I will continue, because I need to cover other amendments that have been tabled.

On Amendment 11, assessing the signs and indications of abuse can be complex and subjective, particularly for the very large number of non-experts that this duty will apply to, many of whom are engaging with children infrequently or irregularly. We have therefore chosen to focus the duty on scenarios in which a reporter has been given an unambiguous reason to believe that they are in receipt of an allegation of child sexual abuse.

Amendment 22 seeks to add a reference to the legislative definition of “positions of trust” in schedule 7. However, a person occupies a position of trust only in relation to specific sexual offences committed against a specific child, and the term’s value as a definition for a reporter of abuse is therefore limited. The amendment also has the potential to create confusing duplication, given the significant overlap between regulated activity with children and positions of trust. The list of activities in schedule 7 has been drawn up to set out activities involving positions of trust that may not be adequately covered by the definition of regulated activity. The Government will of course keep this list under review, and amend it if necessary.

My hon. Friend Kirith Entwistle spoke to amendment 20, which relates to the new broader offence of encouraging or assisting self-harm in Clause 95. She made a very passionate speech on this issue, and I know that she, too, has met the Minister to discuss it in recent days. On sentencing, the courts must already consider the circumstances of each case, including aggravating and mitigating factors, and follow relevant guidelines set by the independent Sentencing Council. Where a defendant has previous convictions, this is already recognised as a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing.

On whether a charge of murder should be brought in the circumstances set out in the amendment, I have to say to my hon. Friend that the amendment is wholly inconsistent with the criminal offence of murder, which has different elements that must be met before a person can be convicted. That said, it is important to recognise that where the encouragement or assistance results in suicide, the separate offence of encouraging or assisting suicide applies; manslaughter may be charged if there is a direct link between the abuse and the suicide.

John McDonnell spoke to amendment 161, which aims to delete clause 114. The clause will allow the police to impose conditions on a protest near a place of worship if the police have a reasonable belief that the protest may deter individuals from accessing the place of worship for religious activities, even if that effect is not intended. That gives the police total clarity on how and when they can protect places of worship, while respecting the right to peaceful protest.

A number of hon. and right hon. Members spoke about spiking, including my hon. Friends the Members for Hitchin (Alistair Strathern) and for Darlington (Lola McEvoy), David Mundell, and my hon. Friend Emily Darlington, as well as Joe Robertson, who tabled amendment 19. Before I say anything else, I pay tribute to all those who have campaigned on this issue for many years, including families and campaign groups. Richard Graham, a former Member of this House, was a pioneer of the case for bringing forward a spiking amendment.

As discussed in Committee, the offence as drafted already captures a wide range of criminal behaviours, which cover both spiking and non-spiking incidents; for example, it covers the victim being pepper sprayed. As for the reference to a specific intent to “injure, aggrieve or annoy”, that wording is of long standing and has been widely interpreted by the courts. Every case will be judged on the facts. For instance, if someone administers a harmful substance as a prank, they would likely be found to have intended to “annoy” or “aggrieve”. The broadness of the new offence, and the increase in the maximum penalty as compared to the penalty for the existing offence under section 24 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, is, in the Government’s view, sufficient. Introducing recklessness as an alternative to intent risks over-complicating the law and is unnecessary for securing appropriate convictions.

The hon. Member for Isle of Wight East spent a lot of time looking at this issue, so I want to address it. The spiking clause in the Bill is modelled on the offence under the 1861 Act, which does not have a recklessness test. In the 2004 case of Gantz, an intention to “loosen up” the victim—he referred to that intention in the example he gave today—was covered; it may be helpful for him to reflect on that. We also understand that as recently as last month, a person was convicted of spiking another person “as a joke”. We therefore deem that the inclusion of “recklessness” is unnecessary to ensure the appropriate convictions that we are looking for with this new offence. However, we are very happy to continue to have conversations about this to ensure that we get the law absolutely right.

Many other speeches were made today that I would like to comment on, but I am running swiftly out of time. In my earlier comments, I referred to amendments 4 to 8 from Siân Berry. I fully understand why amendment 2 was tabled by Graham Leadbitter, but those who cycle have a duty to do so safely and in accordance with the highway code, and they are wholly responsible and liable for their actions.

In conclusion, I hope that in the light of the responses I have given to the amendments today, Members will not press them. I commend new clause 52 to the House.

Debate interrupted (Programme Order, this day).

The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair (Standing Order No. 83E), That the clause be read a Second time.

Question agreed to.

New clause 52 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

The Deputy Speaker then put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83E).