My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now further considered on Report.

Moved, That the Bill be further considered on Report.—(Lord Bassam of Brighton.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 247 [Determination of minimum term in relation to mandatory life sentence]:

moved Amendment No. 225:

Page 142, line 31, at end insert—

"(7) This section does not apply if the offender was under 18 when he committed the offence."

My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 225, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 237, which is consequential to Amendment No. 225. The purpose of the amendment is to remove juvenile offenders found guilty of murder from the sentencing framework proposed in Schedule 19; that is, those offenders who were under the age of 18 when they committed the offence. The determination of the minimum term to be served in such cases would then be a matter for judicial discretion.

The Children's Society has no doubt briefed other noble Lords as well as myself on the matter. In another place, my right honourable friend Oliver Letwin and his colleagues made it clear in their debates on the Bill that we object in the strongest terms to the inclusion of young people under 18 years old in Schedule 19. When we debated the issue in Committee, the Minister said that she thought it necessary and desirable to include young persons in the provisions. We disagreed then and we disagree now. She said:

"It is very rare for murders to be committed by very young juveniles".—[Official Report, 14/10/03; col. 870.]

She is right and that is, mercifully, true.

The Minister argued that it was not right to have a substantial disconnection around the age of majority and that she would be worried if the new principles were seen to apply to an immature 18 year-old and not to a 17 year-old. However, we argue that it is right to follow the current legal definition of a child enshrined in the Children Act 1989 and the UNCRC. In respect of these provisions, it is therefore appropriate for a cut-off to be at 18 years old.

In Committee, the Minister raised a valid point when she said that my amendment would leave young people without any right to receive judicially determined tariffs because the Bill repeals Section 82 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. The Children's Society suggested a solution, which is in the form of my Amendment No. 237. Section 60(1) of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 inserted Section 82A into the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.

The section applies when a court passes a life sentence that is not fixed by law or where the offender is under 18 years old when he or she committed the offence requiring the sentencing court to specify the period that should be served. This section is repealed in Schedule 28, paragraph 98 of the Bill. Amendment No. 237 would, therefore, delete paragraph 98(2).

This amendment would work; it would not remove the mandatory life sentence for minors who are found guilty of murder—life sentence should still follow. It would preserve the current position whereby the trial judge fixes the minimum period to be served. It should always be remembered, as in every case, that the minimum period is not necessarily the maximum period that will in fact be served.

The Minister undertook to consider the House's view before we reached Report, although she made it clear that she thought it was unlikely that the Government would wish to remove juveniles altogether from the framework on murder. I very much hope that she will be able to say today that the Government have reflected further on the representations that have been made and that they will either accept my amendment as it stands or say that they have decided to bring forward their own similar amendments on Third Reading. I beg to move.

My Lords, I support this amendment on behalf of these Benches. I remain convinced, despite our discussion in Committee, that the discretion of the trial judge to set the minimum custodial sentence before the offender's case can be considered for early release should be retained. It is worth emphasising that we want only to ensure that early release can be considered at a point to be determined by the judge. There would, of course, be no guarantee that early release would be recommended.

In responding to our concerns that the welfare of the child principle is not being upheld by this part of the Bill, and on other occasions, the Minister has pointed out that there are times when the protection of the public should come first. That may well be so, but that is the job of the parole board—to consider the matter of dangerousness at a certain point in time and regularly thereafter. If there was still a risk to the public, early release would certainly not be given. Therefore, I do not believe that the Minister's argument in Committee can apply.

The proposed starting point of 15 years would mean that children sentenced for murder would be held well beyond the point at which they cease to be dangerous. Therefore, this measure does not comply with our obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. As the Minister conceded in Committee, murders committed by minors are rare and do not fall into a pattern. All the more reason, therefore, that judges who have had many years in courts assessing the special circumstances of hundreds of cases should retain the discretion they currently have.

The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, mentioned the cut-off point of 18; the Minister had said that it was arbitrary. Given that some young teenagers are remarkably mature and some older teenagers remarkably immature, that could also be said of adults. It is really rather a good argument for deleting the new principles altogether—for adults, too. Taking the argument to its logical conclusion, perhaps we should have no legal cut-offs at all, because there will always be someone who will fall just outside them.

I remind your Lordships' House of our obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which are to have a separate system for dealing with children in trouble with the law, ensuring that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration and that custody should be a last resort and for the minimum necessary amount of time. These measures contravene all those factors, for the reasons I have just mentioned.

The welfare principle has been emphasised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, in the Venables and Thompson case. He said,

"the judge is bound by Section 44(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. Therefore in imposing such a tariff he must take into account the need for flexibility in the treatment of a child and, in so doing, will set the minimum tariff so as to ensure that at the earliest possible moment the matter comes under the consideration of the Parole Board".

The Sentencing Advisory Panel and the Court of Appeal practice statement both indicate that what the Government are doing in this clause is wrong. Indeed, the joint effect of the provisions of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 and the new statutory minimum would be such that the consideration of welfare would be well nigh impossible.

As my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford reminded us in Committee, the effect of this and other measures will be to ratchet up sentences and to put the courts into a straitjacket. The Minister's comments in reply lead me to think that she believes the public are clamouring for this. I do not believe that is the case at all. The public well understand the need for proper punishment for serious crimes and the protection of innocent people. However, they also understand the nature of children, the impact of their immaturity and life experience on their behaviour and the need to treat them differently from adults. This clause does not do that, and I strongly urge the Minister to listen to the concern of the House, the judiciary and children's organisations about this. I strongly support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay.

My Lords, I should like to add my voice to this debate: My perspective is slightly different. I did not intervene on this matter in Committee, and I wonder if I might briefly do so now.

I have had the privilege of representing a number of children who have been accused of murder and, on occasions, have subsequently been convicted. It has been my experience that in some cases, a remarkable change has already occurred by the time the trial takes place. The child has been in secure accommodation and has, in some cases, received attention which was much needed and brought about very rapid change.

I should like to give an illustration. I once represented a boy, aged 16, who was subsequently convicted of not one but two murders. Having spent nearly a year in secure accommodation, he came to his trial with such determination to better himself that he had become interested in subjects which had occupied none of his time before—he had been a truant. Arrangements were made so that his trial was delayed each morning so that he could take his GCE examinations, which he was passionate to do, and which he passed. He is now in the process of serving his sentence.

Given that children often undergo a remarkable change when they receive treatment and attention which may have been desperately needed before, it seems to be a major mistake to abandon flexibility within the system. There may be rare cases in which this would be necessary or valuable, but we should not lose the flexibility; I am therefore very concerned about the application of Clause 247 to children. I hope that the Minister will adopt one of the two courses that has been urged on her by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay.

My Lords, I strongly support my noble friend Lady Anelay and agree with every word that the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, has said. Like her, I have also defended people under the age of 18 who have been charged with murder, and I share the views that she has expressed.

Serious and grave as the offence of murder is, it seems horrific that the judge should start with what effectively is a minimum of 15 years in prison for a person of 16 or 17, without the opportunity for that child, who will mature and change over the years, to be released at an earlier stage. Had we on this side of the House introduced this measure, I wonder what the Minister would have said about it.

Let me make it clear that I do not like Schedule 19, and I hope one will have the opportunity to debate it under the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner. We are talking about using any of its schedules and applying them to immature young people of 16 or 17. In the two cases I can think of, one was clearly a bag snatch which went wrong, and the other a fight in a school playground. Are we really saying that for people who are convicted of murder in those circumstances—whatever may have happened to them since they committed the offence, however appalled they are about what they have done—the judge should be required to consider 15 years as the appropriate time? It is not a 15-year sentence, because 15 years is the equivalent of a 22-year sentence, but it will be 15 years before they can be released. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, I hope the Minister will think again about this and accept at least that this schedule should not apply to those under 18.

My Lords, my name is on Amendment No. 225, and I also support Amendment No. 237. The arguments have been very well put around the House, and I will be brief.

I emphasise that the UK Government have signed up to a range of international instruments about the rights of the child. Those were not forced on us; we signed them willingly. They are all based on certain principles—that children are not adults, that children must be treated differently from adults, and that the measures taken must be in the best interests of the child. Although society must be protected from children who are genuinely dangerous, children, whatever they have done, must be protected by society.

The proposed starting point of a sentence of 15 years for a child convicted of murder is in that context unacceptable. When an important country such as the United Kingdom allows itself to weaken the commitment to international instruments of such importance as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, other countries think that they can get away with that as well. We are setting a very bad example.

I do not find the arguments advanced in Committee by the noble Baroness, as compelling as she normally is, totally convincing. She said that such cases were very rare, which is the case. That suggests that an individual response to each case is appropriate, rather than the approach taken in the Bill. She also cited the possibility of inequity if an immature 18 year-old is subject to the provisions and a mature 17 year-old is not. That is an argument not for including children in the scheme, but against the whole scheme.

I very much hope that the Minister will be able to bring some satisfaction to a number of us by reporting on the review of principles in relation to juveniles that she promised in Committee, and agreeing that this measure is a step too far.

My Lords, I made a very brief contribution on the sentencing part of the Bill in Committee, to which the Minister made a very generous and warm-hearted reply. Her defence was that she stood for consistency. That is a perfectly good argument; consistency is indeed a virtue. However, the question that must arise is, "Consistency in what?". Consistency as at present applied in the Home Office must necessarily consist of what can be put down on paper and measured.

It is interesting to compare that with the approach of the 17th-century court to consistency. It, too, believed in consistency, according to whether the prisoner showed remorse, whether the crime had been carefully premeditated, and in particular whether it was conducted selfishly for profit or was the result of the mood of the moment—whether the person intended to produce the result that they did. Those are perfectly valid considerations, but they cannot be judged without observing the demeanour of the witness. Indeed, it is difficult even to judge them by reading the transcript. They are questions of consistency that must of necessity fall to the trial judge.

What I cannot see is why one type of consistency—measurable, quantifiable thought—should be sacrosanct and the other sort of consistency totally ignored. If we want to be consistent, we must try in each case before us to strike the balance between the two types of consistency.

A case occurs to me. I admit that it is fictional, but it could perfectly well have happened. Let us suppose that, on the Channel Islands in 1940, a boy of 12 observed the invading Germans open his garden gate and march up his front path. He took his father's shotgun off the wall and fired, killing one of them. The Germans marched straight into the house, seized his father and shot him dead. The remorse that that boy would have felt would last the rest of his life. It is not consistent to treat that entirely on a level with a premeditated criminal who steals habitually for profit.

If we want consistency, we have to hear the evidence of the trial as well as the quantifiable statistics. That is much more difficult to do with children than with adults, because children are much more likely to perform certain unpremeditated action without full understanding of its consequences. That is a very strong argument for accepting the amendments.

My Lords, I strongly support the amendments. I want to clarify a point where there may be slight confusion. I am sure that the Minister will clarify that the Government do not seek to impose a minimum sentence for children. The provision is a minimum starting point, and it will be made clear that if the judge deems it suitable to have a minimum sentence of zero, that would be the case.

What has been the custom in the past is that the minimum starting point is discussed. Then the Lord Chief Justice advises in his practice statement that the minimum starting point, in this case for children who murder, is a certain number of years. Recently, the decision was that that should be 12 years. The Government propose 15 years, which is three years extra to the minimum starting point. My concern is that, as a result of what the Government propose, we will hold children and young people in custody for longer and long past the time when they are safe to return to the public domain.

I should briefly like to remind the House of the situation of such children. As many noble Lords have said, although the children have done terrible things they are also often very vulnerable. In Young and Dangerous, the research of Professor Boswell in 1996, she looked at a third of the children in custody for serious offences or murder. She found that 72 per cent of the children had been abused. That evidence was corroborated by at least one practitioner working with the children, and she felt very strongly that it was an underestimate of the number of children abused. Half the children in the juvenile establishment have been in care or in contact with social services. The rates of mental disorder are far higher than in the general population. Some 45 per cent of children in care have mental disorders, which is four times the average, and 90 per cent of children in residential accommodation in children's homes have mental disorders.

I do not wish to tire the House any further, but when we talk about Sure Start and the Green Paper, Every Child Matters, we are thinking about changing the culture and making this country a better place for children and families. I fail to see how being tougher on children—even children who commit the most terrible crimes, given that they often have horrible and horrific starting points in their lives—fits with the direction of improving the conditions for our most vulnerable families and children. If one looks again at the longitudinal research, one sees that such children come from the poorest and largest families with a history of family breakdown and punishment within the family, where the child cannot regularly predict what the parent will do in response to its behaviour.

I look forward to the Minister's response. She always tries to be as helpful as possible. With her long experience of work in the area, I am sure that her response will be well worth listening to.

My Lords, it is my experience that children who commit crimes of serious violence are damaged children. That encompasses everything that the noble Earl said a moment ago. In this country, it is part of our society that we bend all our agencies in an attempt to help children to get over the disadvantages of their background, their lack of education, the housing from which they come, the bad parenting, and all other factors that have caused them to be damaged. However, we then come to adulthood, which we generally place around or about the age of 18, when we have to say to offenders, "I'm sorry. We appreciate that you have come from a terrible background and that you are a damaged person, but society can no longer function if we do not treat you as a person entirely responsible for your actions". It is at that point that the division is generally and should be made. The drawback of the Bill is that it does not seek to draw any distinction between children and adults in Schedule 19, which I shall criticise later for other reasons. Therefore, I entirely support the amendment.

My Lords, I shall make two points, rather different in character. First, when I was a Queen's Bench judge, dealing not particularly with murder, but with a range of offences, I came to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that the magic age was approximately 24. Before that age, there was a real chance of reformation; after it, it became much more doubtful. Of course, I do not suggest that that is a precise cut-off point, but it is an important point.

My second point is unrelated. It concerns me in relation to the whole of Schedule 19 and its effect on children. Judges take an oath to do justice to all men: "I agree according to law and the customs and usages of the realm". However, if a judge is faced with a situation in which the law requires him to do injustice, or injustice as he sees it, he has a very real problem. I suspect that in most cases he will say to himself, "Well, I am not prepared to do this, so I will now spend a lot of time deciding how I can make it look respectable not to do it". The judge may then turn round and cite "the age of the offender" or "the mental condition of the offender". In other words, he will start not, as the Government would expect, from the provisions of the schedule, but from what is in his view a just result.

Having started from that point, he will try to see how he can bend the various provisions of the statute overtly to justify it, although that will not be his personal justification. That is not a satisfactory situation. If one is going to give judges the authority that they have always had and expect them to do justice in individual cases, according to what they see before them and the evidence they hear, one must let them have discretion. Otherwise, one will either slowly erode their passion for justice or erode the effect of the law. I hope that the latter will be the case.

My Lords, this is yet another case which is covered by the memorandum which the Lord Chief Justice filed in the Library as representing his views and the views of the judges sitting in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. I shall not take up your Lordships' time in reading it all out. I shall content myself merely with drawing attention to paragraph 62 on page 19, in which the Lord Chief Justice states:

"Many of those involved, if not all, come from a disadvantaged background. Those who have responsibility for their upbringing after they are sentenced usually do a most remarkable job of bringing up these youngsters and they can be transformed in consequence".

I suggest that in any case involving a child the ability to have the maximum flexibility in the treatment of that child is absolutely essential.

My Lords, I support the view that judges should be able to exercise discretion. The onus falls heavily on my noble friend the Minister to aver that I am wrong. She has said that the cases that we have to consider are rare. That argument goes against her rather than for her. If they are rare, the judge should be able to exercise discretion rather than not. We have heard a raft of opinions expressed against her proposition. Who supports her proposition? Anybody at all? I may be wrong, but I would be very surprised if anybody were to come to her aid, apart from officials in the Home Office, who, I am sure, are exercising a benign influence on her.

I do not usually vote against my own government, but certain aspects of the Bill are unacceptable and this schedule is one of them. I am not sure that I shall vote against the Government, but I shall at least abstain. My noble friend may be able to persuade me that I am utterly wrong, but I doubt it. I am a great fan of hers and usually—but not always—take her advice, but I will be surprised if I do so on this occasion.

My Lords, my noble friend has thrown down the gauntlet and I am anxious to take it up. I empathise with all that has been said about the rarity and the difficulty of seeking to sentence juveniles.

I should point out to my noble friend Lady Mallalieu and the noble Lord, Lord Carlisle of Bucklow, that I too have had the privilege of representing children of tender years who have been in the tragic situation of having committed heinous offences, not least of which being murder. From practical experience, I recognise, as has been pointed out by my noble friend Lady Mallalieu, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, and the noble Lords, Lord Carlisle and Lord Thomas of Gresford, that there can on occasion be dramatic changes in the nature of the child's behaviour.

However, I also recognise that there has to be a framework within which such decisions are made. I fully understand the purpose of the amendment moved so eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, and supported with such warmth by the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley. It seeks to cure the flaw in the previous amendment and direct attention to the problem with the proposed amendment. It provides for juveniles to retain judicial tariff setting by retaining the current tariff-setting provisions for juveniles under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. I reassure noble Lords that we have given the most anxious and careful consideration to whether it would be right and proper to remove juveniles from those provisions. We have concluded that it is essential for juvenile murderers to have minimum terms set according to those principles.

I want to make one issue absolutely clear. My noble friend Lord Clinton-Davis says that the judge must have discretion and I do not argue with him. The view was echoed by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Donaldson and Lord Ackner, both of whom have great experience of exercising that judicial discretion. Schedule 19 preserves judicial discretion. It is often forgotten, so it is important to recite it, that paragraph 8 of Schedule 19, in dealing with the aggravating and mitigating factors, states:

"Detailed consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors may result in a minimum term of any length (whatever the starting point), or in the making of a whole life order".

So there, enshrined in the schedule—preserved—is the exercise of judicial discretion.

We therefore start with 15 years, but that is not where the judge, in exercising his discretion, may end. I also say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, that this is not a distortion of the judge's exercise of discretion. If one looks at the mitigating and aggravating features, one sees that those are all issues which a court should properly take into account when exercising its discretion and in seeking to do justice not only to the defendant but also to the victims and their families who have suffered and suffered grievously.

I say, too, that it is also important for the victims and their families to understand the basis upon which the court came to its decision. My noble friend Lord Clinton-Davis asked: who supports this provision? If one has had the privilege that I have had in talking to many of the families of the bereaved, one realises that they want to understand the system. It humbles one that they do not often seek vengeance, but what they do seek is an understanding of why the life of their loved one—often their child—was taken and why the court imposed that sentence upon the perpetrator.

These provisions enable the court to explain why and how the court came to that decision. I do not believe that that task is beyond our judiciary because it is a task that many of our judges have undertaken and discharged with great distinction for many years. Some of the best judges in this country make those decisions in a way that all who listen do understand. That is what these provisions achieve. They do not set a straitjacket. They do not say to the judge, "You must impose this". They set a framework within which the judges should work better to explain the decisions they make. I make that as a first point.

I do not apologise for reiterating some of the points I have made because I need to respond to what was said by the noble Baronesses, Lady Anelay and Lady Walmsley. I hope that they will try, as did I, to listen to the points that are made. I cannot stress sufficiently the importance of the figures. As a number of noble Lords have said, cases of murder by very young juveniles are extremely rare, with only one case on average every five to 10 years. Figures kept since 1998 indicate that since then 78 out of 81 murders by juveniles were committed by 15 to 17 year-olds, and none at all by children aged 10 to 11.

Excluding juveniles from these provisions would therefore have little effect on protecting very young offenders. Since the overwhelming majority of juveniles affected are in the bracket nearest the age of majority, this would lead to the undesirable possibility of sudden and considerable disparity in tariffs between 17 and 18 year-olds. Such caps would also lead to a serious loss of fairness, clarity and consistency. That point was emphasised by the noble Earl, Lord Russell, when dealing with the benefits and disadvantages of consistency.

It is also right to remember that the figures we are quoting are not too far from the reality with which we are currently faced. Juvenile tariffs in recent years have not been so far out of line with adult tariffs. Out of a sample of the 18 detainees in Her Majesty's prisons released on licence in 2000, the average tariff was almost 11 years and the average prison term served was 13.9 years. The minimum terms ranged from five to 16 years. There are therefore clear similarities in the levels.

Juvenile tariffs currently tend to average between 10 and 11 years, so nothing in the provisions would cause there to be a disproportionate attack on the issue with which we are dealing. As regards age, paragraph 9(b) states that:

"the fact that the victim was particularly vulnerable because of age or disability", must be taken into account, as must the age of the perpetrator. Age, as regards both the victim and the alleged perpetrator, used as a mitigating factor is echoed in paragraph 10. The courts can take those issues properly into account and can do justice in the way that noble Lords have sought.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, drew attention to the guidelines of the Lord Chief Justice and his comments on maximum flexibility. We believe that these provisions maintain that flexibility. Therefore, a clear, simple and transparent sentencing structure is essential in maintaining public confidence in the justice system, particularly when pertaining to the crime of murder which is understandably the most high-profile crime. We have carefully considered the views and concerns expressed in Committee, but we have concluded that they can be addressed within the framework as drafted for the reasons I have just given. The framework provides the courts with the ability to take proper account of the special needs of juveniles.

It must be stressed that the starting points for the tariffs under Schedule 19 are not minimum sentences. Age is specified as a mitigating factor and the courts will have a discretion significantly to reduce from the starting points to arrive at sentences appropriate to the youth of juvenile offenders.

In practice, courts may be inclined to follow a rule of thumb such as that set out by the Lord Chief Justice in his direction dealing with juvenile tariffs, where the starting point is lowered according to the extent by which the juvenile is below the age of majority. The statute would allow for that. We believe that this flexibility is sufficient to allow for the special needs of the range of juvenile offenders without excluding them from the framework.

We have to ensure that everyone understands the basis upon which sentencing will be managed—that we will have the clarity and transparency we need so that the confidence which has diminished in our system can be restored. We believe that this framework—that is all it is; it is not a straitjacket, but a framework—does that which noble Lords would wish.

My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, I want to say that she has been very persuasive. However, I asked her to name a few of the people or organisations that supplied the view that this is a retrograde step. Will she now tell the House what organisations support the view that she has put forward so persuasively?

My Lords, your Lordships will know that when these proposals were being canvassed through the Auld review and so on, considerable consultations took place and support was voiced for the proposals. I cannot give noble Lords a list of all those who replied. However, I can certainly tell your Lordships that when I have been questioned outside this House about these provisions, I am usually asked by members of the public not why we are doing this but why we are not doing even more.

Noble Lords will know that I chair the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Domestic Violence, which deals with the subject of victims and witnesses. I emphasise that the thrust of many of the concerns voiced there is: "We do not understand why those decisions were made. Help us to understand. What is the basis upon which judges came to the decisions? What rule of thumb was applied? How does this operate? What do they take into account, why do they take it into account, and how does it work?".

We say that the framework gives everyone a basis upon which they can better understand what is being done. It is of no comfort to victims and witnesses to be told that an offence was committed by a juvenile in need; they need to understand why the court came to the decision that that should mitigate the sentence. They need to be told, and we believe that these provisions enable that to be done.

I shall certainly be happy to supply my noble friend with a fuller response about those who urged us to implement this measure. However, since taking on the role of Minister of State with responsibility for criminal justice and dealing with this issue since June, I say openly that not one member of the public has approached me or talked to me about this matter saying that he or she does not want this measure. That is the reality.

My Lords, has the noble Baroness ever heard a judge pass a sentence in a murder case without explaining the reasons for, and factors behind, the tariff which he imposes?

My Lords, I am reminded that this is Report stage. Therefore, I cannot give the noble Lord the courtesy of a reply. If I were able to do so, I would say that my experience is not held universally by all other members of the Bar.

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken so forcefully in support of the amendments. I am particularly struck by the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, who referred to cases in which she had been involved as a lawyer. She remarked, as did others, on the propensity of children for rapid change and said that it is a mistake to abandon flexibility in a system which sentences children. I believe that that must go to the core of what we are discussing today.

The Minister says that there is a solution here, that paragraph 8 of Schedule 19 provides all the flexibility that one needs, and that here the judge does not have to sentence for 15 years but can apply a panoply of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Of course, when the noble Baroness uses that argument, she is arguing against the whole of Schedule 19 because the logical extension would be to leave it to the judge entirely.

The noble Baroness will know that, with some reluctance, I have agreed to go down a very stony path in agreeing with her that paragraph 8 of Schedule 19 may be sufficient refuge for adults. However, I cannot accept that it is a sufficient refuge for children. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 225) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 202; Not-Contents, 113.

Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.

moved Amendment No. 225A:

Before Schedule 19, insert the following new schedule—