Yes, that is also true, but the general point is that the overall timetable is not in our control; it is in the other side’s control. As we have seen throughout this entire negotiation, the moment we gave away sequencing at the beginning, we gave an advantage to the other side. My right hon. Friend Mr Jones, the former Minister of State, is nodding: he remembers it.
There are essentially three emblematic conclusions to this. The first is the World Trade Organisation, which we have talked about already—I doubt whether it will be a deliberate conclusion, but it is a possible one—the second is Norway, which a number of Members on both sides of the House have suggested might be the best outcome, and the third is Canada plus, plus, plus. There are compromises between them; there are mixtures of them; but those three essentially capture the possible outcomes.
Let me start with the issue on which I disagree with pretty much everyone who has spoken so far: the World Trade Organisation deal, the so-called no deal. The Chancellor called it a strict no deal, because he knows full well all the preparations that have been made in the Government to create a basic no deal, or basic negotiated outcome. There is a whole stratum, a whole spectrum, of possible types of no deal. Some of them deal with the issues that my hon. Friend Nigel Huddleston raised earlier—aviation, data and so on. If this deal goes down, as I think it will in a few days, there will be a scramble in London and Brussels to start putting those one-on-one, unilateral negotiations together. So there is a range of possibilities.