Before we come to the urgent question, I once again remind Ministers of the requirement in the Government’s own ministerial code that major announcements be made to the House in the first instance, not the media. This applies to Secretaries of State. It is disappointing that the Secretary of State for Defence made a speech on television yesterday, yet no statement from the Government has been made in this House. I hate to say this, but the House went up at 3 o’clock yesterday. There was a huge gap that could have been filled.

This is the third time in a row from Defence that a statement has been made to the outside—to the media—rather than to the House. We are elected Members of Parliament. All Ministers serve this House, not Sky News or the BBC, so I hope that message is going back. The ministerial code is not fit for purpose if this continues to happen, so I hope that it will be used, and that Ministers will take it seriously. Please, as I stated yesterday: matters relating to the defence of the realm should always come to this House first.

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the use of lasers by the Russian spy ship Yantar.

Mr Speaker, with your permission I would like to make a statement on the Russian main directorate of deep-sea research—

Order. I say this gently to the Minister: unfortunately, it is not a statement—that is what I had wished it would be. He is answering an urgent question, and I think that is the big problem; somehow, different Departments have decided that statements do not matter. I know that is not the Minister’s position, but I hope that people are listening and that the message about how important it is that this House comes first will go back to the Defence Secretary.

Mr Speaker, I will pass the message on to the broader team.

I would like to make some comments on the Russian main directorate of deep-sea research programme, known as GUGI. As the Secretary of State for Defence described yesterday, the Russian research vessel Yantar is part of this programme, and is used for gathering intelligence and mapping undersea infrastructure, not just in the United Kingdom but across many other nations, both in Europe and across the globe. The UK understands that the Yantar is but one ship in a fleet of Russian vessels designed to threaten our critical national underwater infrastructure and pose a threat to our economics and our way of life.

Russia has been developing a military capability to use against critical underwater infrastructure for decades. GUGI is developing capabilities. It is deployed from specialist surface vessels and submarines that are intended to be used to survey underwater infrastructure during peacetime, but then damage or destroy infrastructure in deep water during a conflict. Russia seeks to conduct this type of operation covertly without being held responsible. Such capabilities can be deployed from surface vessels like the Yantar. That is why Defence directed a change in the Royal Navy’s posture, so that we can better track and respond to the threats from this vessel and many others.

The Yantar has been operating once again—for the second time this year—in and around the UK’s exclusive economic zone. During that time, she was continuously monitored by Royal Navy frigate HMS Somerset and the RAF’s P-8s.

We will ensure that the Yantar is not able to conduct its mission unchallenged or untracked. But that has not been without difficulties: a laser assessed to be originating from the port side of the Yantar was directed at British personnel operating one of our P-8s in a highly dangerous and reckless attempt to disrupt our monitoring. The P-8 continued to monitor the Yantar’s activity. Post incident, when its personnel arrived back safe in the UK, they were medically assessed. No injuries were sustained and no damage was sustained to the aircraft or her equipment.

Russia does not want us to know what it is doing or what the Yantar is up to; it does not want the world to know what it is doing. But we will not be deterred; we will not let the Yantar go unchallenged as it attempts to survey our infrastructure. We will work with our allies to ensure that Russia knows that any attempt to disrupt or damage underwater infrastructure will be met with the firmest of responses. I finish by saying a great thank you to the brave men and women of our Royal Navy and RAF who continue to keep us safe at home and abroad.

Thank you, Mr Speaker, for granting this urgent question. I echo what you said: it is unacceptable that we are getting the Minister’s update on a major national security incident 24 hours after the Secretary of State gave his press conference. Have Ministers learned nothing from the total shambles of the strategic defence review, when defence companies got a copy many hours before parliamentarians?

I turn to the incident, which appears to represent a serious escalation by Russian forces in close proximity to our homeland. Given the priority of protecting our service personnel—I welcome the news that the P-8 pilots were unharmed—will the Minister outline what mitigations are being taken against the evolving laser threat involved?

This incident surely underlines that Russia remains a serious threat. That being so, we could not help but notice that yesterday the Defence Secretary got the podium out for the media just as the Defence Committee was publishing a damning report about Labour’s total lack of progress on boosting our defence readiness. The report said that when it comes to readiness the Government are moving “at a glacial pace”.

On the subject of pace, the SDR promised a defence readiness Bill that would include measures to deal with the grey zone threat, but Ministers recently told me that it has not even been timetabled. In what year will the defence readiness Bill become law?

Capability questions will be key when it comes to undersea cables, but every one of Labour’s defence policy papers has been late. The Government promised to publish the defence investment plan “in the autumn”. With a week of that season remaining, will they keep that promise?

As the Minister knows better than anyone, when it comes to the hybrid threat, our special forces are more important than ever. Is he not concerned that General Sir Michael Rose, who led the relief of the Iranian embassy siege that made the SAS world-famous, has condemned the Government for “hounding SAS veterans”, warning that that will harm recruitment and morale?

The Yantar incident shows the seriousness of the threat that we face, but what are the Government actually doing in response? The answer: Labour is cutting £2.6 billion from defence spending this year, surrendering sovereignty of the Chagos islands and, following its shameful vote this week, putting the British Army back in the dock.

The hon. Member is correct that Russia does remain a threat. With the ongoing conflict in Ukraine causing over 1,000 casualties a day, it is the biggest threat that the UK has faced in a generation.

As we progress and we hear the Opposition’s criticism of the Government, trying collectively to convince us that we are not doing anything, it is worth noting from my perspective of 24 years of service that we watched the degradation of defence, with the armed forces facing their lowest morale, equipped with equipment that was not fit for purpose, going alongside ships that had not left docks in years, and with families in houses with leaky homes and damp. We had to put up with delay, decrepitude and downgrading of all our defence capabilities.

Now, for the first time in a generation, the military is looking at an increase in defence spending and, with the strategic defence review, integrated missile defence, “NATO first”, and by 2027 running a Steadfast Defender with a whole-of-society approach. We are putting £4 billion into uncrewed systems and £1.5 billion into munitions. The defence readiness Bill is another legislative process to push further changes through by the end of this Parliament.

On elements at the tip of the spear, I can assure the hon. Gentleman, looking into the details, that recruitment and retention is not one. Indeed, we inherited the smallest Army since Napoleonic times due to recruitment and retention issues under the previous Government. Before the Conservatives start lecturing us, a year and a half into our government, on how decrepit our defence is, and downplaying our soldiers, Air Force and those individuals in the Navy, they should take some responsibility for the mismanagement of the defence portfolio for the last 14 years.

The Yantar’s presence within our waters makes clear Russia’s threat to our democracy, and I am grateful for the service of the brave men and women of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force who protect us. Within the context of the Defence Committee’s recent report, can the Minister highlight how our Government’s leadership of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group and our treaties with Germany and France are essential in ensuring that we reset our relationships and ensure that democracy is safe within Europe?

I would like to thank my hon. Friend for his contribution.

Since coming into Government, we have signed the Trinity House deal with the Germans and renewed the Lancaster House deal with the French. We have done the world’s biggest-ever frigate deal with the Norwegians, bringing in tens of billions in investment. We have done a Typhoon deal with the Turkish, and we have secured a UK-EU security and defence partnership. We have led the coalition of the willing with the French. We have taken on the UDCG, which has generated billions of investment for Ukraine. We have done deals with the EU, US and India. I would argue that this is like an episode—a really bad one—of “Deal or No Deal”.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

May I begin by joining the Minister in thanking our service personnel for their bravery and dedication? The use of lasers in this instance was a brazen act of aggression by Russia that endangered the lives of RAF pilots. Have the Government identified the Russian officials and military personnel who gave the order to engage so that they can be held accountable and sanctioned? What assurances can the Minister give that Russia understands the consequences of repeating this aggression towards the UK?

This episode has shown once again the lengths to which Putin will go to undermine Britain’s defence. It follows the reports of Russian sabotage of Poland’s civilian railway this week. Can the Minister tell the House what conversations Ministers have had with fellow European Ministers to agree a collective response to Russia’s hybrid attacks, including to protect Europe’s critical undersea infrastructure? Recognising also that our Ukrainian allies are on the frontline of Putin’s aggression, will the Minister take forward my private Member’s Bill, which calls for the unilateral seizure of Russian assets in the UK so that they can be used to fund Ukraine’s defence?

The hon. Member brings up a really valid point: the Yantar and the GUGI programme is not just a UK issue; nor are the asymmetric threats that we collectively face across Europe. They are international issues. GUGI vessels operate all over the world. We will collectively work together to gather evidence and show Russia that we know exactly what it is up to, and indeed expose any nefarious activity. I would like Members to be in absolutely no doubt that we will hold people, states and organisations to account should any of our critical national infrastructure be threatened in any way.

Given both the Baltic sea incident in 2024, where underground cables were said to be sabotaged, and the latest provocation where the Yantar is said to be mapping undersea cables, will the Minister please outline how allied co-ordination, particularly with our Nordic and Baltic partners, could be strengthened?

My hon. Friend raises a really valid point. We have seen several cables in the Baltics severed or cut. I would argue that the Yantar, with its intelligence-gathering capability, maps these cables, and perhaps accidents take place at a later date. We are working really well, in particular with our Norwegian partners and the US, to ensure that we understand the exact capabilities that sit on some of these vessels, so if something were to happen, we can attribute and expose it , not just from a UK perspective but an allied one.

Responding to that directly, if the Government are trying to map the capabilities of the vessel, can they tell us whether they knew in advance that it had this laser capability, and if they did, whether steps are being taken to find methods of protecting our personnel against such laser attacks? Will the Minister and the Government be careful not to fall for the bully’s playbook of the killer in the Kremlin? It is no coincidence that this incident happened now, just at the time that the Americans are coming up with a “peace plan” that plays into the hands of Putin and betrays our Ukrainian friends.

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his contribution, which was very focused and meaningful, as always. I will not go into detail on the specific capabilities, but from our perspective there has been no impact on the aircraft or the crew, and we have expanded our rules of engagement to ensure that no vessel can operate over sea, over our critical national infrastructure, without being watched and monitored in the closest and most sophisticated way.

The first duty of any Government is to keep our citizens safe, which is why this Labour Government are delivering a historic uplift in defence spending, in stark contrast to the cuts of the Conservative Government. The Minister set out a potent example of the rising threats to our country. Will he say more about how our increased defence spending will keep us safe and support jobs in the defence industry, such as at the Westley Group in my Constituency, which makes all the castings for our UK submarine fleet?

My hon. Friend raises a really important point. Defence spending is not just about defending the nation; it is an engine for growth. The Typhoon deal alone has created over 20,000 jobs, and Members will have seen just recently that we are providing up to 100,000 drones to Ukraine. That is to do not just with the capability going forward, but with the industrial base back here in the UK. The huge increase in defence spending in 2027 will broaden our defence industrial base; combined with deals here in the UK and overseas, we will make it an engine for growth, increase jobs and prosperity, and, importantly, shore up the defence of the nation.

May I congratulate the Government on being more forward in their public responses to this kind of provocation than any other European member of NATO, let alone the United States, but also point out that this underlines what we know from what Putin and Lavrov have been saying? They think they are at war with NATO and with the United Kingdom already. The question is not how we retaliate directly, but how we retaliate in order to put pressure on Putin and Russia. The answer is by increasing our military assistance to Ukraine to tip the balance in its favour, change the calculus, and get the Russians to come to the peace table and agree a proper ceasefire, which even President Trump’s appeasing plan seems most unlikely to achieve.

The hon. Member is right: we must push as hard as we can to impose cost on Russia. To date we have spent £21.8 billion in Ukraine—£4.5 billion in military support—and I know we have support from both sides of the House to do everything we can to increase the pressure. I mentioned that we have upped our drone production to 100,000 this year, and we are increasing our training of Ukrainian troops to 61,000 in total. We will do whatever it takes to enable the Ukrainians to win the peace.

The Yantar was intercepted in the north Atlantic, which is the UK’s new frontline but my constituents’ backyard. I was reassured by the preparedness of the RAF and the Royal Navy and grateful for their defence of our airspace and seaspace, but what assurance can the Minister give my constituents about our preparedness and resilience to meet these kinds of hybrid attacks? These cables do not just run across the Atlantic; they run between our islands, too.

My hon. Friend highlights a valid point. The north-west of Scotland plays an invaluable part in our defence architecture, and sustains economic growth with a variety of undersea infrastructure. We have some of the best ships, personnel, aircraft and Air Force members. They will continue to monitor, track and deter any Russian aggression anywhere near and within our territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.

I associate myself with comments about the bravery and professionalism of the military personnel involved in the response to the Yantar’s presence, many of whom are based at Lossiemouth in my Constituency. Yesterday, the Defence Committee published a report recommending that the UK Government accelerate and deepen defence relationships with the EU in the face of Russian threats. However, unsurprisingly, the EU is now charging the UK to enter agreements to which we had EU member access prior to Brexit. That leaves these isles more isolated. In the face of the very real Russian threat, what is the risk to RAF pilots and crews at Lossiemouth? Will the Minister tell me the specifics of any plans to work closely with European allies to ensure safety and security of the North sea and the protection of Scotland’s coast from Russian vessels?

We are working closely with our European allies to get access to the Security Action for Europe programme and an EU-UK defence partnership. That is primarily for two reasons: first, so that we end up with a far more collaborative and interoperable defence capability, and secondly, to ensure that the economic benefits of both are seen south of our coast and here in the United Kingdom. Importantly, we have a trajectory to invest in P-8s long into the future. They play such an important role in our anti-submarine warfare fleet, and will continue to do so until the threat is gone.

I thank the Minister for his statement and join him in thanking the Royal Navy and RAF personnel, and the civilian staff, who have been involved. There is a possibility that vessels such as the Yantar could be used to launch drone attacks on the UK. Will the Minister reassure us that he is working to bolster the UK’s air defence system?

That is a valid point. For years we have not taken homeland security seriously. The House will note that, in the strategic defence review, we have invested in integrated missile defence, which is important both for very sophisticated systems and for the low-grade systems we have seen flying in our airspace, which are sometimes more difficult to track and defeat. I can absolutely give the assurance that we are investing in integrated missile defence as we move forward with the strategic defence review and the defence investment plan.

I welcome many of the Minister’s comments. I would add my enormous thanks to the intelligence personnel who assisted not only in zeroing in on the ship but in understanding its capabilities a long time before anybody else arrived on the scene.

As a fellow former military assistant in the MOD, may I raise one point with the Minister? We have both seen Governments of every colour making decisions and statements that sound good on the day before the reality of a lack of kit becomes clear. I saw that under Blair and Brown, and again, yes, under Governments of my own stripe. I am sure that the Minister, too, saw that under them all. I raise this because the reality is that the world has changed. We are much, much more vulnerable today than we have been, but we have fewer ships at sea, fewer men in uniform and fewer planes in the air than we have had at any time. Yet the aspiration for the 3% is still “by the end of the Parliament” or “over the next five years”, and always on the never-never. He must be very careful, as I am sure he is hugely aware, that he is there to change defence, not to apologise for failure.

The right hon. and gallant Member raises a valid point. When we came into government, we took the significant step of raising defence spending, but he knows as well as any that it is not just about buying or investing in the same capability; it is about rebuilding and reshaping our armed forces to fight not yesterday’s war but the war of the future. We are absorbing many of the lessons from Ukraine to ensure that we can transform our military to fight in the most effective manner. That is why I got into this game in the first place—to move that along faster, particularly when it comes to autonomous systems.

The right hon. and gallant Member will have seen in the strategic defence review a massive increase of £4 billion for autonomous systems, as well as an increase in the number of drone companies. Just today, the Defence Secretary opened another factory down in Plymouth. I am away after this statement to go and open another in Swindon. A huge industrial base to build drones is growing in the UK. It is a Seedcorn capability that can expand rapidly at times of conflict. I am happy to take any of these points offline to talk further about how we can work collaboratively to move forward.

This reckless act from Russia demonstrates how important it is that the world stands united against Putin’s aggression. What discussions has the Minister had with his international partners about maintaining and galvanising that support?

That is a really useful point. Individually, we are strong. Collectively, we are united. It is really important that we double down on our allies and partners to collaborate—whether that is with NATO, the joint expeditionary force or some of our European or international allies. This is all about our being stronger together, whether that is the UK Army, Navy, Air Force and intelligence partners working to expose the Yantar’s capability, or collectively, working with all our like-minded allies to make sure that we are mapping and tracking its capability. Should there be a disruption in critical national infrastructure, we can then expose it and attribute it as fast as possible.

Everyone in this House should be concerned by the increase in Russian sub-threshold activity, and this certainly is not the first time we have found ourselves in this House discussing the Yantar specifically. The use of lasers against an operational P-8 very much pushes the boundaries of what we could consider to be sub-threshold activity.

I want to ask the Minister a question that is very much within his bailiwick. I do not expect him to be able to comment on whether we have deployed any elements of the Fleet Contingency Troop to HMS Somerset, which is tracking the Yantar, but under what circumstances and geographically whereabouts within our waters would the Yantar need to be in order for us to apply some maritime interdiction via the Fleet Contingency Troop?

I thank the hon. and gallant Member for his point. As someone who used to be in that part of the organisation, I am sure there are lots of people who are champing at the bit to get involved. We must adhere to the international rules of the sea, but let me be really clear for anyone listening to this today that we know exactly what Russia is up to—without a Shadow of a doubt, we know what it is up to—and should there be a connection between understanding our cables or undersea infrastructure and disruption, individuals, units, organisations or countries will be held accountable.

The sight of this sinister ship snooping around our shores strikes alarm. How can we be confident of the security of our vital undersea communication cables and what, without compromising our security, is plan B if they are severed?

As my hon. Friend will know, we work with our allies to build contingency across all our critical national infrastructure. There is lots of work to do, and we are working in collaboration with other Governments to do it. The point he raises, which is one of the most important, is that Russia wants to operate behind a veil of darkness, in the shadows, but let us be really clear: we know exactly what it is doing; we know everything that it is up to. A laser pen is not going to deter us. We will continue, we will double down and, if required, we will expose and attribute.

In the light of this recent escalation, what specific and immediate steps is the Minister taking to ensure that UK armed forces are equipped both to protect critical underwater infrastructure and to respond rapidly and effectively to direct threats from Russia and others?

The strategic defence review points to the multi-role ship and our buying into mapping and tracking our infrastructure, protecting it and, importantly, if required, deterring capabilities such as the Yantar, and a suite of capabilities that the Russians can field, to ensure they cannot work with impunity in either the EEZ or international waters.

In January, the Defence Secretary came to this House to make a statement when the Yantar passed through British waters, but he did not see fit to do so when that ship directed lasers at our pilots, which I think reflects poorly on him. Has the Russian ambassador been summoned over this highly dangerous action, and if not, why not?

I thank the hon. Member for raising that point. It is something I will take up with my colleagues in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. If there is unruly or escalatory activity, we have to continue to ensure that, diplomatically, individuals are called in and held to account, and we will continue to do so.

We know, as the Minister has said, that Russia and China target undersea cables and interconnectors, which we rely on increasingly because of the Government’s energy policy. We know that the Russians put listening devices on our offshore infrastructure to monitor our submarines, and we know that China, which dominates the world market for cellular internet modules, inserts kill switches into the turbines that this Government want to buy from them. I have been asking the same question for a year now: why is there not a single Minister in charge of the security of our offshore energy infrastructure? What representations have Ministry of Defence Ministers made to the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, who is causing so many of these problems?

I would not say that there has been a lack of accountability, but the hon. Gentleman is right to mention that until now there has been a lack of centralisation around our critical national infrastructure. A recent report was issued and we now have clear lines of accountability. Defence is a part of that and we are building our capability, with the view eventually of fulfilling our role with that structure. We are working collaboratively across Government to ensure that our critical national infrastructure is protected, so that should there be an incident, there is accountability.

I thank the Minister for his strong words and his answers, which encourage both hon. Members and those who are listening. Let us be clear and succinct: Russian ships have twice entered British sovereign waters, and to add to that aggression, they have been tracking our RAF pilots with lasers. Our enemy has breached our waters disgracefully, disregarded neutrality and shown disrespect. The facts and the evidence are there. To quote Winston Churchill, who I loved when I was a boy and who was certainly my hero:

“We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be”.

Will the Minister confirm that this is a form of attack, and that the might of our armed forces is poised, their equipment is trained and they are ready to go?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his insightful question. Be in no doubt: we will defend every inch of this country and our territorial waters. If anything is taking place in our EEZ, in particular, we will expose, we will attribute and, be in absolutely no doubt, we will hold people, organisations or countries accountable should there be any impact on or disruption to our critical national infrastructure.

I will now announce the result of yesterday’s deferred Division on the draft Radio Equipment (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2025. The Ayes were 376 and the Noes were 16, so the Ayes have it.

[The Division list is published at the end of today’s debates.]