My Lords, with the leave of the House, I wish to make a Statement dealing with the Government's intention to implement Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. To ensure that people accused of serious frauds do not escape justice, we propose to implement this provision for trial without jury in serious and complex fraud cases. It would be subject to judicial safeguards.

The Government have decided that in the autumn they will seek affirmative resolutions from both Houses of Parliament in order to implement Section 43. Section 43 will enable serious and complex fraud trials to be conducted by a judge sitting alone without a jury. The provision can operate only where the judge is satisfied that the length or complexity of the trial is likely to make it so burdensome upon the jury that the interests of justice require it, subject to the Lord Chief Justice's approval in each case.

The Government gave a commitment to consult further when the 2003 Act was passed. That commitment was made good at a seminar held in January this year at which Opposition spokesmen, the judiciary, prosecuting authorities and the legal profession were among those represented. I am placing a record of the seminar proceedings in the Library of the House.

A protocol for dealing with lengthy trials, which was issued by the Lord Chief Justice on 22 March 2005, emphasises the need for robust and well informed case management to enable the court to focus on the real issues. It is hoped that this approach will contribute towards reducing the length of trials. The Government consider, however, that better case management will not of itself be sufficient to confine the duration of the most complex serious fraud trials within reasonable bounds or prevent such trials imposing an intolerable burden upon the jury.

This provision is not part of a general assault on jury trial. The Government are in favour of jury trial in the vast Majority of cases, where it will remain appropriate. To put it into perspective, there are around 40,000 jury trials in England and Wales annually, and this provision will affect a handful—perhaps 15 to 20.

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

My Lords, when I heard that the noble and learned Lord was going to make the Statement this afternoon, I experienced more than just a pang of sympathy for him.

When the noble and learned Lord first came to your Lordships' House, he was a lion in support of the principles of human rights. I remember, in particular, that he played a very important role in the development of the European Convention on Human Rights.

How disappointed the noble and learned Lord must, therefore, be to have participated in a government who, during the past two and a half years, have engaged in the dilution, in so many different respects, of the rights of the defendant. This Statement is just another example.

During the debate on the Criminal Justice Act, which was passed in November 2003, the following exchanges took place in Another place between Mr Blunkett, the then Home Secretary, and Simon Hughes, the Liberal Democrat spokesman on these matters. Mr Blunkett said:

"First, in moving to a single judge sitting alone we are prepared to have to secure the consent of the Lord Chief Justice. Secondly, we are prepared to agree that we will not implement the proposals set out in Clause 42, as amended, while we seek an improved way forward that does not rely on a single judge sitting alone.

"During the debate, proposals in relation to how specialist advice and support might be offered have been made, including measures drawing on a specialist range of expertise for a jury. On Second Reading and again on Report, I said that I was not against looking at such measures, so I find no difficulty tonight in offering the opportunity to the two main Opposition parties working with the Attorney-General, the Serious Fraud Office and the senior judiciary to take a further look at how that might be taken forward. We are able to look at that in relation to the SFO in a way that Roskill could not. In that light, I will not press for implementation of the clause. I am prepared to offer an affirmative resolution, should that be required".

Then Mr Hughes said:

"Is it the implication of his remarks that, as a result of the Bill passing into law tonight, there will not be any serious fraud trial by a single judge in England and Wales"?

Mr Blunkett said:

"I am prepared to give that undertaking. It is part of the agreement that we will retain the clause, but move forward towards looking at the alternative solutions that I have mentioned and that could be incorporated in one or other of the two measures that have either been consulted on or will come before the House in the Queen's Speech. That safeguard is appropriate. I give a binding undertaking that we will follow that agreement".—[Hansard, Commons, 20/11/03; col. 1027–28.]

Where is this consultation? The noble and learned Lord referred to a seminar that took place in January. I recall attending the latter part of it, because I had to get up very early on a cold morning in Shropshire to catch the train. A large number of other interests were represented, but at no stage was this held out by the noble and learned Lord to be a consultation.

A consultation as I understand it involves an analysis of all the options, a government document summarising that analysis and the canvassing of public opinion. That is the way the Government always consult on legal matters of this sort. Of that kind of consultation we have seen none. The Government are in clear breach of their obligations, which they gave unequivocally to another place some two years ago.

In any case, why are the Government in a hurry? They are just about to embark on the Fraud Bill, which has, as far as I can tell at this stage, some considerable merit. It is designed to simplify the situation for juries, for the police and indeed for defendants. That should have a dramatic effect on the complexity and the length of fraud trials. Why are the Government not prepared to see what effect the Fraud Bill will have once it becomes law?

Moreover, an inquiry has recently been launched into the famous Jubilee Line fraud case, which collapsed after vast expenditure some two months ago. That inquiry is not yet complete. Why are the Government introducing this measure before hearing the outcome of the Jubilee Line inquiry? Surely what is decided by it is absolutely germane to the whole issue of jury trials. Indeed, I would draw the noble and learned Lord's attention to an exchange which took place in another place on 7 June 2005 between Mr Jonathan Djangoly and Mrs Bridget Prentice. Mr Djangoly said:

"We support research on juries— it shows that we are very open-minded about this—

"as long as it is controlled to safeguard jury confidentiality and to avoid interference. If the Government accept the need for such research, how can they justify their intention to abolish trial by jury in fraud trials before such research has been undertaken? Is that not just another unjustified attack by the Government on people's civil liberties?

Mrs Prentice said:

"I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind words at the beginning of his question, but I am sorry that he felt the need to go on to attack what the Government propose. He is wrong on that point. The Attorney-General has already set up a review, under Stephen Wooler, to look in detail at the Jubilee line case, how it was conducted and the effect that it has on jurors and others. I cannot comment any further on that until the review is completed, but that might be a better time to discuss whether fraud cases should be tried by jury or under Section 43 of 2003 Act".—[Hansard, Commons, 7/6/05; col. 1121.]

What has happened between 7 June and today to change so dramatically the mind of the Government, unequivocally expressed by Mrs Prentice on 7 June? What the honourable lady said was surely absolutely the right approach; that is, to wait until Mr Wooler has reported and then to consider the matter in the light of a proper consultation.

This is not a serious proposal; it is a politically irresponsible proposal. We should think very carefully indeed before transferring decisions which have always been made by members of the community, sitting as juries, to somebody who is a professional, paid judge. That is not our legal tradition. It cannot be the right way forward for this country.

My Lords, I thank the Attorney-General for turning what was to be Written Statement, which was somewhat thrust upon us yesterday afternoon, into an oral Statement today. He emphasised, quite rightly, that trial by a single judge is to be used, according to Section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act, where there is a burden on the jury.

No one now seriously argues that a jury is incapable of understanding the fundamental issue in a fraud case, however complex. The question is its ability to decide whether the defendant has acted honestly or dishonestly. Obviously, the setting of the fraud may be commercial, in banking or whatever, but providing the case is competently prosecuted, a jury will have no difficulty. Making a value judgment about a person's conduct does not need commercial or banking expertise. Indeed, I would argue that the standard of honesty to be expected of an individual is the standard of a cross-section of the ordinary people of this country—namely, a jury—and not the standard of the market place. The argument that juries do not understand flows from a lack of practical experience of the way in which the courts operate, on the one hand, and intellectual arrogance, on the other.

The fact that a person has been convicted in a long trial by a jury suggests that the jury has indeed fully comprehended the issues and is sure of guilt. As for acquittals, can the Attorney-General confirm, as in the past, that conviction rates in fraud trials before the Crown Court are generally higher than in any other category? Juries do convict in fraud cases. In cases where there is an acquittal, it is usually the judge who has directed it. It is worth remembering that the judge in the trial involving the members of the Wickes group of companies, which lasted 10 months in 2002, said to the jury:

"The care and attention which you have devoted to this case has been obvious to me throughout from almost the very first moment you started to try this case. Those who may hereafter criticise juries' appreciation of lengthy and complex fraud cases would have done well to see the care and attention that you have given to this case throughout".

It is not understanding that is burdensome; what is burdensome to a jury is the case's length. Three practice directions and a protocol were introduced by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice on 22 March last. The noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General made brief reference to it. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice pointed to the lack of case management that has contributed to problems throughout the whole criminal justice system and said:

"However, nowhere is this more evident than in the case of heavy fraud and other complex cases. Although these cases only form a small minority of the total number of cases before the Courts, they have been responsible for a succession of cases which have blighted the reputation of the criminal justice system. It is essential that they are brought under proper control. In order to achieve this, considerable effort has again been made by representatives of all the agencies and practitioners engaged in the conduct of these cases".

So there you have an approach by judges—by persons who are experienced in how the courts run—who have produced the protocol and the practice directions. So why therefore are the Government seeking to abolish juries in fraud cases without giving time for the changes to prove themselves? I echo the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, about the fact that a new Fraud Bill is beginning its passage tomorrow and his reference to the Jubilee Line inquiry.

If juries are to be abolished, however, decisions should be taken by a judge alone. The idea that a retired banker, company director, stockbroker or accountant should advise the judge behind the scenes on expert issues is repugnant. If you have to abolish juries, it must be better to have a reasoned judgment from a professional judge who has heard expert evidence on a specialised subject, when it is necessary, openly in court where it is subject to cross-examination.

I also oppose the suggestion made in some quarters that a judge should sit with two magistrates as assessors, as a cadre of magistrates would rapidly become a part of the system and would in no way be a replacement for an independent jury. It would simply be window-dressing; they would not retain for long the confidence of the public—and public confidence in the system of justice is paramount. You cannot have a category of crime in which defendants are sent to prison without the public understanding why. The defendant will appear to have been involved in some deep criminality that cannot be properly explained, or, alternatively, conviction by a judge alone may appear to be some lesser form of conviction, a technicality that does not have the same meaning as a jury acquittal or conviction, which carries the confidence of the people of this country.

The noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General said that his Government were in favour of jury trials. This Government, like all authoritarian governments, have set out to abolish juries from the beginning. It is a tenet of new Labour to reduce juries. The Government started with the small cases, and we blocked that. Then they started at the other end with the big cases, in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and we blocked that for the time being. We shall oppose the order in its entirety when it is introduced.

My Lords, let me deal first with the last remark of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, which was also the opening remark of the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland. It is right to remind ourselves that, when we are looking at how to try serious and complex fraud, it is no new debate. It is not something that this Government have come up with but a debate that has been going on for 20 years. In 1986, Lord Roskill, an extremely distinguished Law Lord, proposed after an inquiry that we should do away with juries in serious and complex fraud cases. Lord Justice Auld, a very distinguished Court of Appeal judge and a very experienced criminal judge, proposed in 2001 that we should do away with juries in serious and complex fraud cases.

We are considering a particular category of case, not on the basis of some presumed prejudice on the part of the Government but to achieve justice in that category. First, why does it matter in serious and complex cases? It matters because there us an unreasonable burden on the people whom we ask to hear those cases, which can go on for six or 12 months—and, as noble Lords will know because of recent events, even longer than that. Secondly, what does that lead to? It leads to juries who cannot be representative of the population as a whole. They are self-selecting—understandably, because most of us cannot give up that period of time out of our normal lives. It therefore follows that part of the great justification for the jury system—that it is representative of the general population—disappears in those cases. Thirdly, the evidence must be produced orally, which adds considerably to the complexity and length of the trial, or, as happens, prosecutors are required to cut out of their cases more and more of the evidence that they would like to rely on, so that the full criminality of the case is not put before the court.

There are mixed views about whether juries understand some of those complexities. I certainly do not put that at the forefront of the Government's reasons, but it is a plausible view that inviting juries to deal with complex and often arcane business practices that are outside their normal knowledge puts an even greater burden on them than ordinary and other cases. Finally, the longer those cases go on, the greater the risk of collapse of the cases at huge public expense and huge disruption to witnesses and the defendants themselves. So there are some objective, real justifications for wanting to go down this road.

The noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, raised the question of consultation. I am always sorry when that sort of point is raised, because I am sorry that we debate the process issue. We obviously have a different view of what took place, and it is right that noble Lords should know what took place, as I see it. The noble Lord was right to refer to what my Right Honourable Friend Mr Blunkett said in Another place at the conclusion of the debate on the Criminal Justice Bill. I shall repeat the key words. He said that he found,

"no difficulty . . . in offering the opportunity to the two main Opposition parties working with the Attorney-General, the Serious Fraud Office and the senior judiciary to take a further look at how that might be taken forward".—[Hansard, Commons, 20/11/03; col. 1027.]

What was the "that"? The "that" was precisely what Mr Simon Hughes referred to, which was some alternative way forward—for example, a special jury or a judge with assessors.

When we invited participants to the seminar, we made it clear in the letter—I have the letter here—that the seminar would pursue that very undertaking. I am glad to say that the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, was able to attend; unfortunately, his colleague from the House of Commons was not able to, although he had indicated that he was going to. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, attended, for which I was grateful, as did senior members of the judiciary, including the next Lord Chief Justice, the present deputy Lord Chief Justice and a senior presiding judge. In advance of that seminar, a detailed document was submitted that set out the options available.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, indicated fairly that the conclusion of the legal profession—and his own conclusion—was that, when one looked at the alternatives such as having assessors or having lay justices sitting with the judges, the preference was clearly for there to be trial by judge alone if there was not going to be trial by jury. It was not easy, because clearly there are balancing arguments, but that was the preference. So that particular issue, in the view of those whom Mr Blunkett had thought should be invited, was put to rest.

We are then asked, "Why are we rushing into this?". Of course, we have consulted on it twice before. We consulted in 1998, and we consulted when the response to the Auld report was put out. The proposal is in fact the implementation of a provision in an Act that was passed by both Houses of Parliament. We seek to bring the matter back to both Houses in the autumn, to invite them to consider implementing it. Why is there a hurry? The Fraud Bill will not deal with the issue, though it will simplify the law of fraud, which is important. Why not wait for the Jubilee Line inquiry? That was set up not to determine whether jury trials were right or wrong but to find out what happened in that trial, which took more than two years before collapsing in confusion, something about which we were all extremely unhappy.

The noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, referred to what my Honourable Friend Mrs Prentice said. If he had read just a few lines before the ones he quoted, he would have seen that she indicated that I would make an announcement on the matter shortly—as I have done—to tell the House at the earliest opportunity that this is the view that the Government have taken. There is plenty of time for continuing debate. We will bring the matter back in the autumn. I am happy to agree, if noble Lords think it would be helpful, to hold a briefing before that occasion, so that the issues can be looked at.

I hope that we can deal with the substance. What it really comes down to is the difference between the Government's position and that which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, put forward: can you simply rely on case management to reduce the trials to a manageable length? The Government's view is that we cannot, although we very much welcome the measures that are taking place.

There is an important safeguard. The requirement under the Act that both a judge and the Lord Chief Justice would have to agree to trial by judge alone in a particular case means that if, contrary to what may be pessimistic assumptions and contrary to our belief, it turns out that it is possible radically to reduce the length of this sort of trial, no doubt that will be taken into account by the judge and the Lord Chief Justice. Of course we debated that very point in the seminar. The Majority view, including that of the senior judges, was that, although robust case management was extremely important, it would not deliver enough to make these manageable trials.

I came here because it was plain that there was a lot of interest in the statement of the intention. I hope that noble Lords will keep an open mind about the issues and consider the arguments and the facts. When we come back to the debate in the autumn, we will obviously return to all the issues.

My Lords, the denial of the ancient right to trial by jury is a matter of great concern on which I have fought long and hard. On the one hand is a right that speaks for itself; on the other, the punishment imposed on citizens of having six months or more of their life taken away from them in their public duty as jurors. The longest case in which I appeared started in February and finished in September. To this day, I lack confidence that case management would solve the issue.

As many attempts have been made in my time in Parliament to limit the right—I welcome very much the statement by the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General that it is not a general assault by the Government on juries—it would make my task of not opposing the Government easier if the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General were to give a clear assurance that the Government would not try to encroach further on the right to trial by jury.

My Lords, I am grateful for what the noble and learned Lord has said. I can certainly confirm that there are no plans—no intention—to make any further changes to the provisions relating to mode of trial by jury. They are now incorporated into the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and there are no plans to change that.

If noble Lords would allow me, I should like to deal with a question from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, that I did not answer. I am told that the statistics are that the rate of conviction in other cases is a little higher than that in fraud cases: 70 per cent in fraud cases, averaged over the past five years; over 75 per cent—nearly 76 per cent—in other cases.

My Lords, I listened to the noble and learned Lord, and I think that the Government are to be congratulated on moving on the issue. The current situation is a nonsense. One has only to look at some of the cases that have been heard. I was astonished to hear the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, say—I do not have every word of it—that, "No one suggests that jurors are unable to understand complex fraud cases". That is astounding. Many of us in the Chamber have worked for many years in the financial services sector. We know that it can be very difficult to explain matters such as hedge funds or split capital trusts to potential investors, and the general public do not deal with balance sheets every day.

It is said that the jurors can be taken gently by the hand and have matters explained to them. You bring them off the street. You put them there to listen. They hear an argument put by an eloquent lawyer—and I am not suggesting for one moment that lawyers would have any special interest in this subject. The lawyer carefully explains to them exactly what is involved. The jury take notes, because they are sensible, conscientious people. Then, that lawyer sits down.

The next lawyer gets up and expresses it slightly differently: jurors will need to understand that what was said before was a load of old cobblers. He says, "I will now seek to explain why everything you have just heard is untrue". You are asking ordinary people who do not come into contact with issues of that kind to make that judgment.

This is not just my opinion. Let us think of Polly Peck, Maxwell, Wickes, Guinness, Blue Circle—you could go on with a much longer list. They have one thing in common: vast sums of other people's money were stolen, but not one person was found guilty of anything. Is that something with which we are all satisfied?

We will continue the debate in the future. It is an important subject. However, I believe that, if anything, it is long overdue to re-examine the ability of people picked at random to understand complex financial evidence that has been produced and outlined by highly paid, skilled professionals. It is grotesque to think that we can do otherwise.

My Lords, I have noted what the noble Lord said. I shall just refer to two observations on the subject by senior judges. The first, Lord Justice Auld—a very senior, experienced judge—referred in his report to,

"the burdensome length and increasing speciality and complexity of these cases, with which jurors, largely or wholly strangers to the subject matter, are expected to cope. Both put justice at risk".

A senior judge who produced a paper for the seminar to which I referred said that, in his view,

"jury trial is wholly unsuited for the trial of lengthy frauds . . . the present system not only threatens serious injustice, to both parties, but also causes quite disproportionate use of time and resources".

That is the view of independent, experienced judges.

My Lords, does my noble and learned friend appreciate that serious and complex cases are not confined to fraud? What are the Government proposing to do about other cases that are just as important?

My Lords, I have made it clear: the Government do not seek to extend the provision beyond serious and complex fraud cases, which are in a special category because of the frequently complex nature of the transactions. After all, at the end of it, someone may be asked to distinguish between something put forward as a legitimate if unusual business practice and something that is actually fraudulent. That is very different from the sort of issue that most of us come across in our daily life.

My Lords, tomorrow, as I understand it, we are to have the Second Reading of the Fraud Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, has said correctly that it is concerned with simplifying the law. I had the impression from what he said—I would not be surprised if it is the case—that the Opposition would largely favour the simplification. It is a simplification that will benefit the prosecution and the defence, undoubtedly benefit the juries who sit in fraud cases, and reduce the complexity of the existing law.

The principal complexity of fraud cases does not arise so much—certainly not entirely—from the existing complexity of the law but from the complexity of the facts and the way in which those facts are presented to the jury. As the noble Lord, Lord Marsh—referring to a number of cases and names of companies only too familiar to many of us—indicated, the complexity of the facts in such cases arises because the jury do not have to decide only whether there was honesty or dishonesty.

I have heard the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, say in the past that the essential thing for the jury to decide is whether the defendants have been honest or dishonest. One should bear in mind the months and months of evidence that is so often given in relation to balance sheets and profit and loss accounts—no doubt many of them are muddled through inefficiency, incompetence or sometimes, I suggest, deliberately, although that may be one of the issues involved in the case—and the complexity of the facts for people the noble Lord, Lord Marsh, described as coming in off the street from their normal walk of life and trying to cope with this material over weeks and months. That is where the complexity lies.

You should add to that the disruption of the individual juror's time. That became very evident in the recent case concerning the Jubilee Line, during which some of the jurors suffered very severely both in their family life and in their business life as a result of what they were required to do. There are surely many reasons why one should say that, at least with the safeguards of the judge's approval and the approval of the Lord Chief Justice, a judge-only trial should be held. These proposals should not be dismissed by noble Lords opposite but should be regarded as well worth taking seriously.

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord.

My Lords, overwhelmed as I am with surprise at that response, will the noble and learned Lord deal with a widely held view that the overloading of indictments is a primary cause of a fraud trial becoming unduly long and complex? If the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General were to direct all prosecuting authorities—after all, he has jurisdiction to do that—to concentrate intelligently and boldly in their indictments upon the real core of the case for the Crown, would that not resolve the problem, or go a long way to resolving it, while leaving intact the principle of jury trials and, I might add, at the same time confound the Treasury, which has always been against it?

My Lords, I hoped I had made it clear that although the expense is a very important issue because, after all, this is public money and in some cases tens of millions of pounds are spent which could be spent on something else, that is not the primary reason for putting forward this proposal. The primary reason is to produce a situation which is just and to enable people to be brought to justice. One of the matters that worries me is that it is easy to prosecute blue collar fraud such as benefit fraud, but it is much more difficult to prosecute white collar crime. Where there is fraud, whether it is in the City or in the workplace, it is very important that we apply the standard of bringing that to justice. That is the problem we have at the moment.

The noble and learned Lord asked the very important question whether you can deal with this matter simply by splitting cases and cutting them down. That view is held by some. My view is that while you can do some of that, the real risk—this view is strongly held by prosecutors—is that prosecutors are required so to cut down the case that they do not present the full criminality involved to the court which is trying the matter and which needs to pass sentence. Those of us who have been involved with these cases, whether on the civil or the criminal side, know how very complicated they can be and therefore how necessary it is to see the conduct in its context. The more one cuts it down, the more risk there is that that will not happen.

My Lords, the Attorney-General was right to refer to this being a long-running story going back to the Roskill commission. He will recall that when the matter was considered in Another place, 11 out of 12 speakers in the debate proposed the rejection of the Roskill findings and they were consequently withdrawn. Before we have to take decisions on this matter will the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General enlighten us further by providing more evidence on the study of juries which may lend support to his evidence that juries as presently constituted do not contribute to a just trial because they are unrepresentative? The examination of what juries do is a peculiarly unploughed furrow in this country and is for many people an academic mystery. If the Home Office or the Government have evidence about the unrepresentativeness of juries, or the attitude of those who have sat on these cases, it would be helpful if that could be made available to us.

My Lords, when jurors are asked whether they will be able to sit for two, three, six months or even longer, many say that they will not be able to give up that amount of time. However, as I hinted earlier, I am very happy to hold a briefing open to all noble Lords and present material which I hope will help noble Lords to reach a decision when the orders are brought forward. I hope that the noble Lord will find that helpful.

My Lords, does the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General accept that the Lord Chief Justice's recent protocol clearly recognised that there had been a serious failure to have a well informed and robust management plan in past cases—hence the protocol which he provided? I urge the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General to allow that to be tried to see whether it works. It may do. To rush in before one knows the extent to which that contributes to the unsatisfactory situation is ill advised.

Does the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General recognise that there is a public perception in regard to the criminal law which views trial by jury as providing a better quality of justice? That may be right or wrong but it is strongly felt. A perception exists that the judges are case hardened—that they have heard the excuse many times in the past. There is the perception that the judges know that the DPP and the Attorney-General, where he is involved, must have gone to a great deal of thought in bringing the case and accordingly there must be something in it. The perception exists that the judges, perhaps subconsciously, are motivated in favour of the prosecution because of their appreciation of the care and thought that have gone into bringing the case. That is why I urge the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General to allow the protocol introduced by the Lord Chief Justice to have a chance to operate to see how effective it can be rather than run the risk of causing a loss of public confidence in the administration of justice.

I have one final point. The noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General told us that there is to be no general assault on jury trial. He says that between 15 and 20 cases may be involved annually. My recollection of the representative of the Serious Fraud Office who spoke in the "Today" programme on the radio is that only a couple of cases may be involved. Can the noble and learned Lord account for that marked difference?

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord makes three points. First, the view of the senior judiciary present at the seminar was that firm case management was highly desirable, had its limits, and should not be regarded as likely to be sufficient. As I have indicated, if it turns out that it is, that will affect whether the applications are allowed.

Secondly, I am not sure that I agree with the noble and learned Lord about what the public think. I would rather hope that the public thought that the judges of this country were independent, objective, professional and highly competent. What we have done to increase the independence of the judiciary, noted for example by the appointment of a new Lord Chief Justice and the new arrangements, would only reinforce that.

Thirdly, I have given an estimate of the number of cases that I think this may affect. We will have to see whether it is 15, or 20, or two, or a little bit more. What really matters is that the vast Majority of cases will remain trial by jury.

My Lords, how confident is the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General that a judge, as a single person, will be able to deal with the complexity of those sorts of fraud trials? I have over 21 years of experience of dealing with audit committees of various companies, and it is not easy. That is not part of the training for judges. Secondly, is there any suggestion that there should be an independent group of highly skilled financial people behind the judge in some sort of independent area who would be able to advise him? Otherwise, a huge onus is being put on the judge.

My Lords, I am absolutely confident that the judges will be able to deal with it. They deal with exactly the same sort of subject matter in civil cases at the moment. Secondly, it will be for the judiciary to decide whether they use any of the powers that they have to use expert assessors in cases. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, said, there was a general view that people did not want to see trial by judge and experts.