With permission, I would like to update the House on the Government’s response to the Humble Address of 4 February. Before I do, I think it is important for all of us to reflect again on the impact that this debate will have on the victims of Jeffrey Epstein. Members across the House will be aware of the truly horrific crimes that he committed against countless women and girls; we hold them in our thoughts when discussing these issues again today.

The Government have today laid the second tranche of documents. These were laid before the House in advance of this statement and are now on gov.uk for the public to see. The documents we are publishing today comprise one of the largest Government publications ever laid before the House. This disclosure process has been wide-ranging, costing the Cabinet Office alone over £1 million. As the House knows, this was an official-led process, with judgments made by senior officials, and I am grateful for the careful work that they have undertaken right up until today’s publication.

While the first tranche dealt with Peter Mandelson’s appointment, withdrawal and severance, this second tranche responds to the parts of the motion that requested communications and documents concerning his appointment and vetting, as well as messages between Peter Mandelson and Ministers, special advisers and civil servants in the months prior to, and throughout the duration of, his appointment.

I recognise that the House will need sufficient time to review today’s tranche in full, given the size of the publication. As we have just heard from the Leader of the House, that is why I have secured Government time on Wednesday for a subsequent general debate: so that there is an opportunity for Members to ask further questions after today’s statement. To inform that debate and for clarity and accountability, I draw the House’s attention to the methodology set out in the publication today, which explains in detail how the Government undertook the disclosure process. I will not repeat that in full here today, but I will make reference to a number of areas that I know the House has expressed an interest in previously.

First, on redactions, in line with the motion, over 300 individual documents were referred under a process agreed between the Government and the Intelligence and Security Committee. I confirm that no material has been redacted on the grounds of prejudice to national security or international relations without the Committee’s approval. For clarity, all redacted material agreed with the ISC is labelled in the bundles today with three asterisks. Outside this arrangement, this process does not change the important and well-established constitutional principle that national security and international relations judgments are ultimately for the Government. I once again express my thanks to the Intelligence and Security Committee for its engagement in this process. Further limited redactions have been made outside the ISC process in respect of information that relates to junior officials’ names; contact details, like telephone numbers and email addresses; the personal or commercially sensitive data of third parties not relevant to the motion; and, where relevant, legal professional privilege.

I would also like to confirm that no redactions have been made to references to Global Counsel, other than to protect the identity of individuals who worked there and are not public figures. Officials have sought to be transparent in the material where the individual is a Global Counsel employee. Also, no redactions have been made to references to Palantir and Anduril outside the scope of the existing ISC redactions process, and no clear references to current or former UK politicians have been redacted on the basis of their being third parties.

I can also confirm to the House that no Government Minister or special adviser has determined any of the redactions themselves. The redaction process has been overseen by Cabinet Office officials and, where relevant, in agreement with the ISC. In addition, the Cabinet Office Humble Address team have taken advice from an independent King’s Counsel—this has included review of the methodological approach followed by officials—and acted on that advice to inform their work. This has helped to ensure that the Government are confident that their approach is compliant with the Humble Address and the Government’s legal obligations.

These additional targeted redactions, made outside the agreed ISC process, have been made in line with the Freedom of Information Act 2000, the ministerial code, and the resolutions on ministerial accountability passed by both Houses in 1997. This is important because it goes to the question of whether the Government have complied fully with the Humble Address. That question should be answered in the context of the established rules and precedents that relate to Humble Addresses. If these rules were not relevant, the Humble Address would have required extensive additional detail on the face of the motion dealing with these procedural issues. However, I recognise the level of interest in the House in respect of these redactions not related to national security and international relations, so, on the recommendation of the ISC, I can confirm that Simon Hoare, the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, has reviewed our approach to third-party redactions this morning. He has confirmed that we have applied the methodology set out in the document and that, in his view, the redactions are sensible, reasonable and proportionate. I thank the ISC for this recommendation and the hon. Member for the additional reassurance he has provided on this point.

As the House is aware, the Metropolitan police has also asked the Government to withhold some material in scope of the motion that it considered could be prejudicial to its ongoing criminal investigation or any subsequent prosecution. This request remains in place and I am very grateful, again, to the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, with whom we have also shared this information in order to provide additional accountability for the Government’s actions. I hope that Members will appreciate the need not to prejudice the investigation and understand that I will not be able to answer questions about certain documents that have been withheld. No responsible Government would wish to undermine a criminal investigation and put at risk the justice that it seeks, and I am sure that the House will share this position. I can, however, confirm that this material does include questions put to Peter Mandelson by the Prime Minister’s then chief of staff, and Peter Mandelson’s responses.

In addition, a small number of documents have been withheld at the request of the police, which fall broadly into the following categories: national security vetting material; conflict of interest process material; and relevant internal correspondence with Peter Mandelson. Such information will, of course, be published at the conclusion of the investigation or at the point at which it would no longer be prejudicial to the police investigation to do so.

The documents published in the first and second tranches contain the entirety of the documents the Government have available for disclosure, except those few documents I have just referred to in relation to the Metropolitan police. Members will no doubt have questions about what might be perceived to be “missing” messages and meeting notes, which I would like to address in turn. On messages that some might expect to be included, I can confirm that we have conducted multiple rounds of discovery from relevant Ministers, special advisers and officials, in line with the motion passed by the House. This has involved requesting searches of email, messaging platforms such as WhatsApp, and other related communications services on both work and personal devices.

However, the House should note that some messages may not have been backed up where devices may have been changed or disappearing messages turned on, for reasonable and permitted reasons, including before the dismissal of Peter Mandelson or the passing of the Humble Address—my messages included. I do recall having some limited exchanges with Peter Mandelson over WhatsApp, including those I have already discussed in the media, but these conversations did not involve transacting Government business and were in line with official guidance on the use of non-corporate communications channels at the time.

I share the view put by the Intelligence and Security Committee to the House that there are lessons for the civil service to learn in respect of better note-keeping, archiving and the use of appropriate levels of secure IT systems in the future. The Government have already committed to a review of the use of non-corporate communications channels, the terms of reference for which we will shortly publish, taking into account the concerns that have been raised in this House and the two tranches of documents that we have published in response to the Humble Address. I will of course keep the House updated as we progress that work.

I now turn to the material relating to Peter Mandelson’s national security vetting process. I can confirm that the vetting process summary and recommendation that was put by UK Security Vetting officials to the Foreign Office has been shared with the Intelligence and Security Committee. It was shared for the purpose of agreeing redactions, as part of the agreed process, so that it can be published when we are in a position to do so. What have not been shared are the highly sensitive personal data inputs collected during the interview process. These could, for example, relate to how much money an individual might have in a particular account or who a person may have had a personal relationship with in the past. If those participating in the vetting process cannot trust that the information they feed into that process is confidential, that will harm the integrity of the whole system. Anything less than full candour would be hugely damaging and profoundly negative for our national security; this would be felt by this and future Governments and, ultimately, by the British people. Sharing this data for any person undergoing developed vetting would therefore undermine the very basis of our national security vetting system.

This is the 10th update to the House on this matter that I have provided. With the exception of the small number of documents that are withheld at the request of the police, which we intend to publish when the police are content for us to do so, the Government now consider that they have duly discharged the duties set out in the Humble Address. I will, however, return to the House for the general debate on Wednesday to provide a further opportunity for colleagues to ask questions. On that basis, I commend this statement to the House.

I call the Shadow Minister.

I thank the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister for advance sight of his statement. If the story in The Times is to be believed, he may be positioning himself to be the chief successor to the Prime Minister.

I also thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving me advance sight of the material that was published today, which I was fortunate enough to see this morning. However, it is important to put on record that only a very few Members of this House were able to see it this morning. It was available at 9.30 am, yet it was published only at 2 pm, so here we are today with hon. Members not having had a chance to read it and yet being expected to ask the right hon. Gentleman questions. I know the response will be that we are going to have a general debate on Wednesday, but as Government Members will know, if the Minister chooses not to take interventions in a general debate, there is no scrutiny at all. At worst, this is obfuscation; it is an attempt to deny scrutiny in a way that is unnecessary. The documents should have been published at 9.30 this morning in advance of this statement.

It was on the news. The case of Peter Mandelson’s appointment remains of the utmost national importance simply because it touches on national security and on the Prime Minister’s honesty, integrity and competence. I want to make two basic points about the material before us today: the first is about disclosure, and the second about the process by which Peter Mandelson was appointed.

On disclosure, although we have a huge number of documents, it is clear that very many are missing. Some have been withheld, some have been lost, and it is clear that some have probably been destroyed. Because of the approach the Government are taking, however, it is impossible for hon. Members to know which documents fall into which category. We are told that the Metropolitan police has requested that certain documents be retained, but the Government have refused to tell us which documents are being retained.

I respect the fact that the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister has told us about three broad categories now—this is progress. We did ask for those categories some time ago and were told that we could not have them, but it turns out that we can have them. We know there is no good legal basis for the Government not to disclose to this House which documents are being withheld. The Government should tell us. Indeed, it would be possible for them to disclose those documents to the ISC or to certain Members of the House on Privy Council terms. Again, this is obfuscation. It is an unnecessary attempt to defer or deny scrutiny, and the Humble Address did not allow for the Government to redefine the request in this way. If the Government wish to retain documents because the Met police has asked them to do so, they should come back to the House and change the terms of the Humble Address. They have not done that and, consequently, they risk being in contempt.

Some Ministers have duly handed over their WhatsApp messages; it is clear that some have not. Are we to believe that there was no WhatsApp exchange at all between the Prime Minister and Peter Mandelson? We know that there was, because it has been reported in the press, and yet those messages reported in the press do not appear in the release today. It is clear that some messages have gone missing.

It is also the case that, in all these documents, the Prime Minister’s presence is almost non-existent. Despite the fact that he was appointing a man to be head of our most senior mission, we have almost nothing in his name. It is as though somehow he appointed Peter Mandelson as ambassador without leaving any documentary trace of that decision at all. It really beggars belief.

Take, for example, the former Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology, well known to be a friend and ally of Mandelson. He appears to have submitted a nil return on his WhatsApp messages. I hope the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister will tell us why. Why was it that there were never any messages? That seems unlikely. Was it that those messages have been deleted? The House has a right to know. The House has a right to know in each case whether information has gone missing or it has not been handed over.

We know that Peter Mandelson has refused to hand over his phone—it is in the document. We know that he was asked to give over his phone on 31 March, some time after the Humble Address. He has declined to do so, and it is simply not acceptable that the Government should allow this to pass without some sort of pushback. The Government has within their power the opportunity to take legal action to recover the exit payment they gave to Peter Mandelson if he is not playing ball with the Humble Address.

There is then the matter of redactions. There are acres and acres of white space, a constellation of asterisks—perhaps all too appropriate for a Labour document. It is clear from the reports in the press that the ISC has had serious concerns about the redaction process. I listened to what the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister said, and I will listen with interest to what members of the Committee say in a moment. There are a huge number of redactions under the heading “Third Party”. On what grounds have those redactions been made? For example, on page 251 of part III, Mandelson refers to someone who is “currently staying” with him in Government property. This name is redacted. Why has it been redacted? Why cannot the House be told who was staying in Government property with the ambassador?

On the national security vetting material, it seems once again that the Government are happier to provide The Guardian with more information than they are prepared to provide to Parliament. Preparation of the security vetting document for publication appeared in recess, leaked by someone in Government who was familiar with it, and then we have seen that The Guardian has multiple sources saying that concerns were raised by the vetting agency about Peter Mandelson’s foreign contacts with the Chinese Minister, with Oleg Deripaska, with Tamir Hayman and so on. There were multiple sources, and yet we are being asked to believe that this information was only seen by a tiny handful of people within Government. Someone somewhere is not being frank with us.

If we had time, and we will have time on Wednesday, we could talk about the concerning information about Chagos. We could talk about the fact that Peter Mandelson, after he had been appointed, asked whether he could do paid work in Shanghai on a private basis. We could talk about the fact that Peter Mandelson wrote to the then Foreign Secretary saying,

“if you were minded to appoint me I would make sure you never regret it.”

The truth is that we must return once again to the process by which Peter Mandelson was appointed. Everything in the documents released today shows that the Prime Minister did not follow the instructions he was given by the then Cabinet Secretary on 11 August 2024. He was told to get security vetting done before the appointment was confirmed, which he did not do. He was asked to do that because the Prime Minister had been provided with a due diligence document by the Cabinet Office that said that Peter Mandelson had an ongoing friendship with Epstein after he had been sent to prison, that he had been a director of a Russian defence company that had supplied arms to Putin during his invasion of Crimea, and that he had maintained unhealthy business relations in China.

Despite this, the Prime Minister did not get the security vetting done before he made the appointment: he went ahead and made it anyway. The rest of the system was then scrabbling around afterwards to try to make up for the error, but it was the Prime Minister’s error. It was clear that due diligence was not followed. It is a failure that is visible from space, it is a failure that will define this Prime Minister’s premiership and it is a failure that will be written as his political epitaph.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his questions. There were three broad questions: first, on access to the documents; secondly, on what documents are available or not; and thirdly, on the redactions process.

On access to the documents, as I said in my response to the urgent question before the recess, I have been mindful of the fact that given the significant number of documents published today, we wanted to create as much time as possible for the House to scrutinise them and to be able to ask the Government questions. I agree that had I published these documents 45 minutes before standing up to give a statement for 45 minutes, that would have been insufficient in the circumstances. I hope that the hon. Gentleman welcomes the lengths that I and the Government have gone to, not only to provide the documents in advance to him, the Leader of the Opposition, the Chairs of the relevant Select Committees and other stakeholders, but to publish them much earlier than is normal, and to secure a general debate on Wednesday.

In respect of the documents that are available, as I said in my statement, this tranche plus the first tranche of documents represent the entirety of the documents that the Government have available for disclosure, except for those that have been made available to the Metropolitan police. The hon. Gentleman invited me to list the documents that have been given to the Metropolitan police. As I have said from the Dispatch Box before, I am acting on the advice of the Metropolitan police in not being able to do that, but I am pleased that he welcomes the commitment that we have secured from them to give a little more shape by setting out the categories of the documents that are being held. I remind him and the House that we have also shared the documents directly with the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, so that there is an additional check and balance within Parliament, without being able to share the documents more widely until the Met police tell us that we can do so.

The hon. Gentleman asked me about notification of the Prime Minister’s decision to appoint Peter Mandelson as ambassador. I refer him to the first tranche and the document from the Prime Minister’s principal private secretary in No. 10 communicating that decision to both the Foreign Office and the palace.

Finally, the hon. Gentleman asked me about the redactions process. As I set out in detail in my statement, that process was predominately with the Intelligence and Security Committee, where the information relates to national security or international relations. Secondly, non-national security redactions were undertaken in line with established process and precedent, with the additional check provided this morning, again by the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, in relation to third parties. I understand that the Chair has confirmed that he is happy with the process that the Government have followed.

I call the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

I thank the Minister for giving me access to the papers at 9.30 this morning. However, is it right that among the 1,500 pages of documents released, there is no written evidence of any mitigations being put in place either to minimise Peter Mandelson’s conflicts of interest or, more importantly, to reduce the risk to our national security that vetting had flagged, due to Peter Mandelson’s close connections with Russian oligarchs, senior Chinese officials, retired Israeli spymasters and a debt of £1 million to buy shares in a secretive Israeli start-up? Will the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister please tell us whether we will see such documents later because the police have got them, or whether they just do not exist?

Without being able inadvertently to name specific documents, the best I can say to my right hon. Friend on the potential conflicts of interest, as I made clear in my statement, is that that nature of document has been made relevant from the perspective of the Metropolitan police criminal investigation.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

I thank the Minister for advance sight of his statement, and I thank members of the ISC and Simon Hoare for their work on this matter. I acknowledge again the women and girls who found the courage to come forward about the abuse that they endured at the hands of rich and powerful men. As we continue to discuss this matter, we must remember that those women are owed justice.

When Peter Mandelson was appointed, UK Security Vetting advice was overridden. The then permanent Secretary at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office suggested that he was subject to constant pressure, and there is a line in today’s files suggesting that senior people expressed interest that the vetting process go smoothly. Given the Minister’s repeated assurances that there was no pressure from Government relating to vetting, what does he think that line refers to?

We now know that Cabinet Ministers were privately praising and flattering Mandelson from before his appointment all the way until after his dismissal. Senior Ministers showed a staggering lack of judgment. Will the Chief Secretary explain why so much business relating to one of the most controversial public appointments in recent years appears to have been conducted over WhatsApp? It was private, informal and outside the official record. Government by WhatsApp, which the Lib Dems have continually called for an end to, must end, because informal messaging outside official channels creates accountability gaps that should trouble us all. Does the Chief Secretary agree that Government by WhatsApp must come to an end?

Documents released today display concerning evidence that Peter Mandelson lobbied Ministers on behalf of his clients. That would appear to be a serious breach of the code of conduct for the other place, yet an initial reading of the files seems to suggest that many Ministers were pliant and responded warmly to him. Will the Minister confirm whether any Ministers reported their concerns about this seemingly egregious lobbying?

The Government have outlined their plans for the removal of peerages Bill. At first glance, it is a narrow and woefully unambitious Bill that completely fails to rise to the moment. Will the Minister outline what it will take for the Government to make meaningful reforms to the second Chamber?

Senior Cabinet Ministers asked Mandelson for advice on a range of issues, despite many of those issues falling outside the scope of his role. Issues of how we run this country stretch far beyond this scandal. The ministerial code, which should strongly inform the conduct of those who hold the highest offices in the land, continues to exist as guidance rather than the law. Ministers who breach it face no legal consequences. The Prime Minister can choose whether to act on the findings of independent advisers, which means that accountability is optional, and it is far from clear what consequences follow when rules are broken. Will the Government use this moment to bring forward legislation to enshrine the ministerial code in law?

The hon. Lady invites me in her first question to comment on the intent of conversations between people other than myself. I am sure the House will understand that all I can do at the Dispatch Box is refer to the documents disclosed in the bundle, given that I was not privy to those conversations.

The hon. Lady asks me a number of questions about the use of non-corporate communication channels. The guidance is very clear that non-corporate communication channels can be used, but, where government is being transacted, the decision needs to be recorded on official Government channels. None the less, WhatsApp has been used extensively, which has raised a number of questions for the Government to consider. We will do that as part of our review of the use of non-corporate communication channels, the terms of reference for which I will announce very shortly.

The hon. Lady asks me about the peerages Bill, which was confirmed in the King’s Speech recently and which we will bring forward in due course. We share the ambition to use it as a piece of legislation to modernise the House of Lords in respect of peers who have brought the House into disrepute.

The hon. Lady asks me again about putting the ministerial code on a statutory footing. We have had exchanges a number of times across the Dispatch Box, and I point to the fact that the changes this Government have already made have proven to be effective, given a number of Ministers who have had to resign.

I call the Chair of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy.

Any cases that are clearly a real risk to national security should alarm everyone around this House. I think back to some of the questions that I put to then Prime Minister Johnson, as you will recall, Mr Speaker, about his relationship with Alexander Lebedev, for example. We have heard about the case of Oleg Deripaska with George Osborne and Peter Mandelson, as well as other characters, which is deeply concerning.

Let me land on a point about the non-corporate communication channels and IT systems. I am delighted to hear that the Government are reviewing those, but this is a matter of urgency, because it has become the norm for civil servants and those in Government, including in previous Governments, to use the likes of WhatsApp as the normal operating system. When will that review be published?

The first part of my hon. Friend’s question goes to the point I made in my statement about the importance of allowing the developed vetting interviews to be fully confidential. We need to ensure that when people join the Government and undertake a DV interview, they are fully transparent with the Government about any relationships they have with individuals. Turning to the review of non-corporate communications channels, I hope to be able to announce its terms of reference very shortly.

I call the Father of the House.

As far as the House of Commons generally is concerned, this statement is fairly meaningless, because it is impossible to ask questions about hundreds of pages, having had a few minutes to read them. So many general debates are damp squibs, so will the Minister undertake to answer every single question that has been put to him by the time he opens the debate on Wednesday?

indicated assent.

I see that he is nodding; that is very helpful. In my experience, these scandals are always made much worse by any covering up, so I am sure that the Minister will want to be completely open. I listened to the Opposition spokesman, my hon. Friend Alex Burghart, and it is strange that the Prime Minister seems to have so little involvement in this whole affair. I am reminded of the wartime film, “The Man Who Never Was”. Does that sum up this premiership—the man who never was?

I look forward to engaging with the right hon. Gentleman in the general debate on Wednesday, in which, of course, I commit to the House that I will do my best to answer questions that are put to me. On the Prime Minister’s communications, I point out to the House that Prime Ministers do not sit at computers, sending emails from Outlook. They have officials who action their decisions on their behalf, and that is what is represented in the disclosure.

It seems that Mr Mandelson’s business interests permeated every aspect of government. This afternoon, we are to debate the Health Bill and the federated data platform. Palantir, a client of Peter Mandelson’s, will clearly have a specific interest hardwired into the Bill, and we are expected to vote on it without seeing the full documentation, or having time to digest it. What exactly was the relationship between Mr Mandelson and Mr Thiel, and was that disclosed in the interview process?

I am afraid that I am not at the Dispatch Box to speak on behalf of Mr Mandelson, and I was not in the developed vetting interview process; nor have I seen that information, so I cannot answer the specific questions that my hon. Friend has asked me. What I can do, though, is point her to the relevant comments in my statement: the Government have gone to lengths to ensure that references to Palantir have not been redacted in the documents, other than in line with normal commercial processes, given the level of interest in that company in the House.

I call the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee.

First, through the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister, may I thank all of the officials at the Cabinet Office who have dealt with this matter in a very thorough, professional and—as far as I am concerned—courteous way? For that, I am grateful.

Casting forward, it is probably perfectly correct that a Prime Minister should be able to make a political appointment to an ambassadorial position, but there seem to be two key lessons that need to be learned here, and I wonder whether the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister could say a word or two on both. The first is that as a matter of course, vetting should be conducted prior to making public an announcement of appointment. The second is that there seems to be confusion—the earlier pages of part I, published today, indicate this—about what being a member of the Privy Council, a Member of the House of Lords, or a former member of the Cabinet means for what type of vetting is required. Can the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister assure the House that those key lessons have been learned, and that very clear direction has been given to those who are charged with this important and sensitive job, so that they know precisely how and when to do it, and so that there is a level playing field for applicants?

Again, I thank the hon. Gentleman, as Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, for providing oversight of the Government’s processes on behalf of Parliament. On his first question, about security clearance being concluded before an announcement is made, he is right. That is something that the Government have learned from this process, and that policy has already been changed.

The second issue he asked me about is represented in this bundle by the uncertainty about how the developed vetting policy applies to members of the Privy Council and/or Members of the House of Lords, given that Ministers are not put through the DV process, because it would be undemocratic interference with the electorate if a democratic process could be overturned by unelected civil servants. The documents show that the Government came to the right conclusion—that Peter Mandelson should go through DV clearance, even though he was a Member of the House of Lords and a Privy Counsellor—but they also show that there was some uncertainty about that. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that we should strengthen the guidance to make that clear in the future.

The challenge for all our constituents is that every time this subject comes up, they cannot shake the sense that Peter Mandelson’s business interests hang like a grubby layer over decision making in this Government. I know that the Minister will want to challenge that, and challenge the concern that Mandelson’s behaviour was a symptom, rather than the cause, of the problem that we face. When we were last in the Chamber discussing this matter on 27 April, I asked the Minister explicitly about the Adrian Fulford review, and he assured me that the investigation of the vetting process would be completed within three to four weeks. We are now past his deadline. He will understand the concern that our constituents might have that there may be more to come. Can he reassure me that that review will be published? What will be in it?

My hon. Friend is right to pull me up. That review has not concluded in the time in which I had initially hoped it would. Adrian Fulford is conducting the review at the moment, and knows that we want to be able to report on it shortly. I cannot tell the House what is in it yet, because I have not seen it, but as soon as I have received it, I will return to the House.

The documents show that in July 2025, Peter Mandelson contacted No. 10 to suggest that the Prime Minister should make time to meet Peter Thiel while he was in London. Peter Mandelson described Mr Thiel as a “celebrated techie”, and this followed the meeting in February 2025 with Palantir in Washington. First, can the Minister confirm whether that meeting with the Prime Minister happened? Secondly, is it the view of the Government, as expressed—unchallenged—by their former ambassador to the US, that a man who described Nazi Carl Schmitt as a major influence on his thinking, and who also said that freedom and democracy are incompatible, is indeed just a “celebrated techie”? Finally, can the Minister confirm that the Government will review all links and contracts between Palantir and the Government, the NHS and the police, following the revelations around Mandelson, Global Counsel and Palantir?

On the question about whether there was a follow-up meeting further to that request, I do not know the answer, so I will not make an assumption one way or another. If the hon. Gentleman tables a parliamentary question, I am sure that we will be able to check and confirm for him. He asked me about Peter Thiel. I will not take the opportunity to give personal views about Mr Thiel, but the hon. Gentleman’s are on the record. Thirdly, he asks about a review of Palantir contracts. I think the Health Secretary has confirmed that there is a review under way on its contract with the Department of Health and Social Care.

I thank the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister for his statement. He has talked before about the potential implications for vetting, due diligence and non-corporate communications. Can I ask about one further area in which Ministers are keen to improve: our lobbying transparency regime? When might the House expect some progress, or to hear thoughts about how we could make that more effective, given the learnings from this episode?

I thank my hon. Friend for his excellent work in this area. The Government have learned a great deal from his expertise. The House knows that this area sits alongside other areas—non-corporate communications channels, peerage removal in the House of Lords, lobbying, transparency and the work of the Ethics and Integrity Commission—as a portfolio of work that the Government are in the process of reviewing. Now that we have completed the publication of the second tranche of these documents, we will want to accelerate our work on those subsequent areas of review. I look forward to coming back to the House with an update in due course.

The Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister is well known for being courteous and passionate at the Dispatch Box, and I am a fan. [Hon. Members: “Hear, Hear.”] This is where I get to the bad part: he is not necessarily known for answering everybody’s questions when they ask them. On the question asked by the Father of the House, my right hon. Friend Sir Edward Leigh, will the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister commit to opening the debate on Wednesday and, with the leave of the House, closing it, so that every Member of this House can ask him questions?

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and I would not want to displease a fan with an inadequate performance from the Dispatch Box. We have considered whether I should open and close the debate on Wednesday, which would be unusual, but we have decided instead that my colleague the Paymaster General and Minister for the Cabinet Office, my right hon. Friend Nick Thomas-Symonds, will open the debate. I will be here for the entirety of the debate, and I will certainly do my best to answer all the questions in closing it.

Given that Morgan McSweeney’s name has been copied into so many messages, these disclosures show the need for us to return to the role of Labour Together. Can the Minister tell us whether any third-party redactions relate to any figures associated with Labour Together and, now that its former director has left his seat in this place, will he also tell us when we can expect a full and independent investigation of its activities?

I refer my hon. Friend to my earlier answer at the Dispatch Box in relation to calls for an investigation of Labour Together, which is a privately owned organisation outside Government and public service. As for to her invitation to name individuals who have been protected in the disclosure by third-party redactions that do not have a direct relationship with what we are discussing today, I am not at liberty to do that, but as I said in my statement, we have put those redactions before the Chair of the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee for additional checks and balances.

Given that the key person in this scandal, Lord Mandelson, refused to hand over his personal WhatsApp messages, how can the Government guarantee that Parliament and the public have seen the full truth? Was the Prime Minister misled, or are the Prime Minister and the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister accepting partial disclosure?

Let me gently remind members of the Scottish National party that Nicola Sturgeon was very effective at deleting messages during the covid inquiry. It is important that Ministers do not do that, and I am sure that the SNP has learned those lessons as much as everyone else. I made it very clear in my statement that the documents that we have available in front of us—[Interruption.]

Order. May I just say that I am not responsible for the answer? It is no use appealing to me. The Minister can answer by means of his own ability; he does not need my help.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, but any encouragement is welcome. As I said to the hon. Gentleman, the documents relating to his questions are clearly set out in the bundle, and they speak for themselves.

It is very clear that Peter Mandelson should never have been appointed as our ambassador, and I know that we will all have Epstein’s victims in mind today.

It is right that the Prime Minister has called for the removal of peerages from disgraced peers. In view of the comments from Lisa Smart, can the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister confirm that the removal of peerages Bill, which appeared in the King’s Speech, will actually have teeth, and will enable us to radically reform the upper Chamber?

We are concluding internal drafting of the peerages Bill, and will look to secure time to introduce it in this Session. I can assure my hon. Friend and the House that we want to introduce legislation that is effective and meaningful; that is certainly our intention.

I think the country has a right to know how the Prime Minister reacted at the end of Mandelson’s vetting process. Have the Prime Minister’s comments on the outcome of the vetting been released, are they being withheld, or are we expected to believe that he made no comment about it at all?

Let me make two points. As I made clear in my statement, vetting documents have been withheld by the Metropolitan police, although some of the documents have gone through the Intelligence and Security Committee, but I refer the right hon. Gentleman to what the Prime Minister said previously. As has been clear, the Foreign Office did not flag this information with the Prime Minister; he was not aware of it until it had been leaked to The Guardian.

I thank the Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister for his statement, and I associate myself with his comments about Epstein’s victims, who must be at the forefront of our minds. However, a significant amount of material in this tranche was reviewed by the Intelligence and Security Committee. Is the Chief Secretary able to tell the House what steps officials took to ensure that any documents relating to national security and our international relations have been shared with the ISC?

As I confirmed in my statement, more than 300 individual documents were put before the ISC for its consideration of proposals from the Government for redaction. There were a small number of redaction hearings towards the end of that process, when agreement was sought between the Government and the Committee, and all redactions currently published in the documents have been made with the full agreement of the Committee.

Like many of us here in this Chamber, I have not yet had the time to read the 1,000-plus pages of material released today, but the release shines the light of disinfectant on the political culture of how we treat the victims and survivors of heinous abusers of women and girls, and on the scandal of how Mandelson, despite being matey with the convicted child sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, was allowed back into the highest possible office. Does the Minister agree that it is essential that this sorry episode in British political history leads to a fundamental change in political culture, so that the voices of women and girls who survive abuse at the hands of people like Jeffrey Epstein are always listened to and put front and centre?

I certainly agree with the sentiment of the hon. Lady’s question. In relation to the time made available to read the documents, I refer her to the general debate on Wednesday, which she is perfectly able to attend.

Peter Mandelson should never have been appointed, and I look forward to the day that we can remove him as a peer. Even now, he makes a mockery of this process by not releasing his messages. Is there anything that the Government can do to compel Peter Mandelson to provide the information that this House seeks?

I am afraid the Government have powers to compel disclosure from Government employees, Ministers and special advisers, but do not have powers to compel disclosure from third parties outside our employment. However, the Metropolitan police will be conducting a criminal investigation, and I am sure there will be disclosure through the court process, should a case be put forward by the Crown Prosecution Service in due course.

Further to the question from my right hon. Friend Sir Julian Lewis, we have seen in the first tranche the box note that was sent from the Prime Minister’s private office to the Prime Minister setting out the issues and asking whether Peter Mandelson should be appointed, but that piece of paper bears no comment. When I asked the permanent Secretary at the Cabinet Office about this, she said that she would have expected there to be a record of the Prime Minister having written a comment or held a meeting to discuss it. There is apparently no record of either. Is the Minister saying that it does not exist, and if it does not, why not?

The communication of the Prime Minister’s decision does exist in the first tranche, where his principal private secretary drafted a letter communicating the Prime Minister’s decision to the relevant stakeholders.

All of us have a significant amount of reading to do to fully understand how the good friend of a convicted sex offender was rewarded with a top job, but it remains obvious that Epstein’s victims simply were not on the radar of the boys’ club in control at No. 10. The Minister can come to his place again and again and again, but how does he justify the culture that was in power at the time?

I gently point out that No. 10 is not occupied solely by men; there are very senior women who work in the Labour party and the Labour Government. In relation to the sentiment of the right hon. Lady’s question, which I agree with, it is important that we have a diversity of views and a diversity of inputs into the decision-making process, regardless of whether decision makers are in Government, business or elsewhere.

Can the Minister confirm that the Prime Minister has not deleted any of the messages that he received electronically on any personal or Government devices in relation to Peter Mandelson?

All of the Prime Minister’s messages have been disclosed in the bundle, in the same way as those of every other Minister.

May I take the Minister back to the answer given to Rachael Maskell earlier? Palantir is a very big and very dangerous outfit. The Government are developing a close relationship with Palantir—platforming and so on. Could the Minister assure the House that everything to do with Palantir will now be paused until we can get to the heart of the matter of how it first became embroiled in Government contracts, how it gained them and what its influence over this Government is, particularly via Peter Mandelson?

I slightly challenge the assumption that the Government are developing a “close relationship” with Palantir. As far as I am aware, that is not true. I think Palantir has been awarded two or so contracts for Government services, and it continues to bid for services. In line with our procurement policy, it is for Departments to decide whom they give contracts to, but the right hon. Gentleman is right: there are a whole range of issues that, in line with procurement policy, Ministers and officials will need to consider, including the protection of people’s personal data, the conduct of companies, and their ability to deliver public services in line with our values.

I thank the Minister for his statement. The media are going to have a frenzy over the tittle-tattle of all this stuff during the next three days, but to my mind the whole Mandelson affair represents a very serious breach of national security. Can the Minister reassure me and the House that the Foreign Office and the security services are turning over with a fine-toothed comb every minute of Lord Mandelson’s time as ambassador to make sure his actions in that office were in the national interest?

I can confirm, as I think I have from the Dispatch Box before, that officials are conducting that review of documentation. We are also making sure, through the review conducted by Sir Adrian Fulford, that we avoid these situations happening in the future. In particular, Departments will have the right not to take the recommendation of UK Security Vetting when appointing people to developed vetting status.

I was staggered to find in the 1,500 pages published today that the victims and survivors of Jeffrey Epstein’s crimes are not referred to in any of the documents dated before Peter Mandelson’s appointment. The only reference to Epstein’s victims is an email sent after Mandelson was sacked. Victims and survivors should never be an afterthought, and they clearly were in this case. How will the Government ensure that the trauma of Epstein’s victims and survivors is never betrayed again?

I would first say to the hon. Member that the disclosure of information from Bloomberg and subsequently from the United States Department of Justice showed a depth and extent of relationship between Peter Mandelson and Jeffrey Epstein that nobody was aware of—nobody was aware of that until that information became public—but that does not excuse the point he makes in his question. He is right that, as I have said at the start of every statement from the Dispatch Box on this issue, while we debate all these procedural issues about WhatsApp, security vetting or who was given a job on what basis, at the heart of this are the most atrocious crimes—unimaginable to all of us—by Jeffrey Epstein in relation to many young women and girls. We know that this is not just confined to Jeffrey Epstein; sadly, violence against women and girls is a more widespread issue. The Government are working hard in trying to tackle that issue, in line with our commitment to halve it over the course of this Parliament.

The central figure in this entire saga is someone who enjoyed a cosy relationship with Ministers at the heart of this Government, yet he has refused to hand over his mobile phone and Ministers, many of whom he had as close friends, seem simply to have accepted that refusal. Does the Minister really expect this House to believe that full transparency has been achieved when Mandelson continues to be able to pick and choose what evidence he allows us to see?

I share the right hon. Lady’s sentiment, but the Government do not have the legal power to require the disclosure of Peter Mandelson’s device. As I have said in earlier statements, other powers are available—for example, to the Metropolitan police and others, should the CPS proceed to put a criminal investigation before the courts—so that may become clearer in the future. However, the Government have done everything we can to ensure we have provided full disclosure in compliance with the Humble Address.

On page 243 of volume II part III, the Minister’s predecessor, talking about Labour MPs, states:

“Every meeting I have is ‘who can we tax in order to pay benefits to others’.”

Is that the same experience the Minister is having in every meeting he has?

No.

The Chief Secretary to the Prime Minister is obviously well liked by me and this House, and we appreciate his honesty in his answers, although they may not have all the information we are seeking. I very gently remind him that the general public view these continued delays as obstructive. The Government’s goal must be to show that no one is beyond scrutiny and accountability, and any further delays or redactions will not help to reach that goal. Will he undertake to ensure that these delays end, the material is released and the general public are assured that we are all accountable for our mistakes and hat these lessons have to be and must be learned?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his question. He knows, because I have said it repeatedly at the Dispatch Box, that I take very seriously the role of Parliament holding the Government to account, in particular, as a former Select Committee Chair, the role of Select Committees as well as the statements and questions we make and answer on the Floor of the House. That is why I have gone to lengths to ensure that the Intelligence and Security Committee, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, and the Foreign Affairs Committee—the lead Committees on this—have been given as full and as transparent access to the process and the documents as I have been able to make available, and why I have secured additional time for Members to be able to ask further questions on Wednesday.

On pages 115-116 in volume II, part I of the documents released today, there is an email from Olly Robbins dated 16 September 2025 in which he writes to another senior civil servant in Downing Street saying that he has still not yet seen “potentially crucial documents” in relation to the appointment of Peter Mandelson. That date is important: it is the same day that Chris Wormald, the former Cabinet Secretary, wrote to the Prime Minister saying that all “appropriate processes” had been followed in appointing Peter Mandelson. Can those two things be true? Can appropriate processes have been followed if Mr Robbins himself had not seen these “potentially crucial documents”?

That is an important question, Mr Speaker, but a question I am unable to answer given I was not privy to those discussions at the time. Maybe if other Select Committees are able to ask questions in the future, they might put that to the relevant people.