Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 5:35 pm on 9 September 2024.
I thank the hon. Member. If he allows me, I will go a little further into the introductory remarks, which I hope will specify why this afternoon’s measures will provide greater teeth. I hope that will answer his concerns, but if it does not, I will return to him.
The instrument, as well as increasing the effect on shipping, also broadens the designation criteria under the Russia regime. It expands our powers to target those who provide financial or material support to Russia’s war machine. That could include, for example, foreign financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions on behalf, or in support, of Russia’s military industrial base. That is in line with steps taken by partners and the G7’s commitment to curtailing Russia’s use of the international financial system to further its war in Ukraine.
Let me turn now to the measure about which Jim Shannon asked. The instrument adds new relevant activities to the existing power in the Russia sanctions regime under regulation 57F—“specification of ships”—to provide the criteria to sanction individuals’ ships. The amendment provides that a ship may be specified by the Secretary of State where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that it is, has been or is likely to be used for any activity whose object or effect is to destabilise Ukraine, to undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine, or to obtain a benefit from, or support, the Government of Russia. That includes where a ship is involved in carrying dual-use or military goods, oil or oil products that originate in Russia, or any other goods or technology that could contribute to destabilising Ukraine or to undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine.
Where a ship is specified under regulation 57F, it will be subject to measures in regulations 57A to 57E—the shipping sanctions. Where those sanctions apply, a specified ship is prohibited from entering a port in the UK, may be given a movement or a port entry direction, and can be detained or refused permission to register on the UK ship register—or, indeed, have its existing registration terminated. Additionally, UK persons and persons in the UK cannot provide funds and financial services, including maritime insurance, or brokering services, in relation to specified ships that are transporting certain oil and oil products, and cannot use specified ships to supply or deliver Russian oil and oil products, regardless of the price of the oil on board.
Once again, the UK has already specified ships using that enhanced power. The previous Government specified six vessels on
This statutory instrument also amends regulation 6 of the Russia sanctions regime. That regulation provides the criteria for the designation of individuals or entities for the purpose of an asset freeze and other relevant measures. Specifically, the instrument adds additional activities for which a person may be designated, including where individuals or entities provide financial services or make available funds, economic resources, goods or technology to persons involved in obtaining a benefit from, or supporting, the Government of Russia. In practice, that widens the set of actors and enablers that can be targeted for providing financial and material support to Russia and its war machine as Putin continues to prosecute his illegal war in Ukraine.
The instrument also consolidates powers under the Russia regulations to designate individuals or entities involved in the destabilisation of Ukraine. Specifically, the additional activities that the instrument adds to the designation criteria make possible the designation of persons who have owned or controlled entities involved in destabilising Ukraine, as well as individuals who work as directors or managers of such entities.
In the plainest language—because that was the language that the hon. Member for Strangford used—the instrument enables us to target the ship, as well as the individuals or entities involved with the ship. We found, through the previous regime, that the ship itself is the sharpest area of vulnerability, so the International Maritime Organisation number of the ship itself is where sanctions have greatest effect, and that is the effect that we are using today.