rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what is their policy towards developments in the European Union's relations with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.

My Lords, the purpose of this debate is to look at how relations are developing between the European Union and Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. It is about two years since I last held a debate on this topic and I welcome my noble friend Lady Royall to this rather select group of Members of this House who take an interest in these matters.

When I re-read my speech of two years ago, I was reminded that the whole debate was coloured by the fact that Russia had just cut off the gas supply to Belarus in a dispute over pipeline tariffs. Now, of course, we have the ongoing dispute between Ukraine and Russia about essentially the same issue and this only emphasises the point that I made in the previous debate that, while we may choose to debate Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, Russia is a huge consideration. Russia's relationship with those countries and with the EU tends to colour the whole debate.

Nevertheless, it is useful to look at these countries on an individual basis. They are Europe's closest neighbours and, inevitably and rightly, they have risen up the political agenda since the EU was expanded. It is no surprise to anyone that the new members want to ensure that the EU prioritises its developing relationships with Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine.

I will deal first with Belarus. Belarus is a country with no ambitions towards European Union membership. With Belarus, the same old issues come up again and again—fraudulent election results, repression of NGOs, and past political figures who have disappeared. Sadly, there are new restrictions placed on current political figures who I shall name here tonight—the former Prosecutor General and current head of Presidential Administration, Victor Sheiman; the Minister for Sports and Tourism, Yuri Sivakov; and the Minister for Internal Affairs, Vladimir Naumov. I find it is depressing that the leadership in Minsk prefer to live in a kind of Cold War aspic where they are very certain of who their enemies are but uncertain of their own future, rather than a world where they can embrace the opportunities for creating a society that sits comfortably with the international standards of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

However, I want to say something positive about developments in Belarus over the past couple of years and argue that, despite this lack of progress, it is worth us persisting with a policy of selective co-operation with the authorities in Minsk.

I am a patron of a British charity called Leaves of Hope, which operates in the social and health fields in Belarus and which has taken a number of initiatives from the introduction of a fostering system for children to taking disadvantaged youths from Cardiff and driving them all the way to Belarus, which is a long way to drive. The charity has pursued a number of initiatives over a number of years and, so far as I am aware, has had complete co-operation from the Belarusian authorities to the extent that national laws have been changed and amended to accommodate some of the initiatives that have been introduced. I am thinking particularly of the field of fostering of children. To me, that is a positive example of Belarusian willingness to look constructively at alternative methods of addressing social issues and, in some cases, changing the old Soviet system, where they are persuaded of the benefits.

The second positive example is the development of the Belarusian economy itself. I realise that understanding the Belarusian economy is something of a black art; nevertheless, the authorities claim that their economy is growing at least as fast if not faster than that of many countries in the region. That is almost certainly a knock-on effect of Russia's economic progress due to the higher energy prices, but it is progress that is being claimed by the authorities in Minsk.

When I meet Belarusian officials, they never lose an opportunity to talk about their economic ambitions and particularly their trading ambitions with the European Union. That presents an opportunity for the European Union to show what those opportunities are for Belarus and to show the Belarusian authorities that we are serious about human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Many people who I meet in Belarus understand that; they understand international standards, our common standards, and they understand that this presents an opportunity for the Belarusian people themselves. But unfortunately the leadership—and I mean the very top of the leadership structure—takes a more isolationist approach.

I know that our Government are looking to support civil and democratic forces in Belarus, and that the presidential election in March will be an opportunity for the Belarusian authorities to demonstrate some willingness to support democratic forces and the rule of law. Nevertheless, we should not expect too much in reality and, whatever the results, we should continue to work with civil society, as the current regime will not be in place for ever.

I turn to Moldova, where I know that there is a new parliamentary group to be set up by my noble friend Lord Dubs. Noble Lords will be aware that Moldova is the poorest country in Europe and that in 2001 it turned back to the Communist Party. A Communist president was re-elected in March last year. Moldova will be a new neighbour of the European Union when Romania joins in the not-too-distant future. The Transnistria conflict remains frozen; fortunately, Ukraine is taking a more active interest in the negotiations, together with Russia and the EU, and various initiatives are under way. Where are we on those negotiations—and is the idea of putting in some EU troops in the form of peacekeepers or in a monitoring role still being actively discussed?

The EU is trying to export stability to countries such as Moldova, and it is rightly conscious that if it does not export stability it will import instability. To some extent, that has happened already. The population of Moldova has reduced by some 15 per cent in the past 10 years, and there are now substantial Moldovan populations in Portugal and Greece. Of course, the main reason for that is the desperate poverty in Moldova. These migrations present a real problem for the EU member states to try to reverse the trend—and I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, will say more about that in his contribution.

In Ukraine there have been the greatest political changes since my debate two years ago, with the Orange Revolution. However, many of the underlying economic and environmental challenges remain as intractable as ever. Ukraine may have a flawed legal system and economy, but there is no doubt that it has a vibrant democracy.

There is no doubt that the Rada, the national Parliament, forms a national focus for political debate—which sometimes might take the form of gridlock, or might be a way of expressing dissatisfaction—that cannot be claimed by many other countries in that region. Ukraine is a large and important country within greater Europe, and the EU is rightly pursuing a number of initiatives with it, all, I hope, building towards EU membership some time in the future. Ukraine has made its choice, and the EU has a responsibility to respond to that choice. There are negotiations on WTO accession leading to a free trade agreement with the EU, which are substantial goals, and can offer both parties benefits.

Around one-third of Ukraine's trade is with the EU, while in percentage terms the EU's trade with Ukraine is insignificant. That might tempt some people to say it is not a particularly important issue, but of course the reverse is the truth. The success of Ukraine matters hugely to the stability of the region as a whole, and it is my perception that the UK is in a particularly strong position to direct the debate within the EU about how the relationship with Ukraine will develop.

I want to mention gas pipelines, since they have coloured the national news so much in recent weeks. I alluded to the fact that they were in the national news a couple of years ago, although in a more minor way. I want to say two things, which I hope are not stating the obvious, as I think they are important for context. First, there can be no doubt that Russia has a competitive foreign policy regarding the gas pipeline supply situation, and it is adjusting its policy on that basis.

Secondly, as with all political and economic issues, short-term issues totally eclipse the long-term considerations of gas and oil pricing. In the short term the massive increases in gas prices are, as we know, impossible for the Ukrainian authorities to accept, but in the long term it is desirable that the Russians move away from their differential pricing of oil and gas resources. Some noble Lords may know that my professional life involves this aspect of the oil and gas business, and I can say to the House that differential prices between the near abroad, the far abroad and the international, as they refer to them, provide a huge incentive for corruption and a huge disincentive for industrial reform. It really is in everyone's interest that in the long term we move towards competitive oil and gas pricing. I have heard no real argument against that in eastern European countries. The political debate is about the rate of transition to the market-based oil and gas prices, and that rate provides Russia with an opportunity that they have not been slow to exploit.

I conclude by saying that, when I was preparing for this debate, I received a couple of unclassified briefings from the Foreign Office. A couple of years ago there was a "new neighbourhood" policy. It now seems to be done in a more piecemeal fashion as the countries are developing at different speeds. That is the right approach, and I trust that our Government will take a greater interest in these matters as they move up the political agenda.

My Lords, I begin by thanking the noble Lord for enabling us to discuss this subject; indeed, this complicated set of topics. He closed by dealing with the energy market aspect, something I do not propose to deal with, but it is illustrative of a very important issue.

I propose to focus mainly on the implications of developments in and around Ukraine not just because it is, as the noble Lord said, a large and important country—which it certainly is—but also because it is the country of which I have had most experience in the past decade or so. I am deputy chairman of the all-party group and spent seven or eight years, together with the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, on the advisory council of the Supreme Rada—years that proved increasingly fruitless and barren.

I am talking not just about the implications for Ukraine but the wider ones because there are very important implications of our and their handling of relations with Russia, not just, as the noble Lord pointed out, on the part of this country but throughout the European Union. It is one of the many issues that need and deserve consideration on a Europe-wide basis rather as Mikhail Gorbachev would have foreseen when he talked about our common European home. So it is a good reason for persisting in the pursuit of European common policies as far as possible but not in any way to exclude the interests of the United States and our North American partners, which are obviously substantial. Indeed, it is important to maintain a common view on both sides of the Atlantic. Different issues are of more importance to one than the other. For Europe perhaps gas is at the top of the list; for the United States perhaps it is counter-terrorism. The difference in our interests should not lead us to differences of policy, rather the reverse.

As for Ukraine itself, my last visit there was some 18 months ago in the summer of 2004. I visited with several colleagues from the all-party group. As the noble Lord pointed out, the situation has improved enormously since then. Those were the dying days of President Kuchma's presidency. The victory of President Yushchenko in what is known as the Orange Revolution has effected an enormous change. It signalled the arrival of reformist European-minded leaders with respect for honest democracy, the rule of law and economic liberalism. That is true not just of President Yushchenko himself, who at one time suffered harsh hardship because of his belief in those principles but also, at least in some respects, of his two Prime Ministers, Tymoshenko and Yekhanurov. However, they face difficulties like some other former authoritarian states that formed part of the Soviet Union. In many ways their constitutions were designed, unintentionally, for conflict. A rather rigid adherence to the division between executive and legislature for an immature country was almost a prescription for deadlock. Not just Ukraine but other countries from the former Warsaw Pact bloc have learnt how democracy enables a country to change its government, which is quite important. But democracy has other purposes than that. They have not learnt the need to establish continuity notwithstanding a change in government. Sometimes we make the same mistake.

For those reasons it is important for the European Union to keep its door open, for Ukraine to have the prospect of joining at some date in the future. That may be the best incentive for it to persevere, through a democratic system, with the difficult but necessary economic reforms which are still going ahead. There was important progress during the United Kingdom presidency marked by the Kiev summit on 1 December when Ukraine was granted market economy status and negotiations were opened on many other important issues. There are a number of other advantages of the association with Europe—market liberalisation and, beyond, honest government. I give the following example. At the request of the presidents of Moldova and Ukraine there has been established the EU Border Assistance Mission, which we hope will offer potential help in the settlement of the Transnistria conflict, to which the noble Lord referred. In a different way, the example of the market economy and its application since the Orange Revolution has enabled, for example, the resale of Ukraine's largest steelworks at Kryvorizhstal to the Mittal group last October for $4.8 billion, six times the price raised from the previous purchaser in the Kuchma-era privatisation. That is one of the advantages of a more open and honest pattern of government.

Most recently, as the noble Lord pointed out, those advantages have been overshadowed by the gas conflict. The most worrying feature of that conflict is not the fact of commercial disagreement—in the end the markets will have to resolve that in different ways in price changes—but the political element in the way in which Russia appears to have conducted the negotiations, indeed, some would say with political ruthlessness at one point. It is not time to speculate about the nature and extent of the changes that are taking place in Russia; but there can be no doubt about the increasing authoritarianism of Putin's presidency. Is that due to careless or recklessness, diversity of authority or ruthlessness? One can come to only one conclusion about that, underlined by the resignation from the Kremlin of Andrei Illarionov, once a key economic adviser to President Putin, who felt that he had to resign because he was no longer able to speak his mind. One can conclude that carelessness is the least likely explanation for the growing authoritarianism.

It is part, really, of the Russian reaction to a sequence of democratic revolutions which have caused them discomfort: in Kyrgyzstan the tulip; in Georgia the rose; in Ukraine the orange, which have all been greeted without enthusiasm in Moscow. In every case the democratic alliance is, to put it mildly, under pressure. Moreover, authoritarianism is strengthening its grasp rather than weakening it in other countries. The noble Lord has referred to Belarus, but President Putin does not attempt to conceal his sympathy with President Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, as well as with Lukashenko in Belarus. There are now, in the face of this, some signs of successful pressure being brought to bear even on Russia itself. It is encouraging that the Council of Europe in Strasbourg made representations on human rights in relation to the recent Russian legislation diminishing the importance of non-government organisations, and that some advice at least from the Council of Europe on the shape of that legislation has been delivered and to some extent regarded. Other issues will arise. That is the most important aspect of the debate in the wider setting that we have tonight.

That tension between authoritarianism and democracy will remain a cause of potential disagreement—even possibly of confrontation—although hopefully and mercifully not of conflict. I hope and believe that it may never become conflict. However, it does require above all sustained collective attention and consideration from the rest of the world; from the European Union and its member states, with British leadership so far as we can give it, and from the whole of the transatlantic alliance, from democratic governments, to keep the pressure in the direction of democratic self-government rather than authoritarianism. Above all it has to come from the European partnership. It also calls for responsible government in Ukraine itself. The recent change of government as a result of the decision of the Rada is a turbulent factor, and as the Times leading article today said, it has some discouraging features about it. The democratic leaders, including most notably Mrs Tymoshenko, one of the key figures, who together played the part that they did in effecting the Orange Revolution need to understand the folly of risking the destruction of the democratic framework that they helped to create, if they do not pay attention to the need for continuity and stability on a democratic foundation in that country. We need to do everything that we can to support that foundation for a country that is of importance to us beyond many people's understanding.

My Lords, I too congratulate my noble friend Lord Ponsonby on initiating this debate on a region that is so important to the future of Europe, and which has a wider geopolitical significance. It is a shame that so few noble Lords seem to agree. This is one of those debates where there seem to be as many Ministers and shadow Ministers as there are ordinary punters, especially as I am not sure that I could define the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe, as an ordinary punter.

About a year ago I was in an airport looking for a book to read on a long-distance plane journey. I came across one by the author Tony Hawkes. I do not know if other noble Lords will have seen it—Playing the Moldovans at Tennis. Tony Hawkes made a bet when he was drunk that he could beat each of the Moldovian football first team at tennis. He went to Moldova to carry through that bet; he played all members of the football team and, as far as I remember, he ultimately beat them all, showing that being good at one sport does not make you good at another. It is a charming book and I did not find that it in any way patronised Moldova, which has a certain charm. He got to know a family very well and he provides a sympathetic account of the situation and problems of the country. Part of the reason why he chose the title was that Moldova seemed to him an exotic and perhaps obscure country—as it is for most people living in western Europe. That would have been true to almost all of us until relatively recently.

As we all now recognise, Moldova is virtually on the front line of the European Union and it holds an intense interest for us, as do the other countries mentioned in the title of this debate. At one point they were all exotic to most western Europeans. Eastern Europe used to be in between; but eastern Europe has now become central Europe and therefore the European Union faces a very different geopolitical situation. All three countries are essentially new, dating from about 1991. I am not sure why only those three countries feature in this debate, but the enlarged EU, as we know and as has been mentioned by my noble friend, shares an enormous common geopolitical position with Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and even Armenia. Most of those countries are authoritarian or are trying to break away from authoritarian government; none looks especially stable; and they tend to be centres of rather noxious forms of international crime, including human trafficking, the organ trade, money laundering and so on. Yet, they are all looking west.

In Tbilisi and other Georgian cities the EU flag flies alongside the national flag on public buildings. As the noble and learned Lord mentioned, the country's "Rose revolution" was one of the first in the region and it helped to inspire similar uprisings not just in the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan but in the Lebanon—which is not too far away in the Middle East. All of that is a reminder of how potent the EU's appeal is. But I must say that the EU's appeal these days seems a bit like the strategies of Don Giovanni, because it has an immense attraction whereby suitors of the European Union will bend every effort to achieve their objective of joining, but once they do so they seem to be much more dismissive and uninterested in what they have achieved. So that appeal has become somewhat paradoxical.

Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine cannot easily be discussed in one breath because they have quite a lot of differences, some of which have been referred to. Belarus is most closely tied to Russia and there is continuing talk of Belarus joining up again with Russia. I do not think that that will come to anything but certainly Belarus has been most impervious to the EU's charms. President Lukashenko has famously been called by George Bush, and I believe others, "Europe's last dictator". He is the author of several bons mots, including the following in which he told his citizens, "You will live badly but not for long". However, that might be an artefact of translation.

A whole series of initiatives which have gone on since the early 1990s in Belarus have largely come to nothing on the part of the EU. As has been said, they have included sanctions as well as positive inducements. However, like my noble friend, I feel that the country is unstable. It cannot go on for too long in its current state, and therefore I think that the initiatives, which I shall come to later, should still be sustained.

Moldova and Ukraine are in rather a different position. I, too, will not talk much about the energy issue, although it is worth recognising the extent of the subsidy which Ukraine received from Russia. According to figures that I dug out, that subsidy was worth about US $3 billion to $5 billion a year. That is more than all the EU aid that has been given to Ukraine over the past 14 years since its independence, which puts the whole thing in a certain perspective.

The difference is that both Moldova and Ukraine have accepted a framework of agreements with the European Union and are covered by their EU neighbourhood policy. A new EU-Moldova action plan was agreed this year. As has been mentioned, we know that Moldova famously has the lowest GDP per head in Europe, and I think that it has something like half the GDP per head that it had in 1989. It is a heavily agricultural country; nevertheless, it has 99 per cent literacy, and I feel that its economic prospects are not too bad.

Talking of playing tennis with the Moldovans, I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, was here when we discussed Croatia and Slovakia—two rather poor countries in Europe, neither of which existed until recently. They were both in the final of the Davis Cup, so perhaps the same will happen to Moldova not too far down the line. In any event, I do not think that the prospects for the country are as poor as they are sometimes said to be, and I think that involvement with the EU will be fundamental to its future.

Of course, Ukraine is the key country because it is larger. It had the famous Orange Revolution. That revolution has lost some momentum and has run into difficulties, but it seems to me to be an irreversible transition. It is important to recognise that Ukraine is a transit country for gas and oil flows from Russia and the Black Sea, and that gives it a large geopolitical significance. It is also the site of Chernobyl, which has still not been fully decommissioned, and other ailing power stations. Ukraine still gets about 30 per cent of its power from those power stations.

The Ukrainian Government have declared their commitment to join the European Union, and the latest suggestion is that that will happen by 2012. There is an amusing anecdote in the book of the noble Lord, Lord Patten, Not Quite the Diplomat, in which he talks about going to Ukraine. There, they say to him, "If Turkey is a European country, why isn't Ukraine a European country?" The criterion for joining the European Union set out many years ago is simply that a country should be a European country, and the noble Lord, Lord Patten, amusingly documents his stumbling attempts to answer that question. Personally, by the kind of definition that now attains, I think it is irrefutable that Ukraine is a European country.

That leads me, in conclusion, to suggest a number of questions for the Minister about the Government's policies and orientation towards this new border of Europe and the EU's involvement with it. First, I have a general question that I have asked before, but my noble friend Lord Triesman did not give me a completely satisfactory reply. I support the Government's pro-enlargement policy, which is crucial for the EU. But pro-enlargement inevitably means that the EU becomes a geopolitical actor. It is inevitable that if the EU expands into a completely different region of the world, it must exert influence in that region.

What do the Government think should be a political project for the EU? It is no use supporting enlargement and supposing that that will transmute the EU into a sort of quasi market—a kind of free trade area. You cannot expand in a way that has clear geopolitical connotations and not supply leadership. That, in turn, means some kind of political co-ordination. We know that our European constitutional treaty has been rejected, but what would the Government want in its place? What would the Government provide in the co-ordination that the EU must have if it is to deal appropriately with such areas? They cannot simply base the matter all on economics and free trade.

Secondly, with regard to Belarus, I echo the implicit question asked by my noble friend. We do not want to give up on Belarus, but what about giving more support to NGOs and international charities? We know that the situation with NGOs is difficult, but nevertheless they seem to be the organisations likely to have the most impact. Which of those organisations should we be supporting, and how?

Thirdly, although my noble friend might disagree, there seem to be major problems with the EU's neighbourhood policy. Obviously it is a new policy, so it is relatively early to discuss it, but there is another good quote from the book written by the noble Lord, Lord Patten, when he says:

"Our partners are welcome to set up their stall in the market place, but not to set foot in the town hall".

It seems that the neighbourhood policy could easily be said to be fundamentally contradictory. It offers the possibility of association with the European Union but not where that association will be carried through. How does the Minister see that neighbourhood policy evolving in relation to states that have firmly said that they wish to become members of the European Union?

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for initiating the debate and asking the Question. The sub-committee of the European Select Committee which I chair has the European Neighbourhood Policy within its remit. Of course, I speak tonight on my own behalf, not on behalf of the sub-committee, but nevertheless I have a number of questions for the Minister.

The European Neighbourhood Policy objective is to secure peace and stability within the ring of countries that border the new and extended borders of the European Union. It enables the countries to enjoy a close relationship, including economic co-operation, which is delivered through action plans for each country. Among the objectives is creating political and economic reform within the countries concerned.

It has already been said that the action plans for Ukraine and Moldova have been adopted. They were adopted in February last year. Ukraine has already been granted market economy status, and reference has already been made to the border monitoring machinery between Moldova and Ukraine. There was an EU/Ukraine summit in December, and a joint statement was issued showing the extent of the co-operation between the Union and Ukraine, referring to matters such as the initiative supporting Ukraine's efforts to destroy its stockpiles of small arms and light weapons and the role that the president of Ukraine has played in attempting to reopen the negotiations on settling the Transnistria conflict.

Ukraine has also been emphasising for some time the importance of the introduction of a visa-free regime. I am sure that the House would be grateful if, on what is potentially a sensitive issue, the Minister could say where we are on those negotiations and at what stage parliamentary scrutiny is likely in connection with that proposal.

The noble Lord, Lord Giddens, referred to the wish of Ukraine to become a member of the European Union. Rightly, in my opinion—this is stated in the Union's published policy—neither the European Neighbourhood Policy nor the action plans are intended to be a formal precursor to membership, but they do not preclude it. Nevertheless, we need to be extremely careful not to mislead countries such as Ukraine into a belief that membership is in any way imminent.

European neighbourhood policies affect two of the three countries—and potentially the third—under discussion. It has always seemed to me that these policies are comprehensive, ambitious, and contain precisely nothing that anyone could object to. In fact, perhaps they contain too much. Time precludes me from reading the areas covered in the action plans—I would not be able to address your Lordships on any other issue. Suffice it to say that they range right through political dialogue and reform, human rights, fundamental freedoms, economic and social reform, trade, justice, home affairs, transport, people-to-people contact, public health and cross-border and regional co-operation, to mention but a few. Clearly, we cannot do everything for every country that is the subject of a European Neighbourhood Policy at once. There is a clear case for establishing priorities. If we do not believe that these ambitions can be prioritised, are we satisfied that these important programmes are going to have sufficient funds allocated to them?

I know that there is now a European Neighbourhood Policy instrument that will replace existing funding such as TACIS. Nevertheless, from whatever source the money comes, the adequacy of the funds is an important question. It is no longer good enough to say that they could all be funded if the European Union budget was radically restructured in respect of the common agricultural policy. That is not going to happen for some time. I say that not as a criticism of the agreement on the budget reached at the end of last year, but as what I believe to be a fact. We must resolve this problem.

Another dilemma is that, in the context of overall European funding, it is frequently said by those interested in development aid in its classic sense that the EU aid should go to the very poorest nations. Despite Moldova's plight, these three countries may not quite fall into that precise definition in a global context. Nevertheless, peace, security and the aims of the neighbourhood policy, to which I have already referred, are of vital importance in these countries, which are our neighbours and with which we have, and should have, close and friendly relations.

On Moldova, in the debate on 20 December, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, referred to Moldova's unusual position because of its close economic and social relationship with Romania, and said that Moldova would be significantly affected when Romania joined the European Union. The European Union has a special representative to Moldova. Are we satisfied that that representative is adequately funded to carry out the work? How does he relate to the action plan and the European Union-Moldova Co-operation Council, which seems to meet infrequently?

The exception to all of this activity is Belarus. The European Union has stated that contractual relations can only be established when a fair and democratic form of government has been established. Aid is going to certain elements of civil society, but there is little sign of President Lukashenko relaxing his grasp on the country, and Russia is unlikely to encourage him so to do if the consequence of that would be to push Belarus into the arms of the European Union. So I hope that the Minister will be able to share with the House the Government's thinking on how relations with Belarus should be developed. Are we, as the European Union, making the best of the contacts and relationships which exist between that country and our new Baltic member states?

Other noble Lords have referred to the attitude of Russia, which is clearly crucial. With regard to Moldova, as I understand the position, there is a commitment on the part of Russia to withdraw its troops and munitions from Moldova and to ensure the full withdrawal of arms and ammunition from Transnistria, with their destruction on site, and the withdrawal of Russian forces. Will the Minister indicate the position on that? The last communiqué from the last European Union/Russia summit seemed silent on that point. We need to know our Government's attitude towards Russia on these three countries.

What position are we trying to persuade our European Union colleagues to agree in that connection? The scope for a common foreign policy on these matters must be considerable. We talk of solidarity within the European Union. Some members from the Baltic States may feel that having achieved European Union and NATO membership, more might have been done on their behalf on the occasions that they have been subject to somewhat hostile comment from a country that clearly even now remains less than convinced of the justice of their independence. Were we to take a similar approach with regard to these three countries and feel that somehow or another representing the case of democracy and freedom is off-limits so far as Russia is concerned, it would not be encouraging for those in those three states who are seeking a new, western dawn.

My Lords, I join in the thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for introducing this debate on a troika of relatively recent new states. I want to concentrate on Moldova as I have visited there almost every year since 1993. Moldova has been described as a mosaic of minorities, but I would add that those minorities have been cemented together by 200 years of intermarriage.

Your Lordships will know that, politically, Moldova was part of tsarist Russia, went on to be part of Romania and then became part of the USSR. Independence was rather rapidly followed by the internal war of 1991-92, which I would suggest was essentially about power and office—although that may be disputed. There was a good deal of outside intervention in that war which has left a quasi-independent Transnistria. The only good thing about the aftermath of the war has been the excellent ceasefire.

As has already been mentioned, Russia probably has the greatest influence and strongest weight of any external power, but Russian policy has been characterised over a long period by consistent ambivalence. By that I mean that there has been no formal recognition of Transnistria, but a considerable amount of veiled support.

One could perhaps describe the aftermath of the Moldovan fighting as one of the most over-mediated conflicts in the world. All this diplomatic and other activity over 13 years has produced no overall political solution, so we are faced by a conflict that continues to be frozen. The moral perhaps is that it is a bad idea to have large and powerful nearby neighbours acting as mediators, which are to some extent in competition with each other, and to have the OSCE trying to do the same job at the same time. The lack of political agreement means that today there are still two armed forces, two currencies, two legal systems, a continuing propaganda war, rather indifferent human rights on both sides of the Dneistr and a good deal of organised crime and trafficking, together with economic failure and rather large debts.

The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, mentioned the important factor of poverty. I would just support that by saying that not only has the total population fallen, but that also many hundreds of thousands of Moldovans each year have to go to other countries in order to earn a living. The result is continued instability and a very poor economic climate for any kind of investment.

On the role of Her Majesty's Government, will the Government continue to persuade Russia not to intervene in the internal affairs of Moldova and, as was pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Bowness, honour its obligations under the 1999 OSCE Istanbul agreement? Russia seems to be very keen to join as many international organisations and settings as it can. That may be all very well, but a pre-condition should perhaps be that it brings itself up-to-date on what it has already agreed.

I would like to make a suggestion on a much more effective way of carrying out mediation. This borrows from what has happened in the former Yugoslavia. I suggest that we need in-country a high representative of some supranational body. I do not think that the EU is the appropriate international body, but the OSCE might be. Any high representative might be given really strong powers to protect all the various minorities, to supervise economic reintegration and to help with the drafting of a new constitution, which has already been endlessly discussed; and perhaps he should also have the power to dismiss and replace corrupt and incompetent officials.

It is desirable in the medium and long term to end up with a state which is capable of freely associating both with the European Union and with a commonwealth of independent states. Internally both sides of the divided country will have to be persuaded that they share a possible and as yet not achieved common good. Just condemning each other is simply not good enough. I would also suggest that unrecognised entities claiming to be states cannot continue for ever. Therefore, a sunset clause would perhaps be helpful, particularly for current office holders.

Perhaps I may finish on a lighter note by saying to the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, that just about the only integrated institution in Moldova is the national football team, which draws from both sides.

My Lords, it is a pleasure and a privilege to follow the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hylton. I have a sad confession to make: unlike the distinguished five contributors to this very interesting debate so far, I have not had the pleasure or honour of visiting any of the three countries. So, although I am winding up on behalf of these Benches, I fear that it is in a very unprofessional way. I hope that the House will forgive me for that.

Continuing the allusion to Don Giovanni mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, it struck me that one may thematically continue into that dangerous and difficult territory. I recall a black and white film scene many years ago, when Bob Hope was in an African safari tent in a bath tub, having his shoulders massaged by Anita Ekberg. His good line after that was, "When I have finished this bath, I will go to the drug store tomorrow to get some ugly pills". Is the European Union perhaps in the condition that that would be a way to dissuade people from wanting to become members in due course?

There is inevitably a rather agonised argument in all countries in the European Union now—for which no member state needs to apologise, although it is frustrating to countries still thinking about joining in future. After the big absorption of the 10; the recent agreement to allow Romania and its neighbour to join as well; and then to open talks with Croatia and Macedonia, implicitly leading to future membership, it would be unfair to cast a dark shadow on the possibility of other countries joining.

However, equally, at the summit in mid-December, there was an agreement among all the leaders that the Union would rightly pause for a moment to think about the future, how enlargement would shape up and what should be the agenda. If, in the end, that produces a renewed élan in the European Community, that is a very good thing, because there is a fear that the European Union will run out of steam and just add on a few more trading entities, but not much else. That would not be right, especially for those of us who do not want to see the United States as the sole, exclusive representative of Western world power in the world. There are many other reasons for that. The European Union must be an equal partner in that sense, which is, presumably, another reason why more and more countries want to join

In the limited time available, I therefore, with less expertise than other noble Lords, make only one or two comments. However, that is a reasonable point to make. Perhaps the public generally in the European Union feel that the Ukraine is the most suitable candidate for various reasons, not least because it is a large country, so the trading and economic opportunities are bigger, but there are many problems and questions there. The defence equation and military equipment questions that arise from such an idea are also important.

In congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, if he is to continue to raise this interesting subject every two or three years, as he seems to have done so far—I think that this is the second occasion—if the House authorities also thought that it was a good idea and sufficient initiatives were taken by individual Members of the House, we might have separate debates on each of those three countries. It is a problem putting them together, notwithstanding their obvious historical links, their close geographical proximity and the rest of it. Hesitation arises from the sudden increase in size of the European Union in recent times—although, as we know, it has resulted in only a 4.5 per cent addition to GNP, which must also be borne in mind. There are reasons to be circumspect about the future structure of the Union, its objectives and ambitions and how it will welcome additional applicants in the longer term future than the immediate horizon.

As the debate showed, that does not apply to Belarus, for obvious reasons. That is a closed and unattractive totalitarian regime, which is often attacked by parliamentarians here and by many members of the US Congress. I do not know personally, and I do not think that the House knows generally, exactly what will happen in Belarus. Will opposition develop in future? Would the regime have collapsed a long time ago without Putin's support? Many people think so, but there is a lot more water to flow under the Belarus bridge.

The Economist of 17 December stated:

"Life is bleak for beleaguered democrats in Belarus. The country's autocrat, Alexander Lukashenka, has put tight controls on the media, rigged elections, torn up the constitution and sent opposition activists to jail, exile"— or perhaps worse.

"Now a new law on public security will make it a criminal offence to 'discredit Belarus's standing abroad'".

So the signs are very unpromising. At the moment, one literally has to leave it there and see more indications from Belarus of its serious intention to come into the comity of civilised countries.

With Moldova the situation is totally different. Despite its perhaps lagging economic development, referred to in the debate, in many ways its prospects psychologically, politically and economically can be much better in the future. That is a classic example of where the European Union should help a country in that condition, without interfering in detail internally and only if the country wishes that to happen.

Manifestly, the formation of the all-party group—the first meeting may take place next week under the aegis of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, who was already mentioned in the debate—is a good possibility for this Parliament to engage much more on closer studies of Moldova with an earnest and sincere wish to help that country without excessive interference in its internal affairs, which would not be right. The EU permanent mission has at last been opened in the capital city. Therefore, I hope that that will be built up and will eventually give relatively more ignorant politicians like myself the opportunity to visit such countries and to get to know what the EU is doing. That is not a specific plea but a general aspiration.

I want to emphasise one or two points about Moldova. I think that it is right to say that there have not been any official visits from the United Kingdom in about 15 years of democracy. Perhaps the Minister will announce a forthcoming visit by herself or the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, or whoever might be the relevant Minister. It would be very congenial for us to hear more about that. I believe that I am right in saying that the speaker of the Moldovan Parliament will come in February, presumably also to address the all-party group. Moldova needs more attention from Europe, particularly with Transnistria and Gagauzia as serious problems. With trade, we look forward to the resumption perhaps of Moldovan wines coming into this country as they did in the past, as well as other estimable products and exports from that country.

In the Ukraine, the situation therefore is very different from the other two countries, but the prospects are extremely interesting. Even if the Ukraine has established its aspirations within a certain timetable for membership, that is not something that can automatically be acceded to by any responses in the European Union. At the moment, there are many problems and issues arising. The political revolution—coloured orange rather than blue as in Moldova, if that will be a revolution in due course in the full sense of the word, but Moldova already is a democracy—in the Ukraine does not seem to be so firmly based now. There are many question marks over what will happen in the parliamentary cockpit there over coming months with the current crisis and the hesitations in the co-operation between parties.

I conclude with one or two comments on the largest country of the three in order to finalise that aspect of the debate. Most political factions in the Ukraine advocate joining the European Union and developing ties with Europe. But many in the EU are more doubtful about Ukraine's particular prospects. As we know, Commissioner Günter Verheugen said that a European perspective for the Ukraine does not necessarily mean membership for some considerable time. That has to be borne in mind without sounding too discouraging. Ukraine will most likely develop some kind of intermediate relation with the EU, but also continue its links, as a noble Lord said earlier in this debate, with the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Those therefore are the pictures that we see at the moment, with the message that the European Union has to respond to any country that applies to it. Eventually they will subscribe—not necessarily in the immediate offering as it approaches the European Union for possible future membership—to the conditions for the transitional period, the total acquis communautaire—however long it may be; it has to be lengthy obviously for all of the complexities involved—and then for future full membership. If a transitional period is longer than we see with the seven years of recent examples, that necessarily would not be a very bad thing. As long as countries feel that they get a response when they knock on the door, I think that noble Lords will be more than satisfied. But it depends on the complex differentiation between the three countries in this debate.

My Lords, I add my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for securing this debate. Sadly, I must join the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, in admitting that I too have not visited any of the three countries we are discussing today, so I hope that I will be forgiven for not having the expert knowledge of most of your Lordships. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has been consistent in his efforts to draw the attention of the House to the important issues that affect these three east European countries and, as before, this is a timely debate. When considering the European Union (Accessions) Bill on Tuesday, we again welcomed enlargement and the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in the European Union. Before Christmas my noble friend Lord Dundee highlighted our hope that negotiations will eventually lead to the membership of Croatia and Turkey.

The European Union has always acknowledged the need for closer co-operation with countries on its new borders, but there is still a vast amount to do regarding the EU's relationship with the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. As with Romania's accession, there are opportunities and challenges associated with Moldova, including, as pointed out in a Written Answer in another place by the right honourable Douglas Alexander,

"the problems presented by the frozen conflict in Transnistria [which] will lie on the EU's common external border".—[Hansard, Commons, 10/10/05; col. 123W.]

We need not look further than the example of the Ukraine gas dispute over the past few weeks to see how these border countries' relationships with the EU can either complement or cause trouble. The gas dispute in the Ukraine has been portrayed as having political roots, a way for Russia to punish Kiev for pursuing closer links with the European Union and NATO despite, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, having received $5 billion a year from Russia. I would be interested to know for how many years this payment has been made.

This dispute has directly affected EU member states, a point made by other noble Lords, because 80 per cent of EU gas supplies are transported through pipelines in the Ukraine. It is clear that the problems surrounding these countries are becoming acute. In the light of this, can the noble Baroness indicate what the Government's response is to suggestions that the European Union should move towards a common energy policy, as mentioned by my noble and learned friend Lord Howe of Aberavon? Can she also indicate what reappraisals the Government are making to our own energy policy, which involves a heavy reliance on imported gas supplies, bearing in mind the recent dispute?

European Union relations with the Ukraine, in comparison with the other two countries, are more productive. Indeed, the gas dispute I have just mentioned shows how far they have come. They build on the current Partnership and Co-operation Agreements which will come up for renewal in two years' time. This highlights shared fundamental values regarding peace and stability, described so clearly by my noble friend Lord Bowness. That is an essential element of the EU/Ukraine relationship. Given that, what pressure is Her Majesty's Government exerting to make certain that the EU supports the application made by the Ukraine to the WTO and its adoption of the necessary bilateral rules that go with it?

As I have stated in previous debates, the assumption that the regional degrouping which took place after the collapse of the Soviet Union would result in the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus remaining closely allied with Russia has been proved questionable more than once. These former Soviet countries have experienced serious social and economic problems, as well as problems regarding human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe has raised concerns and criticised all three countries regarding their political situation and key areas where elections have fallen short of international standards. Thankfully, the people of the Ukraine took measures into their own hands through the Orange Revolution earlier last year.

In 2004, in the debate initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, I stated that Belarus remains a thorny issue. President Lukashenko's moves towards authoritarian rule and his rejection of the several overtures made by the European Union to assist the return to basic democratic standards are of great concern, bearing in mind the importance of Belarus as an EU neighbour.

Belarus remains the furthest out on a limb of the three countries in question. It has never expressed, either, any interest in joining the European Union, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, told us. It remains the only European successor state of the former USSR without even a ratified Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. Its application for WTO membership is still under consideration now, 11 years later.

I am sad to say that the situation as it stands today has not significantly changed. In fact I understand that even Moscow is showing increasing signs of exasperation with the Belarusian authorities.

The FCO human rights report argues that the Belarus human rights record remains poor, whilst a recent report by Adrian Severin, the UN Special Rapporteur, goes further and is highly critical of the situation. Can the noble Baroness inform the House what steps Her Majesty's Government will take to make certain that the statement issued by the UK during its presidency of the European Union in August 2005 referring to the recent developments in Belarus is followed up by concerted EU action? Do they intend to take any bilateral action outside of the statement?

I was most fascinated by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, and his detailed knowledge of Moldova. Moldova's president stated that,

"integration with Europe is an absolute priority in Moldova's foreign policy".

With Georgia, too, as we heard in the interesting speech of the noble Lord, Lord Giddens. However, the FCO human rights report of 2005, whilst mentioning the commendable work that is being undertaken, highlighted that there are still serious allegations of,

"ill treatment and torture of suspects and prisoners by Moldovan police officers, as well as worrying levels of corruption within the . . . police force and the judiciary".

The United Nations Committee on Human Rights, Racial Discrimination and the Rights of the Child has expressed grave concerns over child abuse problems. Unfortunately, this pales in comparison to the human rights situation in Transnistria. What discussions have Her Majesty's Government had with both the Moldovans and the Russians on this issue?

We welcomed the European Neighbourhood Policy, ENP, to which the FCO report referred. It highlighted that the ENP would receive,

"substantial financial assistance, and that the European Commission will develop Action Plans with each country".

Can the noble Baroness highlight how Her Majesty's Government intends to support the ENP and make certain it is implemented, and how this will fit in with the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements?

I have but touched on the issues surrounding these increasingly important countries. I hope the noble Baroness can provide us with some of the answers we are seeking, and especially some guideline to the important question from the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, regarding the EU institutional reforms needed to cope with the enlargement of the European Union.

The Centre for European Reform has rightly said that,

"The EU can never be safe so long as their neighbours are poor and unstable, rife with the trafficking of arms, drugs and people".

My Lords, like other noble Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Ponsonby for tabling this timely debate. He has great knowledge of this part of our common European home, and I am delighted to join this select band of interested and expert Peers.

Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova are a high priority for the UK and the European Union. The accession of the 10 new member states from central and eastern Europe in May 2004 has put this important region on the EU's eastern common border. It has also brought into the EU new member states that have long cultural, historical and economic links to the three countries and a new level of expertise and interest.

I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe, that the orange revolution in Ukraine at the end of 2004 marked a new beginning not only for that country but for the region. It was a major landmark in the spread of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Following the election of President Yushchenko on Boxing Day 2004, Ukraine set eventual integration with the EU and NATO as its clear strategic goal, but, as my noble friend Lord Ponsonby pointed out, there is much work to be done to take forward reform and especially to tackle corruption. Against that background, we made Ukraine one of our presidency priorities and aim to progress EU policy there and across the region. Our aims were, and are, to support and encourage democracy and economic reform in all three countries. I was interested to read that today Ukraine becomes the 40th member of the Group of States against corruption, a Council of Europe body. That is very much to be welcomed.

One of our prime tools for encouraging democracy and economic reform in these countries is the EU's European neighbourhood policy, which was the initiative of the United Kingdom in 2002, in particular the action plans signed between the EU, Moldova and Ukraine in February 2005. They are wide-ranging documents that provide support for reform across the agenda, from justice and home affairs to tackling corruption and upholding the rule of law. Both countries have truly seized their action plans; they are using them as a tool to take themselves closer to EU standards, and they have made good progress.

Several points have been raised on the European neighbourhood policy. My noble friend Lord Giddens suggested that it was perhaps a disingenuous policy. I refute that. The policy represents an ambitious new framework for relations with neighbours of the post-enlargement Union. It holds out the perspective of a closer relationship with the European Union in return for progress on internal reforms. Quite rightly, it does not prejudice future applications for EU membership by eligible countries. However, it is extremely important as a means of strengthening stability and security in the countries and in the region. The policy is a real tool for transformation in those countries, so I do not think that it is disingenuous at all.

Several noble Lords mentioned enlargement. The Government have successfully championed enlargement, as we have seen with Croatia and Turkey, and will continue to do so. With regard to the countries that are our close neighbours and part of the neighbourhood policy, we have to leave the perspective of membership open. We have to encourage them to transform and to adhere to the standards and norms of the European Union, not just in economic terms but, perhaps more important, in terms of value, democracy and human rights. At the same time, it is extremely important that we keep the publics of the countries of the European Union and those of the prospective countries informed, because we must take them with us and ensure that they are fully informed and engaged along the way. That is what we must concentrate on at the moment.

The noble Lord, Lord Bowness, asked about the financial aspects of the neighbourhood policies. Apparently, EU support for the ENP is via TACIS, which the noble Lord will know. For Moldova, in 2006–07, the EU is providing €42 million. For the Ukraine, we are providing €88 million in 2005 and €100 million in 2006. From the end of 2007, the new European neighbourhood and partnership investment will come into force. The final level of funding is subject to the EU's external relations budget 2007–13, and the UK will work to ensure that there are sufficient funds.

Our agenda with Ukraine during the UK presidency went wider than the ENP action plan. The Prime Minister and President Yushchenko agreed when they met in February that there should be three priorities to support reform: granting market economy status for Ukraine; progress and support for WTO membership; and beginning visa facilitation negotiations. The EU-Ukraine summit was able give a strong signal of support for the goals of the Orange revolution and further reform. It was a summit of real substance and was widely recognised as the best EU-Ukraine summit to date. Moreover, it was held in Kiev on the anniversary of the Orange revolution—a message that was widely recognised in Ukraine.

Market economy status was granted in December and the EU strongly endorsed Ukraine's WTO aspirations at the Hong Kong ministerial. Negotiations on facilitated visa agreement and on readmission were launched in November. The second round of negotiations is scheduled for mid-January, and we will naturally put a finalised agreement before Parliament. The EU and Ukraine signed an MOU on energy co-operation as well as agreements on Galileo and aviation.

Looking ahead, Ukraine faces crucial parliamentary elections in March 2006. They will be a key test of the Ukraine's new democracy and its commitment to European standards. The Ukraine has made good progress in implementing recommendations from the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the OSCE and in entrenching media reforms. We expect Ukraine to meet its international commitments and welcome the early invitation to the OSCE to monitor the elections. The UK will contribute to the observer mission.

My Lords, are the Government satisfied that the European Union processes for monitoring the nuclear weapons in Ukraine and their supervision and maintenance are proceeding as well as expected?

My Lords, I believe that the UK Government are satisfied, but I will check. I will write to the noble Lord, copy it to noble Lords present and put a copy in the Library.

As well as supporting political and economic reform in Moldova under the ENP action plan, we aimed in our presidency to try to make some progress on attempts to resolve the frozen conflict in Transnistria. As the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, pointed out, that is a complex problem. Although relations between Moldova and the illegal regime in Transnistria had reached a new low in 2004, there were some positive signs. They included the appointment under the Luxembourg presidency—strongly supported by the UK—of the experienced and able EU special representative, Jacobovits, and a new positive approach from Yushchenko's Ukraine. I assure the House that the special representative is adequately financed and resourced. I take note of the suggestion from the noble Lord, but I believe that the fact that we now have a special representative is an important step forward.

Building on those developments, we were able during our presidency to take two major steps forward. First, we secured agreement to include the EU, together with the US, as an observer in the five-sides settlement talks on Transnistria. Secondly, we were able to launch an EU border assistance mission to monitor the border between Moldova and Ukraine. The border mission is particularly important, as not only does it put pressure on the illegal regime in Transnistria, but it helps tackle smuggling of goods and people from the region into the EU. Finally, the European Commission opened a delegation in Chisinau during the UK presidency—a small but highly symbolic step for Moldova. I warmly welcome the establishment of the inter-parliamentary group on Moldova by my noble friend Lord Dubs. I can confirm that the Speaker of Moldova will be visiting the UK in the near future.

Belarus is clearly in a completely different situation from either Ukraine or Moldova. Over the past couple of years the political and human rights situation in Belarus has been getting worse as President Lukashenko seeks to isolate the regime and prevent a coloured revolution in Belarus. We have seen opposition figures arrested and imprisoned on trumped-up charges; the closing of the European Humanities University; harassment of political parties and a restrictive law on NGOs; the closing down of opposition newspapers; and a new anti-revolution law designed to muzzle dissent. The EU has a well established policy on Belarus in the form of the benchmarks and a common position, which seek to offer Belarus better relations with the EU in return for improved behaviour on democracy and human rights.

Our aim during the UK presidency was to operationalise policy against the background of the deteriorating political situation. We believe that we succeeded in this. At the November GAERC, the EU laid down a clear marker that we expect the forthcoming presidential elections to be free and fair and that the EU is prepared to take further appropriate restrictive measures if they are not. The Austrians will now take this forward during their presidency and we stand ready to provide election observers to the OSCE's international election observer mission.

At the same time as holding the regime to account and focusing on the elections, we also recognise the need to reach out further to the Belarusian people. We are not giving up on Belarus. We therefore outlined further steps to be taken by the EU to step up contact with the Belarusian people and to strengthen support for civil society, including through technical assistance and by opening an EU office in Minsk. To this effect the EU has transferred €2 million from its TACIS programme to the more flexible EIDHR programme. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Rawlings, that we will ensure that all the steps that we agreed on during our presidency we will follow up on diligently.

In response to the question asked by the noble Lords, Lord Bowness and Lord Hylton, about whether we are holding Russia to its Istanbul commitments to withdraw troops to Transnistria, we certainly continue to urge Russia to fulfil the 1999 Istanbul commitments on Moldova and Georgia. NATO Foreign Ministers issued a robust statement on 8 December calling on Russia to resume complete withdrawal of Russian military forces from Moldova as soon as possible. The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, is absolutely correct when he says that there must be a peaceful solution to the divisions in Moldova, with the state capable of associating freely with the EU and the CIS.

The noble Baroness asked whether this Government were in favour of an EU energy policy. We certainly are; this is one of the key policy issues that was discussed in the meeting at Hampton Court, and there was certainly wide agreement on that matter.

We believe that the UK made strong progress in taking EU policy forward in support of democracy and reform in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus during our presidency. It is certainly an achievement of our presidency. This is widely recognised by partners and by EU institutions, all of which have thanked the UK for its professional and transparent handling of the EU's agenda for these countries over the last six months. Clearly our relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova will grow in importance over the coming years, to the benefit of the people of those countries, as well as of the European Union.

I realise I have not answered all questions, not least that from my noble friend Lord Giddens about the future of the European Union. I feel that is a debate for the future, and one I would be anxious to have.

House adjourned at twenty minutes before seven o'clock.