Police (Northern Ireland) Bill

Part of the debate – in the House of Lords at 5:45 pm on 25 October 2000.

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Photo of Lord Archer of Sandwell Lord Archer of Sandwell Labour 5:45, 25 October 2000

To his great regret, my noble friend Lord Desai has been suddenly and unavoidably called away. He asked me to do two things: first, to apologise to the Committee; and, secondly, to move his amendment. It may be convenient to the Committee if, in considering Amendment No. 205, we debate all the amendments down to Amendment No. 218, and then Amendment No. 236.

Before he left, my noble friend Lord Desai spent all of 45 seconds explaining to me the purport of Amendment No. 205. If my exposition appears a little inadequate, I trust that the Committee will find it in its heart to forgive me. As I understand it, he wishes to raise the question of whether the powers of the Chief Constable to decline the board's invitation to submit a report, or to frustrate the board's intention to hold an inquiry, are too wide.

The Patten commission said that he should have power to decline if the information concerned a sensitive "personnel" matter. That appears in the Bill as a sensitive "personal" matter. Whether that is deliberate, I am not sure--no doubt my noble and learned friend will be able to tell us--but I have thought for a long time that there is room for a book on how printers' errors and clerical errors have changed the course of history.

The difficulty is that there are a number of sensitive "personal" matters which may require a report and which may very properly give rise to an inquiry. If, for example, the question arose as to whether someone had a criminal record, that may well be a proper occasion for a report--but it would be of course a "personal" matter. That, as I understand it, is the purport of what my noble friend Lord Desai wished to raise. I am not sure that I can helpfully carry it much further.

However, I can speak to my own amendments, Amendments Nos. 209 and 210. We are considering the powers of the board to establish an inquiry into a matter of concern. It is obviously not intended that an inquiry should be held lightly. The power is activated only when the board is so concerned about the matter in question that it has required a report from the Chief Constable, and that report has persuaded them that it is a grave matter or that the circumstances are exceptional. The Patten commission believed that the freedom of the board to appoint an inquiry was important. That importance was emphasised in paragraph 6.23

The clause then goes into the hypothetical mode. Suppose the Chief Constable does not agree with the board that an inquiry should be held. I assume that that is not a view he would reach lightly. It would be virtually bound to become public that the board wanted an inquiry and the Chief Constable, as it might well be seen, wanted the matter hushed up. The Patten commission said that if there is a difference of opinion between the board and the Chief Constable as to whether an inquiry should be held, the issue should be referred to the Secretary of State. The Bill seeks to give effect to that and so lists the grounds which would justify the Chief Constable referring the issue to the Secretary of State. The grounds are carefully defined. We probably all agree that they are indeed grounds which would require careful consideration.

In that situation, the Secretary of State must decide between the board and the Chief Constable. It would not be an enviable position in which he would find himself. Whatever he decides would attract criticism. But we would expect him to make himself familiar with the grounds on which the Chief Constable had reached his decision to oppose the appointment of an inquiry. If the Secretary of State decides that one of the grounds listed in the Bill and specified by the Chief Constable is established, he must weigh the consequences of holding an inquiry against the consequences of not holding it. Up to that point, I have no quarrel with the Bill.

But suppose the Secretary of State is not satisfied that the Chief Constable has made his case; that he is not persuaded that, for the reason advanced by the Chief Constable, the inquiry ought not to be held? I apologise for the double negative; it probably requires a visual aid. If he reached that conclusion, one might have thought that that would be the end of the matter. But, no--the Secretary of State may also overrule the board and decide that there should be no inquiry if it,

"would serve no useful purpose".

The board has already decided that the matter is so grave that there should be an inquiry. The Chief Constable has argued why there should not be an inquiry. The Secretary of State has decided that he does not agree with him. After all that, the Secretary of State may still say, "Oh, but I do not think the inquiry would serve a useful purpose". Members of the Committee will remember that if the Chief Constable had not referred the matter to the Secretary of State, he would not have been involved at all. He would have had no opportunity to ask himself whether it would serve a useful purpose. But having decided that the reason why the question was referred to him will not hold water, he can now say, "But having got my hands on the matter I can decide it on a ground which was not previously ventilated".

This situation has arisen because in another place the Secretary of State was persuaded that he had gone too far in imposing limitations on the board and sought to modify his own powers. Members of the Committee will recollect that if the Chief Constable is required by the board to submit a report at the very inception of the process, he may at that stage appeal to the Secretary of state and argue that he should not be called on to submit a report--but only under one of the grounds set out in Clause 57. Even then he is not entitled to submit that it would serve no useful purpose. So why, when the board is so concerned that it proposes to hold an inquiry, is the Secretary of State given power to second guess it, but to do so only if the Chief Constable thinks there is some different objection to holding an inquiry?

If the Secretary of State ever exercises that power, one might imagine the outcry at the suspicion that something is being hushed up. None of the other objections to an inquiry has been argued or, if argued, upheld. But the Secretary of State tells us that it would serve no useful purpose. Later today your Lordships will be debating the Freedom of Information Bill where concern has been expressed that the Government are afraid to let go of nurse's hand and leave behind the culture of secrecy. Is this not a classic example?

I turn to Amendment No. 210. This is a very narrow issue. But in Northern Ireland, it is so often the narrow issues which spark off the controversies. Clause 58 states that the board, having decided to hold an inquiry, may appoint one of the persons listed in subsection (6) to conduct it. If it decides that there is a reason why it should not be conducted by one of those persons but by someone else, it may appoint another person. I understand that in that situation it would be wise to consult the Secretary of State. I have included that provision in Amendment No. 210. The Bill would go further. The Bill would require the approval of the Secretary of State; he can veto the proposal.

We would hope that the board would not take leave of its senses and decide to appoint someone who was wholly inappropriate. Surely those appointed to the board will be sensible and reasonable people who can be relied on not to go mad. If not, the whole scheme of the Bill collapses. Surely they should be permitted a measure of independence. I am bound to say that if, per impossibilia, I were the Secretary of State, I should not wish to be placed in a position where if I decided to overrule the board I would be widely suspected of being afraid of a serious inquiry and wishing to appoint my own nominee; while if I refrained from overruling the board and anything went wrong I would share the blame. So one would rather hope that the Secretary of State would not be minded to take advantage of the power. But would it not be wiser to allow the board to let go of nurse's hand and take responsibility for its own decisions? On behalf of my noble friend Lord Desai in relation to Amendment No. 205, I beg to move.