I beg to move,

That this House
recognises the danger that Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine poses to European and British security;
further recognises the threat to the international order and the UK posed by China;
also recognises the increasing uncertainty surrounding the reliability of the US as an ally within NATO;
acknowledges the current shortfalls in the UK’s ability to deploy a credible fighting force;
further acknowledges that this lack of military capability is resulting in the coercion of Britain and its interests in the international sphere;
and calls on the Government to begin a programme of rapid rearmament to strengthen the defence of the UK and its allies.

The key word of the motion on the Order Paper today is “rapid”—rapid rearmament, not eventual rearmament or rearmament with an asterisk. The reason it is the key word is that the clock is not ours to choose. Three weeks ago, before the defence investment plan came out, the Prime Minister said:

“it is our intelligence assessment, and the assessment of other countries in NATO, that there could be an attack by Russia on NATO as soon as 2030.”

The deadline is not contested. Intelligence confirms it, NATO proclaims it—they are speaking of this in Ankara today—and our Government accept it. We must be ready by 2030.

That is why the defence investment plan is so maddening. I have read it from cover to cover—I am that kind of guy—and I cannot wrap my head around it. It fails the test of its own threat assessment. It does not go far enough, and what it does do, it does too slowly. Large parts of it are also unfunded. It is too little, too late, and there is not enough cash.

It is worth considering how this plan came into being. Lord Robertson, the lead author of the strategic defence review, wanted to have the DIP—that is, the money bit—as an annexe to the SDR. That is really good practice when making strategy: set out a vision, which is the SDR, and then set out the resources, which are the DIP. If a Government do not have the resources to deliver their vision, they need either to downgrade the vision somewhat or to increase their resources. The decoupling of the two documents by a year, with the vision coming a year ago in the SDR, and the money and resources just recently in the DIP, is the greatest failure of statecraft committed by this Labour Government in the two years they have been in office.

First, allow me to speak about the money in some detail. Quite well ventilated in the media is the £4.7 billion that quite blatantly must be found in the next Budget, in the autumn. Although Andy Burnham has said that he intends to fund defence seriously, he has not specifically said that he will find those sums in that Budget. As the Government repeatedly tell us, defence of the realm is the most important duty of any Government. So why is £5 billion of that sacred duty in the in-tray of the next Chancellor—a person unknown at this point?

Secondly, I would like to talk about these efficiency savings—£10.7 billion of them. Speaking in this Chamber, the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, called this the oldest accounting trick in the book. If we dig just one layer below, we can see the detail: £2.4 billion of that £10.7 billion is what the Ministry of Defence calls “high maturity initiatives”. I find that it is always worth really looking into what the MOD says, because the remaining £8.4 billion of that nearly £11 billion of efficiency savings is what the MOD calls “plans at lower maturity”. Lower-maturity plans, Madam Deputy Speaker, is MOD-speak for “we have not worked out how to deliver those savings yet.”

Thirdly, and most egregiously, is a theme that I will keep returning to: the fact that this is a DIP of two halves. The first period is from now until 2030, which is covered by the current spending review, subject to the caveats that I laid out earlier. However, the second part, which covers 2030 to 2035, has to be confirmed in the forthcoming spending review. If the future Chancellor or Prime Minister do not agree to those sums going into the next spending review—due, one assumes, in the spring of 2027—the DIP will then not exist. It will just be an unfunded piece of paper.