cases. I heard what she said but, in our view, such cases do not necessarily break new ground. Any order that prevents someone from committing an act of anti-social behaviour could perhaps be too broad, but the prohibitions will have to be tailored to the circumstances of the individual. That is the general rubric and the way in which we intend to approach matters, given the powers set out in the Bill. I trust that the noble Baroness and the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw or not move their amendments.

The fundamental problem with ASBOs and this new drinking banning order is that they are sought as civil orders. This means that a different standard of proof applies and orders can be made on the basis of hearsay evidence. Tittle-tattle from the neighbours has been sufficient to found an ASBO on—and anonymous tittle-tattle at that.

The problem that has arisen with ASBOs is that they have criminalised conduct that is not otherwise criminal. Since the breach of an ASBO—whatever prohibition may be in it—is a criminal offence, people have been sent to prison for up to five years for doing things for which they would not face a criminal charge initially. That has been the weakness and the problem behind the orders. I am concerned that drinking banning orders should not have that fatal flaw in them.

The proposed insertion of the word "appropriate", which alters parliamentary counsel's drafting, is not a criticism of parliamentary counsel, who I have no doubt will never look at this Bill again once it has been passed; it will give a guideline to magistrates or to the county court judge, whose job it is to impose the order in the first place. For the judge to have before him the word "appropriate"—the direction that that order must be appropriate—is important.

It might be easy for a person seeking an order to paint such a picture that the tribunal thinks, "Well, it is necessary to do something about this; it is necessary to impose this, that and the other prohibition". I would like to see a check on that thought process, so that the judge has to ask himself, "Is what I am setting out in this order appropriate?" "Appropriate" is an important word and I will return to it at a later stage of this Bill.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, for his answer, even though it did not take us very much, if at all, further. I made it clear at the beginning that my amendments are probing and I stand by that. They were intended to tease out from the Government the extent of prohibitions. I have failed singularly in that, in a sense, because the Minister was kind enough to say that I had given interesting examples in Amendment No. 3 and that they were of a type that the court could properly consider. He said that he would expect the court to look at all the circumstances of the offence and the individual. That raises the very question that was addressed by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford—the hybridity of this matter, whereby we are talking about offences in one breath and a civil order in the other. That is an unhappy hybridity.

The whole point of my amendments was that I was trying to ask the Government what else could be given as guidance today, with regard to what would properly come within this provision. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, was seeking to do much the same thing by imposing the requirement of appropriateness with his amendment. I was trying to tease out some guidance about what might be appropriate for our future debates.

The Minister says that the Bill already allows for what I was seeking to achieve. Of course it does; the Bill allows for just about anything on this earth to be done, within human rights legislation, of course. That is why I find it unsatisfactory that the noble Lord should say that patience is to be rewarded and the guidance will make it clear—the Minister nods sagely. Well, when? The Bill came to this House on 15 November, I think. That is a heck of a long while ago. Before further stages, we will be asking the Minister and his Bill team what progress they have made on guidance. It is a matter that we will return to time and again throughout the Bill. We will be particularly keen to get some idea of that guidance, because without it we will find that little has been achieved between the start of the Bill's passage in another place last June and its completion some time in June this year. Against that background, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 2:

Page 1, line 10, leave out "or disorderly"

Amendment No. 2 deals with another vagueness in Clause 1. The order may impose any prohibition on the subject which is necessary for the purpose of protecting other persons from "criminal or disorderly conduct". That expression is used in a disjunctive way to separate two different types of conduct—criminal and disorderly.

Criminal conduct is conduct punishable as a criminal offence by the courts. In terms of public order, we are already familiar, as I said a moment ago, with the concept of a person being guilty of the criminal offence of drunk and disorderly or of urinating in the street. Criminal offences arising out of a breach of public order are widespread: criminal damage; the use of threats of violence; harassment, including racial harassment; vandalism; the spreading of graffiti; the possession of dangerous dogs; and public disturbances. All those are criminal offences. So one has to ask the Minister: what disorderly conduct is not criminal? How do you distinguish between them? As Amendment No. 49, which is grouped with my amendments, suggests, does it mean conduct which is not in,

"the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress"?

Is it something that is done privately? Is conduct disorderly when nobody can see it? If we start introducing drinking banning orders for what somebody does when nobody can see it, we are going an awful long way towards interfering in people's lives.

In the amendments that I have tabled, I have sought to get away from this disjunctive phrase "criminal or disorderly". "Criminal and disorderly" might be better, but simply to leave it as "criminal conduct" would, in my view, be a better foundation for the imposition of orders of this type. I beg to move.

I should like to speak to Amendment No. 49 in this group. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, for having flagged this up for me. Like Amendment No. 2, it probes the necessity for introducing new legislation to tackle drunk and disorderly behaviour in this way. The matter was debated at some length in another place, and the answers there were unsatisfactory.

The question is essentially about the adequacy of existing legislation, a theme which runs right through the Bill. This is not the first time it has been raised. Clause 1(2) says that an order may be imposed to protect persons from "criminal or disorderly conduct" by the subject, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has said. This raises the question: what conduct is disorderly but is not also criminal? There are already plenty of public order offences on the statute book that address the problem of drunk and disorderly behaviour. The main point is this: if the conduct is tantamount to committing a criminal offence, it should be dealt with as such. Section 5 of the Public Order Act makes it an offence if a person uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, but adds a proviso that it has to be within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby. All our amendment would do is remove the proviso. In doing so, it shows that pretty much any behaviour—for example, high spirits—might pass the threshold for a drinking banning order.

Will the Minister provide an example of unacceptable conduct that is disorderly but not criminal? If he can provide such an example, why is the Public Order Act not being amended to catch such behaviour? I suspect that the reason why no such example will be forthcoming is that the Public Order Act already adequately covers the behaviour that most reasonable people would find unacceptable. If this is the case, DBOs are being introduced as a substitute for arrests and the Minister should come clean about it. No doubt, the police are overwhelmed in town centres on Friday and Saturday nights and do not have the resources to arrest people who in theory are committing an offence. We should then debate police resources and getting enough police officers on the ground to deal with criminal conduct appropriately rather than maintain a pretence that the problem can be addressed by giving more powers to the courts to deal with alcohol-fuelled disorder.

I am grateful to both noble Lords for their attention to this part of the Bill. I shall turn first to the amendment spoken to by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, and then come back to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. Amendment No. 49 proposes that,

"'disorderly conduct' should include conduct that does not occur within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby".

In a sense, the amendment would add a gloss to the term "disorderly conduct", making it clear that disorderly conduct which took place outside the hearing or sight of anyone likely to be caused distress, but which was perhaps captured on CCTV or witnessed by a police officer, would lead to a drinking banning order. We agree that such behaviour could be capable of leading to such an order, but the amendment is unnecessary. The ordinary meaning of "disorder" would in our view encompass such behaviour.

The amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, would have the effect of restricting the circumstances in which an individual can be given a drinking banning order to engagement in criminal, but not disorderly, conduct. I know that the noble Lord has a sincerely held view about anti-social behaviour orders, which he does not like because of the way in which they are phrased and their civil nature, but one has to recognise that there are occasions and instances where it is hard to suggest that an act is criminal but to deny that it is anti-social and causes people distress, nervousness and alarm. Such an act is not always describable as a form of criminal activity. The noble Lord might want to consider also that his amendments would restrict the possible drinking banning order prohibitions to those necessary to protect other persons from criminal, but not disorderly, conduct.

The Government are committed to tackling all aspects of alcohol-related and alcohol-fuelled crime and disorder. Noble Lords will be aware that alcohol misuse is a concern to many people in our communities and that behaviour of that sort may take the form of anti-social behaviour, which, as I have said previously, is not criminal in nature but can nevertheless have a significant and negative impact on many individuals in many of our communities. For that reason, this issue needs to be addressed, and there is substantial public support for our doing so.

Numerous recent statutes refer to both crime and disorder, including the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005, the Licensing Act 2003 and the Anti-social Behaviour Act 2003. In addition, key provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 refer to "crime" and "disorder" as distinct concepts. This Bill enables courts separately to consider making a drinking banning order following conviction in criminal proceedings where the offender was under the influence of alcohol when the offence was committed.

It does not seem to be entirely appropriate, in line with our policy or in keeping with recent legislation to retain both crime and disorder in the drinking banning order provisions. It is important that we do not seek to restrict the circumstances in which an individual can be given a drinking banning order to criminal but not disorderly conduct.

I was asked for examples of what might constitute disorderly conduct but might not necessarily be caught by the criminal law. Activities such as causing a noise nuisance and disturbance, kicking dustbins late at night, setting off fireworks at an inappropriate time or shouting or swearing in the street could be considered disorderly conduct, but might not necessarily, depending on the circumstances, be a criminal offence. Those are the kinds of thing that would be commonly considered in those terms. I hope that noble Lords will feel able to withdraw or not move the amendments having heard what I have had to say on the subject.

The Minister has just pointed out that in previous legislation the phrase "crime and disorder" has been used, and not "crime or disorder", so one seeks to find out why the disjunctive word is used here. None of the examples that the Minister has given really amounts to a justification for banning people from public houses and placing on them any prohibition the court may think fit. If the purpose is to impose a drinking banning order on someone whose conduct is caught on CCTV but does not affect another member of the public, that is even worse.

I intend by these amendments to restrict the scope of the drinking banning order. I think it important that we do that. The answer that the Minister gave on two occasions was, "We do not want to restrict in any way the scope of the order". Any sort of conduct that could be described as someone causing a noise or making a nuisance of themselves could lay that person open to the drinking banning order. The reason why the Government do not wish to confine the matter to criminal conduct is that, if it were criminal conduct and a criminal offence had been committed, that would have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt on proper evidence. Only by that route could it lead to a person being in prison. That is the sanction at the end of it all; if the drinking banning order is breached, a person goes to prison.

To take the Minister's examples, he suggests that shouting or kicking a dustbin could give rise to a drinking banning order. If an order is made with a prohibition against kicking dustbins, and the person does it again, he can be fined under this Bill. If he fails to pay the fine, he can go to prison. What is he going to prison for? For kicking a dustbin.

A lot has been said recently. The Home Secretary, whose future is so much under discussion at the moment, made it clear that he was dissatisfied with descriptions that have been given in this House and elsewhere of the conduct of this Government as authoritarian. But when they introduce a law that threatens a person with imprisonment in the long run for kicking a dustbin, how dare they deny that this is an authoritarian society? Having made that point for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 3 to 5 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 6:

Page 2, line 17, at end insert—

"( ) from having access to or contact with members of his family (whether under the terms of a court order or under the terms of an agreement with his partner); or

( ) from taking his child or children to a place where they may receive medical treatment."

In moving this amendment, which stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Anelay, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 114.

These amendments add to the list of restrictions on what can be prohibited under a drinking banning order under Clause 1(4). That subsection safeguards the individual's access to his residence, place of employment and education or medical services. Paragraph (d) also allows the individual to attend a location that he has been ordered to attend by statute or court order. The purpose of these amendments is to test whether these restrictions on the scope of a drinking banning order are sufficient. Can the Minister explain on what criteria these limitations have been selected? If he thinks that it is safe to leave the question of the fairness of particular prohibitions to the discretion of the courts, it begs the question why any limitations have been included at all. Is the Minister entirely satisfied that Clause 1(4) provides sufficient protection to the rights of the individual?

The amendments would impose a further limitation to a DBO by ensuring that a subject can always have access to his family. Surely that is a right that also needs to be safeguarded. Contact with a member of one's family would not fall under the mandatory obligations contained in court orders safeguarded in paragraph (d). How can it be guaranteed that any prohibition made as part of a drinking banning order will be compatible with access to one's family? The example of accommodation tied to a licensed premises poses a particular problem, but there must be other situations in which the issuing of a DBO might conflict with family interests and access to children. I beg to move.

As I explained earlier, Clause 1 introduces a new civil order, a drinking banning order, which is available to protect persons and their property from criminal or disorderly conduct by an individual while he or she is under the influence of alcohol. A drinking banning order could impose any prohibition on an individual that a court considers necessary to protect others against such conduct. That includes prohibitions with regard to an individual entering premises that sell alcohol and club premises that can supply alcohol to members and guests.

Amendment No. 6 seeks to stipulate two situations in which a drinking banning order could not impose prohibitions on an individual. As the noble Lord explained, the first is that no prohibition should prevent a subject having access to or contact with members of their family, whether under the terms of a court order or under the terms of an agreement with his partner. The second is that an individual should not be prevented from taking his child or children to a place where they may receive medical treatment. The Bill already sets out certain effects that a prohibition cannot have, such as preventing an individual attending his place of work. These provisions ensure that we do not end up with perverse prohibitions that would inappropriately impact upon the subject of a drinking banning order.

I understand the basis of the noble Viscount's amendments. However, there may be instances where the court may wish to impose a prohibition to protect family members from an individual's behaviour while under the influence of alcohol. So I am not persuaded that this amendment is necessary. However, I recognise that we would not want courts to impose prohibitions in drinking banning orders that would prevent an individual taking his child or children to a place where they may receive medical treatment. I expect that noble Lords could quote a never-ending list of similar situations where prohibitions would be inappropriate and should not be imposed. However, I believe that such matters are best left to the discretion of the court to consider on a case-by-case basis. However, I am happy to ensure that the kind of example that the noble Viscount drew to our attention is included in drinking banning order guidance, as it fits exactly the requirements that we will have to set out so that it can be best understood by those who would give effect to the orders.

Amendment No. 114 is the same as that which has been proposed for drinking banning orders, but for directions to leave. I believe that it is therefore appropriate to discuss it at the same time, and the noble Viscount has grouped it with Amendment No. 6. Clause 22 allows a constable to direct a person to leave a locality. Subsection (4) provides that no prohibition can be given by a constable if it prevents the individual to whom it is given having access to his home, to his place of work, to a place that he needs to attend to receive education, training or medical treatment, or to a place that he has been ordered to attend. The amendment would, again, add the same two situations as those proposed in the amendment on drinking banning orders.

For directions to leave, the provisions already in the Bill seek to set out the situations in which lack of access would be highly counter-productive for the individual, such as being unable to attend his place of employment. They are the basics required to ensure that we do not end up with nonsensical unintended consequences. Again, I am not persuaded that it would be right to include anything in the Bill on the need to ensure that the direction does not prevent someone having access to, or contact with, members of his family. It is already the case that a direction to leave cannot prevent someone having access to his home—that is where a person's family is most likely to live. A direction lasts only for a maximum of 48 hours, so it is a very short-term arrangement.

I recognise that we would not want a direction to be given that prevented an individual taking his child or children to a place where they might receive medical treatment. I am not sure under what circumstances that might arise, as the basis for a direction to leave is that it should be given only if it is necessary to prevent alcohol-related crime or disorder and it can last only for a maximum of 48 hours. It is most likely that directions will be given from a town or city centre and the area that has a concentration of pubs and clubs. However, as in the case for drinking banning orders, I am happy to ensure that this is covered specifically in guidance on directions to leave. I hope that, with those assurances, the noble Viscount will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

I am grateful to the Minister for that comprehensive explanation. We shall of course be examining the guidance very carefully and, on that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 7:

Page 2, line 17, at end insert—

"(4A) Before making a drinking banning order, a court may receive a report from an appropriate officer about the proposed subject of the order, which contains information about the subject and, in particular, about whether there is any reason to suspect that he may be—

(a) suffering from substance addiction (including alcohol dependence);

(b) a person falling within section 1 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c. 20) (application of Act: "mental disorder"); or

(c) suffering from any other recognised physical or mental illness or condition which could either—

(i) affect his ability to restrict his intake of alcohol;

(ii) cause him to engage in criminal conduct while under the influence of alcohol; or

(iii) affect his ability to comply with a drinking banning order.

(4B) In subsection (4A), an "appropriate officer" means—

(a) where the proposed subject is aged 18 or over, an officer of the National Offender Management Service or a social worker of a local authority social services department;

(b) where the proposed subject is aged under 18, a social worker of a local authority social services department or a member of a youth offending team.

(4C) If the court determines that the proposed subject of a drinking banning order may be a person falling within subsection (4B)(a) to (c), the court shall not make a drinking banning order unless satisfied, on receipt of medical evidence, that—

(a) his ability to understand and comply with the order will not be significantly restricted by reason of his being a person falling within subsection (4B)(a) to (c); and

(b) compliance with the order, either alone or in combination to any other order or sentence to which he is subject, would not have a deleterious effect upon his mental or physical health."

This amendment raises a very important issue, which I am sure the Minister will address. Is it intended that these drinking banning orders will be applied to rough sleepers who are alcohol or drug-dependent? Is it a mechanism for removing from the streets people who are suffering from alcoholism in one way or another? If that is the case, then a person suffering from that sort of illness is bound to breach any prohibitions that are put on him or her, and a drinking banning order would just be one step towards fines and subsequent imprisonment.

We welcome the government amendments in the group commencing with Amendment No. 8, which deal with the introduction of approved courses to treat alcoholism, and that will be discussed in due course. But it seems to me that the introduction of the approved courses idea by the Government brings in a considerable refinement to the Bill as first put before another place.

A major effect is that the drinking banning order will not be the crude and simplistic,

"short sharp shock to make people confront their behaviour"—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee B, 13/10/05; col. 16.], to use the words of Miss Hazel Blears on 13 October last year. It is an order intended to deal with people's problems, as well as to give them a short, sharp shock. If the orders are to be tailored to deal with an individual by, for example, different prohibitions for different periods, as set out in the original Bill, by an order that a person should attend an approved course, or by the possibility that a particular prohibition can be terminated and so on, then it is necessary to have full and proper information about the individual before the court.

Amendment No. 7 does not require a report in every case, but if unusual prohibitions are to be contained in the order, or if it deals with a person with an unusual personality, it is only sensible to have a report from an appropriate person, as defined. If, as I have said, the orders are imposed on people who are rough sleepers, surely a report from the Department of Social Services should be available to the court before it considers what prohibitions should be placed on that person.

Further, when there is reason to think that a person may be suffering from drug or alcohol dependence, or any other recognised physical or mental illness, it is only sensible, as the amendment suggests, to have a professional medical view. The order that the judge who hears the application will make will be a matter for his discretion, and the prohibitions that he imposes will also be a matter for his discretion. Therefore, he should have all the available assistance from social services and the medical profession that are relevant to the case. I beg to move.

I support the amendment, to which my noble friend Lady Anelay of St Johns has added her name. It would be helpful in some cases if a report were made available to the court before it made a drinking banning order. It is a sensible proposal that should not lead to too great a burden on the court or on those with responsibility for preparing the reports.

We are all concerned about the heavy workload carried by the Probation Service, which has been highlighted in recent very tragic cases, especially in light of the extra burden that it will face at the end of this year when custody plus sentences come into effect. Despite the fact that the DBO is a civil order, it would be valuable if a report could be called for by the court when it believes that it will assist it more effectively to determine whether an order should be made and what prohibition should appropriately be imposed.

The amendment is even more appropriate in the light of the Government's new clauses that open up the prospect of a court ordering that a person should be offered the chance to complete an approved course, to which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has referred, and get a discount on the length of their DBO as a result. I hope that the Government can accept the amendment.

I hear what the noble Viscount says and should perhaps say at the outset that I am going to disappoint him. However, I think that I can give him some cause for cheer.

The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and supported by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, seeks to introduce safeguards into the process of making a drinking banning order. As explained, the amendment would mean that any court considering making an order may first receive a report from an appropriate person on the subject's mental and physical health and whether he or she has any substance misuse addictions. We have a great deal of sympathy with the aim behind the amendment. The image conjured up by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, of the rough sleeper is one that I readily understand as my own city has a fair problem of exactly that nature. It is only right and proper that policies should be directed towards giving assistance and help, which is the spirit in which the amendment has been moved. I understand that.

The amendment would ensure that an order is not imposed unless the court is satisfied that the subject can understand and comply with the order, and that it will not have an adverse effect on his mental or physical health. We know that rough sleepers, who are a part of our community, invariably have mental and physical health problems. This amendment was tabled and debated in the other place and my colleagues there had a similar sympathy with it. I understand the importance of the issue and agree with the aim, but in our view there is no need to set out the requirement in the Bill. I give the assurance that this issue will be dealt with in guidance, as is the case with anti-social behaviour orders. To our way of thinking that seems the best way of dealing with it.

It is already the case that local authorities have a duty under the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 to assess any person who may be in need of community care services. If there is any evidence to suggest that the person against whom the order is being sought may be suffering from drug, alcohol or mental health problems, the person's circumstances should be properly assessed and the necessary support provided by social services or other relevant agencies. That support should run parallel with the collection of evidence and application for an order where that is deemed necessary.

When applying for an order against a young person an assessment should be made of their circumstances and needs in each and every case. That will enable the local authority to ensure that the appropriate services are available or are going to be provided for the young person affected and for the court to obtain the necessary information about his or her circumstances. However, it is vital that any such assessment does not introduce delay to the application process for an order as the needs of the community should be paramount. The lead agency should work closely with the local social services department or youth offending team from the start of the process so that where a new assessment is required it can be made speedily.

As I said, the Government will ensure that those considerations are set out in the detailed and comprehensive guidance that will be an important part of ensuring that the legislation when it reaches the statute book becomes operational. I hope that having heard that explanation the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. However, he appeared to be describing a parallel service whereby the local authority will look at specific individuals and assess them for their needs. He has not told me—and I would like clarity on this point—whether they will provide a report for the decision maker, whether it is a magistrate or a civil judge, to have before him when he sets out the various prohibitions that he wishes to impose in a drinking banning order. If I could have assurance that guidance would be to the effect that a judge must consider whether a report is necessary and call for it there would not be any need for me to pursue the amendment. But as it stands and in the absence of any further assurance, it is a matter that I shall pursue. Perhaps the Minister would like to consider it between now and Report.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for extending that invitation. As I understand it, the amendment in any event seeks to create a situation where before an order is made the court may receive a report from the appropriate person—probably social services. I made it clear in my comments that when an order is sought, particularly against a young person, an assessment will be made of their circumstances and needs in every case, which will enable the local authority to ensure that the appropriate services are available or can be provided to the young person concerned. The assumption would be that a report should be formulated.

A statutory requirement will be placed on the police and on the local authority to consult each other. That will help to identify vulnerable people. I have no doubt that before an order is sought there will be partial reliance on the wisdom of local services. As I am sure the noble Lord will appreciate, the expectation is that the police and the local authority, in seeking to tackle the problems associated with alcohol in those terms, will work closely together before seeking to make use of a drinking banning order in relation to other criminal activity driven by alcohol. The expectation is that there will be close liaison and that the information required before an order is made is available to the court.

I will, however, reflect further on the noble Lord's other points. This is something that we can pick up between now and Report.

In his earlier remarks, the noble Lord was not clear whether the court would have a duty to consider whether a report was necessary. However, he made it clear that rough sleepers, people suffering from alcohol dependence and perhaps drug dependence are not excluded from this Bill. It is not just a Bill to deal with binge drinking by young people. It obviously has much wider connotations. I shall read carefully what he said. I hope we can return to this in a constructive way when we get to Report. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 8:

Page 2, line 18, leave out subsections (5) and (6).

This is a large and complex group of amendments and I hope that the Committee will bear with me as I work my way through them. In commenting on the government amendments, I shall also comment for the convenience of noble Lords on amendments that have been made to them.

Reference has already been made to some of the issues that these amendments cover. I ought to place on record the Government's gratitude to Humfrey Malins, who suggested many of the ideas which we have attempted to encapsulate within the amendments. No doubt other contributors to this debate will draw further on Mr Malins' important initiative.

In Committee in the other place, the Government gave a commitment to consider whether positive requirements to address alcohol misuse behaviour could be attached to a drinking banning order. During Second Reading in this House, my noble friend Lady Scotland confirmed that we would indeed be tabling new clauses to this effect.

The first new clause—Amendment No. 8 and associated Amendments Nos. 9, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29 and 32—will enable individuals who are subject to a drinking banning order to undertake a course to address their alcohol misuse and enable them to confront it.

A court will be able to propose to an individual that they attend an improved course. The court can do this if it is satisfied that a place is available for the individual; if the individual has voluntarily agreed to attend the course, this can be included in the drinking banning order.

Before attendance of an approved course is included in an order, the individual must be informed—in plain language in writing, or by other means—of what attendance on the course will involve, any fees that they would need to apply and at what time they would need to be paid. If the court decides it is not going to include a provision in a drinking banning order for an individual to attend an approved course, it must give its reasons for not doing so in open court.

This new clause makes it clear that the duration of a drinking banning order—known as the "specified period"—can last for between two months and two years. Different prohibitions within a drinking banning order can also take effect for different periods, known as the "prohibition period". The new clause provides that the terms of a drinking banning order or the prohibitions contained within it may cease to apply before the end of the specified period or prohibition period if an individual successfully completes an approved course specified in their order.

The court would set a time when a drinking banning order or prohibition would cease to have effect should the individual satisfactorily complete an approved course. The court would also decide the appropriate reduction in length of the drinking banning order or prohibition and state the date by which the individual would need to complete the course.

An order or prohibition cannot cease to have effect until at least half of the specified period or the prohibition period. Therefore, an individual would have to serve over half the duration of a drinking banning order—or prohibition in such an order— before it can cease to have effect. The Secretary of State will be able to make regulations, subject to the affirmative procedure, to modify the earliest time at which an order or prohibition can cease to have effect. That will enable the minimum duration of a drinking banning order or their prohibition to be adjusted if it is necessary to do so in the light of experience.

We are making some consequential amendments to the drinking banning order clauses to reflect this new provision. Amendments Nos. 21 to 23 in Clause 4 and Amendments Nos. 27 to 29 in Clause 7 reflect the introduction of "a relevant local court" in relation to a drinking banning order, meaning a magistrates' court acting for the local justice area in which the subject normally resides. Amendment No. 32 in Clause 8 changes "the permission of the justices' clerk" to that of a "proper officer", also in consequence of the new clauses being introduced.

I turn to Amendments Nos. 10 to 14, tabled by Conservative Members of the Committee, which relate to the new clause. Amendments Nos. 10 to 12 appear to propose that courses should cover such issues as rehabilitation, alcohol awareness and anger management. The courses may cover such issues but in our view there is no need to specify that in the Bill. The content of courses needs to be flexible so as to address an individual's alcohol misuse behaviour. On Amendment No. 13, which would ensure that an individual is informed "in an accessible format" about what attendance on a course will involve, we say that the Bill already specifies that such information should be provided in plain language in any event—in writing, or otherwise. It is best left to the court to decide how to inform the individual. With regard to Amendment No. 14, we can also leave it to the court to decide how they will inform the subject of the implications of not completing a course. Where it is appropriate to do so, these matters can be covered in guidance.

I also need to speak to Amendment No. 37, which will give effect to the second new clause on the duration of a drinking banning order. It sets out the basis for operating and running approved courses. Applications can be made to the Secretary of State to run a course addressing an individual's alcohol misuse behaviour. In deciding whether to approve a course, the Secretary of State will have regard to a course's proposed content and whether the person providing and administering the course is an appropriate person to do so. In reaching that decision the Secretary of State may seek the views of others appointed to consider those applications.

A course may be approved subject to specific conditions that the Secretary of State considers appropriate. That will ensure that course content is appropriate and targeted specifically at addressing alcohol misuse behaviour which has become subject to the drinking banning order. Once a course is approved it can remain in place for up to seven years. Approval can, however, be withdrawn at any time that is considered necessary. The Secretary of State is given a power to make regulations covering, among other things, the payment of fees for the consideration and approval of applications, the maximum fees that an individual may pay to attend a course and the monitoring both of courses and those providing them. He may also issue guidance on the conduct of courses.

So, this new clause provides for an effective regime to be in place to ensure that courses to address the behaviour of those subject to an order are operated professionally and should make a positive contribution to our societal efforts to reduce alcohol-related crime and disorder.

Opposition Amendments Nos. 38 to 41 seek to alter our approach. Amendment No. 40 seeks to restrict applications for running courses to not-for-profit organisations. I understand the motive behind that, but we do not want to restrict applications for running courses on that basis, which could otherwise restrict the number of organisations that might be suitable—and have the right experience in running courses aimed at addressing alcohol misuse behaviour. Amendments Nos. 38, 39 and 41 together propose that rather than saying regulations may be made about the approval of a course, "may" would be replaced with "shall". To us, that seems unnecessary.

I need also to speak to the new clause proposed in Amendment No. 42 and the consequential Amendments Nos. 48, 50, 51, 56 and 57. This is the third new clause that we are introducing. It provides for a certificate to be given to an individual who has satisfactorily completed an approved course and for a written notice to be issued if it is decided not to give a certificate. When an individual has satisfactorily completed an approved course, the court must provide a certificate. An individual would be considered to have successfully completed the course once the certificate has been received by the court.

The Secretary of State can make regulations specifying the form of the certificate and any particulars it must contain and cover. A course provider must give a certificate unless the individual undertaking the course fails to pay the course fees, fails to attend the course as instructed or fails to comply with any other reasonable requirement of the course provider. If the course provider cannot issue a certificate, it must give the individual written notice of that decision and their reasons. The course provider must issue a certificate or a notice within 14 days of being asked to by the individual. As with certificates of satisfactory completion, the Secretary of State is given a power to make regulations on the form of the notices that are issued when an individual fails to satisfactorily complete the course. The remaining government Amendments Nos. 48, 50, 51, 56 and 57 are consequential.

I hope that the Committee will agree that the introduction of approved courses to help individuals subject to drinking banning orders to change their behaviour is a very positive step. By allowing courts to reduce the length of an order or its prohibitions, we are creating a sensible incentive for individuals to address their behaviour. We feel that that combination of imposing prohibitions on an individual and providing educational interventions will increase the effectiveness of drinking banning orders in addressing alcohol-related crime and disorder. I commend the new clause and the associated amendments.

I now turn to opposition Amendments Nos. 43 to 45, 58 and 59. Amendments Nos. 43 and 45 propose the inclusion of a new subsection so that if an individual who is subject to a drinking banning order is unable to complete a course because the person providing the course ceases to operate under the conditions approved by the Secretary of State, he may make an application to the court that made the order to issue a certificate of the approved course. I agree that a person should not suffer a detriment if he has done all that is required of him but, before he has completed the course or obtained a certificate, the course provider ceases to operate.

However, experience from drink/drive intervention courses, from which the provision is very much drawn, shows that that is a very unlikely scenario. In respect of the courses for drink-drivers, which have operated on an experimental basis since 1993, and in all court areas since 2000, we are not aware of a single case where the provider has ceased to operate without first giving a period of notice. The Secretary of State can approve and withdraw approval for behaviour intervention courses. Therefore, conditions can be set when approving a course to ensure that adequate notice is given if a course provider decides that it no longer wishes to provide a course.

If a course ceases to operate under the conditions approved by the Secretary of State, approval for the course can be withdrawn. Such action should be timed so as to ensure that those already attending a course delivered by the provider in question are not adversely affected, but also so as to ensure that no new referrals to the course take place. Although that scenario is very unlikely, the most likely outcome would be that the person would be referred to another provider to continue to complete the course. That provider would then issue the certificate of completion.

In any event, I do not believe that a court would be well placed to make judgments about whether a person has fulfilled the attendance and other requirements of a behaviour intervention course without making time-consuming inquiries. So I assure the Committee that these matters will be covered in detail in guidance and that the amendments proposed are for that reason unnecessary. The subject of a drinking banning order is to be regarded as having completed an approved course satisfactorily if and only if the person providing the course has issued a certificate stating that the subject has done so.

Amendment No. 44 seeks to remove ", and only if,". This amendment, too, is unnecessary, as this is the only basis on which an individual would have satisfactorily completed the course. The person providing an approved course must give the individual a certificate of completion unless the individual has, among other things,

"failed to comply with any other reasonable requirement of that person".

Amendment No. 46 proposes to omit this requirement and would, in our view, unnecessarily limit the situations under which a certificate may not be given.

Amendments Nos. 58 and 59 seek to change amendments that we have tabled. Amendment No. 58 seeks to ensure that no regulations are made under Section 11 unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution in each House. Amendment No. 59 seeks to remove:

"A statutory instrument containing . . . regulations under section (Approved courses) or (Certificates of completion of approved courses) . . . shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament".

The government amendments, which the amendments seek to change, set out the parliamentary procedure for regulations and orders made under Chapter 1 of Part 1. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which has obviously had the chance and the opportunity to comment on the Bill, has not objected to these or to the proposed level of parliamentary scrutiny. For those reasons, we cannot accept the amendments. I apologise for having detained the House at length over the amendments, but I thought that the issues to which they give rise needed to be given our very fair consideration. I also wanted to set out in some detail the effect of the government amendments. I beg to move.

At this stage, I would like to speak to the amendments grouped with the government amendments, which I appreciate is rather complicated. I fear that I have made life very difficult for the Chairman because, in attempting to help the Bill team and the rest of the Chamber, I have tabled a significant number of amendments to the Government's new clauses. This makes it rather difficult to follow the Marshalled List, for me as well as for everyone else.

I would like to speak to Amendments Nos. 10 to 14, 38 to 41, 43 to 46, 58 and 59, 15 of which are in eight sub groups. If the Government's new clauses had appeared in the original draft of the Bill, we might have had the luxury of dealing with these very important matters in separate groupings. I would therefore have de-grouped them and not burdened the Chamber with a long speech, which I now have to give to respond to the Government's presentation of these clauses.

First, I put on record the fact that I am very grateful to the Minister for trying to address some of my amendments immediately. He has managed to take away some of the information that I shall have to give, but not a lot, I have to say. He was right to say that the Government have responded helpfully to proposals advanced by my honourable friend Humfrey Malins in another place. The difficulty is that, in tabling these new amendments last Thursday, the Government have at first blush given a much wider power to the courts than my honourable friend had anticipated. I therefore tabled the amendments to try to probe the Government's intentions very fully. The letter that was sent to me and, I suspect, to other noble Lords who spoke on Second Reading merely says that the new proposals allow courts to refer an individual to attend voluntarily an approved alcohol intervention course, the successful completion of which could lead to a reduction in the length of the drinking banning order. The letter goes on to say that the Government believe that this will complement the drinking banning order arrangements by addressing an individual's behaviour as well as imposing prohibitions on them. That rather limited explanation is the reason why I felt I had to table a series of amendments to give the Bill team at least the hope of trying to work out where my objections might lie.

All my amendments today are probing, and we will need to consider the Government's further responses before deciding whether these new clauses need to be improved on Report or whether everything can satisfactorily be left to guidance, which I think will be the mainstay of the Minister's speaking notes at all stages of the Bill, by the sound of it. We may have to help him to put guidance into the Bill before it leaves this House.

Although these new clauses may well prove to be welcome, as I think they will be, we in this House are the only ones who will have the luxury of time to debate them properly. When they go to another place they will form part of the whole group of Lords amendments, and we know that the time allocated for consideration of Lords amendments is notoriously inadequate. That is my apology for taking some time on them today.

Have the Government consulted Alcohol Concern or any other related organisation on the specific drafting of these new clauses, and if so, with what results? As soon as I saw the amendments, I telephoned Alcohol Concern and although, understandably, staff were on leave last week, I want to put on record my heartfelt thanks to Helen Symons at Alcohol Concern for turning around a response this week. Broadly speaking, she said that Alcohol Concern very much welcomes the fact that the Government have responded to the argument that the punitive action of the DBOs needs to go hand in hand with proactive measures to change the way people drink if it is to be truly effective. She has given a list of very pertinent questions. I have tried to incorporate them into my list of questions on the relevant amendments. As this is a late submission by Helen Symons, I was able to look at them only at two o'clock today, so I have not been able to give advance notice of the questions to the Minister. However, having gone through them today, I shall be happy to provide the e-mail to his Bill team later on.

My first subgroup of amendments comprises Amendments Nos. 10, 11 and 12. It probes the purpose of the approved course that is to be specified in the order. The amendments severally describe the approved courses as promoting rehabilitation, alcohol awareness and anger management. Amendment No. 10, which triggered all this off, is the one that was tabled by my honourable friend Humfrey Malins in another place.

I do not intend to go into the detail of what those three objectives might achieve—I think the Minister has addressed that. He has said why he does not think it is right to put the detail of that in the clause itself. My questions relate to why the Government have overcome their initial objection. On 13 October, the Government rejected the proposal of my honourable friend Humfrey Malins on the basis that DBOs are civil orders and not criminal penalties. Hazel Blears stated:

"When there is a conviction, it is . . . open to the court to direct a mandatory course of action involving rehabilitation, education, drug support and drink support".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee B, 13/10/05; col. 22.]

She quite rightly pointed out that human rights issues are involved and that it would be wrong to force people to take up treatment if they do not wish to do so in the absence of a criminal penalty. She said, of course, that she would take it away for consideration and today we have the result.

This means that the Government have to address the question of why they are now sure that these proposals do not offend against the human rights issues referred to by Hazel Blears. I am glad that the Government think they do not offend, but I think that we and, in future, the courts need to be reassured that they do not offend human rights issues. Of course, I appreciate that the Government's proposals have the advantage of not, strictly speaking, forcing an individual to go on an approved course; they ask an individual to agree to that. However, offering a discount is such an inducement that it will be very difficult for someone to say, "No". If people are being offered a reduction in the period of a DBO if they take up a course and complete it satisfactorily, I need to be reassured that that does not offend against the principles that governed the Minister in the other place saying that this was not a way forward.

My second subgroup comprises Amendment No. 13, which relates to the Government publicising this in an accessible format. The Minister says that this is already covered because they will put out the information about the DBOs in plain language and that that covers it. However, Amendment No. 9 says that the court must provide the information "whether in writing or otherwise". I would like to know what the "or otherwise" conveys. It might mean that it could be in Braille, Easyread or some format that was accessible to someone who could not necessarily read it; it could be translated into another language. I do not think "plain language" covers it. I just want to be reassured about what "or otherwise" might convey.

The third subgroup comprises Amendment No. 14. This would require the court to give a warning about the possible consequences of a failure to complete the course. The Minister says, "Let us leave that to the court to decide". I had in mind a situation where a court currently imposes a community penalty. The court is required to give guidance to a person before it on what will happen to them if they do not complete the course. It might be helpful for courts to be advised that this is good practice and that as a matter of course they should give guidance about the possible consequences of failing to complete. That might make a person more ready to let the people running the course know as soon as possible if they were unable to attend on a particular day for a good reason—it might be to attend the funeral of a close relative or to attend a job interview. I want to get that good practice into the system. We keep being told that we should not worry as it will be in the guidance, but we are not seeing the guidance. That is why I need to be persistent—nay awkward and difficult—and to keep asking the questions today.

I now move on to the amendments that affect the Government's new clause on approved courses. The next subgroup—Amendments Nos. 38 and 40—probes the nature of the organisations or persons that the Government expect to license the approved courses. The Government say they do not want to restrict the kind of persons or organisations who could run this. But—and I welcome his statement here—the Minister said that they need the right experience. That is absolutely right. Alcohol Concern points out that it is crucial that whoever runs the course is properly trained in delivering alcohol interventions. Are the Government really intending that these courses will be delivered only by social services and probation services? Can they give an assurance that other relevant organisations—charities and people with real experience in this field—would be favourably considered as organisations qualified to run these approved courses?

The fifth subgroup is covered by Amendments Nos. 39 and 41. These are the old-fashioned "may/shall" amendments and are intended to probe the nature of the regulations made by the Secretary of State in relation to the approval of courses that may be undertaken. Amendment No. 39 would require the Secretary of State to take into account any recommendations made by persons appointed by the Secretary of State to consider applications to run approved courses. Amendment No. 39 has been tabled because I want to know who will be processing these applications to run courses. Will it be Home Office civil servants? Will it be an independent body appointed by the Secretary of State to process the applications? Will it be in-house or out of house? Will it be in-house, with a specifically nominated group of civil servants who would have expertise, or will it be out of house, with an independent body of persons appointed with long experience in these matters? Alcohol Concern says:

"We would like to seek assurances that the Secretary of State will consult with experts in the field before approving the content of any courses, and that the focus of the course will be changing behaviour, not just raising awareness".

It continues:

"It is important that the course is linked in with the Department of Health's focus on screening and brief interventions to ensure that everyone who comes through the course is referred on to appropriate treatment if necessary".

That seems to be very wise advice.

Amendment No. 41 requires the Secretary of State to include in the regulations the matters set out in subsection (5). The provisions to be covered in the regulations are significant and it would be unthinkable if the Secretary of State were not to include them in the regulations. This "may/shall" amendment is simply there to probe the details behind the matters listed in subsection (5). Paragraph (a) is a provision for the making of applications for approval. Does this mean prescribing the administration of processing applications? There are good management issues here, such as the time to process the applications and the reasons to be given if the Secretary of State refuses an application. Is that what the Government intend to be covered?

Subsection (5)(b) covers the provisions on the payment of fees. Do the Government expect different charges to be set in different parts of the country, and for the charges to differ depending on the nature of the organisation running the course? What happens if a person elects to go on a course when they are financially able to take on the payments, but then loses their job or faces some other financial crisis and no longer can afford to pay? What impact would that have on the provisions in the new clause about certificates on completion of approved courses? If someone cannot complete their attendance, they will get neither the certificate nor the discount on the period of the DBO.

Subsection (5)(d) covers monitoring the running of these courses and closing them down if it all goes wrong. Who will carry out the monitoring? Is it to be the Home Office, the local authority or some other body? To quote Alcohol Concern again, it says:

"It is crucial that the courses are properly evaluated for numbers of people taking them up, changes in behaviour and reductions in reoffending rates".

The sixth group covers Amendments Nos. 43 and 44. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said that he agrees that a person should not suffer if a course is cancelled because of problems encountered by the supplier. He said that it is an unlikely scenario and that it has never happened without notice. I shall not go further because the noble Lord has said that this will be left to guidance. In those circumstances, he has given as full an answer as I can expect.

In the seventh group, Amendment No. 46 seeks to delete paragraph (c). Again, the noble Lord has covered the point. The final group covers the government amendments to Clause 11. The purpose of my Amendments Nos. 58 and 59 is to make the order-making power applying to the Government's new clause subject to the affirmative procedure. Of course the Opposition always prefer the affirmative process where it is responsible to seek it because another place then has at least a chance of proper time being allocated for debate. This House has more opportunities to pray against negative resolutions, certainly more so than the other place. The noble Lord has said, "Don't worry about it. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has already considered this and given it a clean bill of health. We do not need the affirmative resolution procedure". While of course the committee has looked at the other clauses, I am not aware that it has had a chance to consider these new provisions. If the noble Lord tells me that it has already done so and I have missed the report that will have been produced since the publication of these clauses last Thursday, I accept that and will have someone scurry along to the Printed Paper Office to collect it. However, I do not think that the Select Committee has yet had an opportunity to look at these specific clauses. That is the reason for tabling Amendments Nos. 58 and 59. These are welcome, interesting and certainly significant new clauses and it may be that, at least in the first instance, the affirmative procedure should be applied to the regulations governing them. If that system were applied to the first set, it might then be perfectly proper for the negative resolution procedure to apply thereafter.

Having wearied all noble Lords present, I hope that I have at least raised some pertinent questions.

As ever, the noble Baroness has been persuasive and assiduous in her contribution and I am grateful to her for the constructive way in which she has approached the amendments. If I am unable or I fail to address all the issues she has raised, I apologise in advance and will undertake to cover them between now and Report stage. They may even be picked up during a future sitting of the Committee.

The first point rightly referred to was the human rights question. The noble Baroness answered herself in part. The reason why these provisions do not offend against human rights concerns is that they are voluntary in nature. It is the case that the person potentially affected by a referral to one of these courses decides for himself. In the end, it is up to him. Yes, the person may get a discount—but that does not undermine ultimately the voluntary nature of the arrangement. Yes, it is an incentive—I make no apology for it being anything other than that. The noble Baroness will recognise that it is a very valuable incentive to have.

The noble Baroness asked about the meaning of the term "in writing or otherwise". Again she has anticipated my answer. She is right that "otherwise" would include Braille and audiotape as ways and means of communication. In some circumstances, where a person is challenged as to his ability to read, the instructions may be given orally so that he is able to understand them.

The noble Baroness asked who were likely to be the providers of courses. We have made it clear that we do not want to restrict the provision of courses simply to not-for-profit organisations; some commercial concerns may well provide courses which are fit for purpose. Like any other such organisations, they will have to have trained staff with the relevant experience. Our experience of the drink/drive intervention courses suggests that organisations that might be interested in providing courses would include social services, probation services, voluntary alcohol advisory services falling within a statutory remit, primary care trusts and other relevant public and private sector organisations. Where appropriate, we would hope to build on the existing infrastructure of providers of the drink/drive intervention courses, which have proved to be very successful. We have been grateful in the past to Alcohol Concern and other organisations for their help and support in ensuring that we approach these courses and their construct in a practical way.

Amendment No. 39 relates to the kind of conditions that might apply to a course. It is the case that the Secretary of State will be able to approve a course, subject to specific conditions. Any conditions would apply on a case-by-case basis and would obviously depend on how course providers plan to run the courses. Such conditions may well relate to the content and operation of the courses, including how long the course will last and over what particular time period.

The noble Baroness made a very important point about the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. She is right to say that we have not yet had the opportunity to clear or receive its recommendations on the new clauses, but we are optimistic that we will. We will need to keep the noble Baroness and others involved in the debate informed as to that clearance. We expect that to be the case but, if it is not, we shall need to look at the matter again. We need to be very careful to ensure that that is the case.

I think that that deals for the most part with the questions raised by the noble Baroness. Many of the issues that have arisen will be deliberated over and considered during the construction of the guidance notes. In particular, we will have to consider the level of the fees to be charged and their impact on individuals and their changing circumstances. It is perhaps worth saying that we expect that the fees that individuals will have to pay to the course provider are unlikely to be below £30 or in excess of £300 per course. That is based on the experience of the work that has been undertaken with those who have been going through courses as part of the drink-driving referrals. Obviously the level of fee would depend on the length of the course. It is likely that for short drinking banning orders the courses will also be short, whereas for longer drinking banning orders the course would need to be longer, so it will be tailored to the individual concerned and the length of the order. The cost of administering the courses would be covered by the fees. Our experience suggests that the range of fees for the drink-drive intervention courses runs from about £50 up to about £250, so the fees in this case are likely to be broadly comparable.

There is not much more that I can say about course providers. The Secretary of State will establish criteria for the consideration of course content. Course providers will be able to apply to the Secretary of State to run a course and it will then be for the Secretary of State to decide whether the course is appropriate or not. Regulations will set out the approval basis for courses. They will include provision for the making of applications for course approval; payment of fees and the amounts prescribed with regard to applications for approval and the giving of approval, or both; the maximum fees that an individual may pay for a course and when fees have to be paid; the monitoring of courses and of those people providing the courses; and details about withdrawing approved courses and making information available about courses and those persons providing courses. Those things will be set out very carefully in regulations, which means that we will have the opportunity to give those matters consideration when they come before your Lordships' House. I hope that that answers the general points raised by the noble Baroness on that range of issues.

Unless I have missed anything, I am happy to leave it there. I am also happy to discuss with the noble Baroness outside the Committee points of concern relating to the detailed operation of the scheme.

Before the noble Baroness responds, may I just say that I, too, had a briefing from Alcohol Concern on a good number of the issues that she has brought to our attention? She has saved me a lot of breath on those matters and I congratulate her on the way in which she has moved the amendments to many of the Government's proposals, which I welcome. This is a step in the right direction and puts a proper balance on the way in which the legislation is moving forward.

I was pleased to hear that an endeavour will be made to ensure that the contents of the courses will be as flexible as possible to fit in with the individual requirements of those who are affected by them. However, I have a concern. Some people will be able to meet the fees, but there may be people who will not be able to find the cash that will be required. I wonder whether we could have a look at that issue later, because provision is required to protect those people. Otherwise it looks as if they are going to be covered right the way through the period of the ban without any opportunity of getting the discount by undertaking treatment—and it is treatment—which is required by all, irrespective of whether they really want to get involved with it. There may be people who are debarred on the basis of the costs and we should try to find a way in which they can be covered.

I share my noble friend's view that the providers should not be limited solely to the not-for-profit agencies. Although many of those will be interested, many treatment centres in the private sector have the best interests of drug and drink abusers at heart. They will be equally well qualified—if not more so—to provide appropriate courses as some of the public services and they should not be ruled out. I hope that the noble Baroness will reflect on those points and perhaps not move her amendment on that matter.

Overall, this is a step in the right direction. I look forward to seeing the regulations and am content that there will be, I hope, a wide consultation before they are finally drawn together.

We on these Benches also welcome this addition to the Bill, which we think gives it a great deal more balance than it had before. The provision of treatment to people who are subject to these orders cannot but be of benefit for them.

I am also pleased to note that subsection (8) of Amendment No. 9 requires the court to give reasons when it does not order a course of treatment. That is a very positive way of ensuring that the court gives adequate consideration to the individual circumstances of the person before it. This reflects back on my earlier amendment to seek a report from social services or other appropriate authority into the individual who is to be made the subject of the order. We are getting away from the short, sharp shock that was to be imposed without much consideration and are taking a far better approach to the problem. I congratulate the Government on taking this step.

I am grateful to the Minister for his response. I agree entirely with the spirit of what the noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, said. We welcome these proposals, provided that they are effective, because this is the right way forward. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, agrees with that. We have tried to make the best of it because, once these provisions leave this House, that is it. We want to be sure that those who will be subject to drinking banning orders get the best out of the courses if they are offered them.

We should look again at issues such as the level of fees. The Minister was very helpful in giving an indication of the range; as he said, it has to depend upon the length of time. But there is also a concern that a category of people should not be excluded. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, referred earlier to rough sleepers, and I would not wish to see people in a category such as that automatically excluded from being able to benefit from such an approved course. We need to think about that constructively.

I assure the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, that I have no intention of moving any amendment proposing that only not-for-profit organisations should set up such courses. By golly, I would be a strange Peer on these Benches if I did that. These were probing amendments to try to tease out from the Government what we might see in the guidance.

I did not hear the Minister say that the Government had consulted other organisations about these provisions. I may have missed it. Perhaps they have not had a chance to do so. I think that it would benefit debate in this House if they did so between now and Report so that we had a broader response.

I asked in Amendment No. 39 that the Secretary of State should take into account any recommendations made by persons appointed by the Secretary of State to consider the applications to run approved courses. There is a throwaway part of the clause that refers to these people, but we hear no more about them. That is the kind of thing to which I will want to return in a constructive spirit at Report, when we will be able to consider the amendments rather more cautiously and in smaller groups.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 9:

After Clause 1, insert the following new clause—

"DURATION OF DRINKING BANNING ORDERS

(1) A drinking banning order has effect for a period specified in the order ("the specified period"), which must be not less than two months and not more than two years.

(2) A drinking banning order may provide that different prohibitions contained in the order have effect for different periods; but, in each case, the period ("prohibition period") must be not less than two months and not more than two years.

(3) A drinking banning order may include provision for—

(a) the order, or

(b) a prohibition contained in it, to cease to have effect before the end of the specified period or the prohibition period if the subject satisfactorily completes the approved course specified in the order.

(4) Provision under subsection (3) must fix the time at which the order or the prohibition will cease to have effect if the subject satisfactorily completes the specified approved course as whichever is the later of—

(a) the time specified in the order in accordance with subsection (5); and

(b) the time when he does satisfactorily complete that course.

(5) The time specified for the purposes of subsection (4)(a) must be a time after the expiry of at least half the specified period or (as the case may be) the prohibition period.

(6) Provision under subsection (3) may be included in a drinking banning order only if—

(a) the court making the order is satisfied that a place on the specified approved course will be available for the subject; and

(b) the subject has agreed to the inclusion of the provision in question in the order.

(7) Before making provision under subsection (3), the court must inform the subject in ordinary language (whether in writing or otherwise) about—

(a) the effect of including the provision in the order;

(b) what, in general terms, attendance on the course will involve if he undertakes it;

(c) any fees he will be required to pay for the course if he undertakes it; and

(d) when he will have to pay any such fees.

(8) Where a court makes a drinking banning order which does not include provision under subsection (3), it must give its reasons for not including such provision in open court.

(9) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend subsection (5) so as to modify the earliest time (after the completion of the specified approved course) when by virtue of that subsection—

(a) a drinking banning order, or

(b) a prohibition contained in such an order, may cease to have effect."

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendments Nos. 10 to 14 not moved.]

Clause 2 [Orders on an application to magistrates' court]:

moved Amendment No. 15:

Page 2, line 32, leave out "16" and insert "18"

Amendment No. 15 brings us to a rather different topic. I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 24, 34 and 35, which are grouped with it. They are concerned with the naming and shaming of individuals between the ages of 16 and 18 who are made the subject of these orders.

The Government have taken a robust view of naming and shaming people who are subject to ASBOs. On 1 March, the Home Secretary, Mr Clarke, calling on local authorities to name and shame, said:

"Too many communities are still blighted by the mindless behaviour of a few yobs, who can ruin the quality of life for everyone. Many offenders think that they are untouchable and above the law. If they thought there would be a news blackout on their actions they must now think again. Publicising ASBOs has been tested in the courts and today we are making the position crystal clear—your photo could be all over the local media, your local community will know who you are and breaching an ASBO could land you in prison".

I suppose that one might say of Mr Clarke that his photo is all over the media and that the community knows who he is, but I shall not pursue that.

However, an opposite view is put forward by Professor Al Aynsley-Green, who is England's first Children's Commissioner. Speaking on a Channel 4 programme in February, he said that naming and shaming is not in a child's best interests. These amendments are concerned with people between the ages of 16 and 18, who are "children" as defined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Professor Aynsley-Green said of naming and shaming:

"I'm very concerned about this because it is a breach of one of the UN Conventional Rights of the Child's articles. Children have the right to privacy, and I'm very alarmed when invitations are expressed through the media to get the local people to name and shame the young people, particularly children under the age of criminal responsibility".

Fortunately, the drinking banning orders are not concerned with children of that age. Professor Aynsley-Green continued:

"I think it affects both the older generation and the younger generation. The incessant portrayal of children as thugs and hooligans and yobs reinforces the fears that the other generation has . . . It influences political directions, it influences political policy and it certainly influences possible changes in legislation".

He was also concerned that,

"the incessant dispersal, the incessant pressure of ASBOs are generating alienation of a generation of young people from law and authority and that can only be seriously damaging to our society in the future, if we have a generation now who are children who grow up as adults who do not respect law and order and do not respect the power of authority".

It is all very well for the Home Secretary to say, "Publish their names! Publish their photographs! Let the neighbours tell the authorities that they are in breach of this order or that order or prohibition", but the consequence, as fully outlined by the Children's Commissioner, will be the alienation of young people from authority. If that goes for ASBOs, so it will go for the new drinking banning orders. The only difference that I see is that, in the context of drinking, there may be naming, but there will be little shaming of the person who has his photograph plastered everywhere—in the present culture of drinking, it might be more a badge of honour.

Naming and shaming is not a proportionate response to youth drinking. I suggest to the Government that it will not assist the proposals for treatment courses that we have just acclaimed to have a person coming out of the place where he has taken the course to see his picture and details plastered all over the place and to have the population pointing at him. So I ask the Government to think again about 16 to 18 year-olds, which is the age group to which my amendments relate. I ask them to think again about the whole policy of naming and shaming when it comes to ASBOs, but, in particular, not to extend it to the drinking banning orders. I beg to move.

I will speak in support of Amendment No. 15 on the basis that I take it as a probing amendment to explore the Government's rationale for setting the age limit at which a court may make a drinking banning order at 16. It asks the Government to justify why it should be 16. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, simply raises the age to that of adulthood—18. There was a useful debate on this matter in another place on 18 October, at cols. 66 to 74 of Hansard, but a couple of matters were not addressed then that we need to look at today.

We on these Benches do not contest the argument that some young people under 18 drink when they should not, sometimes drink to excess and sometimes then become involved in disorder. We do not oppose the idea that help should be available to them to ensure that they do not behave in public in such a way as to cause distress or harm to other people, or indeed to cause harm to themselves. The question is whether a drinking banning order is the right way to go about forcing those under the age of 18 to change their behaviour, or whether there are other and better ways of addressing that problem. What is it about drinking banning orders that the Government believe is uniquely valuable in ensuring that young people under 18 will change their behaviour?

In addition, we now have before us the new proposals—the Government's new clauses on approved courses that we have just now agreed to have added to the Bill. What steps will the Government take to ensure that courses are available to young people under 18, and that they are specifically appropriate for young people as opposed to adults? Does the Minister agree that it would not be appropriate for the content of the course and the method of delivering it to be the same for young people under 18 as it would be for adults? What if courses are available to adults, but not available on the same geographical spread to young persons? Would that not create two different classes of people subject to drinking banning orders, with one class being at a disadvantage because they would be unable to get the chance of the discount on the length of their order?

The other matter to which I have to draw attention is that the Government seem to have a split personality when it comes to legislation regarding those under 18. Sometimes they treat them the same as adults; sometimes they recognise the fact that they are, as I would say, different from adults. We see that split personality within the Bill. In Part 1, young people are treated as adults for the purposes of drinking banning orders, yet, when we reach Part 2, suddenly young people are not treated as adults. For example, the Government seek to raise the age at which young people are permitted to buy or hire air guns from 17 to 18. I am not going to object to that; what I object to is inconsistency in the way in which the Government treat young people between 16 and 18. That is extraordinary anyway, but it is even more extraordinary that such an inconsistency should be within one Bill. That is why I hope that the Minister will address the questions that I have put today on the way in which drinking banning orders treat young people as adults.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, concentrated his remarks on the adverse effects, as he saw them, of naming and shaming someone between 16 and 18, but his amendment, probing though it may be, seeks to ensure that no drinking banning order may be made on those below 18. Yet it seems, perhaps to many of us, that 16 to 18 year-olds are the age group most at risk of alcohol abuse, arising partly because of youth and inexperience and partly because of their not being accustomed to drink. I should have thought that a commonly held view was that there was a great risk to those individuals, let alone to the people around them whom the drunken youth might adversely affect. I am sure that the Government do not take the view that a drinking banning order is the be-all and end-all, because they have said many times that all sorts of other educative things could be done—including considering the sort of advertisements that are targeted at young people—to try to reduce the impact of so-called binge drinking.

I understand the point that imposing a banning order on 16 to 18 year-olds has a restrictive and negative aspect. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, fairly said, the Bill has developed from First Reading and its first printing and, when you include the educative process and the courses that have been discussed under previous amendments, you realise the protective value that making a drinking banning order against an individual who is between 16 and 18 may have. It is now clear that the negative aspect of imposing a banning order may well be combined with courses for rehabilitation, anger management and so on, so there will also be positive aspects to a banning order. Therefore, although the noble Lord concentrated on the naming and shaming aspect to a drinking banning order, there are many positive aspects. I am not at all sure about the naming and shaming aspect. I understand the points that the noble Lord made, but there are also beneficial aspects to the community and to the individuals concerned if they are held up to some form of obloquy. There is nothing wrong in the community feeling obloquy towards someone who is deserving of—which is the hypothesis about which I am talking—a drinking banning order.

I do not think that the Bill is about naming and shaming. We should look for some consistency of approach in its purpose of protecting other persons from criminal or disorderly conduct while the subject is under the influence of alcohol. Those of us who have some experience of living in cities know that, like it or not, youngsters these days increasingly drink before the age of 16. Youngsters are often drunk and disorderly before they are 16 and impose themselves on the rest of the community in a variety of ways that are unacceptable. Regrettably, we have seen that in the requirement to enforce ASBOs. So there is a need for consistency in approach.

The positive side relates to the opportunities for people to opt for training. The Minister said that the contents of the courses would be flexible to meet individual needs. If youngsters create mayhem, fall foul of the community and have the orders placed on them, they would have an opportunity when they come before the court to receive training that would be tailored to meet their specific needs and could be quite different from that afforded to adults.

These amendments have given rise to a useful short debate on the two issues to which they relate: the age level at which drinking banning orders should kick in, and the issue of publicity for those affected by them. I am grateful to noble Lords who contributed to the debate. I have long admired the notion that, before we make legislative changes, they should be well informed. We like to think that this legislation is the product of well informed debate and sound information on the ground.

I shall take the amendments in turn and deal in good measure with both sets of issues raised. Amendment No. 15 seeks to raise the minimum age at which a drinking banning order can be applied from 16 to 18. The Government's consultation paper, Drinking Responsibly: The Government's Proposals, published earlier this year, proposed that drinking banning orders should apply to those aged 16 or older. By setting the minimum age for an order at 16, it is intended that those drinking while underage who are involved in criminal or disorderly conduct while under the influence of drink are held to account for their conduct.

The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, said that, although she was supporting the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, she had no particular objection to the approach that we were adopting in this but that she was looking for consistency of provision. I certainly understand the noble Baroness's point, but it is about making this fit with the reality out there. As my noble friends Lord Brooke and Lord Borrie said, drinking in teenagers starts rather earlier than 18, and sometimes rather earlier than 16. As a parent of teenage children, I know from my own experience that that is the case. We have to recognise what is going on in the wider society and, in particular, in our towns and cities. This set of measures is targeted very specifically at that.

The Government believe that raising the age at which an order can apply to 18 could well fail to address the real problem of underage drinking and would enable young people to escape the consequences of their actions. It fails to recognise specifically that an order may be appropriate to protect other persons from this type of conduct. I would not want us to do anything in your Lordships' House that undermined the use of drinking banning orders by restricting them to those aged over 18.

In addition, the amendment fails to recognise the evidence. As I said earlier, I am an admirer of legislation brought forward on the basis of good debate and good information, and the evidence base for this is very clear. The Interim Analytical Report of the Prime Minister's Strategy Unit Alcohol Harm Reduction project—that is a bit of a mouthful but it is no doubt well intended for all of that—suggested that those aged 16 to 24 are more likely than all other age groups to binge-drink. Our experience in towns and cities tells us exactly that. In addition, the characteristics of offenders identified in the British Crime Survey tell us that for alcohol-related assaults, offenders generally tend to be aged 16 or older. Those are additional reasons why we would not want to undermine the use of drinking banning orders by restricting them to those aged over 18. By doing so, we might well miss an important cohort of young people who would benefit greatly from the approach that we are intending to be adopted through the use of drinking banning orders.

I also take issue with another amendment—Amendment No. 34—tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, to which he did not refer. It would limit fines for breaches of drinking banning orders to those aged 18 and above. I cannot see the benefit of that amendment. It would mean that those aged under 18 should not be punished for breaching a drinking banning order, and I hope that other noble Lords will agree with our position on this.

I turn to Amendments Nos. 24 and 35, which would reimpose automatic reporting restrictions on proceedings for orders on conviction involving young people and when there is a breach of an order by a young person. I am well aware of the noble Lord's concerns, which were raised on Second Reading, about what he described as naming and shaming and putting up photographs of those who are subject to anti-social behaviour orders.

The Bill lifts automatic reporting restrictions on proceedings for drinking banning orders involving young people. In proceedings brought against a young person of 16 to 17 for an order or when an order has been breached, reporting restrictions will not automatically be imposed. That will allow the press to report cases to inform local communities of action being taken to deal with activity that blights and is a blot on many neighbourhoods.

Of course it is the case—and this reassurance is important—that the courts will retain discretion to apply reporting restrictions if they consider it appropriate in the circumstances. We are not creating a situation in which all cases involving young people will automatically be reported. While we are reversing the presumption, we are not preventing the courts imposing reporting restrictions when it would be appropriate to do so. I do not think that we should undermine what is after all an important form of communication and an important route of reporting action that has been taken to deal with the behaviour of individuals when it is appropriate to do so. I share the view of the noble Lords, Lord Borrie and Lord Brooke, that it is right that we in the community understand the action that has been taken in our name, so that we can identify those who cause problems in particular locations. I think that a degree of obloquy is relevant in certain circumstances, which is why we encourage publicity in some cases. Ultimately, it will be for the court to take a view on the issue.

Evidence suggests that we should have an age restriction that begins at 16 and upwards. We know from evidence that young people between the ages of 16 and 24 are more likely to be involved in binge drinking and the sort of drinking that attracts the attention of the courts and the use of drinking banning orders. We know that if we can catch the problem at an earlier stage it is much less likely to turn out to be a bigger problem as the individuals get older. If we can affect and influence young people who have a drinking problem at that age, perhaps we can save them, through the use of drinking banning orders and the conditions and prohibitions that apply, from a life that is blighted by alcohol and causes consistent concern. That is the overriding good that we seek to capture and make available to communities.

For those reasons, I ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment. For similar reasons, I ask him not to press his later amendments, which he believes should apply and restrict the ability of the press to report on court cases involving drinking banning orders.

Across the whole breadth of the criminal law, it is a matter of public policy which is agreed to by all parties and in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which this country is a signatory, that we have thought it right to protect young people up to the age of 18, so that if a person is charged even with the most serious offence of murder, his identity will not be released. That is the policy that this country has adopted.

We are now introducing a completely new concept. The breach of this civil order will lead to a criminal offence, and we are lowering the standard for this civil order. We are saying to young people: "You should be in the newspaper. Everybody should know all about you. If you want to make a noise or kick a dustbin"—to get back to our earlier debate—"or if you want to be disorderly in a way that affects others, then you can expect your name and photograph to be published". Is it really that serious an issue that we have to go against the whole trend of public policy in this country of trying to protect young people until the age of 18? The noble Lord, Lord Brooke, asked what the reality is. We probably all have different concepts of reality. Is it really the truth that packs of 16 to 18 year-olds are going into public houses, getting drink to which they are not entitled and running riot?

My own view of reality—and I am fairly close to the ground in my part of the world—is that it is people with a bit of money in their pocket before they take on the responsibilities of a family who are causing problems and at whom such orders should be addressed. If it is not them, it is what we have called the rough sleepers who have alcohol or drug dependence. Those are the problem people at whom the drinking banning order is directed. It is a sad day when it comes to something like disorderly conduct that all the safeguards that we have recognised, which have developed over many years, should be thrown away and young people should be pilloried in the way that the Government suggest.

If a young person between the ages of 16 and 18 commits an offence—if he is guilty of criminal damage; if he is drinking under age; if he is drunk and disorderly; if he is urinating in a public place; if he is swearing at people—he can be taken to a youth court and dealt with in that protective way that we have developed. But under this provision the principle is weakened and his protection is weakened. It is a sad day. I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions. Many good points were made against the proposition that I am advancing, which I shall consider with care. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 16 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 17:

Page 2, line 37, leave out "relevant" and insert "other"

Government Amendments Nos. 17, 25, 52, 54 and 60 make some minor and technical amendments to the provisions on drinking banning orders by removing the concept of relevant persons. The concept of relevant persons refers to those people in a relevant authority's area whom the authority is seeking to protect in applying for an order. While that definition holds for drinking banning orders made on application by a relevant authority it does not hold when a court considers making a drinking banning order on conviction. In such proceedings no relevant authority is involved.

The matter was helpfully drawn to our attention by the Crown Prosecution Service and we are now amending the Bill to remove the term "relevant persons". That will remove an unintended fetter on the courts' ability to make a drinking banning order on conviction. It is a technical set of amendments. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 18:

Page 2, line 45, at end insert—

"(6) Nothing in this section affects the operation of section 127 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c. 43) (limitation of time in respect of informations laid or complaints made in magistrates' court)."

Government Amendments Nos. 18 and 165 to the drinking banning order provisions and the new clause amending anti-social behaviour legislation respond to the uncertainties created by the Boorman case, which was decided in November last year. The amendments clarify the time period in which a complaint can be made for a drinking banning order or anti-social behaviour order. The complaint will have to be made within six months of the criminal or disorderly conduct taking place. However, earlier behaviour outside the six-month period will be relevant to support an application—to show, for example, that there is a pattern of behaviour that the order is intended to address.

I should stress that this new clause simply reflects the existing guidance in relation to ASBOs and is no more than a reflection of current practice. A consequential amendment has also been made for ASBOs in Northern Ireland. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 3 [Orders in county court proceedings]:

moved Amendment No. 19:

Page 3, line 10, leave out subsection (3).

The intention is to probe the effect of subsection (3) of Clause 3. Clause 3 enables relevant authorities to apply to the county court for a drinking banning order against an individual in certain circumstances. Those relevant authorities are the chief officer of police, the chief constable of the British Transport Police force and a local authority.

Where proceedings are already under way in a county court and the authorities are not involved in any way in those proceedings—not a party to them—subsection (3) allows those authorities to get involved just so that they can apply for a drinking banning order against one of the people who are already involved in the proceedings. In effect, subsection (3) allows relevant authorities which should not otherwise be involved to get stuck in.

Is it not the case that the majority of cases in the county court are likely to be applications for non-molestation orders in private family proceedings? Subsection (3) would therefore surely mean that the police or local authority would have the right to become directly involved in private family proceedings and apply for a drinking banning order against one, or perhaps both, of the parties. Is it the Government's intention that this should be the purpose of subsection (3)?

I appreciate that private family proceedings would not immediately be a matter of public knowledge. But presumably social services, the police or probation might well have knowledge of the circumstances which gave rise to the application for a non-molestation order and therefore they would be in a position to know that the case was in the list. My concern, therefore, is that subsection (3) could give a much wider power to the police and local authorities than the Bill at first implies.

When I tabled this amendment, I rather hoped that the Ministers would say, "No, this is not what we intended, and therefore we are going to make sure that we clarify the clause". Then earlier today I listened to the responses given by the Minister to other amendments and I became concerned that perhaps the Government had an intention that I hoped they did not. When the Minister responded to Amendment No. 49, which was grouped with Amendment No. 2, he tried to convey that the Government intend that actions that take place in private at home could indeed lead to a drinking banning order being made. I am going one step further and asking whether it applies within the context of county court proceedings.

In response to Amendment No. 6, the Minister said that the Government could envisage preventing access to the person's family. Surely the Children Act directs that the welfare of children is paramount, although the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, in replying to Amendment No. 7, said that the needs of the community are paramount.

I hope that the Minister is able to say that subsection (3) categorically rules out intervention by the state in private proceedings in non-molestation orders in the county court. If he is not able to give that assurance, I shall certainly be concerned and will want to look at the matter again on Report. If he is able to give that assurance, I shall need to know how that can be clarified in the Bill. I beg to move.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her amendment. Whether what I say will actually fully answer her point I am not sure, but I will give it a go and hope that she will be mollified by my words.

I intend to explain the relevance of it in the context of where the noble Baroness's amendment is pitched. The Bill provides for the police and local authorities, known as relevant authorities, to apply to the county court to be joined to proceedings, if they are not party to the proceedings, in order to apply for a drinking banning order. The amendment would mean that the relevant authorities would not be able to take this route to seek a drinking banning order.

For drinking banning orders via the county court, relevant authorities can apply for a drinking banning order against an individual who is already party to proceedings in the county court. If the relevant authority is not a party to such proceedings, it can apply to the court to be joined in order to apply for a drinking banning order. The authority can also make an application for another individual to be joined to the proceedings where that individual has engaged in criminal or disorderly conduct while under the influence of alcohol, and where that conduct is material in relation to the proceedings. For those reasons I cannot see the benefit of restricting the scope for relevant authorities to seek a drinking banning order where it is necessary to do so.

The noble Baroness specifically raised non-molestation orders and she rightly described those as being plainly domestic proceedings. She raised the issue, in essence, of the state intervening in a set of proceedings in a way which she thought was not appropriate, given what we are trying to achieve more broadly with this legislation. It would be fair to put it on record that it is not that instance that we are trying to capture by enabling these proceedings to be taken in the county court.

The best thing I can do is give an example of where we think an application might be sought through the county court for a drinking banning order. Injunctions under Section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972 can be made where a person has caused a public nuisance. We think that might be the sort of instance where a drinking banning order could be pursued through the county court route. I think it fair to say that we are not seeking to extend into proceedings in the county court. I well understand the noble Baroness's nervousness about us approaching other matters that county courts consider in the way in which she suggested.

I am happy to reflect further on what she said and provide her with some further reassurance outside the Chamber today. I suspect that that is important, not just for today's debate but to ensure that we can clarify the issue to her total satisfaction. I think that we have a very useful provision here. Off the top of my head, I can think of other circumstances where it might perhaps be appropriate for the local authority or the police to seek a drinking banning order through the county court. We need to provide some better clarification on that issue so that we have a common understanding of why that set of proceedings would be more appropriate.

I am grateful to the Minister because I appreciate that he is trying to take the matter forward. I agree with him that this could be a useful provision. I am certainly not trying to prevent a useful provision being in this part of the Bill. I remain concerned that subsection (3) gives a wider power than the Government clearly intend as the current drafting would not exclude the right of a relevant authority to make an application to be joined in non-molestation cases. I really will need to reflect further on that. I am grateful to hear the Minister say that he will reflect further and, perhaps, give some assurances outside the Committee. I cannot honestly see how an assurance would be sufficient at this stage as it would leave that power within the Bill. At the moment, I cannot see myself being persuaded that that would be right.

In his answer, the noble Lord specifically said that it would be important that conduct is material to the proceedings before a relevant authority were involved. I am of course aware that, in a non-molestation order, a person's conduct while drinking may well be very relevant to those proceedings. That is why I remain concerned, but I know there is good will on the government side as there certainly is on ours. On the basis that we want to look at this before Report, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 20 not moved.]

Clause 3 agreed to.

Clause 4 [Variation or discharge of orders under section 2 or 3]:

moved Amendments Nos. 21 to 23:

Page 4, line 7, leave out from "to" to end of line 8 and insert "a relevant local court"

Page 4, line 11, leave out "period for which it has effect" and insert "specified period"

Page 4, line 15, leave out from first "the" to "; or" in line 16 and insert "specified period"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 5 agreed to.

Clause 6 [Supplementary provision about orders on conviction]:

[Amendment No. 24 not moved.]

Clause 6 agreed to.

Clause 7 [Variation or discharge of orders under section 5]:

I have to tell the Committee that if Amendment No. 25 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 26.

moved Amendment No. 25:

Page 5, line 39, leave out subsection (2).

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 26 not moved.]

moved Amendments Nos. 27 to 29:

Page 6, line 11, leave out from "to" to end of line 12 and insert "a relevant local court"

Page 6, line 13, leave out "period for which it has effect" and insert "specified period"

Page 6, line 18, leave out from first "the" to "; or" in line 19 and insert "specified period"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 8 [Interim orders]:

moved Amendment No. 30:

Page 7, line 2, at end insert—

"( ) Where the court makes an order under this section pursuant to an application without notice, the individual who is subject to that order is to be served with a copy of the order personally by an officer of that court."

This amendment also stands in the name of my noble friend Lady Anelay and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. It has been tabled to question the Government on the procedure that will be used when interim orders are issued under Clause 8. In another place, the Government inserted subsection (3) during the Bill's Standing Committee stage. The subsection allows for applications to be made without notice to an individual and for hearings to,

"be heard in the absence of that individual".

The new subsection caused some consternation when it was introduced and the comments made by Hazel Blears at the time in another place did little to allay those concerns. As was pointed out there, the key purpose of interim orders is to resolve a situation where speed is of the essence and where waiting for a full hearing would not be appropriate or sensible. However, it is hard to see why applications for drinking banning orders need to be made with such haste. If the situation is so critical, surely the individual would have committed a criminal offence and therefore would be in custody anyway.

However, if the Government want to insist on leaving it as an option to the courts to hear "an application without notice", our amendment tries to limit the risk of injustice to the individual by ensuring that he is served personally by the court,

"with a copy of the order".

That seems entirely reasonable. If someone is expected to abide by prohibitions they need to know what they are. In Standing Committee B on 18 October 2005, the Minister in another place admitted as much. Moreover, she then said that she would be happy to consider the position to see whether the Government could set out the need to serve someone personally with a copy of the order. Have the Government considered this matter further? If they have decided not to set out the need to serve one personally, can the Minister explain why? I beg to move.

I have indicated that I oppose Clause 8. At this stage, I should like to hear the reasons for requiring an interim order. Such orders are to last only for a limited period unless renewed. Renewal is another problem, as it looks as if they can be renewed without much difficulty. Why should it be thought necessary to make an order without notice or service and "heard in the absence of the individual"? What machinery do the Government have in mind for serving the order on the individual and what is the position if he breaches that order while knowing nothing about it? For example, the order may prohibit him from entering a particular public house, which may be his local. He may go there every night for a week until someone gets around to serving this order on him. So, the reasons why an interim order is required—and how the difficulties of non-service and non-appearance are dealt with—are matters which I hope to have answered at this stage.

The court can, of course, make an interim drinking banning order if it thinks it necessary to take immediate action to stop the problems that are being caused by the criminal or disorderly conduct of an individual while under the influence of alcohol before the application for a drinking banning order can be fully determined. To be able to take action as speedily as possible is the primary reason for approaching matters through the interim drinking banning order. Subsequently, a full application would be made and considered. From memory, I think that such an application has to be made within four weeks, but I may need to be corrected on that.

Amendment No. 30 seeks to ensure that where an application for an interim order is made without notice a copy of the order is served personally on the individual by an officer of that court. That seems an entirely reasonable amendment, on the face of it. Court procedures for applying for or making an interim order would in any event be set out in magistrates' courts rules, while those for the county court would be set out in civil procedure rules. There is thus no need to specify in the Bill how those orders are to be served. They are already covered in court rules, which will specify precisely how a copy of the order is to be served. For that reason, we resist the amendment.

I am grateful to the Minister. I shall need to look carefully at his reply in the context of the procedures and of his honourable friend's remarks in another place. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 31:

Page 7, line 3, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

"(4) Permission of the court is required for the making or hearing of an application in accordance with subsection (3)."

This amendment ensures that it is the court and not the justices' clerk that has to give permission for an application to be heard without notice. It is my understanding that the role of justices' clerks is primarily an advisory one, along with some case management responsibilities. Given the potential risk of injustice for someone to be made subject to one of these orders in their absence and without notice, it seems more appropriate that this decision be taken by the magistrates themselves rather than it being delegated to the justices' clerk. The purpose of the amendment is not to make any criticism of the role of justices' clerks, but merely to guarantee that questions of this seriousness should be treated as judicial decisions, not as merely administrative ones. I beg to move.

I entirely support Amendment No. 31. It concerns the same problem with the interim orders to which I have already referred and I shall not repeat myself.

The amendment would replace Clause 8(4). That provides that provision for the making or hearing of an application for an interim order must be made by the court, for proceedings in the county court, or the justices' clerk for applications to a magistrates' court. Instead, the amendment proposes that permission of a court be required for interim orders for those made without notice or in the absence of the individual.

However, the amendment does not reflect the different court procedures that should be adopted in the magistrates' court from the county court, where permissions are required for the making or hearing of an application or for an interim banning order. That difference needs to be specified in the Bill. For that reason, we cannot encourage the Committee to press the amendments.

I shall consider carefully what the Minister says. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 32:

Page 7, line 8, leave out "justices' clerk" and insert "proper officer"

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 33:

Page 7, line 27, at end insert—

"( ) The Secretary of State must issue guidance setting out factors that the court should have regard to in determining whether applications for the renewal of orders under this section should be granted."

This amendment, standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Anelay, relates to applications to renew interim orders. As the Bill stands, there are no limitations on the number of times for which an interim drink banning order can be renewed; nor is there any specific threshold or test set out for the granting of such a renewal, beyond the general test of whether it is just to do so, set out in Clause 8(2). That leaves it open to the courts to continue to renew interim orders without a final hearing ever taking place.

Without any specific limitations or thresholds, the applicant—probably the local authority—might find it convenient to invite the courts to use the renewal mechanism repeatedly rather than have a final hearing. This would in effect be an abuse of the interim order process. It would seem sensible to try to limit the use of the renewal mechanism, thus ensuring that the onus is placed on the applicant to gather the necessary evidence and have the matter dealt with properly at a final hearing as soon as possible. It might well be that a four-week interim order is necessary to allow evidential difficulties to be overcome, but that should not be used as a cloak for inefficiency on the applicant authority's part.

In another place, the Minister said at col. 89 of the Official Report of Standing Committee B on 18 October that she would "consider any guidance" that the Government might issue to cover this point about renewals. Is any such guidance likely to be issued? If so, what might be contained in such guidance? I beg to move.

I am grateful to the noble Viscount for setting out his concerns. I agree with him: it would be wrong if a series of interim banning orders were activated at the behest of the police or the local authority in the way in which he suggests. As he says, that would be an abuse of process. I think that he said that it would be a cloak for inefficiency, which is a pretty precise description.

The amendment would require guidance to set out the factors to which the court should have regard when deciding whether applications for renewal of an interim order should be granted. I can offer this much assurance: we will produce guidance on drinking banning orders, which will have to be supplemented, where necessary, by court rules. Clearly, they will need to address that issue. I cannot tell the noble Viscount this evening exactly how we will do it, but it is on our "to do" list and I assure him that it is something that we will need to cover, because we want those matters to be brought before the court in an efficient and expeditious fashion.

We do not want authorities to get into the habit of using a lazy process; we want to be as rigorous as possible. It is right that the interim process should be exactly that and that authorities are obliged fully to satisfy the court by making a proper application for a permanent drinking banning order. We will need to address that issue in the way in which I described. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Viscount will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

These guidance notes are gathering increasing numbers of treasures; I look forward to reading them.

They are on course to become a collector's item.

I look forward to receiving and studying them with anticipation. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

On Question, whether Clause 8, as amended, stand part of the Bill?

This gives me an opportunity to reply to what the Minister said earlier. His reply to the amendment dealing with a personal service of the order was, "Well, that will go along in the usual way with the usual procedure in the county or magistrates' court", yet the clause introduces new procedures. Why should it be assumed that the rules for the service of an interim order personally on an individual should follow? If the order is to be made without notice and heard in the absence of the individual, at the least the Bill should provide a requirement that the order be served.

What happens when it is not served? What happens if it is renewed once, twice or three times and 12 or 16 weeks go by but it has not been served so the person does not know about it? Is he in breach of an order that he knows nothing about? If he is, what is the significance of that? What is the consequence of that? We need an answer to that. I do not see the utility of an interim order—a drinking banning order—made against someone who knows nothing about it. It is absolutely pointless until he knows something about it. It has no effect. I intend to pursue that matter. I should be grateful if the Minister could answer my earlier question: what happens if someone does not know anything about the order? What is the consequence?

The consequence is clearly that interim banning orders are there to ensure that action can be taken against a criminal offender with some speed, so that measures begin to have a bite and effect. As the noble Viscount knows, an interim drinking banning order can be made in absentia and the magistrates' court—for that matter, the county court—could therefore, subject to some provisos about service, consider the complaint in the absence of the defendant. As I said, the same general position applies in the county court.

However, we think it very unlikely in practice that a court would want to make a final drinking banning order in the absence of the defendant except in exceptional cases. We believe that an adjournment and the powers to issue warrants to secure attendance are much more likely in those circumstances. That probably answers the noble Lord's point, if that position were ever to be reached. The idea of an interim order is to ensure that action can be taken speedily. As I said earlier, the maximum duration of an interim drinking banning order is to be limited to four weeks and, although it can be renewed, in practice we would not want it to be renewed. We would far prefer a proper drinking banning order to be sought and made, because we think that that would properly give effect to what the police or the local authority are seeking to achieve under the drinking banning order. The permission for an application for an interim order may be given only when the court or the clerk is satisfied that the application needs to be made without the individual concerned receiving notice and without his presence. They will have to be satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances. There are sufficient safeguards within that to ensure that this is a proper process and that the objectives that we seek to fulfil through the legislation are properly met.

A drinking banning order will obviously take effect when the subject is made aware of its terms, so it makes sense to serve the drinking banning order personally and, in many cases, this can be done while the subject is in court. The need to serve drinking banning orders personally can be set out in guidance and, of course, reinforced through court rules where necessary. I understand the noble Lord's objection to this. We take a different view and we are determined that the application of this part of the Act, as it will be, is effective and can be used in a way that provides some flexibility but also ensures that the authorities are fully aware of the need to conform with the strictures that are set down on how drinking banning orders may be applied for.

I think I understood the Minister to say that the order does not take effect until the individual knows about it. Where in the Bill does it say that? I cannot find it anywhere but, if that is the case, would the Government undertake to include a provision to that effect in the Bill?

I shall certainly consider the noble Lord's point, which is a fair one, and I shall reflect further on his comments.

Clause 8, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 9 agreed to.

Clause 10 [Breach of drinking banning orders]:

[Amendments Nos. 34 and 35 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 36:

Page 8, line 42, leave out subsection (11) and insert—

"(11) The Secretary of State must not make an order under this section unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House."

This is very much a probing amendment. I really want to find out who can bring proceedings for an offence under Clause 10(1). Under subsection (4), it is a local authority. Under subsection (5),

"the Secretary of State may by order provide that a person of a description specified in the order may bring proceedings for an offence . . . in such cases and such circumstances as may be prescribed by the order".

Well, who are we referring to? Who do the Government have in mind apart from the local authority? If it is someone other than the usual prosecuting authorities, my amendment really bites, because I would remove subsection (11), which is the negative procedure for extending the power of the Secretary of State, and would impose instead a requirement for a positive order. I would give the House an opportunity to consider who would now have the chance to bring proceedings for a breach. I am always aware that the Government are privatising everything, and I do not know whether a security firm that used clamps and all that sort of stuff would be given the power to bring someone before the courts for a criminal offence. Could I have some information about that, please? I beg to move.

Amendment No. 36 would require any order made by the Secretary of State under Clause 10(5) to be made by way of the draft affirmative procedure rather than the negative procedure. Orders under that subsection could extend the range of persons who can prosecute for breaches of a drinking banning order, and might be used if we can expand the range of persons who can apply for drinking banning orders. I cannot be more specific than that in response to the noble Lord's point.

It would not, in our view, be a good use of parliamentary time to require all such orders to be debated. It is entirely appropriate for an order such as this to be made by the Home Secretary and then laid before Parliament. Noble Lords can of course pray in aid against the order when it has been laid if they feel that that is right and appropriate. I also remind your Lordships' House that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was content with the level of scrutiny that we propose here. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will not feel the need to press his amendment to a vote.

We now have no idea who could be the subject of an order by the Secretary of State to bring 16 to 18 year-olds, for example, before the court for a breach of a drinking banning order. I do not think that is a very satisfactory reply, and I shall return to it. But for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 10 agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 37:

After Clause 10, insert the following new clause—

"APPROVED COURSES

If an application is made to the Secretary of State for the approval of a course for the purposes of section (Duration of drinking banning orders), he must decide whether to grant or refuse the application.

(2) In reaching that decision the Secretary of State—

(a) must have regard to the nature of the course and to whether the person providing it is an appropriate person both to provide it and efficiently and effectively to administer its provision; and

(b) may take into account any recommendations made by persons appointed by the Secretary of State to consider the application.

(3) A course may be approved subject to conditions specified by the Secretary of State.

(4) The approval of a course—

(a) is for the period specified by the Secretary of State (which must not exceed 7 years); and

(b) may be withdrawn by him at any time.

(5) Regulations made by the Secretary of State may make provision in relation to the approval of courses and may, in particular, include—

(a) provision about the making of applications for approval;

(b) provision for the payment of fees, of such amounts as are prescribed by the regulations, in respect of applications for approval, the giving of approvals, or both;

(c) provision specifying the maximum fees that a person may be required to pay for a course and about when fees for courses have to be paid;

(d) provision for the monitoring of courses and of persons providing courses;

(e) provision about the withdrawal of approvals; and

(f) provision authorising the Secretary of State (whether on payment of a fee or otherwise) to make available information about courses and about persons providing courses.

(6) The Secretary of State—

(a) may issue guidance about the conduct of approved courses; and

(b) in exercising the powers and duties conferred or imposed on him by or under subsections (1) to (5) must have regard to the guidance under this subsection that is for the time being in force.

(7) Also, a court must have regard to that guidance in determining what for the purposes of section (Certificates of completion of approved courses) constitutes reasonable instructions or reasonable requirements by a person providing an approved course."

I beg to move.

[Amendments Nos. 38 to 41, as amendments to Amendment No. 37, not moved.]

On Question, Amendment No. 37 agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 42:

After Clause 10, insert the following new clause—

"CERTIFICATES OF COMPLETION OF APPROVED COURSES

(1) For the purposes of section (Duration of drinking banning orders)—

(a) the subject of a drinking banning order is to be regarded as having completed an approved course satisfactorily if, and only if, the person providing the course has given a certificate that the subject has done so; and

(b) the time at which the subject is to be regarded as having satisfactorily completed the course is the time when that certificate is received by the proper officer of the court that made the order.

(2) For the purposes of this section a certificate that a person has satisfactorily completed a course—

(a) has to be in such form, and

(b) has to contain such particulars, as may be specified in, or determined under, regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(3) The person providing an approved course must give the subject of a drinking banning order in which that course is specified a certificate for the purposes of this section unless that subject—

(a) has failed to make due payment of fees for the course;

(b) has failed to attend the course in accordance with the reasonable instructions of the person providing the course; or

(c) has failed to comply with any other reasonable requirement of that person.

(4) Where a person providing an approved course decides not to give the subject of a drinking banning order a certificate under subsection (1), he must give the subject written notice of the decision, setting out the grounds of the decision.

(5) The obligation of the person providing an approved course to give, in the case of the subject of a drinking banning order in which that course is specified, either—

(a) a certificate for the purposes of this section, or

(b) a notice under subsection (4), must be discharged not later than 14 days of any request to do so by that subject.

(6) The subject of drinking banning order who is given a notice under subsection (4) or who claims that a request for the purposes of subsection (5) has not been complied may, within such period as may be prescribed by rules of court, apply to—

(a) the court which made the order, or

(b) if that court is not the Crown Court or a relevant local court, to either the court which made the order or a relevant local court, for a declaration that there has been a contravention of subsection (3).

(7) If the court grants the application, the applicant is to be treated for the purposes of section (Duration of drinking banning orders) as having satisfactorily completed the course at the time of the making of the declaration.

(8) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision as to—

(a) the form of a notice under subsection (4); and

(b) the manner in which such a notice is given and the time to be taken as the time of the giving of such a notice."

I beg to move.

[Amendments Nos. 43 to 46, as amendments to Amendment No. 42, not moved.]

On Question, Amendment No. 42 agreed to.

Clause 11 [Interpretation of Chapter 1]:

moved Amendment No. 47:

Page 9, line 13, at end insert "and

( ) the senior officer of any military police unit in whose area the conduct to which the application relates occurred"

The amendment would add to the list of appropriate persons who should be consulted by a relevant authority seeking a drinking banning order under Clause 2. The amendment would add the military police authorities to the list of consultees, mainly to address the issue of garrison towns, such as Aldershot and Catterick, where the military police may be heavily involved in trying to control alcohol-fuelled disorder and may be in a better position to advise the relevant authority about the scope of any order. But it also addresses the question of whether visiting services personnel cause problems in a locality and then return to their units, or even abroad, and there may be a need to consult the military authorities to ensure that the scope of any drinking banning order is sufficient.

It might be that the Ministry of Defence would argue that it is not the duty of the military police to provide assistance to the civilian authorities in this way and that in the vast majority of cases no service personnel would be involved and, therefore, no need to consult. As such, it is only a probing amendment, but it also raises the further question of what is the purpose of such consultation. The "appropriate persons" in Clause 11(1) are the relevant police forces, where the disorder occurred and where the individual resides, and the relevant local authority. If a relevant authority is already intending to apply for a DBO against an individual, is the point of consulting the police to gain further information on the individual and his behaviour or is it to find out from the police the effectiveness of any previous order or any future order? As such, one wonders whether consultation is necessarily the correct way to term how the local authorities and the police should be working together. It might be better to place the duty on the police to inform the relevant authority of any evidence that it has that might lead to an award of a DBO. I beg to move.

I am grateful to the noble Viscount for addressing his amendment in the way that he has and particularly for drawing attention to the problems that might arise in what could be described as military towns. When I read the amendment I thought instantly of Colchester, which is near where I grew up. I can see that there could be circumstances in which the military police might have an interest. I then began to think about how that interest would be addressed.

The amendment provides that the senior officer of any military police unit becomes the appropriate person in an application for a drinking banning order. The implications of this are that the police, local authority or transport police, as well as consulting each other before they seek a drinking banning order against an individual, would have to consult the senior officer of any military police unit.

The police, local authority and transport police are a "relevant authority" and are also "appropriate persons". They need to consult each other before making an application for a drinking banning order. The noble Viscount was suggesting that rather than consulting, they wish simply to inform each other. The reason why we want them to consult is that there is a need to ensure that actions taken by each agency, regarding the same individual, do not conflict. Effectively, we want them to work together, to act in concert, to understand each other's particular problems or difficulties, to understand why there is a need to apply for a drinking banning order and to understand what it will achieve in any given set of circumstances.

As we see it, as a senior officer of any military police unit cannot apply for a drinking banning order, there is no need for him to be consulted. In our view, there is no benefit in senior officers becoming appropriate persons. We approached the MoD on this issue and it was content with the approach that we were adopting. Although I entirely understand why the noble Viscount has moved this amendment, we do not believe it adds anything. As the military police will not be the relevant authority or the appropriate persons, they do not think they need to be involved as a consultee. I have little doubt that in the military towns with which the noble Viscount and I are familiar there may occasionally be careful consultation with the military police authorities. But we do not believe that the matter needs to be flagged up on the face of the Bill.

I am grateful for that reply. Is this a case for the guidance document?

It may well be.

With that encouraging remark from the Minister, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 48:

Page 9, line 13, at end insert—

""approved course" means a course approved by the Secretary of State for the purposes of section (Duration of drinking banning orders);"

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 49 not moved.]

moved Amendments Nos. 50 to 52:

Page 9, line 22, at end insert—

""proper officer"—

(a) in relation to a magistrates' court, means the justices' clerk; and

(b) in relation to any other court, means the clerk of the court;"

Page 9, line 26, at end insert—

""relevant local court", in relation to a drinking banning order, means a magistrates' court acting for the local justice area in which the subject normally resides;

"specified period", in relation to a drinking banning order, means the period specified in the order for the purposes of section (Duration of drinking banning orders)(1) as the period for which the order is to have effect;"

Page 9, leave out lines 27 to 36.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

[Amendment No. 53 not moved.]

moved Amendments Nos. 54 to 56:

Page 9, line 43, leave out from "damage" to end of line 44.

Page 10, line 1, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

"(4) A power of the Secretary of State to make an order or regulations under this Chapter shall be exercisable by statutory instrument."

Page 10, line 4, leave out "That" and insert "Every such"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 57:

Page 10, line 9, at end insert—

( ) No regulations shall be made under section (Duration of drinking banning orders) unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.

( ) A statutory instrument containing—

(a) regulations under section (Approved courses) or (Certificates of completion of approved courses), or

(b) an order under this section, shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament."

I beg to move.

[Amendments Nos. 58 and 59, as amendments to Amendment No. 57, not moved.]

On Question, Amendment No. 57 agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 60:

Page 10, line 12, leave out "and "relevant persons""

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 11, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 12 [Power to impose charges on licence holders etc. in zones]:

moved Amendment No. 61:

Page 10, line 17, after first "authority" insert "or local authorities"

With a sense of relief, we move from drinking banning orders to alcohol disorder zones, an area which is no less contentious in all sorts of ways. The noble Lord will recall that at Second Reading we supported the basic concept behind alcohol disorder zones. It is a proper mechanism for recovering the costs of policing particular areas which cause trouble from the licensed premises that are the focus of the trouble. A number of issues are left to be determined. On the one hand, we have to determine how much those charges should be and, on the other, we have to determine whether everyone who holds a licence in a particular zone should pay. Another issue is how long those alcohol disorder zones should continue. We all recognise that there is a great temptation for a local authority to see this as an additional tax on business within the area affected.

Amendments Nos. 61 and 62 address the question of how much. It is suggested that instead of imposition by a local authority, it should be "or local authorities", in the event that that zone falls within the area of two local authorities. More importantly, it is also suggested that the charges to be paid to the authority for each month should be limited. The amendment, which at this stage is probing, is that the charge should be at an annual rate of no greater than 3 per cent of a premises' rateable value. We think it is important that businesses should not be sunk by an alcohol disorder zone. It may not assist their business to find their neighbourhood designated as such. Of course, it may be within a licensee's own hands to do something about it. But the charge on the business should not so affect its profits that it cannot continue. Therefore, this is a suggestion that we put forward for the Government's consideration as a limitation on the charge.

Amendment No. 65 is consequential, while Amendment No. 70, which is to leave out subsection (8), deals with the payment, collection and enforcement of charges and the determination of questions about liability. No doubt that is a matter which will be subject to further debate. For the moment, this group of amendments is concerned with maintaining a limit on the cost to business. I beg to move.

This is indeed an important clause. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, points out, the creation of the alcohol disorder zones is a contentious matter. It means that the Secretary of State can make provision enabling a local authority to make monthly charges against licence holders in its area. Although we understand that there may be a need to make such changes in theory, we are sure it will be important to protect premises which control their own premises impeccably. Why should they have to pay for the cost of dealing with the disorder caused by others who may not even be licensees? Throughout all the debates on these issues and future groups, the main thrust of our argument will be on that issue. In the meantime, this is a very useful probing amendment. It is important to know the Government's intention on the limit of the amount that licensees might reasonably be expected to pay each month. As presently drafted, the Bill gives a wide power to impose an extra business tax, as and when a local authority pleases. We need guidance from the Government now—not just printed guidance in the future—about the kind of burden they think it will be reasonable for licensees to face.

I agree that it is useful to debate this area, which I readily accept could be considered by some as contentious. I understand why these probing amendments have been moved. They rightly focus on the arrangements for administering the charge, which is raised under Clause 12. Amendment No. 61 would provide for the charge to be paid to "local authorities" in addition to a local authority. We do not see the need to make the amendment. The Bill does not enable alcohol disorder zones to straddle local authority boundaries. But it has to be recognised, and it would be quite right, that two adjacent local authorities designate areas as alcohol disorder zones where those areas are contiguous to each other. In that situation, each local authority would collect charges from the premises in its area; for example, in cases where there is a night-time economy centre which straddles two local authority areas, as is likely in many of our towns and cities. If the amendment was aimed at areas where there are two-tier authorities, then again we think the amendment is unnecessary. If the county council provides additional services to an alcohol disorder zone, the local authority would designate the alcohol disorder zone and collect the charge and pay a proportion on it accordingly. However, as has been well trailed before this discussion, this is an issue on which I can offer assurance. The assurance is that those situations will be covered in the guidance on alcohol disorder zones. I think it is right that they are, because there will need to be some detail within those guidance notes.

Amendment No. 62 would insert a cap on the level of the compulsory charge in an alcohol disorder zone. The amendment would set that at the monthly equivalent of 3 per cent of premises' annual rateable value. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising the issue of a cap on the compulsory charge in an alcohol disorder zone. I think that he mentioned at Second Reading the matter of when it was discussed in another place and my right honourable friend Hazel Blears, the Minister of State, undertook to consider the matter further.

The noble Lord touched on a number of issues. The charge needs to be set at a meaningful level which is sufficient to recoup local agencies' costs in mounting effective enforcement interventions based on what is required to properly reduce crime and disorder in any given locality. At the same time we take the view that the charge needs to be enforceable and payable. We are not about the business of setting charges at a level which forces people to cease trading. We do not want the charge to act as a disincentive to business formation and to those who are in the business of providing the services of a pub, a club, an off-licence and so on. We firmly take the view that the charge needs to reflect the last-resort nature of alcohol disorder zones and help incentivise local action. We need to bear in mind the relative costs of the type of excellent voluntary arrangements currently in place in some areas, which were helpfully referred to at Second Reading. Having considered this, we believe that we should not put a cap on the charge on the face of the Bill. I do not believe that a cap, arbitrarily set, will deliver what we are looking for here. However, when we debate the regulations, we will need to ensure that we build in sufficient flexibility to enable them to meet local requirements. We will nevertheless need to provide checks and balances to meet what is intended.

I understand the concern. I do not know whether setting the charge at 3 per cent of annual rateable value is right. I am not sure whether the noble Lord thinks it is absolutely right. But there could be a problem if we set a level in legislation. We need flexibility. That is where I think secondary legislation has a value, not least because it means that between now and then we can talk to the local authorities and to the trade and get it right. The important thing is that we get the principles right, that it does not act as a disincentive, and that it encourages collective action—in most cases short of alcohol disorder zones—in areas where there is a commonly perceived problem with unruliness and disorderly behaviour.

Amendment No. 65 would strengthen the link between those rates of charges and the charging power at subsection (1). Again, this is not an amendment that we think is necessary. It is very clear that Clause 12 deals with regulations for the power to impose charges in alcohol disorder zones.

Amendment No. 70, which would remove subsection (8) from Clause 12, provides that the Secretary of State may simply make regulations about the payment, collection, enforcement, liability and appeals concerning the charge. I am slightly puzzled by the amendment because I do not see how it would confer any benefit other than to leave a considerable gap in the scope of the regulations without trying to compensate for it anywhere else in the Bill.

While we accept that this is an important debate, we do not think it appropriate to deal with the detail in the Bill itself. It is right that we should consult further and fine-tune the detail so that we end up with a charging regime that reflects the importance of recouping local agency costs, encourages participation in all actions which fall short of creating an alcohol disorder zone and acknowledges the fact that such zones are in essence a measure of last resort designed to encourage collective action against a commonly perceived problem with alcohol-related disorder.

For the reasons I have gone through in my response, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

I am grateful to the Minister for his reply, from which I take two particular points. First, as I understand it, the Government accept the principle of a cap on these charges.

I cannot concede the principle of a cap, although I recognise the importance of the issue. I want to make that clear. The problem with a cap is that it is an arbitrary notion. I can see why the noble Lord has moved the amendment as he has, but I have sought to make it very clear that we will have to ensure that the charges are set sensitively and fine-tuned so as to achieve our common objectives. As the noble Lord said, he supports in principle the concept of alcohol disorder zones. He has also quite rightly raised his concerns, some of which I am sure reflect a degree of nervousness outside about the practical implementation of the scheme.

I think that that nervousness will remain after the noble Lord's last reply. I wonder whether he and his officials could give some thought to how to give an assurance that the charges will not simply go sky high and that some control will be exercised over the level of charges. As he said, I am not wedded to any particular percentage of the annual rateable value; all I suggest is a mechanism that introduces a form of control, even if the word "cap" is not acceptable.

The second thing I took from the Minister's reply is that it is not the wish of the Government to put people out of business. I am sure that when these charges are considered and calculated, the costs to a particular business of taking appropriate measures to deal with the problem will also be taken into account. It cannot be cost free to have to deal with disorder in a particular zone; otherwise no charges would be imposed. So there is a double burden of charges in the form of the charge payable to the local authority and a charge for the actual measures that the licensee wishes to take. If those are allowed to go out of control, the Government will have the undesirable consequence of businesses ceasing to trade. As a result, an area would become not just an alcohol disorder zone but a desert where you cannot get a drink. No doubt that would be even worse.

Perhaps the Minister will be able to think of a mechanism by which the charges can be controlled. I see that he is indicating his assent. On that basis I am prepared to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 62 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 63:

Page 10, line 24, leave out "may" and insert "shall"

This amendment would remove the discretion afforded to the Secretary of State to make provision by regulations requiring local authorities to use any money raised by alcohol disorder zone charges for set purposes. It would be mandatory for such regulations to be issued.

It seems odd that this discretion has been left in the Bill. Surely the money raised by a local authority from these charges should be used to address the problems caused by alcohol disorder and not for any other purpose entirely unconnected with alcohol disorder. In theory it would still be open to the Secretary of State to specify the "other purposes" unrelated to alcohol disorder prevention, but if that is the case the Secretary of State should be the one to justify that policy decision. If what to do with the money is left to the discretion of local authorities, small and medium-sized town centre businesses may understandably feel that they are at risk of being subject to a tax that will raise income for local authorities to do with as they please rather than making a contribution to remedying an identified and specific problem. I beg to move.

I recognise that the amendment would strengthen the wording in Clause 12 and require the Secretary of State to specify in regulations exactly what services the moneys raised by the compulsory charge can be spent on. I see where the noble Baroness is coming from with this amendment. We also want to ensure that the money raised goes to tackle alcohol-related crime and disorder, but the amendment is not necessary. The regulations will need to include the range of interventions covered by the charge and we can offer an assurance on that. The guidance will also cover the interventions which should be deployed. I do not doubt that those subjects will be covered in discussions with the police and local government associations. I also do not doubt that the associations will want to offer encouragement to their authorities on what is to be considered as best practice. We think that that approach will work best.

The noble Baroness is right to be wary of local authorities going off on a frolic of their own. We certainly do not want to see that. I understand from my political background that that can happen from time to time. But we are aiming for practical and hard-nosed measures. If we reach a point where there is an alcohol-related crime and disorder problem in an area and it is necessary to put in place an alcohol disorder zone, by that stage exactly what is required will probably be understood by the local authority, the police and in all probability by many of the local businesses—in particular those in the trade of selling alcohol. The measures will focus on the particular needs of the community concerned.

I understand the point being made in the amendment. We are at one with the noble Baroness in her objective, but this issue will be covered in regulations, guidance and no doubt, as I said, by best practice as well.

In one respect I am grateful to the noble Lord because he recognises that we have the same objective here. He has offered an assurance about what will be set out in the regulations; that is, to ensure that moneys raised are used for the specific purpose of addressing disorder linked to the need to create an alcohol disorder zone. He also made the point that my drafting would strengthen what is in the Bill. However, we are talking about two different things. The noble Lord's assurance is made with regard to the content of the regulations. My amendment would ensure that the regulations are issued.

I am acutely aware of a conversation I had earlier today with my noble friend Lady Miller of Hendon, who yesterday in the course of discussions on another Bill was somewhat frustrated when she found that continual reference was made to regulations and guidance. The Opposition are a little frustrated by a series of Bills in which much is being left to regulations. I note that we have been considering the Bill for around three and a half hours now. As I forecast earlier, the words "regulations and guidance" have formed a substantial part of our vocabulary.

I am disappointed that we have reached this stage and I still do not feel that the Government have given us detailed information on how the drinking banning orders and alcohol disorder zones are to be implemented. On that basis—and only on that basis—I feel that I must now make my little protest, stamp my feet and say that I should like to test the opinion of the Committee.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 63) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 73; Not-Contents, 96.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resume. In moving this Motion, I suggest that the Committee stage begin again not before twenty minutes past eight.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.