My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now further considered on Report.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 17 [Power to provide for checks on the Register]:

moved Amendment No. 65:

Page 15, line 41, at end insert—

"( ) Regulations under this section may not authorise the provision to any person of information falling within paragraph 9 of Schedule 1."

My Lords, I think that I have already spoken to this Amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 66:

Page 16, line 12, leave out "by the prescribed person in the prescribed manner." and insert "in the prescribed manner by the person specified in or determined under the regulations.

( ) The power of the Secretary of State under this section to provide information about an individual to another person is exercisable only where the provision of the information is subject to the satisfaction in relation to that other person of conditions imposed under subsection (3)(a) and (b)."

On Question, amendment agreed to.

My Lords, I am concerned about the confusion which may have arisen at the beginning of proceedings this afternoon. I am looking at the list of today's groupings provided by the Government Whips' Office, which clearly states that the first Amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland, has not been debated. Perhaps my recollection of debates over the past two days is somewhat hazy, but I had anticipated that the noble Baroness would introduce the amendment. I am a little concerned that we have not had the opportunity perhaps to welcome the amendment and for the House to understand what it is all about.

The confusion is most unfortunate. It may well be that we will have to return to the matter on Third Reading. Government Amendment No. 65 was the subject of a difficult debate on Schedule 9, and it is not a matter that we wish simply to pass over.

Amendment No.66A will be moved by my noble friend Lady Seccombe.

moved Amendment No. 66A:

Page 16, line 38, leave out paragraph (a).

My Lords, Amendment No. 66A would remove subsection (2)(a) from Clause 18. As the Explanatory Notes inform us, Clause 18 sets out that there may be no requirement on individuals by organisations to produce an ID card as the only acceptable proof of identity before a move to compulsion, other than in the circumstances set out in subsection (2). The Explanatory Notes go on to explain that the exceptions in subsection (2) include where there is,

"a specific requirement for a check on an individual's ID card or against the Register under Clause 15"— that is, the power to make public services conditional on ID checks—

"or in accordance with provisions under another enactment; where the organisation allows for reasonable alternative methods of proving identity; or when it is compulsory for the individual to register".

Paragraph (a) refers specifically to Clause 15 and provisions that may be made by another enactment. My fear is that this subsection could potentially catch individuals, private organisations and/or private businesses. It is one thing to require that access to all government-funded public services needs an ID check but quite another to impose on privately run businesses the need for compulsory ID checks, using this system, and, in turn, all the currently unknown costs that will go with that—for example, the cost of readers or of making requests to the system. In addition to imposing such costs, the subsection removes a degree of choice that businesses should themselves make regarding ID checks. I know that the Government disagree with this, but we should not be a nanny state.

The particular open-ended reference to the phrase, "in accordance with provisions made by order under any other enactment" is very far-reaching. No doubt the Minister will argue the need for flexibility. But what is to stop future enactments in theory from compelling something silly like a fairground owner checking everyone's ID card to make sure they are old enough to have a go on specific rides, be they too old or too young? Will the Minister offer to see what changes can be made to the legislation to ensure that none of the above will occur? What assurances can she give that subsection (2)(a) will not be used in this manner? I beg to move.

My Lords, I should like to make a comment about the proposed removal of the subsection by reference to Clause 15, to which it relates. I was hoping for some assistance from the noble Baroness to confirm what I think was said at an earlier stage, although I cannot remember which day it was as there have been so many. Clause 15 is important because it makes public services susceptible to being conditional upon someone having an ID card. Subsection (2) refers to the fact that regulations cannot, however, make that requirement effective with regard to public services provided free. The classic case would be someone getting National Health Service treatment. Clause 15(2) makes it clear that a citizen cannot be forced to have an ID card before he or she gets National Health Service treatment. The reference in subsection (2) is to public services provided free of charge.

The point was raised before, and I hope that the Minister will forgive me if I raise it again. I am sure that we all want to be quite sure, at virtually the last gasp, that, in considering this Amendment and Clause 18, we do not inadvertently get wrong what may happen under Clause 15.

My question for the noble Baroness is this. If one goes to the chemist with a prescription from one's doctor, unless one is in one of the exempt categories—OAP, child, or certain other conditions—one pays a prescription charge. That would fall outside the exemption in Clause 15(2), which is only where the service is provided free. I apologise to the House for what must seem a complicated question, but unfortunately it is a complicated Bill and sometimes one cannot get around the complexities. I am anxious to ensure that we do not leave the Bill in a state where a hullaballoo arises hereafter because people who have to pay whatever the prescription charge is are suddenly told that they are not within the exemption to Clause 15(2) and asked to produce an ID card. That is the question that arises from the amendment, seeing that it will have a direct impact on Clause 15. I would be most grateful if the Minister would give us some light on the matter. I mentioned it to her officials earlier in the day, so I hope that it will not be such a bombshell as it might sound.

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, is right in saying that government Amendment No. 65, which would have led into the conversation we have just had on Clause 15, would bite on this. For the House's clarification it might help if I explained how Amendment No. 65 fits in with the response I intend to make on her Amendment No. 66A, because the two go together. In doing so, I hope to deal also with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, on free prescriptions, not least because he is talking about Amendment No. 33, which he moved on the first day of Report on 16 January. If that suits the House it might get us back to where we should be.

My Amendment No. 65, which was passed by the House, has the effect of preventing the information contained in paragraph 9 of Schedule 1, which is the audit log, from being provided under Clause 17 to public service providers. Noble Lords will recall that Clause 17 enables the provision of information to public service providers for the purpose of verifying the identity of a person who has applied for a service. As my amendment has been accepted, the audit log will no longer be provided under Clause 17. The amendment I moved and that was passed was tabled in response to the concerns raised in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. I was grateful to him for raising that issue so that we could deal with it.

The noble Lord asked about prescription charges. His amendment would have given the individuals the option of whether an audit log should be kept of those occasions when an identity card is checked with the individual's consent under Clause 14. For the reasons that I gave earlier, which were recorded in Hansard, we believed that it would be wrong to allow the possibility of individuals deciding for themselves whether some checks against the register should be logged. If that happened, there would be no record to use in cases of complaint and it would mean that a fraudster trying to use someone else's card could insist that no record was kept of that transaction.

At the same time, we thought again about the second part of the noble Lord's amendment. I hope that we have made it plain that it is no part of our intention to compel people to produce ID cards for prescriptions that are free. I know that there was a debate about whether we would need to do so for ophthalmic and other issues—dental treatment was mentioned on the previous occasion—and I want to make it clear that it is not our intention so to do. We do not think that the noble Lord's concern is well founded.

I turn to the noble Baroness's Amendment No. 66A, which would remove paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of Clause 18. As noble Lords know, Clause 18 is designed to provide a general safeguard that in most circumstances people will not be forced to use an identity card to prove identity in advance of compulsion. Thus, in line with Clause 18(1), it would not be possible for, let us say, a bank or building society to require a customer to produce an identity card as the only acceptable proof of identity in advance of compulsion. The safeguard in Clause 18 still allows an identity card to be one of the methods accepted for proving identity, provided that a reasonable alternative method of establishing identity is also allowed. It would no longer apply once it is compulsory to register and to hold an identity card.

The words in Clause 18(2)(a) that would be removed by Amendment No. 66A serve a purpose. This subsection would allow a requirement to be imposed to produce an identity card in advance of compulsion if it had been imposed under Clause 15, which deals with making public services conditional on the production of an identity card or any other enactment. However, any regulations under Clause 15 would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, so Parliament would have the opportunity to debate and agree them. Moreover, as provided in Clause 15(2), any such regulation in advance of compulsion could not apply to the payment of benefits or to the delivery of any free public service. I hope that gives as clear a reassurance as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, would wish for.

We should not rule out in future providing that identity cards be required to be produced if that is a condition of other legislation, which also would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Accordingly, we believe that the drafting of Clause 18 is satisfactory. I therefore invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

My Lords, before the noble Baroness sits down, I thank her for her explanation of all these matters; they are scarcely simple. However, the language of Clause 15 is different from the policy that the Minister enunciated. She was clear about the policy, and I accept what she said. The problem is that the wording of Clause 15(2) does not follow the policy; it is wider. If one supposes different circumstances, a different Minister and a different government, then one does not have the reassurance that the Minister gave to the House. The classic case of a prescription for which a member of the public has to pay something would not fall within the exemption in Clause 15(2). Will the Minister think again about this before Third Reading, because it is an important point? It is not good law to include in a Bill a provision that is dependent on policy. Will the Minister come back with some wording that takes account of my point?

My Lords, I am certainly happy to look at the matter, but, as I said earlier, the safeguard exists through the affirmative resolution procedure. Any regulations for monitoring this situation would have to come before both Houses for debate and therefore be agreed in the way in which we have clearly set out.

I have also given the assurance that it is not our intention that the provision should operate in a way that would make an identity card compulsory for free prescriptions. I have given assurances also in relation to those other matters.

I hope that I have explained why we are unable to accept the wording of Amendment No. 66A of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, which was spoken to so eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Seccombe. I recognise that she was trying to find a safeguard against the enforced use of identity checks in advance of compulsion. She made that clear in the way in which she explained the amendment. In giving further consideration to Clause 18 safeguards, we are investigating the possibility that a loophole exists. The provisions in Clause 18 are designed to ensure that organisations cannot insist on production of an identity card as exclusive means of proving identity prior to compulsion unless, as we have already discussed, this has been required by an affirmative order under the required identity checks provisions for public services in Clauses 15 to 17 or in accordance with another enactment.

However, the clause does not deal expressly with the possibility of an organisation requiring a person to obtain a copy of their record held on the national identity register by exercising their subject access rights under the Data Protection Act or by making use of the proposed online facility to check one's own records. We should properly look at and tighten up all those things. However, if we do what I have indicated for Clause 18, I do not think that the noble Lord's concern about Clause 15 will be a problem, particularly bearing in mind the assurance I have given. Should we conclude that there is a need to tighten matters, we will return with a government amendment to Clause 18 at Third Reading. My officials will be in touch with the Information Commissioner's Office to alert it to the precise details of the amendment before it is tabled. I hope that by looking at Clause 18 we will be able to close any gaps that remain and that the noble Lord would be content with what we now have in Clause 15, limited as it is by the tightening that we hope to be able to do on Clause 18. I think that that meets the needs both of the noble Baroness and of the noble Lord as well.

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for explaining Amendment No. 65. We realise that it was an innocent error but felt that it was important that the reason for the government amendment should be put on the record. I would like to take the opportunity between now and Third Reading to read what has been said today about Amendment No. 66A and to see what does go down on the Marshalled List for that day. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 19 [Public authorities etc.]:

moved Amendment No. 68:

Page 18, line 21, at end insert—

"( ) The Secretary of State must not make an order or regulations containing (with or without other provision) any provision that he is authorised to make under this section unless a draft of the order or regulations has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House."

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 20 [Prevention and detection of crime]:

moved Amendment No. 69:

Page 19, line 1, leave out "of a person with" and insert "to a person of"

My Lords, these are minor drafting amendments to Clause 20, which have been tabled in response to comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, to whom we are most grateful. I hope that these amendments satisfy him entirely. Of course, it is never entirely possible to satisfy the noble Lord, but we do our best. I can assure noble Lords that these amendments do not change the meaning or operation of the clause in any way. I beg to move.

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord. My satisfaction is more than entire.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 70:

Page 19, line 8, leave out "of a person with" and insert "to a person of"

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 71 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]

Clause 21 [Correcting inaccurate or incomplete information]:

moved Amendment No. 72:

Page 19, line 43, leave out "for being" and insert "to be"

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 22 [Power to authorise provision of information in other circumstances]:

[Amendment No. 72A not moved.]

[Amendments Nos. 72B and 72C had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]

Clause 23 [Rules for providing information without individual's consent]:

moved Amendment No. 72D:

Page 20, line 35, at end insert "; and

(c) requiring the persons referred to in paragraph (b) to act reasonably and proportionately in providing information under sections 19 to 22"

My Lords, I can move this Amendment very quickly. Clause 23, to which it refers, sets out the rules for providing information—that is, information from the national register—without an individual's consent. Therefore it is a singularly important clause. In subsection (2), the Secretary of State may make regulations to make those requirements of public authorities and of persons authorised by public authorities. My feeling is that the inclusion of the amendment would be extremely helpful at an important part of the Bill and would give clear guidance both to the many officials who have to construe this remarkably complex piece of law hereafter and, even more important, to the citizen who has to resort to it.

On many occasions in these debates, many of us have said that this is a citizens' Bill. It is not one of those technical measures that one knows will be resorted to only by professionals; potentially it will affect tens of millions of our fellow citizens. My amendment would require the persons referred to earlier in the subsection—that is, the public authorities—

"to act reasonably and proportionately in providing information under sections 19 to 22".

I am well aware that under the Human Rights Act there is an implied obligation in all circumstances, one can broadly say, for authorities—that is, public bodies—to act reasonably and proportionately. Therefore, it is legitimate for the Government to say in response to the amendment, "This is superfluous. Just trot along to the Human Rights Act and look at the relevant subsections and Bob's your uncle". Well, Bob is not my uncle because I do not know anything about the Human Rights Act. I do not want to be cast in that direction, but I do want to have at a hugely important point in the Bill a simple, clear statement that anyone who is asked to provide information under this clause—it can be highly sensitive information—will have to act reasonably and proportionately.

The other point that I draw to the attention of the House is that I have sought to avoid this obligation falling on the shoulders of the Secretary of State by the way in which I have worded the amendment. It would simply give the Secretary of State the power to make provisions requiring the persons who are to provide information to act in this way. So it cannot be argued that the state bureaucracy is unduly trammelled because at every turn it will have to make an individual judgment on every single individual provision of information. That will fall to the authority providing information to determine, as provided for by the amendment.

I hope that the Government will—as they do on occasions, it must be said—provide words which are implied by the Humans Rights Act or, indeed, that they will put in provisions that are not strictly necessary at all. Perhaps I may refer the noble Baroness, who is already looking sceptically in my direction, to Clause 16(6). It is a completely superfluous and unnecessary subsection but, as it is to give an impression which the Government assiduously try to implant in the public mind, it is included, although it is completely superfluous in literal, necessary terms.

I hope very much that the Government will—as, to be fair, they have done on one or two occasions—make an amendment to the Bill that has regard to the fact that it is Joe Bloggs who is affected by these provisions. We do not want to drive every person to a lawyer in order that they may understand where they stand, and the same goes for civil servants at all levels. I beg to move.

My Lords, I support the intentions behind the noble Lord's Amendment, although I do not support the way in which he is going about it. I certainly agree with him that it is important that there is clarity in the Bill with regard to proportionality. Here, we are trying to get at the issue of good governance and to obtain from the Government reassurance that that will be pursued in these matters.

I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, is saying. It is implied here that one has the protection of the Human Rights Act, but that is an onerous way for the ordinary citizen to obtain redress. The question to which we are trying to get an answer from the Minister is as follows. If the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, is not made, what other clear, simple mode of redress is there for the citizen who believes that those who acted on behalf of the Secretary of State had acted unreasonably and disproportionately? I am trying to pick my words carefully here. The reason why I do not support the noble Lord 100 per cent is that, as noble Lords will notice from the Marshalled List, my noble friend Lord Northesk has tabled a later amendment which approaches the issue from a different angle.

I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, is saying—that is why he has not put an immediate duty on the Secretary of State. When we are looking at a system that is being introduced by the Secretary of State, and there is an essential issue of good governance, it should be for the Secretary of State to take responsibility. I look forward to my noble friend Lord Northesk's introduction of his amendment, when we may, perhaps, be able to explore those issues in greater detail.

My Lords, it seems to me that the Amendment is merely trying to define that the civil servants who will be giving out the information should act in a particular way; it leaves the Secretary of State to lay that down quite clearly. As good civil servants do not act ultra vires, and will tend always to follow the letter of what is laid down, I would have thought the amendment to be very sensible. It leaves flexibility, while at the same time making it quite clear that there is a duty for a civil servant to act in a particular way. I cannot see the disadvantage in this. A lot of people are very worried about some of the things that could be done under this Bill, and it seems to me that this is a very neat way of trying to allay some fears.

My Lords, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, foreshadowed my response to why this is unnecessary. I have to tell the noble Lord that Bob is my grandfather, my uncle, my brother and my nephew, so as far as that is concerned, we think that the Human Rights Act is enough here. I also need to say to the noble Lord, with reference to Clause 16, that it is not superfluous or meaningless: it imposes a duty to consult where regulations are made under that clause and there is an existing statutory duty under other relevant powers. It has some real function and is therefore significantly different from the measure suggested by the noble Lord.

I understand what the noble Lady, Baroness Anelay of St Johns, says about agreeing in essence; we too think it absolutely essential that there should be proper and good governance in this matter. The proposition that the powers under Clauses 19 to 22 must be exercised "reasonably and proportionately" derives from the Secretary of State's public law duties and the provisions of the Human Rights Act. As ever, we are most reluctant to reiterate obligations that already apply. The clear implication of doing so would be that without such wording it would be lawful for a power to be exercised unreasonably or disproportionately. I am sure that that is not what the noble Lord intends.

Aside from that, we unfortunately consider the noble Lord's Amendment to be flawed, in that it seeks to place the duty to act reasonably and proportionately directly upon civil servants. As noble Lords are aware, under the aspect of our constitution often referred to as the Carltona principle, the Secretary of State remains accountable for the actions of his officials. Those actions are, constitutionally speaking, his actions, albeit carried out by his civil servants. If information were provided under Clauses 19 to 22 in an unreasonable or disproportionate way, it would be the Secretary of State who would answer for it.

Nevertheless, I recognise the sentiment behind the noble Lord's amendment; we are acutely aware that those individuals whose job it will be to provide information under Clauses 19 to 22 will have to be well trained in order to ensure that such disclosures are within the terms of legislation—that they are reasonable and proportionate. There will be guidance and procedures to this effect. The power to provide information without consent does not mean that the information must or should be provided whenever it is requested. We will make sure that procedures not only govern the way in which a request for information is made, but ensure that the information is provided only when the request is reasonable and proportionate.

I would, therefore, ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment. I very much take on board what the noble Lady says about making procedures clear, simple and available to members of the public. Indeed, we have sought to do that with administrative law generally, making it easier for people to challenge and, by the way in which they challenge, enabling us to be sure that they are taking full opportunity to do so.

My Lords, I am thankful for the Minister's remarks. To clear up one legal point that she raised, I beg to differ with her on the Carltona decision and the reference in the relevant Clause to civil servants. I do not believe that "persons" here refers to individual civil servants. It is a reference to the persons referred to in Clauses 19 to 22, which are authorities, not civil servants. But let us leave that little joust aside and get to the nub of the matter, which is that the Minister is sympathetic to but unmoved by my desire to have this made plain in the Bill. I cannot at this stage do more than withdraw the Amendment, but I shall speak to the Minister between stages, because I am terrier-like in my wish to make the Bill more sympathetic to the layman. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendments Nos. 73 and 74:

Page 21, line 6, leave out "by the prescribed person in the prescribed manner" and insert "in the prescribed manner by the person specified in or determined under the regulations"

Page 21, line 17, at end insert—

"( ) A power of the Secretary of State under any of sections 19 to 22 to provide information about an individual to another person is exercisable only where the provision of the information is subject to the satisfaction in relation to that other person of conditions imposed under subsection (4)(a)."

On Question, amendments agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 74A:

Page 21, line 17, at end insert—

"( ) The Secretary of State must not process sensitive personal data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 1998 (c. 29) in connection with an individual's entry in the Register without the consent of that individual."

My Lords, the Amendment seeks clarification from the Minister on an issue that I first raised in Committee on 16 November, in cols. 1175–77; it was rather a long debate, as noble Lords can tell from the column references. I was concerned that an amendment made on Report in Another place may have had unintended consequences and might allow sensitive personal data to be added to the national identity register.

Clause 1(6) was added by the Government without debate, because the guillotine prevented it. It was added in good faith by the Government to meet objections that had been raised in another place by the Minister's honourable friends. Their concern and that of Members throughout the House was that the drafting of Clause 1 meant that the database could contain sensitive personal data. The main concern had been that medical and criminal records could be added to the national identity register.

After Committee, the Minister wrote to me to explain why the Government believed that their drafting of subsection (6) remains benign. But she admitted in that letter that there cannot be a complete exclusion of information tending to reveal sensitive personal data from the registrable facts at Clause 1(5) because a photograph or nationality may of itself tend to reveal such data as racial ethnic origin, which is covered by the Data Protection Act 1998. But she argued that that is information that everybody would expect to be on a register. That sounds like common sense, but she will understand that I remain a little uneasy about the position on sensitive data and, like the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, I believe that this Bill changes the relationship between state and citizen so much that it is the duty of all of us to ensure that we get it as right as possible for the citizen.

The reason why I brought back this amendment, for clarification only, is that I believe that it will be consistent with the position that the Government have taken in the Minister's letter. It would simply ensure that the Secretary of State could not process sensitive personal data that were covered by Section 29 of the Data Protection Act 1998. Will the Minister give me a clear assurance that that is the position that the Government intend to adopt in the setting up and running of the national identity register? I hope that she will explain why she feels that it would not be better to have this in the Bill. I know that she will attempt to do so; let us see if she manages to persuade me. I beg to move.

My Lords, I shall be very happy to seek to do so. The noble Baroness is right to refer to the content of the letter and the reasons we have set out. It is important just to run through what "sensitive data" means, because it emphasises why a photograph could arguably be sensitive data. I say "arguably" because people tend to fall on both sides of the argument. Some say that it is not sensitive data—it is just a photograph; whereas others say that it is sensitive data. That is what causes us the difficulty.

Some noble Lords may not be familiar with the definition of "sensitive data", so I shall remind the House what it is. It is the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject; his political opinions; his religious beliefs; whether he is a member of a trade union; his physical or mental health; his sexual life; the commission or alleged commission by him of any offence; any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to be committed by him, and the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court.

It is clear to those noble Lords who are now familiar with Schedule 1 to the Bill that the register will not contain substantive information falling within any of those categories. Moreover, any addition to the list of information in Schedule 1 would have to be consistent with the statutory purposes, which in effect rules out any possibility of adding, for example, medical or criminal records. However, as I have indicated, it is arguable that information that is in itself innocuous is in fact sensitive personal data within the DPA definition. For example, a photograph may reveal someone's racial origin or indicate a particular disability or religion, perhaps because they are wearing a capel, a turban or something of that sort.

So one sees why the debate over photographs comes about. I am sure the noble Baroness is not seeking to prevent the provision of photographic information from the register without consent; for example, to the police under Clause 19(3)(b) for the detection of a crime, and that could quite possibly be the effect of Amendment No. 74A. For the reasons I have given, I hope she will feel comfortable about withdrawing it. I understand perfectly why, in the normal way, the issues that would fall within "sensitive data" would be excluded. If there were not an argument about the photograph, I would have been happy with the amendment, but there is. There will be those who say the photograph clearly identifies a number of those issues, and that is our problem.

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. As I explained, this was for clarification. Most people who have not been involved with every line and word of this Bill would have thought a photograph could not bring offence by bearing sensitive personal data, but people have written to me who are concerned that a photograph, as the Minister has just said, could reveal their religion, which might mean they would be discriminated against in certain circumstances. I entirely understand what she says with regard to why photographs must be included in this—an identity card would not function effectively were they not. I appreciate that there is a crossover with the Data Protection Act, and there have been some complications as a result. I am grateful to her for making further clarification on the record, and I would not return to this on Third Reading. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 75:

Page 21, line 19, leave out "authorised" and insert "that he is authorised to make"

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 76:

After Clause 23, insert the following new clause—

"FUNCTIONS OF THE Secretary of State IN RESPECT OF DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 11 and 19 to 23, the Secretary of State has the following specific functions in respect of the disclosure of information—

(a) to draw up and disseminate to the persons and bodies to whom sections 11 and 19 to 23 apply, guidance as to the disclosure of information between and amongst themselves in a proportionate and necessary way;

(b) to draw up and disseminate to the persons and bodies to whom sections 11 and 19 to 23 apply, guidance as to the circumstances in which it is appropriate for those persons and bodies to disclose information between and amongst themselves in a proportionate and necessary way;

(c) to maintain under review the guidance set out in paragraphs (a) and (b).

(2) In drawing up the guidance set out in subsection (1)(a) and (b), and in reviewing such guidance under subsection (1)(c), the Secretary of State shall consult—

(a) the National Identity Scheme Commissioner;

(b) the Information Commissioner;

(c) such other interested persons and bodies as the National Identity Scheme Commissioner sees fit.

(3) The guidance under subsection (1)(a) and (b) shall in particular make provision as to—

(a) the nature of the information that must or may be disclosed;

(b) procedures designed to ensure the proportionality and necessity of the process of information disclosure;

(c) procedures designed to ensure the accuracy and security of information disclosed;

(d) procedures designed to ensure, where appropriate, the co-ordination of the disclosure of information between and amongst relevant agencies and persons in a proportionate and necessary way;

(e) procedures designed to guarantee, as appropriate, the rights of data subjects in respect of any information about them that may be disclosed;

(f) procedures designed to govern the period for which it is appropriate that information should be disclosed and to ensure appropriate deletion of any information disclosed in compliance with the data protection principles.

(4) This section applies to the persons and bodies identified in sections 11 and 19 to 23 and, as appropriate, any agencies, companies or individuals who may be contracted to work for them or to supply goods and services to them.

(5) The Secretary of State may by regulations subject to affirmative resolution in each House of Parliament proscribe and penalise contravention of any guidance under this section as to collection, sharing, use, holding and disclosure of information."

My Lords, as your Lordships will be aware, we debated this somewhat late in the day in Committee. I hope, therefore, that I may be forgiven for returning to the issue today, although happily I need not weary the House with a detailed explanation of its purpose, which is straightforward: namely, to propose that the Secretary of State draw up statutory guidelines in respect of the information disclosure provisions of the Bill, with the intention that these be enforceable in law. I have been consistent in my pessimism about the Government accepting the Amendment, on the basis—and here I echo an earlier comment of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips—that it will be argued it is unnecessary because the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act will apply to this legislation in any event. The Minister made that case in Committee. Indeed, when I sought to amend the Children Act 2004 in a similar way, my efforts were rebuffed for the same reason, although it is perhaps worth noting that at that time the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, replying for the Government, made the point:

"We are clear that comprehensive statutory guidance is needed".—[Hansard, 15/7/04; col. 1431.]

That was buttressed in the 19th report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which observed:

"We welcome the Government's acceptance of the need for comprehensive statutory guidance on information sharing, in response to an amendment proposed by" myself, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway. It may be somewhat presumptuous of me, but I infer from that that at least some elements of the legislative process have sympathy with my purpose here.

That aside, revelations in respect of a number of related matters over the past few weeks have reinforced my conviction that some form of additional protection for the public in this area is essential. First, your Lordships will of course have noted the recent disclosure that some 24,000 young people aged between 10 and 18 are having their DNA profiles routinely stored, despite the fact that they have never been charged or cautioned for an offence. That is a matter that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, raised in a Starred Question last week. The structure of the Bill, as I have repeatedly argued, allows a great deal of cross-pollination between the national identity register and other government databases. It is entirely possible that the ID card scheme could in the future be used to cross-reference DNA data. Evidently, that flies in the face of the assertions that the Minister made on the point throughout our scrutiny of the Bill.

We all understand that there are legitimate, perhaps even virtuous, arguments in favour of the utility of databases storing DNA profiles. However, it is essential that their establishment should not happen, as it were, by stealth, but should be subject to open and transparent parliamentary debate. Certainly this matter would seem to argue in favour of the new Clause, the more so given that there have been indications that the Home Office may be in the process of reviewing its retention and deletion policy in this area.

Secondly, your Lordships will also have noted the front-page story in a recent copy of the Times revealing that three chief constables have won a landmark appeal to the Information Tribunal against the Information Commissioner. As a result, from April this year, records of all criminal convictions and cautions, however minor, will remain on file pretty much indefinitely. Again, we can all accept and recognise the efficacy of using such data within databases for the prevention and detection of criminal and even terrorist activity. Nevertheless, as a non-lawyer, I cannot square the circle retaining data— albeit "available to police eyes only"—for 100 or so years and the fifth data protection principle, which states:

"personal data processed for any purpose or purposes shall not be kept for longer than is necessary for that purpose or those purposes".

There is also the announcement from the Home Office Minister, Andy Burnham, that ID cards will,

"incorporate a 'contactless' or 'proximity' chip", reliant on RFID—radio frequency identification. The fact is that this technology can be and is used to track the location and movement of items in which it is embedded. ID cards would effectively come with a built-in facility permitting knowledge of the whereabouts of the holder for every second of every day. That is an especially pertinent issue regarding the security of the scheme. All those developments persuade me that, however persuasive the Minister may be in arguing the case, the comfort and security afforded by the Data Protection Act are far from adequate.

In Committee, the Minister suggested that an argument against the new clause is that,

"what is lawful for [recipients of information] to do with it will depend on each recipient's own common law and statutory powers".—[Hansard, 14/12/05; col. 1355.]

In other words, it will be difficult to codify the Bill's disclosure of information provisions because they stretch across such a wide variety of agencies. To my way of thinking, that makes it all the more necessary to do so. It is precisely because current arrangements for disclosure are such a mishmash that guidelines, statutorily based and enforceable in law, are unnecessary. Such a codification should reflect the different approaches adopted by different agencies, thereby creating greater transparency of the regime. Merely because such a task might be difficult should not in any way militate against it being done.

In fact, the new clause buttresses a central recommendation of Sir Michael Bichard's inquiry into the Soham murders. Recommendation 8 of the report states that, in respect of police IT systems:

"A Code of Practice should be produced", which, in the words of Recommendation 9,

"must clearly set out the key principles of good information management (capture, review, retention, deletion and sharing), having regard to policing purposes, the rights of the individual and the law".

The Home Office's progress report of last month identifies that the full set of guidance recommended by Sir Michael Bichard was available as of October last year. To that extent, the new clause—in so far as it applies to Clauses 19 and 20—is entirely consistent with the policy imperatives being pursued by the Home Office. Indeed, while it is idle to speculate, it is conceivable that much of the recent controversy about List 99 and the sex offender register might have been avoided had the new clause, or something like it, already been properly implemented. Dare I say it, but, viewed from this perspective, the Government should be minded to approach the amendment with a healthy measure of sympathy.

I add a few thoughts about this, in part reflecting some of the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, last week. The Home Office has announced, almost with pride, that 7 per cent of the UK population will have their DNA profiles stored in two years' time, thereby reinforcing the UK's position as the world leader in the practice. For example, this compares with the EU average of 1.13 per cent and 0.5 per cent in the United States.

Some 20 per cent of the CCTV cameras deployed in the world are to be found in the UK. Under the current Administration, the UK population has become subject to greater state surveillance than almost anywhere else in the world. This necessarily begs the question of whether the rights and protections of our citizens in this area have kept pace with what some might be tempted to call the Government's infatuation with snooping. There are legitimate reasons for supposing that the powers of the Information Commissioner and associated legislation such as the Data Protection Act 1998 are proving ever more inadequate, as perhaps exemplified by the decision of the Information Tribunal to which I referred earlier.

By the same token, it is perhaps worth reminding ourselves that the Information Commissioner has had just cause in the past to bemoan an absence of appropriate enforcement powers. The new clause is therefore intended to offer some redress in this area.

In conclusion, I repeat my assertion that the new clause or something like it is necessary to act as belt and braces to the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Data Protection Act 1998, and to give both the national identity scheme and information commissioners adequately sharp teeth. As my noble friend Lord Crickhowell pointed out in Committee, it would go a long way towards mitigating many of the anxieties that many of us have about the Bill. I beg to move.

My Lords, I support this Amendment; if I had been a bit more organised, I would have added my name to it. As I have stated before, we need greater protections in this Bill to ensure that the "Big Brother" culture does not get out of control.

I have sat in on many debates on government data-sharing in various organisations to which I belong at which people from various government departments have been present. It is clear that no one is exactly sure what is allowed and what is not. There are also a lot of data-sharing initiatives which I am not sure would, strictly speaking, be permitted under the Bill.

Oversight of all this data sharing by the office of the Information Commissioner is essential. We know, however, that that office is underfunded and overloaded—particularly since the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It is clear that many government departments do not know when they should be referring to the Information Commissioner. By embodying that in the Bill, we will make it much clearer to government departments what they should be doing, who they should be consulting and how.

I was thinking of trying to introduce a privacy impact assessment Clause into this Bill. When I read the amendment, however, I decided that this was probably a much better way of going about it, which is why I support it. The old argument that we should not worry because we have got the ECHR and all the human rights bodies out there holds no water. How are you to get a case together? Who is going to bring it? How does a citizen do that? It is unworkable; people feel powerless.

For example, there is a lot of talk about the fact that local authority valuation officers will be allowed to come into your home and photograph the interior, which has all sorts of privacy and security implications. A lot of people are very concerned about that. They would like to take it to the European Court of Human Rights. My attitude has been to wonder where is the legislation that permits this. They have been clearly told that this is going to happen.

My Lords, I hate to interrupt the noble Lord, but I made it plain in answering a recent Question in your Lordships' House that the proposition which the noble Lord sets out is complete nonsense. Photographs are only ever taken by valuation officers with the express authority of the occupier.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that reassurance. I hope that someone out there reads it and publishes it in the press, for there are still many concerned citizens who believe that the previous story is correct and are wondering what they can do about it. That feeling of powerlessness among the people is significant, and I am glad to have had that proposition knocked on the head.

However, the feeling about ID cards will be the same, which is why I used that example. I was pretty certain that it could not be done, but most of the public out there were not and did not know how to find out. A provision such as this is essential so that the public know that they are protected and know where to go to find out whether the protection is working. That is why I heartily support the Amendment.

My Lords, on the question of protecting the public, one should be seriously worried about the desire of the Government to stick their beaks into absolutely everyone's business, for no reason other than idle curiosity. Together with that we have a series of crashingly incompetent computer systems. A report in the Times today says that the whole tax benefit computer system is simply not working. We have had reports that the Inland Revenue computer does not work and that the computers holding the records of National Health Service doctors do not work.

Not only do we have a nosy Government, but one who insist on putting everything on computer and are then incapable of making those computer systems work—except at three times the cost which was originally budgeted. Even then, they are probably still not making them work. It is very depressing. The noble Baroness may laugh and smile gently at a description that might be mildly hyperbolic, but it is exactly what people out there think. There is too great a track record for it to be laughed off as crying wolf.

My Lords, one thing I know about my noble friend Lord Northesk is that he has, over many years, been thorough in the extreme. He probably does more research on the issue than the entire Home Office put together. However, that said, I sometimes find it quite difficult to understand exactly what he is saying—and that proves to me how extraordinarily complex the issue is.

I suggested in one debate last week that we should look at the German legislation on data protection, which made it absolutely impossible for any government department to share data with anyone else, or for the butcher to pass on the names of customers. While sitting with a glass of wine or two and talking to my friends around the world over the weekend, for a bit of fun I tried to access the 22 countries who are members of the EEA—those whose people are effectively allowed to travel at present into this country with an identity card. I sought to see whether I could harmonise the data on that identity card, and which countries had legislation which would mean approving the sort of legislation which we are introducing today. I had these sorts of comments, some from politicians and some from others; "You cannot be serious!"—that was one—or, "You cannot be doing such a thing in a country with greater liberty than anyone else". There must be some form of protection.

This morning, I had a sudden knock on my door to ask whether I would support a CCTV camera in the lane. There were several others with new houses who wanted them and they were asking me—because they had heard that I occasionally came to this place—whether I could tell them what the law was in relation to the data. The discussion—with some of a Lebanese nationality, or British; I use the word "nationality" guardedly—went that they were worried about doing the wrong thing if they put up a CCTV camera to record information. Some cameras can record for nine months on a single disc, and we discussed who that information belonged to. Would the state have access to it, or would they? Where was the intellectual property?

Going over that in time, I concluded that we are either a bright spark leading a light in the wilderness, and doing the right thing, or—as I tend to believe—we are doing totally the wrong thing. I therefore support my noble friend and hope that he will press this Amendment.

My Lords, I seek clarification on the relationship between identity cards and various government departments. On the "Today" programme on 25 January, the Home Secretary said:

"We have a process where we begin voluntarily linking it to the passport and possibly CRB check in the event of a decision by Parliament".

If this goes forward and we talk about voluntary linking to passport and CRB records, has any thought been given to the impact that that will have upon volunteers? It would appear that in order to get CRB clearance, volunteers in any organisation would have to purchase their own ID card before they can volunteer for whatever they wish to do. In the interests of encouraging volunteering, that is surely not the way we would wish to go.

My Lords, the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, has tabled a practical Amendment that gets to the heart of the principal area of concern about the Bill as a whole, which is how, and under what circumstances, sensitive information can be disclosed. As the noble Earl said in moving the amendment, given that we have a mishmash of provisions in the Bill—that is no one's fault but just a function of a highly complex piece of legislation—there is every reason why the Secretary of State should have the practical task of pulling it all together and putting out guidance. Guidance is guidance; it is not law. However, it would be extremely helpful to those who will have to work this huge, complex bundle of rights and obligations and to those citizens whose information is collected and disclosed. I should have thought that that is totally with the flow of what the Government have been saying all along and the messages and the policy assurances that the Minister has regularly given. I do not see that this amendment does anything but support—in a sense, buttress—all that. It will provide a single place in which civil servants, the public and public authorities can see set out comprehensively what disclosure means and the reasonable limits that should surround it. I hope that this amendment will appeal to the Government.

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Northesk rightly said that I gave strong support to him on this issue when we last debated it. I take this opportunity to say that my feelings are exactly the same today. Indeed, the more I hear of the complexities that have been described to the House by, for example, my noble friend Lord Selsdon, the more certain I am that we need the clearest possible guidance to be given comprehensively in a way that will give comfort, reassurance and understanding to the citizen. Our prime interest in all this should be the protection of the citizen and his rights, which is a subject that I shall come back to on later amendments.

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, on tabling this Amendment. I should have thought that the Government would consider it to be very helpful. We have heard a good deal about the surveillance society. It is very much with us, and will be with us a lot more when the Bill, and other Bills to come, are passed. I feel quite sure that when Orwell wrote 1984, he did not envisage that this country would be the sort of country he wrote about. He would have been quite horrified if he had realised that eventually we were going to have a compulsory register and compulsory identification cards for every citizen in our land. I believe that he did not think that that could possibly apply in Britain. But, of course, here it is—and it is applying.

The Minister has told us very often that the proposals in the Bill have the overwhelming support of the British public. I do not believe that is true. It may be that a focus group has come up with 72 per cent in favour, but I can assure her that the conversation on the buses—I do not know whether she ever goes on the buses—and my postbag tell me that there is a large Opposition to this measure. The more people know about it and the more people begin to understand what is at stake, the less they like it. Indeed, Swindon Borough Council, I am glad to say, passed a resolution last week against the imposition of identity cards and an identity register.

There is much that should concern us about the Bill. The good thing about this amendment is that it will at least give some reassurance to those people who are concerned that their individual liberty and their individual circumstances could be affected by the Bill, particularly when the register and the ID cards become compulsory.

My Lords, I support my noble friend's important Amendment, which gives practical clarity to the provisions governing the disclosure of information. He has done so against a background of reminding us of some of the concerns that there are currently in this country about the way in which information may or may not be disclosed. Where it is right for information to be disclosed, we are all concerned to ensure that, for example, children in vulnerable situations are protected. But there is some confusion on these matters.

I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for asking the question that he did. I know it gently drifted away from the amendment but I hope the Minister will be able to respond to it. I listened to the same radio broadcast as the right reverend Prelate and it struck me then that the Home Secretary was taking a rather different stance from that which is being presented to us here. In front of us we have a Bill which is intended to link from the word go the passport to ID—initially compulsorily—when you apply for a new document. I tabled amendments at the Committee stage which probed the issue of how soon the driving licence would come in as the designated document.

But this is the first time that the Home Secretary has mentioned in one breath the passport and in the next breath the Criminal Records Bureau, forgetting all the rest. That is a cause for concern and I understand exactly why the right reverend Prelate mentioned that against the background of the importance of volunteering. So, although he was drifting away from the amendment, it was an important point to make.

My noble friend has argued his case with devastating logic and it would not be right for me to go over the arguments again in detail. As my noble friend said, it is important to have something which acts as a belt and braces for the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act and gives the National Identity Scheme Commissioner and the Information Commissioner sharper teeth. The amendment does so in a very sensible way.

My Lords, I have listened with great care and interest to all the comments that have been made. I think it is wonderful when one has four Earls speaking to one Amendment. I commend them for that if nothing else.

If one looks at the matters that have been spoken to in relation to the amendment, one finds that two issues have been conflated, so let me separate them out. The first issue concerns DNA, and the other concerns the use to which it should be put in relation to ID cards. I hope that I have made it clear throughout our debate that DNA is not included in Schedule 1 and therefore cannot be stored on the register. Nor are there powers to take DNA samples.

To put the matter entirely beyond doubt, I am happy to tell your Lordships that the Government intend to bring forward an amendment at Third Reading to limit the registrable facts under Clause 1 to external characteristics, which is something that we debated long and hard when the matter was raised—by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, in particular—in relation to how to differentiate between internal and external characteristics. The issue of a future government was raised by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk—I am constantly being told that I am very benign—as a way to undermine my argument. A future government would be prevented from adding DNA to the information that might be added to Schedule 1 by affirmative order. I hope that we can put the debate on DNA to bed. It will not be part of this Bill.

I can tell the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, that it is not right to suggest that the provisions in the 2001 and 2003 Acts have been unmerited in any way. I hope that the noble Earl was present when I said that more than 3,000 cases have been identified as a result of that material, including rapes and murders. One that stands out in my mind is a 20 year-old offence of the rape and murder of a 14 year-old girl, which was discovered as a result of a minor offence being committed some 20 years later. We are not saying that DNA has not some significance, but DNA and ID cards should be separated.

Before continuing, I should mention the suggestion that the Secretary of State should issue the guidance. I confess to being a little surprised, given the trenchant criticisms of the Home Office during our debates on the Bill, that noble Lords would want my Right Honourable Friend the Home Secretary, or his successors in title, to be responsible for guidance on information sharing to all public authorities. That is surely the function of the independent Information Commissioner and should be properly dealt with in that way.

On the issue of contactless ID cards raised by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, I should make it clear that it is currently planned that an ID card will be valid for travel within the EEA. As a result it must comply with the standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organisation. Thus, all countries are considering this very same matter. Standards stipulate that a travel document, such as an ID card, will have to have a contactless or proximity chip. It will require the card to use radio frequencies to allow the card to be read at very short distances of approximately 0 to 2 cm from the reader. That is somewhat similar to the Oyster card used on London transport. To prevent the information on such chips being read at a greater distance, the card will implement basic access control, which requires that the machine readable zone—the MRZ—printed on the face of the card is scanned and the information then used to unlock the read and request data from the chip.

As with e-passports, which the UK Passport Service is beginning to issue from this year, an attempt to read the chip without using the information printed on the MRZ to unlock it will yield no data that can be used to identify an individual. The worry of the noble Earls, Lord Erroll and Lord Northesk, is not merited. The conspiracy theory that the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, seems to be promulgating about the style of tracking will not occur.

As for CCTV cameras, I very much take on board the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon. It amplifies how many of the public want to have better protection and want the facility of CCTV cameras. Indeed, we know that they are extremely useful in the detection of crime, not only in relation to terrorists but in identifying recent criminal offenders. None of that bites on this.The noble Earl's amendment would require the Secretary of State to draw up and disseminate guidance to recipients of information from the register relating to disclosure of that information between and among them.

The noble Earl stressed the importance of data protection and we do not disagree with him. However, the amendment, notwithstanding the fact that it is supported by a number of noble Lords, is misguided. It seeks to give the Secretary of State a role which is more appropriately fulfilled by others, as I have already indicated. Guidance on onward disclosure would necessarily relate predominantly to the legal position. The extent to which, and the circumstances in which, onward disclosure of information by a person who would have received it under these clauses would be lawful would depend on the statutory or common law powers of that particular person and the application of various restrictions from the Human Rights Act through the Data Protection Act to common law duties of confidence. The noble Earl was right to remind your Lordships that I made those points when we last discussed this.

The police have powers which are different from those of the security agencies, which are in turn different from those of government departments. Recipients of information from the register will no doubt take advice from their respective legal advisers on disclosure of information, wherever that information is derived from. It is not appropriate for the Secretary of State, in exercising his functions under the Bill, to be under an obligation to provide what would amount to detailed and tailor-made legal advice to a wide variety of people, all of whom are already getting that advice from its proper source.

Subsection (3) of the amendment provides that the guidance produced by the Secretary of State would in particular have to deal with matters such as the security of information and the period of retention. Those are exactly the kind of matters which are governed by the Data Protection Act. In so far as the noble Earl is proposing that guidance should be given in complying with the obligations which derive from the Act, I gently remind him of the primary duties of the Information Commissioner, which are set out in Section 51 of that Act. The first two subsections provide:

"(1) It shall be the duty of the Commissioner to promote the following of good practice by data controllers and, in particular, so to perform his functions under this Act as to promote the observance of the requirements of this Act by data controllers.

(2) The Commissioner shall arrange for the dissemination in such form and manner as he considers appropriate of such information as it may appear to him expedient to give to the public about the operation of this Act, about good practice, and about other matters within the scope of his functions under this Act, and may give advice to any person as to any of those matters".

Those are the commissioner's proper functions.

I take this opportunity to remind the House of some of the safeguards for which the Bill makes provision in relation to those to whom information may be provided from the register. Clause 24(2) requires the National Identity Scheme Commissioner to keep under review the arrangements made by those who can be provided with information from the register for obtaining, recording and using the information. Furthermore, as a result of government amendments, accreditation for organisations provided with information under Clauses 19 to 22, which are not specified in the Bill, will be compulsory. Finally, under Clause 26(2), the Intelligence Services Commissioner is empowered to keep under review the acquisition, storage and use by the intelligence services of information recorded in the national identity register as well as the provision of that information to any member of those services.

I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, and other noble Earls who have spoken, together with the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, that to include this further obligation on my Right Honourable friend or his successors in title is not necessary. Advice on the circumstances in which disclosure would be lawful is that it really is not an appropriate matter for the Secretary of State. It would be tailor-made to each recipient, having regard to the statutory and common law regime surrounding the recipient.

It is quite clear that it is better for the commissioners to do this job—they are better placed to do it independently and thoroughly, with the appropriate rigour and vigour—than it would be to ask my right Honourable Friend the Home Secretary simply to duplicate all that work. For those reasons, I hope that the noble Earl will withdraw his amendment.

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her response. I am also grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, not least for the level of support that the Amendment inspired. As others indicated and I sought to demonstrate in my introduction, my aim here has always been to offer assistance to the Government. I was particularly struck by the comments made by my noble friends Lady Anelay and Lord Crickhowell. They both correctly identified the utility of giving the public—those on whom the ID cards scheme will primarily impact—clear, concise and transparent information about their data. That can only engender better and greater acceptance of the scheme.

I hear, accept and understand the Minister's comments on DNA. In my introduction, I was content to reflect on the usefulness of it in the detection and prevention of crime. I will not be tempted down the route of explaining why virtually it is possible that the register may have access to DNA—that would become too complicated and it would bore your Lordships to tears.

With regard to RFID, I merely point out that the chips in Biometric passports in Holland have already been forensically hacked from a distance much greater than a few centimetres and decrypted within a matter of hours. In other words, that technology is insecure and raises severe data protection issues. With regard to the Secretary of State's role, interestingly, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, used the reverse argument when we were debating the Children Act. She maintained that the Secretary of State should have responsibility in this area. I suggest that the Government cannot have it both ways depending on which legislation is under consideration. Because my intent with the amendment was to assist the Government, more in weariness than anything else, I should test the opinion of the House.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 76) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 155; Not-Contents, 155.

My Lords, there have voted: Contents, 155; Not-Contents, 155. There being an equality of votes, in accordance with Standing Order 57, which provides that no proposal to amend a Bill in the form of which it is before the House shall be agreed to unless there is a Majority in favour of such Amendment, I declare the amendment disagreed to.

Amendment disagreed to accordingly.

Clause 24 [Appointment of National Identity Scheme Commissioner]:

moved Amendment No. 76A:

Page 21, line 24, leave out "Secretary of State must" and insert "crown must, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State,"

My Lords, after that excitement, I beg to move this short Amendment, which would make the Information Commissioner appointable by the Crown on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, rather than by the Secretary of State alone. In Committee, we discussed a number of amendments designed to give more independence to the commissioner in carrying on his or her work. Most of that work will be with regard to public authorities.

Indeed, in moving the amendment, I could do no better than to take over wholesale the arguments advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Scotland of Asthal, for resisting the previous amendment. Noble Lords may remember that the proposal of the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, was for the Secretary of State to have responsibility for issuing guidance and so on. The noble Baroness said that that was monstrous, completely improper and unsuitable. She said that the commissioner should have those powers because much of the work is to be done by departments of government and therefore it would surely be more appropriate for the commissioner to have the powers. I say, "Hear, hear". That is right in every particular, and apparently your Lordships agreed with the noble Baroness because they failed to approve the amendment.

The powers under the Bill relating to the commissioner are absolutely critical. It is plain—is it not?—that there is a great deal of anxiety in this place and in the country about the prospects of disclosure of information not following the lawful courses provided for by the Bill, leading to inadvertent disclosure of highly sensitive information. Indeed, it is fair to say that there is a great deal of anxiety about the Bill in all its aspects. While it is our duty to make the best of it, I believe that this modest amendment will give the commissioner a little more distance in terms of his or her relationship with the Secretary of State.

We have tabled a later amendment, which would require the commissioner to report to Parliament rather than to Parliament through the Secretary of State. I hope that, when we reach it, the amendment will be accepted or voted upon affirmatively. But, for the time being, Amendment No. 76A deals with the appointment of the commissioner. It is just worth mentioning that Clause 24(2)(a) describes the function of the commissioner as keeping under review,

"the arrangements for the time being maintained by the Secretary of State for the purposes of his functions under this Act".

There is a great deal more of that type of obligation. As I said, it is another vivid example of how the relationship between the commissioner and the Secretary of State is apt to be extremely sensitive and important, and therefore it must be desirable to provide a little more distance and independence in relation to the appointment of the commissioner. With those few words, I beg to move.

My Lords, in the later group to which the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, referred I will be saying rather more about the important issue of independence and the need to have a strong and robust commissioner who, if necessary, can stand up to the pressures that may be placed on him. I must confess that I cannot recall whether, when I became chairman of the National Rivers Authority, I was appointed by the Crown, the Minister of Agriculture or the Secretary of State for the Environment. Certainly I was answerable to the last two but I think that my authority succeeded in being robustly independent.

I will have something to say on the later group, but now I will simply say that I believe that the principle being addressed in the Amendment—that the commissioner must be the strong protector of the citizen; again, I go back to using the word "citizen"—is so important that anything we can do to support and strengthen it should be backed by the House.

My Lords, I strongly support the principle, which has just been elegantly announced.

My Lords, I add my support to this Amendment, moved with such commendable brevity. I think the important point is that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, is proposing a method by which the authority of the Secretary of State would not be compromised, but the position and independence of the commissioner would be enhanced. As my noble friend Lord Crickhowell said, that is exactly what we are trying to achieve as well as ensuring that there is a champion for the citizen throughout this procedure—somebody who will be able to stand up to the Secretary of State. The Minister may, I think as a result of some murmuring I heard from him a moment ago, be about to ask whether it really matters, because people will not particularly understand the difference. I see the Minister shaking his head; I am glad that he is not going to take that tack. The importance will be seen by Parliament and by the person appointed as commissioner. If they are appointed by the Crown, it gives them that "stand back" position, that extra position of authority and impartiality, which would be welcome.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, and other noble Lords have very adequately set out what they seek to achieve. Noble Lords will be aware that there are a variety of different statutory commissioners, some appointed by Her Majesty, some by the Prime Minister and some by the Secretary of State. Among the commissioners appointed by Her Majesty, there are those, including Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary and Her Majesty's Inspector of Prisons, who nevertheless report to the Secretary of State. There is then the example of the Information Commissioner, who is appointed by Her Majesty by Letters Patent, who is a corporation sole, and who reports directly to Parliament.

We take the view that it is appropriate for the National Identity Scheme Commissioner to be appointed by the Secretary of State. I accept the point that the commissioner might be seen as more independent if he were a Crown appointment, but I am not aware that, for instance, the Immigration Services Commissioner is regarded as biased because he is appointed by the Secretary of State, nor that the Intelligence Services Commissioner is compromised for being appointed by the Prime Minister.

To a degree—I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, will accept this point—this is a presentational issue more than anything else. There are no differences in terms of powers and there is little that can be achieved by the Amendment, as the noble Lord himself put it. All it would achieve is the perception of a little more distance. The noble Lord is not, I think, advocating complete independence, such as the Information Commissioner has. The Information Commissioner has the power to serve enforcement and information notices on data controllers, Secretary of State data controllers included. He also has the power to bring prosecutions. Total independence is therefore entirely appropriate in such a case. The National Identity Scheme Commissioner, by contrast, has a rather different role—that of reviewing and reporting—so that both the Secretary of State and Parliament benefit from his overseeing the scheme.

I am unconvinced that a case has been made for the National Identity Scheme Commissioner to be appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, as opposed to being simply appointed by the Secretary of State. I can reassure the noble Lords that the appointment of the National Identity Scheme Commissioner will follow the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments rules and, importantly, its code of practice, as well as Home Office guidance on public appointments by Ministers. I understand the desire for robust independence. We think that the legislation, as it is set out, achieves exactly that, so I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

My Lords, the Minister accepted that this might relate to perception. Is it not the Government's view that that can be vital—hence the decision to move the entirety of the Lords of Appeal out of this House?

My Lords, that is a neat point. However, as I said in addressing the issue precisely when considering the point on commissioners, it would be commonly assumed that the Immigration Services Commissioner and the Intelligence Services Commissioner, as well as other commissioners who are appointed in the same or a similar way to the National Identity Scheme Commissioner do not have their independence compromised. One could fairly argue that they are more than prepared to take a robust and independent line.

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. I am also grateful for that Exocet from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, which was more than a neat point. I thought that it went to the heart of the debate—and, indeed, the Minister hung his hat on mere perception. Perception is important, and it is important here. The Minister talked about the Intelligence Services Commissioner and said that he is appointed by the Prime Minister. I might accept the Prime Minister as an alternative to the Secretary of State. What I am worried about is that the commissioner will have more to do with the Secretary of State and the overseeing of the Secretary of State's stewardship of the whole scheme than anyone else. Therefore, this is an issue on which it is worth testing the opinion of the House.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 76A) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 155; Not-Contents, 138.

Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.

moved Amendment No. 77:

Page 21, line 37, at end insert—

( ) Where the Commissioner reviews any arrangements in accordance with subsection (2), his review must include, in particular, a review of the extent to which the arrangements make appropriate provision—

(a) for securing the confidentiality and integrity of information recorded in the Register; and

(b) for dealing with complaints made to the Secretary of State or a designated documents authority about the carrying out of the functions mentioned in that subsection."

My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 77, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84. Amendment No. 77 clarifies that the National Identity Scheme Commissioner's jurisdiction includes keeping under review the arrangements for securing the confidentiality and integrity of information on the register as well as the arrangements for handling complaints. I listened very carefully to the concerns raised by noble Lords in Committee and I hope that this amendment goes some way towards addressing those concerns.

Noble Lords were particularly concerned about complaints handling. As the amendment clarifies, the commissioner will have oversight of the complaints handling procedures and, no doubt, will include in his report any concerns that he or she might have about the way in which the agency is handling any complaints that it receives.

As I said in Committee, nothing in the Bill would prevent the commissioner taking an interest in or making further inquiries about a specific complaint. What I do not think would be appropriate, however, is to give the commissioner a formal role in the investigation of complaints in general. Complaints handling will be a routine function that the new agency will need to fulfil, and I do not think it sensible for the commissioner to be responsible for dealing with every single complaint, however trivial. It would substantially change the nature of his role, which is, in essence, one of keeping the scheme, as a whole, under review.

Amendment No. 77 will also require the commissioner to keep under review the arrangements for securing the confidentiality and integrity of information recorded in the register. As I have made clear, I was most attentive to the concerns raised by noble Lords in Committee, in particular those about the security and integrity of the information held on the register. It is clear from this amendment that the commissioner must have regard to that and will report on it.

However, we do not accept that the commissioner should have a formal role in requests for data correction from individuals. As I have made clear, the operation of the register will need to comply with the Data Protection Act 1998. The duties of the Secretary of State as a data controller, the rights of the individual as a data subject and the powers of the Information Commissioner will all apply to the national identity register as they do to other databases. Where a person feels his data are being unfairly processed—for example, because they are inaccurate—he could approach the Information Commissioner, who has a power to impose enforcement notices on data controllers. There is also a right under the Data Protection Act 1998 to apply to the courts for rectification.

Amendments Nos. 78 to 82 seek to modify government Amendment No. 77. These are essentially unnecessary drafting amendments; they would have no substantive effect on the remit of the commissioner.

We discussed at length in Committee the question of whether "arrangements for using", under Clause 24(2)(c), would in this context include "uses". As I said then—and I stand by that view—it would. Therefore, Amendment No. 78, which adds the word "uses" into the government amendment clarifying the scope of Clause 24(2), is particularly inappropriate, as the word "uses"—as opposed to "arrangements for using"—does not appear in the subsection which is being clarified.

Amendment No. 83 seeks to add to the powers of the National Identity Scheme Commissioner by allocating him a formal role in the investigation of individual complaints and in dealing with data corrections. I outlined in our discussion on Amendment No. 77 the reasons why that would not be appropriate. I therefore do not intend to repeat those comments now. Suffice it to say that the commissioner should scrutinise the agency's own complaints handling procedures and report on those as he or she sees fit. Staff of the agency will be under a duty to co-operate with the commissioner and provide information to him by virtue of Clause 24(4). If the commissioner is not satisfied with the handling of complaints in general, or a complaint in particular, he can raise it with the Secretary of State and refer to it in his reports under Clause 25, all of which will be laid before Parliament.

Amendment No. 83 also seeks to give the commissioner a role in data correction in individual cases. I have already outlined why we believe that this amendment is inappropriate and I do not intend to say more on that. Individuals will be able to check the details of their own entry on the register. We hope to make that possible by means of a secure online check. I know that noble Lords were concerned about how to ensure that the facility operates easily, smoothly and sensibly. We think that this proposal will be helpful. In any event, they will be able to make a written subject access request under the Data Protection Act.

If individuals are concerned that there is an error on the register, they can request that the information is removed or corrected. In the normal course of events, the problem should be solved without the need for reliance on formal legal rights. Ultimately, however, as I indicated, an unreasonable failure to rectify information can be the subject of a formal application for rectification made to the courts under Section 14 of the Data Protection Act.

Amendment No. 84 seeks to add to the remit of the National Identity Scheme Commissioner both general policy matters and areas that are currently excluded from his remit if any of those areas raises a matter of substantial public interest. The effect would be that the commissioner would have oversight of an excluded matter where a particular case raised a concern of substantial public interest.

In Committee, I outlined why the matters set out in Clause 24(3) have been excluded from the jurisdiction of the commissioner: because they fall under the jurisdiction of other bodies, be it Parliament, the courts or a different statutory commissioner. I also gave a detailed account of why the matters contained within paragraphs (a) to (d) of Amendment No. 84 are not issues with which the commissioner should become involved. I do not propose to repeat those arguments as I am sure that all noble Lords opposite have had the opportunity to read them in detail; it was on 19 December 2005, at col. 1522.

Amendment No. 84 would, additionally, give the commissioner oversight of "general policy matters". Our view is that it is unnecessary to include that in the Bill. The Secretary of State will be establishing the policy for the agency and the agency will implement that policy. The commissioner will be keeping under review the arrangements made by the agency, by designated documents authorities or those to whom information is provided. Nothing in the Bill prevents the commissioner from commenting on any policy matter in one of his reports. Indeed, we would expect him to do so. However, we are of the view that it is inappropriate to list in the Bill all matters which the commissioner may choose to look at, or comment on in his reports. To do that would make the legislation unnecessarily lengthy, and in our view that should be avoided.

I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords that the commissioner's remit is sufficiently wide to ensure that the scheme has the appropriate level of oversight and I would invite the noble Lords not to press their amendments. I absolutely understand noble Lords' concerns to ensure that the commissioner has comprehensive opportunities to make comment. We believe that the way in which we have drawn Amendment No.77 enables the commissioner to do everything which is proper. I therefore beg to move while inviting the noble Lords not to do so.

moved, as an Amendment to Amendment No. 77, Amendment No. 78:

Line 2, after "arrangements" insert "and uses"

My Lords, I should like first to thank the Government for Amendment No. 77, which is important and covers a great deal—indeed, the central parts—of my concern in Committee. It makes the role of the commissioner much clearer, much firmer and much better.

Of the five amendments in my name, Amendments Nos. 78 to 82, the one which seems to have, dare I say, particular merit is Amendment No. 78. I am not quite clear why the Minister rejected it. Clause 24(2) sets out four areas where,

"the function of the Commissioner" is

"to keep under review".

Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) start by referring to "the arrangements" for this or that. Paragraph (d) does not start with "the arrangements" for anything, but says:

"the uses to which ID cards are being put".

For the life of me, I cannot therefore understand why the addition of the words "and uses" to the sentence,

"Where the commissioner reviews any arrangements", at the start of government Amendment No. 77, would not be helpful and clarificatory. If Amendment No. 77 is left as it starts, it would appear that its purview is only in respect of the first three paragraphs—those which deal with arrangements—and not the fourth, which deals with uses.

I would be grateful if the Minister could review what she said on that. I will certainly do so. I accept that Amendments Nos. 79 to 82 are inessential amendments, but I thought that they were improving ones. It struck me that to talk of reviewing the effectiveness with which arrangements are undertaken is better than reviewing,

"the extent to which the arrangements make appropriate provision".

For a start, it is shorter. I also think that, in this context, "effectiveness" is a more effective term than talking about,

"the extent to which the arrangements make appropriate provision".

However, I am not going to go to the stake on that or the other amendments which are pursuant to it. I beg to move.

My Lords, when, on the sixth day in Committee, amendments were moved to ensure that the commissioner would review and report on the extent to which there were proper arrangements for securing the confidentiality and integrity of the information recorded in the register and that there were effective arrangements for dealing with complaints, the Minister argued, at col. 1519 of the Official Report, that it was not necessary to do so as the spirit of the amendments was already reflected in Clause 24 and because the existing complaints procedures were more than adequate. She has now taken a welcome step forward and her new Amendment No. 77 is certainly helpful.

The Minister has argued that the amendments moved by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, are largely drafting amendments and do not add very much. He said that they were improving amendments but did not pursue most of them with any great determination. I think that there is a rather stronger case to be made out for them. In our last debate on these issues, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, pointed out that the commissioner's role was confined to considering structures and frameworks. The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, tighten up the new subsection to ensure that the commissioner will not just examine appropriate provision but consider whether the arrangements really are effective and work in practice.

The issue of complaints had been raised by the Select Committee on the Constitution in paragraph 7 of its third report. The last time that we debated this matter, the Minister argued:

"It would be wrong to give the commissioner a formal role in the investigation of complaints".

She repeated that argument this afternoon. She then said that it would be a routine function that the new agency would need to fulfil and that the United Kingdom Passport Service already had a tried and tested system for dealing with complaints. On that occasion, she did not appear to recognise that the handling of complaints about the accuracy of the register and the uses to which it will be put is not at all the same as the handling of complaints about the manner in which passports are issued.

The Minister went on to give us a description of what she believed was a satisfactory complaints procedure. She said:

"There is an existing four-stage complaints procedure which includes a review by the local customer service manager, followed, if not satisfied, by a review by the headquarters' customer service department. If not satisfied, a complainant can write through their MP to the Passport Service chief executive or a Home Office Minister and then, as I have already said, to the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration—the ombudsman".—[Hansard, 19/12/05; col. 1520.]

Anyone who has had to deal with the so-called "customer service" organisation of any large body—as I have had to do recently—will know what a nightmare it can be. After a long session in which you are asked to key in various numbers on your telephone and a prolonged lecture—admittedly, usually imposed by some regulator—about your rights, you then listen for probably a quarter of hour, at your expense, while someone says that you are a customer and your custom is greatly valued. Eventually you get through, only to be moved on to someone else and to have to wait for another 22 minutes—as happened to me the other day—before you get connected. If the Minister had had the privilege which some of us have had of being a Member of Parliament and going through the procedures by which you pass on complaints to Ministers and the ombudsman, then I do not think that she would have read that part of Sir Humphrey's draft with quite the confidence she did on the last occasion. It seems a far from satisfactory set of arrangements.

Amendment No. 83, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Anelay, will give the commissioner the responsibility of setting up a system for dealing with complaints that tailor the whole thing to the requirements of the register. It would not give the commissioner himself the job of dealing with detailed complaints. I agree with the Minister that that should not be his role.

The final amendment in this group, Amendment No. 84, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Anelay, takes up the issue raised by the Minister on 19 December, at col. 1523, when she attempted to justify the fact that the Bill requires the commissioner's reports to be made to the Secretary of State and not to Parliament on the ground that the Secretary of State must have the right to exclude sensitive material concerning security and crime prevention.

It is hard to see why that should be necessary if the commissioner is specifically precluded from keeping those matters under review, as he is by Clause 24(3). We understand perfectly well, however, why there needs to be a protecting mechanism, and our Amendment No. 84, which will be very relevant when we debate the next group of amendments, maintains the necessary safeguards but allows the commissioner to keep under review general policy matters, particularly issues of substantial public interest that may arise from particular cases without, of course, going into the details of those cases in a way that could prejudice security or crime prevention.

That is a sensible way in which to proceed, and I hope that the House will agree.

My Lords, it seems to me that unless the Amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, regarding usage is inserted, then the uses to which ID cards are to be put under subsection (2)(d) will be excluded from the noble Baroness's amendment. The amendment says:

"Where the Commissioner reviews any arrangements in accordance with subsection (2)".

That refers to arrangements, not to uses. I understood the Minister to say when she introduced her amendment that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, was unnecessary. I am afraid that that is an abuse of the English language. If one says that we must look at arrangements, we look at arrangements—uses are by their nature excluded. So a provision that puts in a "use" is either deliberate or bad English. Which is it?

My Lords, I seem to remember that the whole point about the previous Amendment was that the Information Commissioner would keep a beady eye on all this stuff on our behalf and everything would be fine—which is why we did not need the extra protection of Amendment No. 76. The word "uses" surely means data sharing, among other things. I would not necessarily call data sharing an arrangement. If it is trying to provide information, it is a use. I am sure that clever lawyers in government departments who wanted to get the information could argue that. I therefore believe that we need the word "uses" here, or we need Amendment No. 76 back.

My Lords, I too thank the Government for tabling their Amendment. It meets the commitment in their letter to noble Lords which followed our Committee debates. In the letter, they maintained that they had always intended that the National Identity Scheme Commissioner should as part of his function keep under review the development and operation of the complaints procedure to provide some kind of reassurance that the register is secure and reliable. They also maintained in the letter that they believed that the Bill already gives them the power to do that, but they offered to table an amendment to clarify the matter. That is what they have sought to do here. The whole question has been whether we are 100 per cent grateful or whether we feel that there is greater mileage in having greater clarity with regard to other amendments that have been tabled.

I have tabled two amendments with my noble friend Lord Crickhowell—Amendments Nos. 83 and 84—but there is a more important amendment to come, on which my noble friend will lead, in regard to where a report is laid. I therefore feel that it would be churlish to push ahead on Amendments Nos. 83 and 84. Although I would have preferred Amendments Nos. 83 and 84 to have been accepted, I am not going to go to the stake on the issue if there are other robust safeguards. I think that the House has already decided on one with the appointment of the commissioner. I hope that the Government will be able to accept my noble friend's Amendment No. 85 with regard to a report being directed at Parliament and not via the Secretary of State.

In soft pedalling and assisting the Government on Amendments Nos. 83 and 84, I am still not satisfied with the way in which the Minister sought to address the issue in Amendment No. 78, which has been tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. I agree with the noble Lord that, to coin a phrase, it is not appropriate to forge ahead on this one today given the other aspects of the debate and the other amendments on the role of the commissioner.

I am rather perplexed that the Government say the words "and uses" should not be inserted. I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, about what those two words should cover and that they should be on the face of the Bill. The Minister has not fully satisfied me on this issue but, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, said, it is not something on which I am going to go to the stake.

My Lords, I hope I can clarify the issue in relation to "uses". The uses to which ID cards are put have a direct role in the two matters dealt with by government Amendment No. 77, which relates to paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Clause 24(2), but not to paragraph (d). That is why in opening in support of my Amendment No. 77—we discussed this at some length and that is why I was reluctant to do it all over again—I said that the "arrangements . . . for using" in Clause 24(2)(c) would in this context include "uses". Therefore Amendment No. 78, which seeks to add the word "uses" into the government amendment which clarifies the scope of Clause 24(2) is particularly inappropriate. The word "uses", as opposed to "arrangements . . . for using", does not appear in the subsection which is being clarified. Our amendment relates to paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Clause 24(2), but not to paragraph (d), which is why I say that it is correct.

I absolutely understand noble Lords' concerns. We wish to draw Amendment No. 77 with the appropriate level of acuity. We believe that we have done so, because it does not relate to paragraph (d). With that further clarification, I hope that noble Lords opposite and the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, will be appropriately grateful.

My Lords, I fear that my legal intelligence may be much exercised and long in years, but it has always had a lumpen quality about it. I still do not follow the Minister's arguments but no doubt I will when I look at them in Hansard. If I do not, I shall certainly not refrain from bringing the Amendment back at the next stage, especially as I have had a great deal of support from other noble Lords. However, at this moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment No. 78, as an amendment to Amendment No. 77, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 79 to 82, as amendments to Amendment No. 77, not moved.]

On Question, Amendment No. 77 agreed to.

[Amendments Nos. 83 and 84 not moved.]

Clause 25 [Reports by Commissioner]: